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JRL Research & Analytical Supplement -
JRL Home POLITICS
POLITICS 1. DEVELOPMENTS IN RADICAL NATIONALISM SOURCE. Galina Kozhevnikova (ed. Alexander Verkhovsky), Radical Nationalism and Efforts to Oppose it in Russia in 2005. Annual Report. SOVA (Center for Information and Analysis), Moscow, January 2006 This is the latest in a series of highly informative annual reports from SOVA on developments on the radical Russian nationalist wing of Russian politics. (1) Violence SOVA statistics on racist and neo-Nazi (mainly skinhead) violence show a decline in the number of victims killed from 46 in 2004 to 28 in 2005, but an increase in the number beaten or injured from 208 in 2004 to 375 in 2005. (2) The range of people selected for assault has broadened to include members of rival youth subcultures like rappers, punks, skaters, and Goths (up from 4 in 2004 to 90 in 2005) and even chance passersby as well as "racial enemies." The regional spread of documented attacks has also widened -- from 26 regions in 2004 to 36 in 2005. Another shift is that skinhead organizations are now much more willing to claim responsibility for racist attacks. In 2005 there were several "ethnic riots" in the North Caucasus (Krasnodar Territory, Rostov and Astrakhan Provinces). These clashes pitted Cossacks and Kalmyks against Armenians, Greeks, and Chechens. Migrant workers were assaulted in Siberia: e.g., 6 Uzbeks lynched in a village in Irkutsk Province. Roma (Gypsies) have been victims of mass attacks in many regions. The report notes various other violent incidents, including an assassination attempt by radical nationalists on Anatoly Chubais on March 17. Organized activity The splintering of what was previously the largest single radical nationalist organization, Russian National Unity, has made for a more complex nationalist scene. (3) However, there have been many fairly successful attempts to bring nationalists from different parties together, especially at the local level through "Russian clubs." An important unifying event was the congress held in Moscow on November 21 to "reconstitute" the tsarist-era Union of the Russian People (Black Hundreds). (4) Instances of collaboration between anti-regime radical nationalist "rightists" and "leftists" have become more common. The author notes several significant shifts in the pattern of radical nationalist activity, including: * An increased emphasis on work with youth. The National Democratic Party of Russia is especially active in this sphere. Also relevant is the establishment of the Eurasia Youth Union, linked to Alexander Dugin's Eurasia Movement. (5) * A shift in emphasis away from anti-Semitism and toward other themes with greater popular appeal such as agitation against Moslems, non-Orthodox Christians, and nonwhite migrants (with the setting up of a Movement Against Illegal Immigration). (6) "Domesticating" skinheads Another "new and alarming trend" is a consistent effort by the Putin regime to "domesticate" skinheads and nationalist soccer fans through the promotion of various pro-presidential youth groups. The most important such organization is "Nashi" -- Russian for "our guys." Nashi claims to be "working with" and "reforming" skinheads. It has close ties with the "Gladiator" security agency, which is connected with the fans of the "Spartak" (Spartacus) soccer club. "Nashists" and "gladiators" are the suspected attackers of young leftists outside the Avtozavodskaya subway station in Moscow in August 2005. The victims were mostly supporters of the National Bolshevik Party. Although the NBP is itself radical nationalist (of the "leftist" variety), it is opposed to Putin. Thus the fight was between pro-regime nationalists and anti-regime nationalists. Pro-regime nationalist youth groups also exist at the regional level. An example is a group in Voronezh called "White Patrol," which practices sports, combats drug abuse, and assaults nonwhite students. Last summer a hard rock festival was held in Moscow under the auspices of Putin's United Russia. To attract skinheads the program featured Sergei "Spider" Troitsky, head of the band "Corrosion of Metal," who has long been known for his links with extreme nationalists. Thus the main thrust of the strategy of "domesticating" skinheads and the like is to co-opt them into structures controlled by the regime, with little if any impact on their violent hatred of ethnic, religious, cultural, and other minorities. Elections Most radical nationalists who run for office still get few votes, but there have been a few exceptions. Colonel V. Kvachkov won 29 percent in the election held in Moscow District 199 in December 2005, despite (or because of) the fact that he faces charges of terrorism for funding the assassination attempt on Chubais. However, many candidates representing "respectable" nationalist parties -- especially but not only "Rodina," LDPR, and CPRF -- also exploit virulent xenophobic rhetoric in their campaigns. In October 2005 Rodina used the slogan "Let's clean the garbage out of Moscow!" -- "garbage" clearly referring to non-Slavic migrants. Opposition to radical nationalism There has been slow but steady progress in the ability of the state to take legal action against perpetrators of hate speech and hate crimes. More people are being prosecuted under a wider range of laws and being given stiffer sentences. Public action, both organized and spontaneous, against extreme nationalism has also been growing. Some 1,500 people attended an "anti-fascist march" on December 18. It is increasingly common for people on their own initiative to destroy nationalist leaflets and graffiti. On occasion bystanders react violently -- for example, beating up skinheads shouting offensive slogans. On December 16 leftists attacked a nationalist music festival, setting off massive fighting leading to many injuries and one death (of a leftist). The author argues that such methods are counterproductive. NOTES (1) Despite the title of the report, it does not cover developments related to radical non-Russian nationalist movements. In this summary I mention only a few points that seem to me of particular interest. I will be glad to forward the file containing the full report on request. Further material is also available at http://xeno.sova-center.ru (2) These figures only cover cases for which reliable data are available. They do not include the victims of mass attacks or of assaults on homeless people and former skinheads, as there are no reliable data for these categories. Thus too much significance should not be attributed to the apparent trends. For more on skinheads, see RAS No. 22 item 1. (3) For a survey (now somewhat dated) of radical nationalist organizations, including RNU and NBP, see my book "Russian Fascism: Traditions, Tendencies, Movements" (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001). (4) The congress was attended by over 1,000 delegates and guests from 70 cities in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Abkhazia. (5) For analysis of Dugin's Eurasianism, see RAS No. 12 item 3, also my book. (6) The shift in emphasis does not mean that anti-Semitism has been abandoned. In Krasnoyarsk, for instance, nationalists called for an investigation of the supposed ritual killing of 5 children by Chassidim.
