Sergei Markedonov is head of the International Relations Department of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis in Moscow. He contributed this comment to Russia Profile.

Ramzan Kadyrov can celebrate another victory. From Mar. 2, he has formally and legally cemented his grip on power in Chechnya. The day after President Vladimir Putin submitted Kadyrov’s candidacy for Chechen president to the region’s parliament, lawmakers backed the acting regional boss. Of 58 deputies in the legislature, 55 voted in favor of Kadyrov. Only two ballots were spoiled.

Putin’s candidate achieved almost total support. The spoiled ballot papers were not counted, since they do not count as votes against the Russian president’s prot?g?. Only one lawmaker voted against Kadyrov’s candidacy.

In proposing Kadyrov for president, Putin expressed the hope that a positive decision by parliament would “aid the continuation of Chechnya’s social and economic rehabilitation at the same speed as at present.” A week before his official confirmation, the Kremlin favorite said: “Being president is a huge responsibility before the Almighty, before the people, and before Putin himself.” We can see in this troika that Allah and Putin belong in the same breath, while the prophet Mohammed is nowhere to be seen.

So the main personnel issue in Chechnya is resolved. Meanwhile, the Chechen Republic itself is becoming ever more a model for the whole of Russia. Vladimir Putin’s ascent to power is closely tied up with Chechnya. His rapid climb up the political Olympus was tied to popular expectations of “pacification” of the rebellious region, the establishment there of peace and victory over the terrorists. And no matter what happens to Russia’s current president in the future, the “Chechen question” will always play an important role in assessments of his place in history.

Hence the amount of attention Putin pays to supporting the image of a peaceful Chechnya. Chechnya – not as a region or a political project, but as a triumph of spin – has shown his effectiveness. There is now a great temptation to spread this political technology across the Russian legal and political sphere, thereby increasing the efficiency not so much of the state as of the ruling class. Here the consequences for Russian domestic politics of Kadyrov’s confirmation in Chechnya’s highest position are of the utmost importance.

First, by accepting President Alu Alkhanov’s resignation, the Kremlin showed its complete disregard for electoral procedures as an instrument for forming state power. Putin demonstrated that his “sovereign will” is much more important than the outcome of elections.

Alkhanov’s resignation came prematurely, which in the eyes of Russians reduces the very fact of his election to political nothingness. The will of the Russian state’s top dog is another matter. It is possible to argue how transparent and competitive the presidential elections of August 2004 in Chechnya were. Most likely, Russian and international rights activists could cite a number of reliably accurate instances of infringements during the Chechen presidential election.

Yet the very existence of the elections and the legitimization of power through them made it possible to say that power was not the game of one person chosen by chance. Now people across Russia, not only Chechens, have been shown that elections of the region’s head are something from a different historical era. And this fact is so insignificant that it can simply be waved away.

Much of the commentary that appeared after Kadyrov was named acting president focused on prospects for a “third Chechen war,” but few noticed that the nomination was in fact a graphic demonstration of the efficiency of the president’s political will and the inefficiency of elections as such. A blow was struck not only at direct elections of regional heads in Russia; the democratic legitimization of power in Russia was also undermined.

Yet the focus is that there are no other forms of legitimization either in Russia as a whole or Chechnya in particular. Putin’s mass popularity was also established by election. Thus, by undermining democracy as a way of legitimizing power, the Kremlin is undermining Russia’s democratic institutions. In 1990-1991, the war against the Soviet Communist Party was automatically a war against the Soviet state, since the Party was not a party but the state administrative system. Today, the elimination of democratic processes and their replacement by the political elite undermines rather than strengthens state power in the country.

Second, the Kremlin gave all power to Ramzan Kadyrov. It is now pointless to talk about the possibility of ruling Chechnya “as an occupier.” Despite all the problems of the “Chechen question,” the administration of the region should be built on a system of checks and balances.

Yet the federal center is itself contributing to the elimination of these balances. At first, all prime ministers named by Moscow were squeezed out, and then Alkhanov – who together with his staff acted as a counterweight to Kadyrov – was “promoted.” From the very start (that is, in 1992, when possible models of government for the region were being considered) the Kremlin had no interest in a parliamentary model of power. Parliamentary institutions are too closely linked to public politics to be seen as favorable to the Kremlin, even in regions where their benefits are obvious.

