Washington Profile: What are the fundamental reasons for the current political crisis in Ukraine? What, if anything, do recent developments reveal about Ukraine's democratic development?

Alexander J. Motyl, Professor of Political Science, Deputy Director of the Division of Global Affairs, and co-director of the Central and East European Studies Program at Rutgers-Newark: There are four fundamental reasons. First, the constitutional reform was poorly conceived and left many questions about the relations between president, parliament, and premier unclear or unanswered. A power struggle was inevitable. Second, the Party of Regions overplayed its hand in the struggle for power and led the opposition to conclude that it aspired to total control. Third, the Orange parties have been unusually inept for much of the period following the March 26, 2006 parliamentary elections, thereby enabling the Party of Regions to expand its power almost undeterred. And fourth, Yulia Tymoshenko's decision to side with the Regions in overriding President Yushchenko's veto of the Law on the Cabinet fundamentally tilted the balance against the president and effectively promoted the Regions' agenda.

The crisis is just the latest in a series of democratic movements (starting in 1999-2000 and continuing through the 2004 Orange Revolution) aimed at weakening and/or dismantling the authoritarian system built by President Kuchma. In that sense, Ukraine is experiencing in compressed form what Poland experienced in the 1970s and 1980s. Ukraine's ability to sustain such a strong anti-authoritarian movement testifies to the emergence within Ukrainian society of powerful forces that want democracy and will continue to want democracy, regardless of how the current crisis is resolved. Also important is that all of Ukraine's elites are using, and sometimes abusing, Ukraine's democratic institutions and laws in order to promote their political ends. Authoritarian elites in authoritarian systems do not act in this manner: they generally bypass or emasculate democratic institutions and laws. Although this use and abuse of democratic institutions and laws may strike us as absurd, it actually testifies to the emergence within Ukraine of a still weak, but no longer trivial, democratic political culture.

Paul D'Anieri, Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Dean for the Humanities in the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at the University of Kansas: The fundamental reason for the current political crisis in Ukraine is that political outcomes in Ukraine are still driven more by the distribution of de facto political power than by the process outlined in the institutional rules. Both sides in this showdown have sought to have the rules enforced only when doing so is consistent with their interests. Since last year's elections, or even before, the distribution of power has favored the Party of Regions and its supporters. It is consistently seeking to use the power it has to gain even more power. Yushchenko, having made a series of tactical and strategic mistakes, is left desperately pursuing a measure of dubious constitutionality, because he has no confidence in the legal system.

The crisis tells us that the underlying forces that drive Ukrainian politics have not significantly changed since the Orange Revolution. Power politics dominate institutional rules. The rule of law has not been strengthened. The Constitutional Court, which behaved in a promising way in December 2004, has not solidified its role as an institution that impartially rules on constitutional disputes. Civil Society has not become a powerful force constraining politicians. One significant result remains largely in place, the freeing of the media. However, the media are increasingly under pressure.

