It is now official - Ramzan Kadyrov, the son of the late Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov, has finally ascended to his father�s throne. Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin nominated him for the Chechen presidency and the republic�s parliament promptly confirmed the appointment. Ramzan Kadyrov has just turned 30.

Two weeks before that, Putin accepted the resignation of the elected Chechen President Alu Alkhanov, a career police officer who fought within the ranks of the Russian army during the first Chechen war. It has long been an open secret that Alkhanov was supported by Russian security services, which remain very distrustful of Ramzan Kadyrov and his private army of former Chechen fighters. But Kadyrov enjoys the only trust that matters in Moscow � that of President Putin.

Kadyrov�s appointment was met in Moscow with both approval and resentment. Some claimed that this is essentially the installation of a nationalist Chechen regime, composed mostly of people who fought Russia during the two wars. Therefore, it bodes ill to give an authoritarian figure like Ramzan Kadyrov free reign, without any checks from competing Chechen clans, in a war-ravaged republic. Others claimed that it was better to consolidate Chechnya under Kadyrov who has clearly shown the ability to keep a tight reign on unruly Chechen elites: it was preferable to end the duality of power in Chechnya and eliminate any potential for an armed fight between the supporters of Kadyrov and Alkhanov.

It is true that Kadyrov�s reign in Chechnya is supreme. He could claim considerable success in bringing an end to the fighting in Chechnya, showing the benefits of the Chechenization strategy pursued by the Kremlin.

The Russian Army is no longer fighting in Chechnya. Most of the counterinsurgency operations are undertaken by Kadyrov�s security forces with Russian intelligence officers embedded in their units to coordinate action. Last year Kadyrov convinced the Russian leadership to declare an amnesty for separatists and more that 300 men came out of the woods under Kadyrov�s personal security guarantees.

In many ways Kadyrov achieved what the West had been urging Moscow to do � engage the separatists in a meaningful political process and give them a chance to reintegrate into new Chechen realities. Indeed, Magomed Hazbiyev, former defense minister in Aslan Maskhadov�s rebel government, has been elected to the new Chechen parliament.

Last but not least, Ramzan Kadyrov abandoned plans to negotiate a special treaty for Chechnya with Moscow, thus agreeing that the republic should be integrated into Russia�s common legal space.

Back in 1999, with the second Chechen war in full swing, I asked a prominent American scholar what Russia should do about Chechnya. �Let it stew,� � was the surprising reply. In fact, Moscow acted on this advice and it seems to be working. Chechnya has ceased to be a major factor in Russian political life and is no longer an irritant on Russia�s agenda with the West. It now looks like a serious but manageable reconstruction problem that Russia is capable of dealing with on its own.

Or is it? What does Kadyrov�s appointment tell us about the evolution of Chechnya? Is Putin putting too much trust in a young and ruthless Chechen leader? How will the West treat the Chechen issue in its relations with Russia? Will it finally recognize that Moscow�s strategy in Chechnya is working? Will the West recognize Ramzan Kadyrov as the legitimate leader of Chechnya? Will Putin go down in history as the Russian leader who pacified Chechnya?

Sergei Shishkarev, Deputy Chairman, Committee on Energy, Transportation and Communications, the Russian State Duma, Moscow:

Putin�s decision to nominate Ramzan Kadyrov as the next president of Chechnya is not surprising. It is highly logical and consistent.

On all counts, Ramzan Kadyrov has demonstrated that he is up to the job. He showed qualities of a capable military commander, tough administrator and, most importantly, a trustworthy political leader, capable of uniting the Chechen people.

Kadyrov managed to convince most separatists to give up their armed struggle and join him in reconstructing a peaceful Chechnya. He even persuaded some important separatists to join the new Chechen government and to work in his administration or in the State Council of Chechnya. Maskhadov�s former Defense minister is now a member of the Chechen parliament. This is his highest achievement. Ramzan Kadyrov brought peace to Chechnya, and this is most important.