ECONOMY 2. OIL AND GROWTH SOURCE. Rudiger Ahrend (OECD Economics Department), Russia's Post-Crisis Growth: Its Sources and Prospects for Continuation, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, No. 1, January 2006, pp. 1-24 Over the period 1999--2004 Russian GDP has risen on average by almost 7 percent per annum. Most observers had attributed the post-crisis recovery to transient factors like the devaluation of the ruble and did not expect that it would prove so strong or last so long. (1) Why have they been proven wrong? The first factor that the author stresses is the "staggering" dependence of growth on natural resource exports, oil above all. Over 2001--2004 natural resources accounted for over a third of GDP growth (70 percent of growth in industrial output), with oil alone accounting for almost a quarter of GDP growth (45 percent of growth in industrial output). (2) Russia's reliance on oil cannot be so heavy over the long term, as its oil reserves are "comparatively limited." However, gas has the potential to take up the slack, provided that progress is made in reforming the currently monopolistic gas industry. The second factor is the significant increases in labor productivity that have occurred in almost all major industrial sectors, averaging nearly 10 percent per annum over 1999--2004 (over 12 percent in 2003--2004). In the earlier part of the period productivity gains were achieved mainly by shedding surplus labor ("passive restructuring"), but since 2002 the more efficient organization of labor has also played its part ("active restructuring"). The third factor is improvement in the fiscal sphere. Tax reform has made both for more effective tax collection and for the reduction of many tax rates. Higher tax revenue, together with tighter fiscal policy, has generated surpluses in the federal budget from which foreign debt has been repaid (with the aid also of appreciation of the ruble). The burden of debt service has accordingly fallen from 3.4 percent of GDP in 1999 to 1.2 percent in 2004. A weak spot remains the investment rate, which at roughly 18 percent is much higher than in the 1990s but still low in international comparison. (3) Although there may still be some scope for fuller utilization of existing productive capacity, Ahrend considers it unlikely that Russia can sustain high growth over the medium term unless the investment rate increases. The rate of investment depends, inter alia, on investor confidence in respect for property rights on the part of the government. The Yukos affair does not bode well from this point of view. Investment in oil extraction decreased by 25 percent in the period January-September 2004 -- a decline that the author attributes directly to the Yukos affair. Ahrend agrees that it would be in Russia's interest to diversify its export structure, which in recent years has been heavily dominated by oil, gas, and other natural resources, energy-intensive basic manufactures like steel, aluminum, nickel, and fertilizer, and arms. However, he argues that diversification "will occur gradually, if at all." Therefore the optimal strategy for Russia is to continue to rely on resource extraction over the medium term while aiming to diversify over the long term. Let me make a critical observation at this point. Seeing how crucial the distinction between "medium" and "long" term is to the author's prognosis, the reader has a right to protest at his failure to state exactly what he means by these terms. Ahrend suggests that "the service sector could be another driver of long-term growth." But increased demand for service presupposes a general rise in living standards -- that is, increased production and export of material goods. The author identifies three sources of risk in resource-driven development: * external vulnerability to sudden changes in the terms of trade * "Dutch disease" -- that is, the tendency to ruble appreciation in response to pressure from resource export revenues, making domestic investment unprofitable. It can be regarded as a kind of addiction. * associated institutional pathologies (see following item for an example) Ahrend believes, however, that these risks can be controlled and minimized. (4) Rapid growth can be sustained over the medium term while furthering long-term diversification, provided that a number of conditions are met: reform of the gas sector, increased pipeline construction, continuing fiscal discipline, limits on state interference in business, respect for property rights. NOTES (1) For one of these less sanguine assessments, see RAS No. 27 item 3. (2) The full importance of the natural resource sector is obscured by distortions in the methodology used in Russia to compile the national accounts. (3) The average rate for all OECD countries is 22 percent. (4) He explains how it can be done in a forthcoming article in the journal "Eurasian Geography and Economics" ("Can Russia Break the 'Resource Curse'?")