Taras Kuzio, President of Kuzio Associates, an independent consultancy and government communications company based in Washington DC and Kyiv: There are a number of different factors here. The constitutional reform, which was adopted in 2004 was hastily adopted at the time, even though possibly the intention was good, to move from a presidential to a parliamentary system, as most post-communist states which are parliamentary systems have done far better in democratization than those with presidential. But the reforms were hastily adopted during the political crisis of the Orange Revolution, and these were never really rectified in 2005. This was partly the President's fault because he did have one year of extensive executive powers under the constitution in 2005 and he could have either put the reforms to a referendum, possibly to abolish them, or he could have called for a constitutional commission to improve them. But he basically ignored the fact that they were pending in early 2006. And of course it was never really envisaged, or never really foresaw, that the main beneficiary from the constitutional reforms would be the defeated Presidential candidate Victor Yanukovych. So this is also laid a kind of time bomb under them, because it is not unusual in even Western mature democracies for there to be conflict between parliaments, presidents and government: France has had this for decades. But at the same time, there is an added factor here at work besides the issue of newly established constitutional norms and institutional conflicts. There is also the fact that Victor Yanukovych came back as Prime Minister in August 2006, and he comes from a political culture which seeks to dominate the political system. His isn't a culture of compromise and coexistence between different political forces. The main reason why the president really changed from opposing early parliamentary elections to moving in favor of them literally only took place in the last two weeks or so, because there had come to be numerous provocations from the part of the parliamentary coalition in government who were surprisingly not really satisfied with the enhanced powers they received under the constitutional reform and were seeking to move into territory and powers that were those of the president. There were numerous and countless examples there of the parliamentary coalition in government chipping away at the president's powers and chipping away at the president's parliamentary factions. The red line that was crossed took place in late March when a large number of deputies from the opposition Our Ukraine, which is the pro-presidential party, defected to the parliamentary coalition, and the parliamentary coalition began talking about the fact that they would soon obtain 300 votes, and thereby a constitutional majority, which would then, in effect, completely sideline the president.

Adrian Karatnycky, Founder and President of the Orange Circle, served for over a decade as Executive Director and President of Freedom House: I think there are two. One is that the country is deeply split politically, I wouldn't say ethnically, but politically between people in the East and the South who want a closer and more accommodating relationship with Russia and people in the West and Center who want a closer and more accommodating relationship with the U.S. and Europe. So that's one level. And the second level is that overlaying all of this was a negotiated change in the constitution, so there is a separate fight for power and for the division of power. Much of this was unclear, it was not specifically delineated in the constitution, and unfortunately the constitutional court has heretofore refused to help to clarify it. So all of these things have come together in this crisis.

I think only the end result will be able to determine the state of Ukraine's democratic development. One thing I would say is that the rhetoric of all of Ukraine's political players is around the constitution and around the adherence to democratic procedure. I think you have in effect two legitimate institutions. You have a legitimate head of government in a coalition based on a democratically elected majority, and you have a democratically elected president who also received a majority vote. So I think in a sense it shows that both sides feel confidant and strong because they have democratic legitimacy on their side. I would say that all of this is occurring in terms of the demonstrations thus far in an orderly and peaceful fashion. Civil society is mobilized in a responsible way. The media are extremely open, but I would say also responsible, even the partisan media. If you look at newspapers across the board, at the major websites, the ones that have developed a higher rating and audience, even though some of them have a political tilt, they provide a broad range of analysis and commentary by all the major players, and I think all of them have had editorially a position that there should be a negotiated solution, there should be a solution through democratic institutions and standards. So I would say a pretty good performance thus far in terms of keeping it within the realm of a democratic process. The one issue which has become a little tense in the last day is the tumult over the Supreme court and today five justices have said that they are withdrawing from the case, one short of denying a hearing of the parliament's case on the constitutionality of the president's decree dissolving the parliament and mandating new elections. In that statement the justices made claims of extreme political pressure primarily emanating from the government's side against the justices in the fulfillment of their responsibilities.

Washington Profile: What could be the aftershocks and wider consequences of the crisis on Ukraine and the rest of the region?

