A year ago at the ExxonMobil seminar in Moscow I ventured a guess that Vladimir Putin had already settled on his successor and that it would be Dmitri Medvedev.

It was a prediction not based on any inside knowledge of Putin’s thinking (who on earth can claim that?), but rather on the analysis of the relationship between Medvedev and Putin. The conclusion I had drawn was that Medvedev was probably the only person in Putin’s entourage to whom the president would be comfortable handing over power and still have the ability to exercise a lot of influence behind the scenes.

After all, throughout his career Medvedev has basically been Putin’s apprentice. Rumor has it that of all the people in Putin’s circle, Medvedev is the only one whom Putin treats not as an associate, but as a son. From this perspective, Medvedev is indeed the One.

Medvedev also appears to be the only one who can enjoy the support of the warring and competing clans. He is acceptable to siloviki, who foolishly view him as a weak leader they can handle and manipulate, while for economic liberals Medvedev is the last refuge of liberalism in the Kremlin.

Three weeks before Putin agreed to lead the United Russia ticket during the Duma elections, I also ventured a guess that Putin would leave the presidency to become Russia’s Prime-Minister, since this is the only legally acceptable way for him to stay in power and accomplish his mission of making Russia into a first-rate world power.

My analysis was based on the Kremlin’s heightened interest in the life and political legacy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt throughout 2007, the first U.S. president to break the historical tradition of two presidential terms and successfully run for the third and then fourth term. I was particularly intrigued by the Kremlin’s attention to the arguments used by FDR to justify his decision to run for the third term in 1940.

A day after his nomination Medvedev returned the favor by proposing to name Putin as his Prime-Minister, and the FDR scenario emerged as the most plausible. Putin accepted Medvedev’s offer less than a week later, and his increasing involvement in economic policy and public pronouncements charting a future for Russia make it clear that he is not contemplating a retirement from public life.

The West welcomed Medvedev’s nomination. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described Medvedev as a smart man who comes from a new generation of Russian leaders. German Chancellor Angela Merkel also expressed confidence that Germany would be able to work well with the new Russian leader.

With Putin’s direct endorsement, Medvedev catapulted to the top of national polls and is already projected to win the presidential election in the first round, getting over 60 percent of the vote.

So what does the Medvedev-Putin tandem hold for Russia’s future? Where would the real center of Russian power be were Putin to accept the offer to become Prime-Minister? Would Putin introduce constitutional changes to relocate most of the powers from the Kremlin to the Cabinet? Would Medvedev settle on being a placeholder or a figurehead president, or would he serve as a junior Putin still proving himself and preparing for the day when Putin indeed may decide to retire, once he feels that Medvedev would be up to the job of saving Russia? Would such a scenario create institutional risks of dual power and mixed authority? Would it risk unraveling the very vertical of power that Putin had reestablished? How would the Russian elites and Russian society react to this configuration? How would it be perceived internationally? Who would represent Russia at the tables of global politics, such as the G8?

James George Jatras, Director, American Council for Kosovo (www.savekosovo.org), Principal, Squire Sanders Public Advocacy, LLC, Washington

In considering a Rooseveltian prototype for the Putin presidency, I am less inclined to think of Franklin Delano than of Teddy. While FDR is remembered for his longevity in office and his wartime leadership, his lasting contribution is the creation of the welfare state, of which opinions remain mixed.

Like Vladimir Putin, the Republican Roosevelt was the embodiment of boundless energy and an inspiration to national vitality. (In reference to an expression common in his time, the first Roosevlet was once described as "muscular Christianity without the Christianity.") Under Teddy, the United States joined the list of world powers. Under Putin, Russia has recovered that status.

American presidents' efforts to extend and validate their achievements via a hand-picked successor have been problematic. FDR changed vice presidents like he changed his socks, and Truman's hardheadedness at the beginning of the Cold War stood in sharp contrast to Roosevelt's having been outwitted by Stalin at every turn. Bush the Elder was elected in 1988 because Ronald Reagan couldn't run again, his vice president seeming to be the next best thing, but with disappointing results. Clinton's stained mantle was insufficient to get Al Gore into the White House.

I suspect Putin will be luckier in the anointing business. The relevant example here may not be American at all, but maybe Rome's "Five Good Emperors" from Nerva to Marcus Aurelius, whose success was based on grooming an heir chosen not by blood but by adoption. (The pattern came to an end with Aurelius' selecting as his successor his own son, Commodus, whose chaotic reign is sometimes seen as the beginning of the Empire's downward slide.) Mr. Frolov's reference to Dmitri Medvedev as being like Putin's "son" may point to the advantages of that August tradition. (And perhaps it is well that Vladimir Vladimirovich has no actual son, only daughters.)