ECONOMY 3. OIL AND BANKING SOURCE. Anastasia Gnezditskaia (George Mason University), 'Unidentified Shareholders': the Impact of Oil Companies on the Banking Sector in Russia, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, No. 3, May 2005, pp. 457-80 The author examines the role of banks owned by oil extraction companies. Seven of Russia's top 30 banks, accounting for 35-40 percent of all banking assets, are "oil banks." In addition, there is a "gas bank," Gazprombank, and a number of "mineral banks" such as MDM and Alfa Bank -- although in the latter case the connection with specific companies is less tight. "Oil banks" (1) first appeared in the perestroika years, but their current importance has its origin in the collapse of the banking system in the financial crisis of August 1998. At this time natural resource exporters closed their accounts with the failing commercial banks and moved the money to the banks under their control. The oil banks work solely with the companies that own them. They feel no need to attract the custom of regional industrial companies, let alone household deposits. (2) Thus they are disconnected from the economy outside the oil and gas sector. The operations of the oil banks are highly opaque. Even the fact of oil company ownership is often concealed behind the label "unidentified shareholders." The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) does not regulate them effectively, being more concerned with control over monetary indicators. Gnezditskaya explains the channels through which oil and gas companies exert influence on government: * by forming alliances with local and regional elites in the regions where resources are extracted Such efforts do not always succeed. Indeed, in only 4 of 10 regions for which information is publicly available do extractive companies have a fully cooperative relationship with regional authorities. * by trying to influence the outcome of local and regional elections -- again, not always with success * by lobbying at all levels of government Since 2000 they have been able to use for this purpose the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, previously dominated by the military-industrial complex. * by influencing appointments of state officials There is a substantial interchange of high level personnel between key companies and the government. This is especially striking in the case of Gazprom. * by cultivating ties with Duma deputies * in several cases (e.g., Lukoil, Interros, Alfa Group) by making use of owned media outlets The influence of the oil and gas companies extends to foreign policy. For instance, in 1995-96 Lukoil, which wanted to participate in oil exploration in the Caspian Sea off the Azerbaijan coast, prevailed over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which wanted to block exploration until the legal status of the sea was settled. The most interesting part of Gnezditskaia's study is her comparison between the banking sectors in Russia and in other "petrostates" such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Here she draws in particular on the work of Karen Aziz Chaudhry on the Middle East. (3) NOTES (1) Here and henceforth I use the term "oil bank" broadly, to include also banks owned by other natural resource extractors. (2) Ordinary citizens (if they use a bank at all) tend to hold their savings at Sberbank, a state bank controlled by the Central Bank of Russia. (3) See Chaudhry's book "The Price of Wealth: Economics and Institutions in the Middle East" (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
ECONOMY 4. FORESTRY REFORM SOURCE. Tomila Lankina, Karelians Denounce Federal Forestry Reforms, Russian Regional Report, Vol. 11, No. 5, 14 February 2006 The Duma is currently considering the draft of a new Forest Code to reform the management of Russia's forestry resources. In January 2006 the author conducted interviews in Karelia (northwestern Russia) with local officials, businessmen, scientists, NGOs, and activists of the Vepps ethnic minority. All respondents were opposed to the draft code but felt powerless to influence its content. (2) Forests are federally owned, but for most of the post-Soviet period control over their use was mainly in the hands of regional governments. New legislation in 2004 shifted the locus of control back toward the federal center. The new code is based on a "business first" philosophy. One provision especially disliked by residents of Karelia is the introduction of auctions to sell forest tracts to the highest bidder, whether from inside or outside the region. Even "Group I" forests adjacent to urban areas, lakes, and rivers will be available for auction, eliminating zoning restrictions and threatening the free access of local people to their natural environment. Another likely consequence is that local government will no longer be able to force timber companies that dominate the local economy to pursue "socially responsible policies" such as the construction of heating facilities for local communities. NOTES (1) The Vepps, like the titular Karels, belong to the Finno-Ugric family. See RAS No. 33 item 6. (2) Documents expressing local views were sent to the Duma, only to disappear without trace.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 5. MALARIA MAKES A COMEBACK SOURCE. Russian Academy of Medical Sciences et al. Izmenenie klimata i zdorov'ye naseleniya Rossii v XXI veke [Climate Change and the Health of the Population of Russia in the 21st Century]. Moscow: Adamant, 2004 (1) Papers by V. P. Sergiev et al. and by V. V. Yasukevich and S. M. Semyonov, pp. 138-46 Malaria was rife in the tsarist empire and in the first three decades of the Soviet regime. The numbers of sufferers registered annually in 1900--1914 was in the range 3--3.5 million. But the worst years were 1934 and 1935, with over 9 million cases registered in the USSR as a whole and over 5 million in the RSFSR alone. The sharp rise in the early 1930s appears to have been one of the byproducts of forcible collectivization. Not only did total numbers peak at this time, but the mass deportation of peasants ("kulaks") from the Volga, the Kuban, and Ukraine spread the disease into the European North, where it had not previously been present. A vigorous campaign against malaria helped bring the figures down substantially in the second half of the 1930s (under 2 million in the RSFSR by 1940). After the war the campaign was resumed, and by 1960 (2) malaria was no longer extant in the Soviet Union. In the whole of the period 1960--2000 there were only three local outbreaks, all in the North Caucasus. (3) Since 2000, malaria has made a comeback in Russia, although so far on a fairly modest scale. Sporadic cases have appeared in the summer months (July and August) in certain districts of Moscow and in some places in Moscow Province. Annual registration in Russia as a whole runs currently at about 1,000. Most cases of malaria originate in CIS countries where the disease is more widespread, reaching Russia as a result of migration. However, the number of cases of local origin has been growing. Thus