"Only a few weeks ago, for the first time since Alexander III, a Russian Orthodox state funeral was held for a Russian government official," said Irina Papkov, Title VIII-supported research scholar, Kennan Institute. Speaking at a recent Kennan Institute lecture, Papkov said that, for some observers of Russia, the funeral of former Russian President Boris Yeltsin was a sure sign that the line between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian government has become increasingly blurred. However, Papkov disagrees with this assessment and cautioned that many examples often cited to argue that the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian federal government are merging are unconvincing upon closer examination.

The first commonly discussed issue that Papkov analyzed was the 1997 law on religion in Russia, which limited religious freedom. Papkov contended that this particular issue is often used as a so-called "Exhibit A" when critics maintain that the state and the Orthodox Church do not respect the principle of separation of church and state. The Church, however, rarely achieves success in pursuing its legislative agenda in this way, Papkov pointed out. Furthermore, Papkov asserted, the law's passage had more to do with the testy relationship between the Duma and President Yeltsin at the time.

Papkov proceeded to discuss another controversial example: the new school curriculum that includes "Fundamentals of Russian Culture," which promotes Russian Orthodox beliefs. While some saw this as a clear sign that the Church is playing an improperly prominent role in the affairs of the state, Papkov pointed out that this program was never given official federal authorization. In fact, after a former Minister of Education took the step of providing some guidelines for regional implementation, he was subsequently fired. The replacement Minister of Education reversed the federal government's policy on school curricula.

A third observation Papkov made is that, while language referencing Orthodoxy and spirituality remain in certain party platforms in advance of the 2008 elections, the most successful ones have gotten rid of Orthodoxy as a concern. Even where Orthodoxy is mentioned, those references to religion cannot be understood as a result of the Church's influence, because the parties' understanding of Orthodoxy is at odds with that of the Church itself. The most commonly stated platform goals tend to be securing a comfortable life and obtaining interesting jobs and high salaries. Religion, Papkov emphasized, is typically referred to as something which unifies citizens of an otherwise shaky Russian Federation, or as a component of Russian dukhovnost, which means spirituality but which is closer in connotation to "culture" than to "religion" as it is used in this context.

In this way, Papkov presented and refuted common arguments regarding the clericalization of the Russian state. She concluded by saying that the Orthodox Church is actually quite weak vis-à-vis the state and that commonly cited examples of its involvement in policy are mostly "window dressing" and lack real federal support.