MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Yelena Shesternina) - The next Russia-European Union summit, in the Portuguese city of Mafra on October 26, will be the twentieth time the two have met.

Officials in Moscow argue that the sides have come a long way since the first meeting in May 1998, and claim their part of the credit for advancing EU-Russian cooperation. The achievements they tout include $230 billion worth of trade, heavy European investments in the Russian economy (75% of the total), and Russia's ranking as the EU's third largest trade partner, after the United States and China.

Yet, Moscow and Brussels now seem to have more divisive issues between them than they did back in 1998. Will the upcoming summit help the sides put at least some of their differences behind and allow them to move on?

First and foremost, there is a problem of a new EU-Russia partnership treaty. This year marks the 10th anniversary of the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which was supposed to be replaced by December 1. At last November's summit in Finland, it became clear that meeting the deadline would be unrealistic. Poland put a stop to talks on a new EU-Russia deal, refusing to discuss it until Moscow ended its ban on Polish meat imports. Today, after a year, there is still no breakthrough.

The lack of a replacement treaty is not much of a worry to Russia, though. At least, it has never admitted its concerns publicly. Officials in Moscow have instead taken a wait-and-see approach, arguing it is European negotiators who should persuade Warsaw to lift its veto on the treaty talks.

The current accord expires at the end of 2007, but with no replacement yet in place to take over, the sides have decided to extend the effective deal for a year.

Polish Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski suffered a defeat in last Sunday's parliamentary elections and will now have to cede his post to Donald Tusk, a moderate politician with no strong anti-Russian stance characteristic of his predecessor. Moscow is therefore hopeful that with Tusk at the helm of the Polish Cabinet, Warsaw will no longer hold the whole European bloc hostage to its own historical phobias vis-a-vis Russia.

Secondly, there is the issue of energy supplies. In September, the European Commission began discussing a plan to introduce limits on foreign investment in its energy infrastructure. If this plan goes ahead, there will be serious implications for Russian energy giants such as Gazprom and for the country's economy as a whole. Luckily, however, several EU countries linked with Russia by close economic partnerships - France, Germany, Italy and Austria - have already spoken against the measure, and Brussels will have to reckon with their opinion.

Thirdly, the sides have not made much progress toward the declared goal of relaxing visa rules. A new EU-Russia agreement on simplified visa regulations came into force on June 1 of this year, which is a positive development at the first glance. Counter to expectations, most EU consulates have now enlarged the list of documents to be submitted by visa applicants instead of narrowing it down, and have begun to charge additional fees for processing services provided by their newly established visa application centers. Whether European consulates should take that responsibility back from the visa centers and get rid of the surcharges will be discussed at the forthcoming EU-Russia summit in Portugal.

Fourthly, the summit will likely raise some controversial international policy issues such as Kosovo, Iran, the Middle East, and the U.S. plan to deploy a national missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

As for the prospective American defense shield in Central Europe, the EU is reluctant to take part in related disputes, arguing that it is something the sides directly involved should resolve amongst themselves. So, there is not much point in bringing up this issue in Mafra.

Discussions on Kosovo, by contrast, may produce some concrete results, especially given that the Troika mediators (Russia, the EU and the United States) have just released a plan that envisages broader rights for this Serbian province while making no mention of it being granted sovereignty. This compromise version could prove acceptable to all the sides concerned, including Serbia and Russia, both vehemently opposed to the idea of giving Kosovo independence from Serbia. It remains to be seen, however, how the plan will be received by the Kosovo Albanians.