In addition, he reconciled the warring Chechen clans, acting on the premise of a Russian proverb that bad peace is better than good quarrel. He worked with Moscow to declare and carry out an amnesty for those militants who were not engaged in murders and atrocities. More than 300 former separatists came out of the woods under the amnesty in 2006.

Kadyrov demonstrated good negotiating skills not only with his military and political opponents. He managed to establish solid working relations with the federal government and the Russian military and security forces in Chechnya. No doubt, he is firm when standing for the interests of Chechnya. But these are exactly the qualities that qualify him for the Chechen presidency.

Finally, he took the historical decision to abandon demands for a special treaty on delimiting authority between the federal center and Chechnya. This was a treaty his predecessors insisted upon. Doing without such a treaty means that there will be no exceptions or special treatment for Chechnya; this republic will be treated like any other subject of the Russian Federation. This means that Chechnya is back within the common legal and economic space of Russia. One cannot overestimate the importance of this fact.

Even if Kadyrov were to be elected not by parliament but through a popular ballot, there is little doubt he would breeze to an easy victory. In the beginning, Ramzan Kadyrov relied heavily on the authority of his late father. Akhmad Kadyrov was a prominent figure in the republic, enjoying well-earned authority in Chechnya and solid connections in the Islamic world. Alkhanov resigned of his own will, since he was not very effective as president and most of the work was being done by Kadyrov.

Is Kadyrov too young to be elected President? We all know that youthfulness is a drawback that lessens with time. At present, his age does not prevent him from acting energetically and responsibly. He has the trust of his people and that�s what counts.

There are allegations from human rights activists that Kadyrov�s security forces might be behind kidnappings and torture of Kadyrov�s political opponents. But since Chechnya is back in the Russian legal space, any such allegations should be pursued through Russia�s system of law enforcement. There is no sense in commenting on the alleged crimes or violations of the law until there are official indictments and court decisions. As far as I know, Ramzan Kadyrov has not been charged with any crime.

Eugene Kolesnikov, Private Consultant, The Netherlands:

The appointment of Ramzan Kadyrov as president of Chechnya is not a circumspect and popular move by Putin in his quest for stabilization in this republic. It was a decision made in large part on the basis of Putin's personal trust, demonstrated openly on numerous occasions.

This trust is not widely shared by the Russian public and the political elite. Despite all the television propaganda, a poll by Levada Center in Dec. 2006 showed that only one third of the Russian public believed that Kadyrov could stop the bloodshed in Chechnya and less than half thought a peaceful life was taking hold there. Many people voiced their unease about Putin's decisions to decorate Kadyrov with medals and awards. Human rights activists must be particularly dismayed at the prospect of a ruthless former warlord governing a region that has been immersed in blood and suffering for many years.

This appointment, however, should be viewed in the context of a 15-year-long struggle that saw Chechnya violently break away from Russia and come back into the fold. I do not doubt for a moment that most people in this proud nation still crave the full independence that they have lacked for over two centuries of Russian rule. But what most foreign observers do not realize or accept is that the Chechen people have put the issue of independence aside for now, possibly for several generations.

Akhmad Kadyrov, his son Ramzan, and a majority of Chechens decided there has been enough suffering and that the people of Chechnya would be better off rebuilding their homeland as part of Russia. In a 2003 referendum, the overwhelming majority of Chechens, 95 percent, confirmed this approach, signifying a decisive turning point in the Chechen war of independence.

Although it is necessary to judge developments in Chechnya through the lens of universal liberal values, such judgments should not obscure the harsh realities of the war and the characteristics of the Chechen tribal culture that have not changed much over the last 200 years. In this context, Kadyrov's appointment is just another precarious, but probably necessary, step in stabilizing Chechnya. It will take time to prove Putin right or wrong about this appointment.

Chechnya needs peace and restoration, processes which are well under way, as was recently confirmed by Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner on Human Rights of the Council of Europe, who said that he was stunned by the changes that have occurred in Chechnya. These positive changes should be encouraged and the geopolitical play with the Chechen liberation movement should be abandoned to prevent the further suffering of the Chechen people. The chance to redraw the map of Russia, as was envisioned by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his book "The Grand Chessboard," is now gone.

