Paul Goble, in an article entitled "How Separate are Church and State in Putin's Russia?" (Johnson's List: #66 17 March 2006) makes several bold accusations against the Putin government and the Russian Orthodox Church. He gives credence to the views of two journalists who claim that the Russian State is surrendering to "full-blown clericalism" and that the Russian Orthodox Church is to blame for the rise of "Nazism" in many parts of the country. These claims are pure demagoguery; the familiar arguments trotted out to support them do not stand up to any sort of scrutiny.

First, it should be observed that the individuals and groups who have made it their calling to pronounce dire warnings about the “clericalization” of! Russia are themselves highly suspect. The commentators cited by Goble set a peculiarly strict standard for “the separation of church and state” which no Western democracy currently meets. Activists such as Messrs Buryanov and Mozgovoi, it seems, would not even grant the Russian Church legal status as a non-profit organization, something which churches in the United States and Europe have come to regard as a constitutional right. Thus, one must conclude that Buryanov and Mozgovoi are, at best, radical proponents of “laicite”, and at worst, nostalgics, pining for the old Soviet policy of state enforced atheism, which is still practiced today in Communist China and North Korea.

Nonetheless, for clarity’s sake, let us review one by one the specific accusations, which Mr Goble has seen fit to repeat. The introduction of chaplains in the Russian army and the establishment of theological departments at Russian state universities cannot be viewed as signs of encroaching clericalism. Military chaplains and theological departments are absolutely commonplace in the United States and Europe, have been so for a long time, and virtually no one ever claims that their existence is a violation of the principle of separation of church and state. The Russian government should be commended for breaking with the country’s Soviet past and bringing Russia more in line with Western norms.

The Putin administration has not granted the Russian Orthodox Church exclusive access to the country’s soldiers and university students, nor has the Church ever requested a monopoly on proselytism in these areas. Deacon Andrei Kuraev has been quoted as saying “Whatever secular institution an Orthodox priest enters, he is prepared to be accompanied by a Muslim Mullah” The Patriarch of the Russian Church, in his recent announcement in support of introducing chaplains in the military, has stated that “if there are practicing Muslims in the armed forces, then the spiri! tual leaders of Islam also need to have the ability to support them.” Interfax-religia has recently reported that the head of the Central Spiritual Command of Russian Muslims Talgat Tadjuddin along with a leader of the Jewish community Rabbi Adolph Shaevich have both spoken out in favor of military chaplains.

Contrary to Mr Goble’s claims, the Putin administration has not supported the introduction of a course on the Foundations of Orthodox Culture in Russian public schools. This course is being taught on a voluntary basis in some regions of the country, where agreements have been reached between local church officials and local authorities. The Church has been campaigning to have the Foundations of Orthodox Culture added to the national curriculum for years (with allowances to be made for regions that have large Muslim populations) but this campaign, thus far, has been met only with resistance from Federal authorities. This itself is evidence that there is no “sweet ! deal” between the Russian Church and the Federal government.

Mr Goble cites allegations to the effect that the Russian Church serves the State’s interests by “giving way to the needs of mercantilist politicians and forgetting about [its] responsibility before God and the people.” Really? Where’s the evidence? None is given. As a matter of fact, in January 2005 the Orthodox Church harshly criticized the government’s ill-conceived and ill-managed plan to monetize state benefits to pensioners and invalids. The Patriarch made a lengthy announcement, which contained the following words: “Reforms should not under any circumstances deprive people of their ability to use public transportation and communication, to keep their homes, or to have access to medical assistance and medical drugs. Otherwise a tragedy is inevitable for millions of our fellow citizens who have worked their whole lives for the good of their Fatherland, and who today are in need of support, and protection…. “I call upon all government authorities today to act according to the golden rule of Christian morality: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”

Accusations are constantly made about the suppression of religious minorities in Russia. Russia’s act "On freedom of conscience and on religious associations" passed in 1997 is a law that Western observers, particularly Americans, love to hate. But this law, which gives preference to three “traditional” religions besides Orthodoxy is not proof of the existence of some sort of tit-for-tat alliance of the Russian Church and State which has developed at the expense of Russian society. The first version of the act, passed by the Duma in 1996 with widespread popular support, was vetoed by President Yeltsin, despite energetic lobbying on the part of the Moscow Patriarchate to persuade him to sign it into law. In the two years I lived in Russia, I never once m! et anyone who had a kind word for the foreign missionary groups that descended upon the country in the 1990s. Most have some unpleasant recollection to share of being solicited by missionaries on the streets or on their doorsteps. Some even recall missionaries who fraudulently represented themselves as Orthodox in order to lure people into their churches. Nearly 80 % of Russians declare themselves Orthodox. Whether they are involved in the life of the Church, or merely feel themselves part of an Orthodox cultural tradition, they resent the presumption of foreign missionaries and are satisfied with the current law on religious organizations.

Truth be told, the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Federal government is just what Metropolitan Kirill says it is: “cooperation and dialogue.” The level of cooperation in reality is much less than it could be, and the dialogue often reveals fundamental disagreements on matters of principle a! nd policy, both of which give the lie to the myth about “full-blown clericalism” in Russia.

One last word about the Church and Nazism: Only a follower of Critical Theory, according to which any conservative, traditionalist sentiment or conviction is “proto-fascism”, could really argue with confidence that the Russian Orthodox Church is responsible for a rise in “Nazi attitudes” in Russia. For those of us who realize that Nazism is a distinct ideology of racial superiority and totalitarian government, which arose at a particular time and place in history, the association of the latter with Orthodox Christianity in general, and today’s Russian Church in particular, is simply absurd. If anything, the Orthodox Church has probably decreased Nazi and Fascist attitudes in Russia by the example of its moderate patriotism. It is a piece of clumsiness to call the deceased Metropolitan Ioann a Nazi when his widely published book Samoderzhavie Dukha makes a point of denou! ncing National Socialism as an ideology of “racial pride, imperial lust for power, and pernicious, unchecked vainglory.” Metr. Ioann did say some things that were truly “beyond the pale,” but he never allowed his animus for Russia’s real and imagined enemies to overwhelm his deeper conviction that Russians themselves were ultimately to blame for the tragedies they have suffered. As for Konstantin Dushenov, he has departed from the faith of his teacher and turned Orthodoxy into a “cult of the Judeo-Masonic conspiracy.” He is a self-proclaimed rebel leader of a small lunatic fringe whose views and publications have been censured by Church hierarchs.