Assuming there is no change in the Russian constitution, opinions are divided on where power will reside beginning next year. In the office of the presidency with its formidable constitutional powers, that is, with a likely President Medvedev? Or personally with a presumed Prime Minister Putin, not because of the formal powers of his office, but because he is Putin? In the first case, are we looking at the possibility of, from Putin's perspective, a "runaway presidency," with Medvedev seeking to escape his "father's" shadow and chart a different course (back to Teddy again, he was so disappointed with his chosen successor, William Howard Taft, that Roosevelt came out of retirement to run against Taft in 1912. The result was that Taft finished third -- the only sitting president to do so -- behind Woodrow Wilson and Roosevelt. However, Taft did eventually end up as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court -- again, the only former president to serve on the Court -- which is what he really wanted in the first place.)

Or maybe the game of constitutional musical chairs has another, even more creative solution. Maybe it's about time for the long-discussed union of Russia with Belarus to move forward, with the possibility of a new constitution and a new presidency of a joint state. A Putin candidacy for that office would be a forgone result. (And this time, maybe a longer tenure would be in order. When the Fifth Republic was first established, the French presidency had a seven-year term.)

There would still remain the task of where to put Medvedev and, of course, Lukashenko. But I'm sure such details could be worked out.

Ethan S. Burger, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center & Scholar-in-Residence, School of International Service, American University, Washington, D.C.

If it’s assumed that under no condition would President Putin give up his power and influence over the Russian state, his designation of Dmitry Medvedev as preferred successor was probably the best outcome that Westerners could reasonably hope for. In all likelihood, the March 2008 Russian presidential election will be a mere formality, as the Russian political system ensures that no political figure has the name recognition, experience and resources to defeat Medvedev.

Of course, there is a myriad of ways that President Putin can continue to pull the strings of power, such as: (i) Medvedev stepping down from power before his term is complete or (ii) Putin becoming Russia's Prime Minister and essentially retaining power over the country (with or without amending the Russian Constitution, as the number of seats Putin's supporters hold in both the State Duma and Council of the Federation exceed a two thirds majority). But perhaps Putin's choice wasn’t motivated by some sinister scheme, or was simply a PR move.

There are a number of reasons why Medvedev could turn out to be a pleasant surprise. He does not apparently have an FSB/MVD/Military background. He is a lawyer educated during the Gorbachev era -- a time of glasnost and debate at Soviet universities. Perhaps he has retained some of the spirit of that era, and holds some values other than loyalty.

While remaining Chairman of Gazprom’s Board of Directors would probably conflict with his interests, the experience he has gained there so far widened his knowledge of international economics and appreciation of economic interdependence, as opposed to a perception of the world solely through the prism of national security.

According to a recent press report, an Israeli venture capital fund and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development pulled out of a Russian investment project following a newspaper interview, in which a Russian partner boasted a backing from the FSB to force Russian business owners to sell their assets below market rates. I have no idea if this "story" is indeed true. Nonetheless, Medvedev is likely to appreciate the possible consequences of the Russian state using its power to harm foreign investors and counterparts. Directors of publicly-owned companies and independent lending institutions would fear increasing their involvement in the Russian economy out of a fear for their jobs or due to shareholder lawsuits.

Given that both Putin's and Medvedev's positions are secure, they have the ability to make certain positive and symbolic gestures. For example, offering certain official positions to individuals who ran for the State Duma, but whose parties failed to clear the 7 percent threshold (e.g. ambassadorships to the OSCE or NATO), strengthening the position of the Russian Human Rights Ombudsman, and implementing some of the Putin-proposed infrastructure projects (discussed below). They could also ease up on human rights activists, the independent media, and the registration of NGOs, releasing Mikhail Khodorkovsky as a "humanitarian gesture."

As a lawyer, Medvedev should be sensitive about the authorities observing the Russian Criminal Procedure Code. Needless to say, Putin would have to be convinced, but such actions would send important signals to Western leaders that Russia is indeed looking to be partners with the West on issues of common interest. Medvedev should also get tougher on petty corruption that has an impact on the everyday lives of the Russian people.