Russia will do anything to remain whole and to keep Chechnya in the fold. That is ultimately better for Russia, Chechnya, the North Caucasus and beyond. New realities should be recognized and policies adjusted accordingly by broadening cooperation with the republic and extending development aid.

Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA:

These views do not represent those of the US Army, Defense Department, or the US Government.

Putin's approach updates the classical Russian strategy of empire-building under the tsars, in that it finds elites who are willing to cooperate with Moscow, co-opts them by giving them power, and then uses them to bring the province in question to heel.

Kadyrov is a particularly brutal example of this. While there is no doubt that his Chechenization has worked better than has American strategy in Iraq (and I know of nobody who disputes this), it may be saving up problems for the future because Kadyrov's ruthlessness and power hunger may not be able to confine itself to Chechnya. But it should be remembered that Chechnya is not Iraq. Putin did what America failed to do by insulating the theater of operations form hostile media. His army is permitted to act much more brutally than any American force ever could. If the kind of systematic brutality applied in Chechnya was available as a strategy to the United States, it would be a different nation and this would be a different world.

It will be interesting to see what happens when Putin�s presidential tenure is over. Kadyrov's reign may encounter troubles if his enemies triumph in Moscow. It is also quite possible that the reforms which temporarily reduced violence in North Caucasus last year will prove to be viable and endure beyond Putin�s presidency. Violence will return, however, if the reforms are not sustainable.

Neither should we overlook the costs of Chechnya to Russia, and not just in terms of men and treasure or civilian lives lost and wrecked. Chechnya is the pretext for Putin's media and federal policies that have been instrumental in returning Russia towards an authoritarian form of rule and in further undermining any hope of putting the armed forces and security services under any kind of effective control. These are long-term burdens whose cost will continue beyond Putin's tenure. While he may have put out or at least reduced the fire, he has done so at the possible cost of a much greater crisis later on.

While scholars will undoubtedly compare and contrast the strategies pursued by Putin and Bush, the differences between these areas of military conflict should not be forgotten. Chechnya is smaller and more manageable; the Russian army has much greater freedom to act brutally; there are available elites who can impose a semblance of order; finally, there is a global media presence in Iraq that is missing in Chechnya.

These are all significant differences between the two wars. Moreover, as suggested in a recent paper by Pavel Baev at the annual convention of the U.S. International Studies Association, it is by no means certain that North Caucasus as a whole will become a secure zone any time soon or that Chechnya will find tranquility. If Kadyrov is the sole reason for tranquility, it will remain inherently problematic. Therefore, any prognostication about the region's future, especially beyond 2008, must be a cautious one.

Ethan S. Burger, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.:

The description of Ramzan Kadyrov as the "The Last King of Chechnya" may prove to be prescient. Until recently, there was a consensus that the age of monarchies had long since passed. Still, heads of states in many countries today attempt to pass political power to their heirs.

Andrew Wilson of the University of London's School of Slavonic and East European Studies explores in his excellent book "Virtual Politics" why heads of states in most of the successor states of the former Soviet Union feel compelled to legitimate their exercise of power through the holding of elections. It is a book well worth reading, and it would be wonderful if Russian language versions were made widely available. The irony is that such heads of state would probably win re-election in a vote held in accords with internationally recognized norms, provided they were willing to accept term limitations.

Monarchs can serve as a symbol of national unity. They may also be good for tourism. Monarchs who seek to rule must rely on overwhelming force. Sometimes this force is indigenous, and sometimes it is foreign. In most of the world, kings and queens are symbols of national unity and do not exercise any real power. They may have significant wealth, but usually their residences serve merely as tourist attractions.

Kadyrov will never be able to emerge as a symbol of national unity. Perhaps someone like Magomed Hazbiyev could fulfill this role, particularly if he is able to prevail upon Chechen political figures in exile in Britain and elsewhere to take part in a process of national reconciliation.