in 1998 there were 1,019 "imported" cases and 63 of local origin, while in 2002 the corresponding figures were 764 and 134. Malaria has been imported mainly from Tajikistan, where the disruption of civil war combined with an influx of malaria-carrying refugees from Afghanistan to generate the first post-Soviet malaria epidemic. The civil war and the ensuing destitution, of course, also generated the massive flow of refugees and labor migrants who took the malaria to Russia and other CIS countries. In the last few years Kyrgyzstan has become a second significant source of malaria, with 2,744 local cases registered in 2002. The epidemiological situation in Azerbaijan is also cause for concern. Specialists consider it likely that under the impact of global warming new sources of malaria will emerge within Russia itself. There is a steady increase in the area of stagnant inland water and marshland suitable for the breeding of mosquitoes. (4) Potential malarial habitats are appearing at higher altitudes (over 1,500 meters, i.e. 5,000 feet, above sea level). In addition, the season during which infection would be possible is growing longer. As in the US and other countries, mosquitoes are gradually penetrating further north as temperatures rise. It is a matter not only of the numbers of mosquitoes, but also of the mix of mosquito species. In various parts of Siberia it has been observed that species adapted to a relatively cool climate are giving way to species that prefer warmer temperatures and are more prone to carry malaria. NOTES (1) This is a collection of papers presented to an international seminar held in Moscow on April 5-6, 2004 (edited by Academician N.F. Izmerov and Drs. B.A. Revich and E.I. Korenberg). Sponsoring organizations were: * Division of Prophylactic Medicine of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences * Center of Demography and Human Ecology of the Institute of National-Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences * Russian Regional Ecological Center * "Environmental Defense" (an American NGO) The health impacts of global warming analyzed in the volume are complex and diverse. At the same time, global warming is not the only significant factor involved in many of the epidemiological problems discussed. I shall deal with other impacts in future issues of RAS. (2) Or even by 1957 according to one source. (3) Two occurred in Daghestan (105 and 23 cases, respectively) and one in Karachayevo-Cherkessia (13 cases). (4) For a useful introduction to mosquitoes, see Andrew Spielman and Michael D'Antonio, Mosquito: A Natural History of Our Most Persistent and Deadly Foe (New York: Hyperion, 2001).
EPIDEMIOLOGY 6. AIDS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS SOURCE. HIV/AIDS in the Caucasus Region: A Socio-Cultural Approach. Culture and Development Section, Division of Cultural Policies and Intercultural Dialogue, UNESCO (http://www.unesco.org/culture/aids). June 2005 (1) The first cases of HIV/AIDS in the South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) were reported in the late 1980s. By 2003 registered cases in the three countries taken together numbered 1,200, with a total of 243 deaths attributed to AIDS. Observers agree that these figures are too low: due to cost and/or stigma many sufferers do not seek treatment. UNAIDS estimates that the true figure lies in the range 3,500--19,000. Nevertheless, AIDS is much less prevalent than in Russia and Ukraine, though the rapid rate of increase is cause for alarm. Effective treatment for AIDS is not widely available. As of mid-2002, only 8 people in the whole region were receiving anti-retroviral therapy. (2) The main channels of transmission of AIDS in the South Caucasus are intravenous drug use with needle sharing and heterosexual sex (especially through prostitution). The other three possible channels -- homosexual sex, medical (e.g., blood transfusion), and mother-to-child -- account for under 5 percent of cases. (3) Thus there are high concentrations of infection among drug users and among prostitutes and their clients. However, the spread of AIDS to the broader population is facilitated by the fact that these are NOT marginal or isolated groups: * Drug users are not strongly stigmatized. (4) Many of them are highly educated and well integrated socially. * Most prostitutes are "respectable" women acting under economic compulsion. Many have non-commercial partners; in Armenia a quarter are married. Many are also drug users. Besides widespread poverty, factors conducive to the growth of prostitution are: -- large concentrations of well-paid male workers away from home to earn money in the oil and gas sector; and -- tolerance of male use of prostitutes. In a survey in Georgia 76 percent of young people said that it was acceptable for a young man to be taken to a prostitute for sexual initiation. The large scale of labor migration exacerbates the problem. 79 percent of those registered with HIV in Georgia were reportedly infected through drugs or sex while in Russia or Ukraine. Women trafficked for sex work abroad also return with AIDS. Public perceptions of AIDS reflect the images in the Western and Russian media rather than local realities. Thus people associate AIDS with homosexual and medical transmission, although neither of these has been a significant factor in the South Caucasus. Many survey respondents also believe that you can catch AIDS by sharing towels or toilets, kissing, or even shaking hands. (5) These fears fuel hostile and discriminatory attitudes toward AIDS sufferers. Many efforts by NGOs and IGOs (intergovernmental organizations) in the field of AIDS education have failed due to the absence of appropriate local NGOs to serve as partners and to cultural insensitivity. Parents, and sometimes teachers too, oppose sex health education for children, especially for girls. If children are to be educated, then adults will have to be educated first. This will require gaining the cooperation of local social, including religious, networks. It is interesting to note that Moslem organizations in Azerbaijan have been supportive of AIDS education, while the Georgian Orthodox Church has blocked the introduction of a national health curriculum in Georgia's schools. The spread of Islam may therefore create more favorable conditions for AIDS education and prevention. (6) NOTES (1) Report produced in the framework of UNESCO project "Culturally Appropriate Information, Education, Communication for HIV Prevention in the Three Caucasus Countries." Project funded by Flemish government. Chief Scientific Consultant -- Professor Cynthia Buckley (University of Texas at Austin). (2) These 8 people were in Georgia. (3) A similar pattern applies to Russia, except that medical transmission has played a bigger role there (e.g., the outbreak in Elista, Kalmykia). See RAS No. 8 item 9. (4) More stigma is attached to drug use in Azerbaijan than in Georgia and Armenia. (5) Even in a big city like Baku, 10 percent think you can get AIDS by shaking hands. (6) The last thought comes from me, not the authors of the report.