Thus, in Chechnya the “power vertical” has been impressively implemented. As political analyst Nikolai Silayev correctly pointed out, Kadyrov “has no opponents left either in the region or outside it; all of them were either long ago pushed aside (Aslanbek Aslakhanov, the Dzhabrailov brothers) or are dead (Movladi Baisarov). And this is surprising, since the history of Chechnya over the past 15 or even 17 years is one of endless attempts to create a monolithic regime that have continually failed. This cycle is now broken. The impression had been that the concentration of power could lead to an explosion. This now appears unlikely to happen.”

How far this “vertical” will work in the interests of the unitary Russian state is another issue. The Chechen elite has for many years voiced political, financial and economic complaints. Just last week, before his official confirmation by the Chechen parliament, Kadyrov said: “For Chechnya, oil is our main income. Yet 51 percent of Chechen oil belongs to Rosneft. They know that they have a blocking stake – the lion’s share – and don’t ask us about anything. And if they left us as much as we really need, that would be a massive help to revive the republic’s economy. Chechnya desperately needs to develop its oil-and-gas sector, as before. And I will pursue this in all the corridors and offices of power.”

The concentration of local power in one pair of hands, and the absence of checks and balances, could lead in any given region to a virtually separate state system outside of the Kremlin’s control. And there will be no one to oppose this state system. Within the republic, the only opponents to the local authorities are the separatist rebel bands. But today they are scattered and weak both in terms of political ideology and military strength.

Moreover, opposition from this direction is dangerous to Russian national interests as well. By putting power in Chechnya into one set of hands, without allowing the system of checks and balances to function, Moscow itself is pushing internal political processes in Chechnya toward a standoff between “systemic separatists” and open separatists. What is more, some of the separatist rebels are ready to recognize Kadyrov’s authority. In an interview with the Caucasus Times on Mar. 1, Akhmed Zakayev, whom Moscow is currently trying to get extradited from Britain, said Kadyrov is carrying out a policy of “decolonization.” “In Chechnya life is increasingly taking shape to home-grown, deeply Chechen rules,” Zakayev said. “And the Chechens themselves are consciously pushing Russia away and alienating it from internal administration.”

Third, by nudging Alkhanov out of the political game in Chechnya, Moscow is once again showing that the personal devotion and loyalty of regional leaders to the Kremlin is more important than fidelity to the Russian state as an institution. I have written many times that former Chechen President Alkhanov defended Russian statehood and constitutional order with a gun in his hands. His reward was “internal emigration” for the third time in his life.

Today there is an informal agreement between the Kremlin and the new president of Chechnya. Like no one else, Kadyrov allows the Kremlin to preserve the image of a “pacified Chechnya.” In return he gets significant liberty. In effect, he remains the only regional leader who has the opportunity to speak out on a nationwide stage.

Neither Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov, nor Murtaza Rakhimov, president of Bashkortostan, nor Sverdlovsk Region Governor Eduard Rossel, nor any of the other “regional barons” of the 1990s can speak out in the public sphere as they could 15 years ago on topics outside their jurisdiction. And even Mintimer Shaimiyev, the longtime president of Tatarstan, who allows himself a certain amount of leeway, usually confines himself to topics of national importance that concern Tatarstan.

But how far will Kadyrov remain within his present boundaries when another politician comes to power as Russian president in 2008? His loyalty is not loyalty to institutions. It is personal loyalty. Will the president of Chechnya be prepared to support the new ruler of the Kremlin unconditionally? And if not unconditionally, then with what new demands will he make of Moscow in 2008? Will the 2008 problem also become a problem in relations between Moscow and Grozny? After all, 2008 could be not only the election year in Russia, but also the year in which the contract with the Chechen elite is rewritten.

The Kremlin is likely already concerned about this. And in all likelihood the “third term” solution has already been mentioned in connection with the Chechen problem as well. In this case, the stakes in the Chechen game would not have to be raised, or raised only by a small amount. The idea of a third term is also welcomed in Grozny. It is also an additional guarantee that the Kremlin’s choice will remain intact, and that Kadyrov will not have to worry about his own future. In this situation Grozny will guarantee the image of a “peaceful Chechnya,” and Putin will position himself as the only politician able to solve the Chechen question. And in that case, who knows how prophetic the Russian president’s words about not rushing to throw him out of the Kremlin throne will prove to be?