Most importantly, he should take steps to implement Putin's call for infrastructure improvements (i.e. investment in education, environmental protection, health, and housing). It would be a shame if Putin's remarks in this area were merely campaign rhetoric. Thus Medvedev, rather than being regarded as Putin's puppet, may assume (at least for one term) the role of the person who implements Putin's ideas, much as the late U.S. President Lyndon Johnson followed in the footsteps of John F. Kennedy.

Perhaps these are naive hopes, but a revival of the Cold War is not desirable, and its likelihood would have been greater had one of the siloviki come to power. The best we can expect is having a benevolent Tsar (Putin) operating through bright minds such as Medvedev.

Andrei Seregin, Director of Research, Imageland PR Agency, Moscow

The succession scenario presently being unveiled seems fully consistent with conventional wisdom. Medvedev is elected; Putin moves to head the Government and remains in power for another term until the next election.

Everything seems perfectly set up. Still, the devil in the details may be more interesting. I doubt the effectiveness of a Putin-Medvedev chess-castle maneuver, though it appears to be the simplest and most obvious for the stability of the internal power balance. I still bet on a “glorious comeback scenario,” when Medvedev reaps all the social wrath in the next year and a half only to clear the way for Putin's comeback.

At least three points should be kept in mind when trying to predict the future of the presidential electoral game in Russia. First, Putin should not be exposed to rising social discontent. Secondly, Medvedev may decide to cross the bounds of a “cover presidency” into a real one. Thirdly, the much-desired elite balance of interests seems to have already been undermined.

The recent much-discussed Kommersant interview of a certain businessman Oleg Shwartsman, claiming to expose a “siloviki” faction in the Kremlin, seems to be nothing but casus belli among the highest ranks of Russian power. And the sacred balance of power among the Kremlin pinnacles has already begun shifting. Thus, Medvedev's presidency won't guarantee elite stability, as there are already plenty of losers and outsiders to start a modern kind of “nobility Fronde.”

Bearing in mind the necessity of painful social-economic reforms in Russia, the ballooning inflation, the lurking utility price increase and the likelihood of crises in some key economic fields (banking, mortgage, development), the next presidential term will be very hard on anyone presiding over it.

But surely Medvedev is fully aware of this. It’s highly doubtful that, despite his loyalty to Putin himself, Medvedev will agree either to a so called “technical presidency” or to constitution reform making Russia into a parliamentary republic and giving all power to Putin-the-Premier. Although a longtime Putin legal aid, Medvedev himself is young, smart and ambitious, and almost as cool as his boss. I wouldn't be surprised if Medvedev changes his attitude toward his presidential career the moment he takes oath.

As some shrewd policy observers put it, it’s rather easy to enthrone any successor in Russia, but the amount of power vested in the President's position is too great to let the entourage “backseatdrive” safely or, to put it simply, “the enthroners themselves might not have time to reach shelter after the enthroned starts to exercise his powers.”

Professor Stephen Blank, the US Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA (Dr. Blank’s views as contributed to Russia Profile do not represent the position of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government.)

Putin has stated that he would not try to usurp power from the President as Prime Minister, but this isn’t something that can be trusted. In fact, at this stage it is impossible to know who will ultimately prevail, Medvedev or Putin. But the powers of the presidency are such (and I suspect that Medvedev is no lightweight or liberal, just another talented civilian bureaucrat) that over time he is likely to become the more powerful of the two men, and the most powerful person in Russia. Of course, all this speculation reveals the absence of a rule of law in Russia, and the fact that the regime is one of men and not of laws. Moreover, all the speculation of Putin trying to engineer a constitutional reform to achieve a parliamentary system based on a ruling party, that would result in a facsimile of European democratic models, omit the fact that Putin has done everything he could to demolish democracy and constitutionalism in Russia. Why would he turn around and undo his own handiwork, especially since he is so proud of his achievements?

We would all thus be more informed and understanding of Russian developments if we resist the inevitable and ubiquitous efforts by political scientists to find analogues for Russia in the lexicon of Western political science, which is imbued with European and American models. In fact, Putin's system is a Tsarist system, and the structure of Russian rule resembles nothing as much as the one depicted in the great institutional studies of late and mature Tsarism (Leroy-Beaulieu, Korkunov, and the more recent Zaionchkovskii and Yaney).Understanding the repetitive nature of Russian political history, with its Tsarist court and intriguing boyars, whose main motives are power and greed as they all serve the state, as the only way of achieving these objectives, would be more productive than the endless and essentially misinformed speculation about Western models in Russia.