Last week, the new British government expelled four Russian diplomats and tightened visa requirements for Russian officials in response to Moscow's refusal to extradite Andrei Lugovoi, a Russian citizen whom the British Crown Prosecution Service wants to be tried in Britain for the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, who died of polonium poisoning last year.

There was no word of economic sanctions yet, which probably reflects the British business community's reluctance to lose the handsome profits they are making in Russia.

The United States strongly supported Great Britain, with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice calling on Russia to extradite Lugovoi. The EU, however, was quite lukewarm to the idea of being dragged into another brawl with Russia on a matter that did not directly concern other EU states.

The British move was met with surprise in Moscow, which up to the last moment thought that the case could and should be dealt with as a criminal, rather than political, matter.

Moscow's response was restrained and proportionate, expelling four British diplomats, placing a visa ban on British government officials and suspending joint secret service efforts on fighting terrorism. President Vladimir Putin tried to play down the significance of the diplomatic crisis, and the Russian authorities hastened to reassure British investors that they were safe doing business in Russia.

Moscow also sought to emphasize that the British were simply asking too much ­ to change Russia's Constitution, which directly prohibits the extradition of Russian nationals. The Brits were also accused of double standards and duplicity, since London has a long track record of not extraditing those even suspected of terrorism to third countries, including Canada and Germany, to say nothing about Russia's most wanted man ­ Boris Berezovsky. In 2001, British Home Secretary Jack Straw refused to carry out the extradition of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, despite a request from Spain and a concurring decision of a British court.

Then almost immediately reports emerged that the British police arrested and subsequently deported a Russian national who was plotting to assassinate Berezovsky. The latter immediately claimed to be the target of a Kremlin attempt on his life.

What is the real political significance of this stand off? Did the British overplay their hand by insisting on Lugovoi's extradition while fully aware that the Russian Constitution does not allow it? Was the Russian response justified? What is the view from Washington and Brussels on the diplomatic war between Russia and Britain? How will it all develop? What will be the consequences for Russia's relations with the West and Russia's domestic developments in an election year?

Professor Nicolai N. Petro, Department of Political Science, University of Rhode Island

Leading Western press outlets like the Washington Post and The Times of London have set new standards of journalistic inventiveness by speculating that Britain's refusal to share evidence with Russia about the murder of Alexander Litvinenko must mean that it has evidence that implicates the Russian government!

Why has this evidence not been made public? Because the recently installed Prime Minister Gordon Brown does not want to start his term by damaging relations with Russia. The fact that the British have already done so by expelling four Russian diplomats seems to have escaped their attention.

In contrast, the Russian press has been suggesting for months now that no evidence is forthcoming because there simply is none. But, after all the media frenzy in Britain about Litvinenko, admitting this would abruptly end Brown's honeymoon with the press.

Both interpretations suffer from a lack of hard evidence, but as Mary Dejevsky, lead writer for The Independent cogently notes, there are some rather "perplexing" aspects to the UK's position.

The first is that British officials have failed to provide their Russian counterparts with any evidence for the charges against Andrei Lugovoi (not even an autopsy report on Litvinenko's death!), even though they know that, under the terms of the 1957 European Convention on Extradition, an extradition request cannot be fulfilled without some evidentiary basis. Britain has not invoked Article 16 ("Provisional arrest") or even asked Russian authorities to institute appropriate proceedings against Lugovoi, presumably because this would require sharing "the files, information and exhibits relating to the offence."

In light of Britain's totally implausible demand that Russia violate its own Constitution (Article 61, para. 1: "The citizen of the Russian Federation may not be deported out of Russia or extradited to another state"), Russian officials have called attention to their right, under Article 6 of the 1957 treaty, to refuse extradition. Still, the British government had the temerity to make its request after having refused 21 separate Russian requests for extradition!

Finally, there is the peremptory rejection of the idea that Lugovoi could be arraigned on murder charges in Russia if, as required by the treaty, evidence to support such prosecution were provided. Sir Ken Macdonald, director of public prosecutions, even went out of his way to question the integrity of the Russian judicial system, though he surely must know that it actually has a very good track record when it comes to trying Russians for crimes committed abroad ­ of two hundred such cases, nearly a half has ended in convictions.

It would appear that Gordon Brown sees the entire Litvinenko affair as an embarrassment from which to extricate himself, while scoring a few domestic points with the British press for "standing up to Moscow." He could thus extract maximum political benefit from an essentially empty hand, while simultaneously distancing himself from his unpopular predecessor.

In the long run, however, if no new evidence emerges to build a case against Lugovoi, Britain's only recourse may be to follow the terms of the 1957 treaty and to participate in a trial of Litvinenko's murderer in Russia. Before it comes to that, however, we will most likely see a far more sober-minded Gordon Brown seeking to make amends with Moscow.

Eugene Kolesnikov, Private Consultant, the Netherlands

When a politically significant news story breaks out, the state and national elites send signals to the media on how the story is interpreted by the establishment in order to frame further discourse in accordance with state interests. There are hundreds of ways to do that without violating the principles of free media: news conferences, interviews and off-the-record opinions of state officials, statements by opinion leaders and think tanks, leaked documents etc.

Let's take a look at some of the signals sent by the UK establishment during the first week after Litvinenko's death on November 23, 2006. Immediately afterward, Peter Hain, Northern Ireland secretary, said that Putin's rule in Russia was "clouded" by an "extremely murky murder" of Russian investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya, and that there had been "huge attacks" on liberty and democracy during Putin's presidency.

