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#34 - JRL 2007-10 - JRL Home
Russia Profile
January 15, 2007
Welcome to the Neighborhood
The EU Slows its Expansion, But Can Still Exert Influence
By Charles Grant
Charles Grant is director of the Centre for European Reform, which recently
published his pamphlet “Europe’s Blurred Boundaries: Rethinking Enlargement and
Neighbourhood Policy” (www.cer.org.uk).
The enlargement of the EU is slowing down. Bulgaria and Romania have just
joined, bringing the membership to 27, but in many EU countries there is little
enthusiasm for extending the Union’s boundaries further. Governments worry that
unless the EU institutions undergo drastic reform – which seems unlikely –
further enlargement would render the EU incapable of speedy or effective
decision-making. Ordinary voters worry that more enlargement would lead to mass
immigration from new members coupled with job losses. Croatia may be lucky
enough to join the EU around 2010, but the other Western Balkan states have
little prospect of acceding in the foreseeable future; additionally, Turkey’s
accession talks with the EU are going nowhere.
Until now, the EU has used the accession process as its main method for
promoting economic and political reform in its neighborhood. But with
enlargement slowing down, it needs new methods. Germany, which has just taken
over the EU presidency, says that a new “European neighborhood policy” will be a
priority. A key challenge for the EU this year will be to build stronger ties
with neighbors that are not on the road to membership.
The EU’s current neighborhood policy, in place since 2004, is proving
inadequate. Under present guidelines, the EU has to negotiate an “action plan”
with each neighbor, promising trade, aid, political contacts and participation
in EU programs – though not membership – in return for a series of specified
reforms. Action plans have already been formed with Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Moldova, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia
and Ukraine. If the regime in Belarus became less autocratic, it too could
participate in the neighborhood policy.
Several of the action plans have been modestly successful. Ukraine has
adapted some of its laws and standards to match those of the EU, and will gain
an easier visa regime in return. Morocco and Moldova have improved borders
controls. Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia have set up forums to discuss governance,
democracy and human rights. But the neighborhood policy is failing to transform
neighbors in the way the accession process transformed much of Eastern Europe.
The carrots held out by the EU are not appealing enough to motivate political
elites to undertake many of the painful reforms required.
The EU’s efforts to build a new neighborhood policy have implications for
Russia. Some Russians, seeing the former Soviet countries of Eastern Europe as
part of the Russian sphere of influence, oppose closer ties between the EU and
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Some Americans, and even a few European
policymakers, similarly see Eastern Europe as part of a geopolitical “great
game”: they talk of rolling back Russian influence in the region. However, as
far as most EU governments are concerned, what matters in these countries is the
speed and quality of political and economic reform. They believe that it does
not matter whether an election-winner is pro-Moscow or pro-Western, so long as
the electoral process is free and fair.
Russians would be wrong to think that the EU wants to “grab” these countries.
Quite the contrary: most Europeans are horrified by the thought of Ukraine
joining the EU. Of the 27 member-states, only Poland and the Baltic States are
in favor. The others view Ukraine as a faraway, poor, complicated and unstable
country that would cause trouble if offered EU membership.
It is because the EU does not want to take in the likes of Ukraine and
Georgia that it is trying to beef up its neighborhood policy. Germany has plans
to integrate neighbors with EU energy markets and transport networks. The
Commission will offer Ukraine and other neighbors “deep free trade” with the EU.
That would mean scrapping not only tariffs, but also some non-tariff barriers to
trade and investment.
The EU should go further. It should offer the best-performing neighbors
partnerships in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). If countries such
as Georgia and Ukraine make steady progress towards becoming liberal
democracies, the EU should ask them to send diplomats to the Council of
Ministers in Brussels. They would take part in discussions on policies of common
interest, such as Black Sea security, non-proliferation, counter-terrorism and
illegal immigration. The partners would help to shape EU policy but, not being
members, could not vote on it; once the EU governments had decided a policy, the
partner would be free to sign on to it, or not.
Such partners would gain several benefits. Their politicians and bureaucrats
would learn about the EU ethos of compromise. These neighbors would find it much
easier to adopt the acquis communautaire (the body of EU laws candidate
countries must adopt) in foreign policy – much of which is declarations – than
in other areas, such as the single market. Above all, joining the CFSP would
make countries such as Ukraine and Georgia feel a little safer. Many Georgians
and some Ukrainians view NATO membership as the best guarantee of their
security. But since that goal remains a distant prospect, they may favor closer
security ties with the EU as an interim step. Russia would probably not be very
happy to see such countries join the CFSP. But it would surely favor that option
to the enlargement of NATO.
Such ideas for strengthening neighborhood policy will only work if they are
seen as membership neutral. Some Georgians and Ukrainians will sniff at any
offer that does not mention the goal of membership. But when they realize that
membership is not on the cards for the foreseeable future, they may welcome
other ways of moving closer to the EU. Similarly, some EU countries hostile to
enlargement will be reluctant to give neighbors a status that could be seen as a
steppingstone to membership. But in time, they may see that the EU has a
strategic need to foster reform in its neighbors, and that it must therefore
give them a closer embrace.
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