LAW 7. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT VERSUS THE PROCURACY SOURCE. "Supervision of Legality: The Evolving Role of the Procuracy." Statutes & Decisions: The Laws of the USSR and Its Successor States. A Journal of Translations (M.E. Sharpe of New York), Vol. 41, Nos. 1-2, January-February and March-April 2005 In post-Soviet Russia, as in the USSR, the Procuracy is a very powerful body. In addition to fulfilling functions carried out in the US by the public prosecutor, it is responsible for oversight of the whole legal system. Citizens with grievances against other state bodies may have recourse to the Procuracy. (Whether they get any satisfaction is another matter.) But where can they turn if they have grievances against the Procuracy? There is a place they can turn, and not necessarily in vain: the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (CCRF). These issues of "Statutes & Decisions" reproduce the federal law of 1992 that regulates the work of the Procuracy (No. 2202-1) and a series of rulings of the Constitutional Court that pertain to the powers of the Procuracy. Here I describe four cases in which citizens or regional authorities contested actions of the Procuracy and the CCRF found in their favor. (1) CCRF Decree No. 3-P of 2/18/2000 Citizen B. A. Kekhman lives in Samara. When the local administration demolished the building in which he owned an apartment, he complained to the district procurator. The district procurator investigated the matter and (predictably) found the complaint groundless. Citizen Kekhman then asked to inspect the documents of the investigation. His request was denied. He petitioned the district court to reverse the decision to deny his request. The court (again predictably) found in favor of the procurator. He then appealed in succession to the Samara Province Court and to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, again without result. Finally, he took the matter to the CCRF, which found in his favor. Persistence can pay off, it seems! The district, province, and supreme courts had all relied on Article 5.2 of the law on the Procuracy, which states that a procurator or investigator is not obliged to provide access to documents except in certain cases specified by federal law. The CCRF pointed out that this provision must be interpreted in context: its purpose is to protect the independence of the Procuracy by preventing inappropriate interference in its work. It is not intended to prevent citizens from exercising their constitutional right of access to information, subject only to overriding considerations of state secrecy that do not apply in cases of this kind. CCRF Decree No. 13-P of 7/17/02 The most important question raised by the petitioner in this case was the following. Does a procurator have the right to demand that an acquittal be reversed and a criminal case sent back for a second examination on the grounds that the preliminary investigation was incomplete or one-sided or the court's conclusions inconsistent with the facts? The CCRF answered no. Citing the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms, to which Russia is a signatory, it argued that a second investigation and trial can be held only if there had been an important violation of legal procedure or if significant new evidence had come to light. It ruled that those provisions of the law on the Procuracy and of the Code of Criminal Procedure which permit a second investigation and trial under any other circumstances contravene the Constitution. CCRF Decree No. 6-P of 4/11/2000 The procurator of Kemerovo Province petitioned the Kemerovo Province Court to invalidate a law on price policy adopted by the province legislature as contravening federal law. The court did as the procurator asked. The Kemerovo province authorities then asked the CCRF to rule on whether courts of general jurisdiction had the power to invalidate laws of subjects of the federation on these grounds. The CCRF answered no. The Constitution grants such powers only to the CCRF itself, and those provisions of the law on the Procuracy which vest such powers in other courts contravene the Constitution. CCRF Decree No. 13-P of 7/18/2003 In a somewhat similar case, the authorities of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan asked the CCRF to rule on whether courts of general jurisdiction have the power to invalidate provisions of constitutions or charters of subjects of the federation (2) as contravening the Constitution of the RF. Again, the CCRF answered no. Only the CCRF itself can decide cases of this type. Accordingly, those provisions of the law on the procuracy and of the Code of Civil Procedure which vest such power in courts of general jurisdiction are unconstitutional. So the Constitutional Court does not necessarily take the side of the authorities in disputes with individual citizens, nor the side of the federal center in disputes with regional governments. (3) We may conclude that the idea of the rule of law is at least not completely absent from Russian judicial practice. True, there remains the little matter of whether procurators actually implement court decisions that they don't like. Can someone answer that question for us? NOTES (1) I omit cases dealing with matters of less general interest, such as the age at which procuracy officials have to retire. The March-April issue also contains translations of articles on various aspects of procurators' work. (2) "Ethnic" Republics in the RF have the right to adopt their own constitutions. "Russian" provinces and territories cannot adopt constitutions but can adopt their own charters. These constitutions and charters of subjects of the federation have a special legal status higher than that of ordinary laws of subjects of the federation. (3) This is consistent with a finding of the Reddaway-Orttung study on federal-regional relations (see RAS No. 33 item 3).
RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS 8. NUCLEAR ENERGY COOPERATION SOURCE. Yuri Humber, Putin Revives Nuclear Alliance, Moscow Times, January 13, 2006, as reproduced in Russian Environmental Digest, Vol. 8, No. 3, January 9-15, 2006 The author reports new developments in nuclear energy cooperation between Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan: * A new joint mining venture in southwest Kazakhstan (ownership: 45 percent -- Russian state companies, 45 percent -- Kazakhstan, 10 percent -- Kyrgyzstan) will yield 500 tons uranium ore per year, starting in the second half of 2007. Kazakhstan cannot compete with Australia and Namibia on the world uranium market; it is willing to help supply nuclear power plants in Russia and Ukraine in return for aid in building new nuclear power plants in Kazakhstan. * Another joint venture under discussion concerns the Kharkov firm TurboAtom, which makes turbines for nuclear facilities. To the extent that Russia and its CIS neighbors increase reliance on nuclear energy, their interdependence in this field may constrain tension and rivalry associated with the oil and gas sector.
RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS 9. Irina Isakova, Russian Governance in the 21st Century: Geo-strategy, Geopolitics and Governance (New York: Frank Cass, 2005) Reviewed by Douglas Blum (head of Department of Political Science, Providence College, RI, USA) In this monograph Irina Isakova provides a solid, and in many ways remarkably comprehensive, discussion of the relationship between political and military reform under Vladimir Putin. In the first part of the book Isakova examines the decision-making process and the factors affecting it, including policymakers’ intentions. Chapter 1 provides a rather standard overview of competing ideological orientations - Western, Eurasian, Neo-Eurasian, and pragmatic geopolitics -- and concludes that the latter has become the predominant view of the Russian elite. While hardly surprising, this observation is nevertheless important because it allows Isakova to argue that Putin’s policy approach is marked by a relatively high degree of consensus, especially once the prevailing statist assumptions are linked to an operational reform strategy. Unfortunately, Isakova never problematizes or seeks to explain the very prevalence of such statist beliefs. If they stem not so much, or not simply, from Putin’s personal vision of political change, then where do they come from, and to what extent have they gained consensual support? Still, Isakova’s survey of the ideological landscape is solid, and the upshot is clear enough: a consistent foreign and domestic policy can be seen unfolding since Putin’s ascension to power, geared to the twin inseparable goals of strengthening the state as well as the country’s economic potential. Chapters 2-4 analyze the pattern of Russian foreign policy under Putin. The key theme here is the connection between strengthening the state and pursuing a more assertive policy abroad. The result is somewhat ambivalent, however, since seeking to strengthen the state requires attracting foreign capital, which in turn places limits on Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. In particular, Isakova suggests that the military plays a leading role in Russia’s development strategy, both because the military industrial complex (MIC) has an enormous infrastructural presence and because it is perceived to offer the most potential for technological advancement. While the author provides a fine survey of the main strategic issues and institutions affecting Russian-Western relations, one nagging question concerns the actual scale and scope of FDI into the Russian economy, and specifically the MIC. In practice, aside from the fairly distinct space sector, such investments have not been forthcoming in any substantial volume; in fact, the trend under Putin has been to further tighten state control over MIC enterprises. Isakova is perhaps on firmer ground in her able discussion of strategic partnerships and geopolitical calculations. Here she suggests that Putin’s Asian policy provides a countermeasure to Russia’s marginalization in the West, and to America’s spreading power in Eurasia. She also points to the ongoing debate over how far cooperation on international terrorism should be allowed to proceed, including whether this constitutes a form of capitulation to the US. The second section of the book focuses squarely on domestic reforms. In Chapter 5 Isakova nicely analyzes Putin’s overall strategy of reform, emphasizing the importance of centralization. This is an extremely clear and concise treatment, which students will find helpful inasmuch as it integrates a wide range of developments across virtually all areas of public policy. Along the way, Isakova rightly notes the importance of tensions in center-periphery relations, due to ethnic and geopolitical factors (Caucasus and Siberia) or economic factors (Volga-Urals). She also stresses the importance of the Presidential Envoys in managing such tensions within the Federal Districts, including their role in fostering transborder cooperation and transportation connections, which both add to the state’s coffers and provide local development. One lingering question, however, is that Isakova contends that reforms of the municipal and judicial systems provide a meaningful counterweight to recentralization. Yet it remains unclear just how much the latter has occurred in actual practice, especially given the fact that implementation of the Law on Local Self-Government has twice been postponed (most recently, until 2009). Nevertheless, the real strength of this and the succeeding chapters is in showing how changes in domestic politics, civil-military relations, and security policy are interrelated. Isakova argues that "the new administrative structure of the state is directly linked with the future of the military reform" (pp. 234-5). After all, as she notes, the Federal Districts not only overlap with military districts, but also promote a heightened degree of functional differentiation and coordination in security matters. A concluding chapter stresses the key goal of international integration for domestic development purposes, and the ways in which Putin has pursued this goal by seeking to strengthen the state. This, in her view, has involved "territorial command and control planning, with strong monitoring and control features" (p. 305). However, while she acknowledges the existence of clear top-down mechanisms within this process, she also argues that a substantial degree of bottom-up engagement has occurred. This includes a broad level of consensus regarding the objectives and modalities of Putin’s reforms, and, most importantly, a significant degree of autonomy retained by regional authorities. Accordingly, Isakova insists that the apparent verticality of Russian politics is actually "subject to negotiations from below." As already suggested, it is not entirely convincing that this offsetting trend of decentralization has actually taken root. Yet it is a productive line of reasoning to think through, and specialists will be in Isakova’s debt for her fine and often provocative analysis of contemporary Russian politics.
