Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2007
From: Andrei Tsygankov <andrei@sfsu.edu>
Subject: Misreading Putin
Andrei P. Tsygankov
Program Chair, International Studies Association 2006-07
Associate Professor, International Relations / Political Science
San Francisco State University
http://bss.sfsu.edu/tsygankov/
Misreading Putin
Vladimir Putin’s message of resisting the US-led unipolarity seems to be coming through, and there are evidence to conclude that the West is absorbing the message. These evidence are in 68% of German public endorsing Putins criticism. They are in Putin has a point editorials in mainstream and notoriously critical Western media, such as Economist, Financial Times, and Los Angeles Times. They are also in a cautious language employed by US officials and politicians including those who have called to punish Russia by expelling it from G-8 and imposing tough sanctions against the country. These politicians now indicate they are ready for a dialogue with Russia. The Western discussion is being actively reshaped from indiscriminately criticizing Russia to acknowledging some of its points. The reason for this rhetorical change is partly the assertive style in which the Munich speech was delivered and partly Russia’s readiness to back up its words with actions. The speech was soon followed by a threat to withdraw from the Intermediate Nuclear Missile Treaty should NATO continue with deploying its military infrastructure closer to Russian borders. Until now, the West has been used to Russia that is put on defensive and at pain to respond to Western criticisms within the West-set parameters of debate.
Still, Putins intentions have been largely misread in the West, as many have seen in the Munich speech only a vindication of their old fears about Russia. Now there is willingness to dialogue with the “hard-liner” Putin because no other choices seem available. Russia, like the elephant in the kitchen, is simply too powerful to ignore. Such view disregards that Russia had to swallow the war in the Balkans, two rounds of NATO expansion, the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty, military presence in Central Asia, the invasion of Iraq, and, now, plans to deploy elements of nuclear missile defense in Eastern Europe and the recent statement by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates implicating Russia as a potential enemy. In the light of these developments, it is quite a stretch to see Putin as an anti-Western nationalist, and it paints the West into a corner by allowing it no flexibility in dealing with Russia. The simple transition from a strategic partnership to a coerced cooperation can hardly amount to a strategic rethinking of relations with the Kremlin.
To move beyond simplistic dichotomies, it is essential to understand that Russia’s political scene is not – and never has been – a struggle between liberal pro-Western reformers, on the one hand, and anti-Western hard-liners, now led by Putin, on the other. The so-called pro-Western reformers is a tiny minority that gets no support in the Russian society and is associated with Yeltsin’s era of poverty and state disintegration. The real debate is between Great Power Normalizers and Eurasianists. Normalizers, like Putin, want Russia to regain its great power status, but do so within acceptable international parameters and be accepted by Western nations. Putin’s vision of Russia is that of a country with European identity albeit with historically special relations in Asia and the Muslim world. This is why Putin, despite multiple opportunities in Asia, keeps pushing for Russias greater presence in Europe through energy deliveries and asset swaps, open visa regime, and joint military programs. Opening borders with China, for example, is not on his mind, although Putin is eager to improve economic cooperation with the Asian continent.
Eurasianists, on the other hand, want Putin to close the shop with Europe and turn to “real markets” and “real partners”, such as China and Iran. If Putin is serious in his critique of unipolarity, they maintain, he must bid farewell to the “hypocritical and stagnating” middle class Europeans and embrace economic tigers in Asia and growing powers in the Middle East. He must create energy cartels, exclusive military alliances and push arrogant Americans out of Eurasia once and for all. Russia has fully recovered as a great power and does not need to seek the Wests approval of its actions and intentions. As a member in the Eurasian coalition, Russia will grow much faster thereby creating a meaningful counter-balance to the West. Although Eurasianists keep relatively low profile, make no mistake about their growing influence in the Kremlin and Russia’s media space. Their philosophy is often shared by Putin’s powerful deputy head administration Igor Sechin who is in control of the state-owned oil company Rosneft, the second largest in the country, and who has numerous allies in the media and political circles. Putin is not invulnerable to the group's pressures, and its members insist on the president’s the third term hoping to continue consolidating their influence in his shadow.
The point is not to begin seeing Putin as a pro-Western reformer, as opposed to the increasingly dominant view of him as a hard-line nationalist, but to dispense with the whole moralistic dichotomy of good vs. bad guys in favor of a more balanced understanding of America’s national interest. Critical challenges of the post-Cold War world – terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, poverty, and instability – are yet to be adequately addressed, and it is much too early to write Russia off as a true partner. Putin demands attention by being tough on the United States, but his real intention remains to deepen Russia’s interdependence with Western economies and develop a greater level of cooperation with the West. It is essential to work with him if we want to prevent to rise of the Eurasianist coalition with dangerous arms races and politico-economic confrontation to follow.
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