MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Pyotr Goncharov) - On October 12-13, the Russian and American foreign and defense ministers are planning to discuss in Moscow the U.S. plan to create the third position area in Europe for its national missile defense system. By tradition, on the eve of the meeting the sides outlined their positions on the issue.

It is obvious that the United States is not going to meet Moscow halfway and drop this plan. Nor does the United States want to accept Moscow's proposal to make the Russian-rented Gabala radar in Azerbaijan an alternative to the U.S. radar in the Czech Republic.

Moscow still hopes that common sense will prevail and the United States will accept the Russian proposal because it will help consolidate strategic stability and avoid new risks.

This final meeting was preceded by three rounds of expert consultations from both sides. Now the participants in this meeting will compile reports to the heads of state on the basis of their recommendations.

Much will depend on the ability of the sides to come to terms. In the run-up to the meeting, the Russian State Duma (parliament) has adopted a statement on the consequences of deployment of U.S. missile defense components in Europe. Commenting on this document, former Secretary of the Russian Security Council and MP Andrei Kokoshin pointed out that if the sides failed to reach an acceptable-to-Russia formula, it would have to reply with a package of commensurate political, military and technical measures.

Many policymakers and experts see these reply measures as Russia's withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and are predicting the arms race. Needless to say, the Europeans will not be happy about it.

Why are the sides unable to come to terms?

Washington claims that the missile defense will be exclusively aimed against ballistic missiles of countries with unpredictable regimes, such as Iran or North Korea, and will not threaten Russia in any way.

It is planning to deploy radar in the Czech Republic and ten missile interceptors in Poland because of geometry and geography - not for political reasons. The Gabala radar will not do the job because it does not have the frequencies required for targeting missile interceptors at Iranian ballistic missiles.

Moscow believes that U.S. missile defense elements in Europe will threaten its security, if only because it will tangibly change the configuration of the U.S. military presence in Europe in its favor.

These positions make a compromise practically unrealistic - either the United States gives up its plan or Russia will have to agree to combine the two radars - on Czech and Azerbaijani territory.

Washington seems to pretend that it does not understand Moscow's concerns and continues its policy. Daniel Fried, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs said: "The Gabala radar and the radar in the Czech Republic as if were built as mutual supplements. If they are united they will provide for much more reliable coverage of Iranian ballistic missiles launching." Judging by all, the U.S. delegation is going to uphold this position in Moscow.

This is almost a Hegelian thesis about the unity and clash of opposites. But under the circumstances it would be more appropriate to recall another idea - on changing quantity into quality; in this case - the number of consultations into the quality of compromise. This is a very important task because strategic stability is at stake.