HISTORY 10. THE DREAM CITY OF KITEZH SOURCE. Ye. M. Yukhimenko, "Grad Kitezh" russkogo staroobryadchestva [The "City of Kitezh" of the Russian Old Believers], pp. 105-113 in RAN Institut Slavyanovedeniya [Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences], Utopiya i utopicheskoye v slavyanskom mire [Utopia and the Utopian in the Slavic World] (Moscow: Izdatel Stepanenko, 2002) What is Kitezh? Well, there's a store called Kitezh, a restaurant called Kitezh, a "children's eco-community" called Kitezh, and a minor planet -- they used to be called asteroids -- called Kitezh. (1) The original Kitezh was a legendary Russian city that resisted the Tatar-Mongol invasion by submerging itself in a lake (or in another version, dissolving into mist), leaving behind only the ringing of its bells -- the Kitezh immortalized in Rimsky-Korsakov's opera "The Tale of the Invisible City of Kitezh" (1903). But there is more to it than this. Kitezh is a Christian utopia, "our unbegotten dream" (Voloshin). In a 1924 article, the church historian A. V. Kartashev wrote that Russian religiosity saw in Christianity a revelation of the coming replacement of this sinful, unclean world by a holy yet earthly and material "city-cathedral" (2) of divine grace and light. Jerusalem was such a city, so was Kitezh. And above all for the Orthodox dissidents known in English as "Old Believers" -- though the Russian term refers to the "Old Rite" not "Old Belief." For the "old believers" excommunicated by the church council of 1666-67 had exactly the same religious beliefs as the church reformer Patriarch Nikon. (3) The sole substantive matters of contention were such questions as the number of fingers to be used in making the sign of the cross (2 or 3?) and slight differences in the wording of certain prayers (e.g., the number of hallelujahs). The dissidents' REAL offense was that of defying ecclesiastical authority, and those of them who did later submit were given express permission to continue performing the rites as they preferred. The first teachers of the Old Rite were greatly distressed by the schism in the church and regarded it as a sign of "the last days." Cruelly persecuted, they sought salvation from "the world of the Antichrist" either by immolating themselves or by fleeing to the Russian borderlands. They first trudged north into the "Vyg wilderness" -- a remote and still uninhabited tract of dense forest and marshland around the River Vyg, northeast of Lake Onega. (4) The first Old Rite monks and hermits arrived here in the 1680s, mainly from the monasteries on the Solovetsky Islands in the White Sea. Old Rite peasants followed and established settlements in the early 1690s. In 1694 two settlements were merged to form a monastic community that was to become the administrative center of the new district: chapel and refectory in the middle, cells, hospitals, and workshops around the perimeter, all surrounded by a high wooden fence. A similar community for women was established in 1706. By 1700 some 2,000 Old Riters from various parts of Russia were living in the Vyg district. They maintained a diversified economy of plow land and orchards, livestock rearing, culling of marine animals, and handicrafts. Expectations of the end of days faded: they felt settled and were coming to look on the Vyg as their homeland. Rules adopted by the Vyg council (sobor) in the 1720s and 1730s regulated their way of life: segregation of the sexes, attendance at service, obedience to the abbot, no private property, etc. The first half of the 18th century was the golden age for the Vyg. A new policy of government toleration of the Old Rite enabled the Vyg council to find some highly placed patrons and normalize their relations with Moscow. By 1725 a trade in grain was underway and a pier had been built on the Onega shore. Books, manuscripts, and icons were collected and a library founded; monks wrote chronicles; a cult of local saints grew up. By the 1740s two mills were functioning and shipbuilding was in progress. Under Nicholas I the state resumed its persecution of the Old Rite and the Vyg entered a period of decline. Trade was obstructed, chapels closed, books and icons confiscated, buildings and even cemeteries destroyed. Nevertheless, the Vyg remained a center of the Old Rite well into the 19th century. Even after that, an unusually high level of literacy bore witness to the special history of the district. So was Kitezh on the shore of Lake Ladoga, or under its waters? Yukhimenko does not claim any direct connection between Kitezh and the Vyg, but sees a symbolic link. Nowadays Kitezh is no longer underwater, but lives on in a new medium of our unbegotten dreams, cyberspace. (5) NOTES (1) Discovered by N. S. Chernykh in 1979. (2) It is sometimes claimed that Debussy's prelude "La Cathedrale Engloutie" (The Sunken Cathedral) was inspired by the legend of Atlantis. But surely they didn't have any cathedrals on Atlantis. Carolyn Abbate draws a connection between Debussy's "phantom sounds" and Kitezh (Cambridge Opera Journal, March 1998). That seems much more plausible. (3) I draw here on the account of the schism by V. O. Kliuchevsky in Chapter XV of his "A Course in Russian History: The Seventeenth Century" in the translation by Natalie Duddington (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994). (4) In Russian: Vygovskaya pustynya. In English let us speak of "the Vyg district" or simply "the Vyg," just as we refer to "the Volga region" or "the Volga." (5) There is a "virtual Kitezh" at http://kitezh.onego.ru/e-kitezh.html