Motyl: Everything depends on how the crisis will be resolved. There are three possible scenarios. 1) The Constitutional Court supports Yushchenko, the Yanukovych forces accept the verdict, and new elections are held. Ukraine's democracy would benefit, and a clear signal would be sent to the post-Soviet space that the trend toward authoritarianism is reversible. That could have enormous consequences for the 2008 presidential elections in Russia. 2) The Constitutional Court rules against Yushchenko and the Orange opposition accepts the verdict. If the governing coalition then returns to its power-grabbing ways, part of the opposition may defect to Yanukovych, while part may become more intransigent. While that would certainly weaken the Orange camp, it would not necessarily make the Regions more unrestrained in their ambitions. The larger the governing coalition and the more Orange defectors it contains, the more unwieldy and possibly more moderate it will have to be -- especially if it faces the certainty of continued anti-authoritarian movements and public unrest. This outcome would not promote democracy in Ukraine, but neither would it necessarily represent a huge setback. The message for the region would be that authoritarianism, while perhaps not easily reversible, is not necessarily invincible. 3) Whatever the Court's verdict, some side refuses to accept it and the crisis continues. Ironically, the Regions may be more likely to accept a negative verdict than the opposition for two reasons: first, Regions will do well in new elections, and they know it; second, Yushchenko controls the forces of coercion. If the Orange side refuses to accept the verdict, and if the current elites supporting Yushchenko remain supportive of him, then the likely outcome may be a behind-the-doors deal between Yushchenko and Yanukovych. Such an outcome would represent a decaying of Ukrainian democratic institutions and political culture and would signal to the post-Soviet space that democratic norms are indeed in retreat.

While all three outcomes are possible, the first may be most likely (albeit marginally so). Scenarios 2 and 3 entail continuing instability, and neither Yushchenko nor Yanukovych wants that. And Scenario 1 entails new elections, in which the Party of Regions and the opposition are sure to do well. Considering that the Court appears to be more or less evenly divided between Yushchenko and Yanukovych supporters, the judges may be more swayed by political judgments than by inherent legalities.

D'Anieri: The consequences will depend on exactly who prevails and how. If, as I predict, Yanukovych prevails, it means the completion of the lengthy self-destruction of Viktor Yushchenko and Nasha Ukraina. It likely means a return to the pre-Orange period, in which a single group dominates, and in which other actors have powerful incentives to come to terms with that group, rather than challenging it. Again the tendency is for power to become increasingly concentrated, rather than naturally tending toward balance. It is not clear what means would be necessary for Yushchenko to prevail, but the consequences would not likely be good. Many commentators have focused on the hope that Yushchenko will prevail over Yanukovych. This misses the more basic point that politics in Ukraine are not much closer to liberal democracy than they were immediately after the Orange Revolution, and that the trend is now in the opposite direction. This is true even if Yushchenko somehow prevails.

Kuzio: Well there are different scenarios that could come from this. Ukraine could emerge from this a far better democratic system, assuming that no violence takes place, that this is peacefully resolved. Again, these kinds of constitutional political crises are not that uncommon in the West as well, in Western Europe in particular. But a more negative scenario could be that this could be the undoing of President Victor Yushchenko. He really in many ways is in a no-win situation because if he had not acted then the anti-crisis coalition could have very quickly received a constitutional majority of 300 members of parliament, and he would have then been completely sidelined. At the same time, rather he has acted, he is also in a very difficult situation because he doesn't know how the constitutional court will rule, the legality of his decree is on semi-tenuous grounds, and the outcome could be his removal from power potentially through impeachment or at the very least through presidential elections ahead of 2009. So there are different scenarios. One could be the more optimistic that eventually some kind of negotiated compromise could be reached and a more refined constitutional reform could be the result of the crisis. Or a more pessimistic scenario would be that the outcome would be that President Yushchenko loses power and that Ukraine moves towards a full parliamentary republic where the dominant person is Victor Yanukovych.

Karatnycky: Ukraine has had numerous occasions where compromises were struck. President Yushchenko's radical critics on his side would say that he has been too accommodating, but he certainly has shown that he is a person who is interested in trying to reach compromise, so I wouldn't exclude that. Also there are very strong signals that within the Party of Regions the people who represent larger business interests want stability and would like to see a peaceful compromise that leads to the consolidation of the country, which is divided basically 50/50, something that creates a consensus that allows the country to move vaguely forward without half the country feeling alienated. So it seems to me as long as there are those types of major players involved on either side of the negotiating process, that despite all of the tension and heated rhetoric, in my view the chances for a soft landing and a reasonable solution are still pretty high in Ukraine.