For this to be possible, Russia will have to recognize that Chechnya is entitled to autonomy and to recognize the difference between those criminals who kill innocent civilians and those who have targeted military and political figures. But this may be asking too much in the short term. Tragically, more Russians may have to die in violent, criminal terrorist actions for such a political initiative to be politically palatable for the Russian governmental elite.

Unfortunately, the Russian leadership does not seem to appreciate either history or regional expertise. It can always find opportunistic individuals who recognize that Moscow's backing is one method of gaining and holding on to power. Such persons are mortal and Chechnya is full of people who will oppose those they see as pawns of a foreign state.

I believe that Chechnya is entitled to self-determination. It declared independence upon the break-up of the Soviet Union, never signed the 1992 Treaty of the Federation nor ratified the 1993 Russian Constitution by referendum. Legal basis is thus lacking for Chechnya's forced incorporation into the Russian Federation.

Nonetheless, there has to be a legitimate new way out of the present situation. The Russian political leadership should make time to read more about how the Caucasus was incorporated into the Russian empire and about recent history.

Many individuals in Chechnya's struggle for independence will commit indefensible terrorist acts in the hope of furthering their cause. Sometimes these actions are counterproductive, often motivated by a desire for revenge and less frequently by religious extremism. Still, Chechnya represents an open wound for Russia.

It is the only G8 country where separatists are willing to die for independence. Russia cannot grant legitimacy to any Chechen leadership. One does not choose those with whom one negotiates. The Kremlin leadership should seek out Chechen political and intellectual figures who renounce terrorism to begin a dialogue that would result in an internationally-recognized treaty, perhaps short of granting Chechnya full independence, yet providing both sides with legitimate security guarantees as well as protection for the Russian and other minorities in the other's state. Furthermore, other national groups in the area would have to be brought in to the process.

Chechnya is a failed state and certainly would be one if it were to become fully independent. Continued Russian control of Chechnya through force is not worth a single additional Russian or Chechen life. Perhaps the large Chechen diaspora living in Russia can play a positive role in this process. Only a freely negotiated political solution will avoid the continuation of a conflict that has had tremendous costs for both Russia and Chechnya in human, financial and political terms. Ultimately, Chechenization, like Vietnamization (or Iraqization) is unlikely to succeed.

Andrei Zagorski, Professor, MGIMO-University, Moscow:

Chechnya is now different from what it was in 2000 or 2004. The process it went through, however, can hardly be characterized as pacification. It was rather a sort of tranquilization.

The recent appointment of Kadyrov Jr. as president of the republic was the culmination of the Kremlin�s policy of the last four years which bestowed almost total power to a single clan that has previously fought on the side of the rebels. This clan was relatively successful in making former insurgents work for the government and in developing an immunity vis-?-vis the Russian authorities.

By refusing to share the power with other groups, especially those loyal to Moscow, it failed to consolidate Chechen society. On the contrary, it further alienated it through corrupt reconstruction management, unaccountability and a lack of remedies to put a limit on its arbitrariness.

Those who emphasize that the Kadyrovs have reduced the intensity of insurgency are right. They are wrong, however, if they ignore other worrying developments. The self-assertive government in Grozny again generates animosities inside Chechnya and with Moscow. There is a growing opposition to the almost unlimited power of a single clan serving its own interests.

This inner opposition now includes Chechen groups that have often shown loyalty to Moscow. Finding themselves in opposition to Kadyrov, these groups, however, also find themselves in opposition to the Kremlin which has installed Kadyrov and his regime. At the same time, Ramzan Kadyrov, like his father, has many powerful enemies in Moscow who are unhappy with his growing supremacy.

The emerging new lines of conflict within and between Grozny and Moscow promise that the tranquilization effect is unlikely to last long. Indeed, the legitimacy of Kadyrov�s regime is now more of a problem than it has been over the past four years. The presidential elections held in Chechnya in recent years were anything but free and fair. However, they gave the installed regime at least an illusion of legitimacy. Now the factual appointment without proper elections has deprived Ramzan Kadyrov even of this fragile legitimacy. It now rests exclusively on the trust of the current president of Russia.

This may easily change after 2008, however, resulting in a new conflict.