RUSSIAN LANGUAGE: FOCUS ON ORTHOGRAPHY 11. A POTTED HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN ALPHABET The Russian alphabet now has 32 letters -- or 33 if you allow "yo" to count as a separate letter. (1) It is the end product of successive reforms of the "Cyrillic" alphabet attributed to St. Cyril, a 10th-century missionary from Byzantium. (2) Cyril relied mainly on the Greek alphabet. Even today it is easy enough to spot most of the Russian letters that have their origin in Greek. Even those letters that look as though they might come from Latin mostly come from Greek (e.g. K -- kappa, P -- rho, T -- tau). But Greek letters could not be found for certain sounds in Slavic speech, and so there was SOME input from Latin, including a letter looking like S (for the sound "dz") that was later abolished by Peter the Great. There was also some input from Hebrew, which before Cyril had been widely used to transliterate Slavic languages under the cultural influence of the Judaized Khazars. In particular, the resemblance between the Cyrillic "sh" and the Hebrew letter shin is unmistakable (3 vertical lines joined at the bottom). The voiced counterpart to "sh" -- "zh," one of the letters apparently invented by Cyril -- looks like an adaptation of "sh" (with the outer lines bent inward). Later Peter added a hook to "sh" to make "shch"; so since then there have been 3 Russian letters that have their origin in Hebrew. The first great reform of the Russian alphabet was that carried out by Peter in 1708-10. Several letters, including the Greek xi, psi, and omega, were dropped and the form of others simplified. The Russian Academy of Sciences introduced further changes in 1735, 1738, and 1758. The second great reform came in 1917, following long and bitter controversy. (3) It can be regarded as the joint work of the Provisional and Soviet governments, both of which issued key documents specifying the content of the reform. (4) Another 4 letters were eliminated. One of them was the Greek theta (Russian doesn't have the sound "th"), turning "orthografiya" (orthography) into "orfografiya." Use of the hard sign was abolished at the end of words, but retained in the middle of words where required to indicate that a consonant is hard not soft. Some further minor modifications to spelling rules followed during the Soviet period. NOTES (1) See RAS No. 25, item 13. (2) To see the Russian alphabet as it existed at various times in history, go to http://www.omniglot.com/writing/cyrillic.htm (3) The source gives detailed information about the course of debate and the alternative schemes proposed in the decades leading up to 1917. (4) Circulars of the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment dated May and June 1917, a decree of the Council of People's Commissars in October 1917, and a decree of the People's Commissariat of Enlightenment in December 1917. The source for the following item reproduces all these and other documents.
RUSSIAN LANGUAGE: FOCUS ON ORTHOGRAPHY 12. POST-SOVIET CHANGES IN RUSSIAN ORTHOGRAPHY SOURCE. T. Grigoryeva, Tri veka russkoi orfografii [Three Centuries of Russian Orthography] (Moscow: Elpis, 2004), pp. 228-43 The author discusses two main developments in Russian orthography in the post-Soviet period: a limited revival of elements abolished in the reform of 1917 and the infiltration into Russian usage of letters from the Latin alphabet. The pre-1917 element most frequently encountered is the hard sign at the end of words ending with a hard consonant. This may be done just to create an "old world" impression, as in plaques indicating that Pushkin, Suvorov, or some other pre-revolutionary personage once lived in a certain building or in the names of firms and product brands that are supposedly successors to tsarist-era counterparts. In some cases the use of pre-1917 elements signals a genuine cultural or political orientation toward the tsarist era and its values. The publications of the nationalist-monarchist movement "Pamyat" (Memory) have always appeared in the old alphabet. Mainstream periodicals of the Russian Orthodox Church make limited decorative use of the old letters: they appear in headings and epigraphs but not in ordinary text. Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Academician Dmitry Likhachev (an eminent historian of moderate nationalist views) have both advocated a full return to the pre-1917 alphabet. However, the majority of Russian philologists are opposed to such a step. Grigoryeva herself says that use of pre-1917 elements should be restricted to people with the necessary competence and to cases in which they are "functionally significant." Using the old alphabet has become an "entertainment of the poorly educated" and errors are rife. The infiltration of the Latin alphabet reflects the widespread presence of Western languages, especially English. Numerous words have been adopted into Russian from English and transliterated into Cyrillic, so spelling them in Latin letters is obviously the next step. The practice is common in advertising, but it is found occasionally even in academic texts. It is, however, a trifle jarring to see Cyrillic and Latin letters used together in the same word. Among the examples of this cited by the author, we have a car repair firm called "Avtozona" with "avto" in Cyrillic and "zona" in Latin letters and a rock band calling themselves "deadushki" -- "dead" in Latin, "ushki" in Cyrillic. (This is a play on words, "dedushki" meaning "granddads.") |
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