He was soon joined by the Liberal Democrats' leader, Sir Menzies Campbell, who said the government should have been "much tougher" on Putin, adding that it would have to consider relations carefully if it were established that "state terrorism" was perpetuated on British soil. British legislator Malcolm Bruce joined the chorus by accusing Russia of backsliding on democracy, human rights and media freedoms. "We have treated Mr. Putin with too much respect while we have been watching him pursue these post-Soviet tendencies. I think we have a situation where there is a growing realization that you can't really trust Russia." he said.

During the same first week, press reports suggested that British intelligence sources increasingly suspected that Alexander Litvinenko was the victim of a plot involving "rogue elements" within the Russian state. When Russian authorities confirmed that Russian citizens cannot be extradited to Britain and have to be interrogated and persecuted in Russia, Tony Blair declares that no political or diplomatic barrier would be allowed to stand in the way of the British investigation into Litvinenko's death. At the same time, British officials in Moscow were reportedly trying to explain the nature of the judicial system in Britain and the fact that detectives operate independently of political pressure, making clear that in Russia this would not be the case.

Thus, very quickly and efficiently, before the ink had dried on the investigation order, the UK, as well as the Western establishment in general, launched a public campaign against Russia. It was the second major campaign in a row, the first being the assassination of Anna Politkovskaya, also spun in the same manner. The fact that it should take a real stretch of the imagination to suggest that Russian authorities would want to kill a minor former KGB officer and cover half of Europe in radioactive traces leading back to Russia did not matter as the story took hold with the public.

My reading of this and many other related stories is that the UK is playing a geopolitical game against Russia in full coordination with the United States. The aim of this game is to contain Russia and bring Europe back into the Transatlantic alliance with a consolidated front against Russia. The West still does not want to come to terms with Russia's independent foreign policy course.

Russian response to the British political and diplomatic escalation has been measured and conciliatory to the extent possible, providing confidence that Russia cannot be so easily shaken by political provocation.

Andrei Zagorski, Professor, MGIMO-University, Moscow

The case of Lugovoi does not have a political solution but can have a legal one. The British authorities should recognize that the Russian Constitution prohibits extraditing Russian nationals. Meanwhile, Moscow needs to realize that London has good reasons to mistrust the Russian courts and prosecution. It would be fair to expect reassurances from Moscow that the case would receive a fair and politically unbiased court hearing. For this, the trial could admit not only international observers, but British investigators should be given the opportunity to conduct required investigative activities in Russia and to represent the side of the prosecution.

Alternatively, Mr. Lugovoi could himself sue the British government either in the UK or in a third country. He has good reasons to do so, since his reputation, business and travel opportunities are affected by the current dispute. He would not have to appear in court himself but could, instead, be represented by lawyers.

Moscow should have a vested interest in bringing the case to a legal resolution as soon as possible unless it fears that the eventual consequences would outweigh the benefits.

Firstly, Moscow seems to suffer more from the unresolved dispute than the UK does. It fits into the chain of cases, such as the assassinations of Politkovskaya and Litvinenko, which fuel the impression that those murders have been politically motivated and that Moscow is covering those who might have been involved. This continues to damage both the image of Russia and that of Putin personally.

Secondly, the attempt to compare the Lugovoi case to London's refusal to extradite an exiled Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky and the former representative of the separatist Chechen government Akhmed Zakayev does not help but, rather, hurts the Kremlin's reputation. This argument reinforces the impression that the reason not to extradite Lugovoi is political, with the legal argumentation provided only as a flimsy excuse.

Professor Stephen Blank, The US Army War College, Carlyle Barracks, PA

(Dr. Blank's views as contributed to Russia Profile do not represent the position of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government)

While we are only at the beginning of the controversy over Lugovoi's extradition, this episode will surely further damage Russian relations with the West because it reinforces the perception of the values gap separating Russia and Europe. The issue over the Russian Constitution not permitting extradition is overblown because, as the Economist has pointed out, such issues have in the past been handled by other countries in an expeditious way.

As for Britain's refusal to extradite people wanted by other states, this must be understood in terms of the British tradition of hosting political refugees and giving them shelter. Lugovoi's murder however, is not a political crime as in Pinochet's case but rather a purely criminal act.

Russia's incomprehension of the British response and of the EU's support for it underscores once again that it believes everyone conducts their affairs with the same cynicism and brutality that Moscow does, and that talk of democracy is nothing more than a sinister power play aimed at undermining Russia. While such talk may play well in Russia, it is utterly misguided and ultimately reflects the self-isolating, even paranoid and ethnocentric elements of Russian policy so prevalent these days.

Although this episode is unlikely to affect U.S.-Russian ties in any serious fashion, it is another blow to Russo-European relations. Litvinenko's murder and the Russian reaction to it have re-invoked the presumption of political murder being a standard Russian response to domestic dissent, raising questions about Russia's G-8 membership and claims for special rank and privilege. In addition, a fugitive tycoon Leonid Nevzlin in Israel also has claimed that Putin's people have tried to kill him, and the revelation of a recent murder plot aimed at Boris Berezovsky only heightens this presumption.

As for the justifications offered for Russia's response, the most one can say is that it was proportionate to Great Britain's actions. Its restraint suggests that Moscow knows full well that London's stance was justified. Unfortunately such episodes only reinforce the conviction that Russia is regressing to behavior redolent of the Soviet period and that it cannot be completely trusted as a full partner for Europe.