The future of Europe’s relations with Russia is all but settled. Official communiques on relations between Russia and the European Union are generally tuned to the requirements of positive thinking and the designs of strategic planners in European big business. Major national governments in the EU maintain satisfaction with the state of bilateral affairs, but multilateral cooperation is characterised by discrete discontent on the side of European diplomacy. The Council of Europe blames Russia of non-compliance with a whole range of European standards and multilateral treaties. As the 1997 Cooperation and Partnership Treaty between the European Union and Russia is up for renewal in 2007 the EU commission is filing a whole range of alterations.

Russian foreign policy, however, remains quite content with the current situation, i.e. the practical irrelevance of these agreements. This indeed constitutes a “unique partnership” as formulated in the Executive Summary of the Luxemburg Conference. The current state of affairs calls for a reassessment of past experience and scenarios not based on wishful thinking only. In this context the further development of Russia’s political system is key to the formulation of alternative futures for Russian relations with individual European states and the EU. This article looks into the reasons for skepticism regarding the future of democracy in Russia and the ensuing prospects for neighbourhood in an all-European framework.

Integration and Partnership

The process of European integration is by no means on safe ground. It feeds on inputs from national governments as well as on a developing body of common values and goals growing in the respective societies. The recent renaissance of the 20th century paradigm of power games in bargaining and competition in the EU has been boosted to a large extent by the accession of new members which had had no time to experience the benefits and costs of being truly souvereign, i.e. on their own in times of globalisation. But the present crisis of integration should be seen as part of a learning process that can delay the formation of an institutionalised common foreign policy but not cause it’s total collapse. In an optimistic view it shall be assumed that integration and institutionalisation of the European Union’s foreign policy, painfully slow as they have been, will also be driven by external challenges more powerful than the forces of nationalism.

It is quite characteristic in this context that post-communist Russia never was seriously considered a candidate for EU membership. Occasional talk about this option dissipated quickly, not least because Russian elites never warmed up to the idea. Now the leadership in Moscow opts for restoring the components of a great power in Europe, scoffing even at the European model of integration. A condescending tag posted by Russian analysts on the EU as being “a normative great power only” (correct as it actually is in describing the essence of driving forces in the European Union’s foreign policy) is typical for the attitude of the vast majority of political elites in Russia.

The partnership between EU and Russia is shaped by the perceptions and ambitions of political elites on both sides who do not see eye to eye. Geopolitical analysts in Russia now even claim a chance to recoup political territory which was lost over the last ten years. Any dialogue about a “common strategic vision” will therefore be particularly difficult if the leadership of one side, unconstrained by institutional balances, is hedging unclear or outrightly incompatible ideas about the rules of cooperation and competition in Europe. This is the case with Russian policies of “liberal imperialism” and the prevailing hegemonial approach of coaching and defending autocratic regimes in Belarus, Moldova, and Central Asia against any outside criticism. The unconditional support for antidemocratic practices and trends in Russia’s near abroad dovetails with a distinct trend towards an authoritarian regime justified by the Russian elites of all political shades as the “Russian way to democracy”.

The Russian Way

Under Putin the much acclaimed political stabilisation of Russian statehood came with institutionalised vertical controls and back-ups (a.o. the abolition of elections of the governors and the recent foundation of a “Public Chamber” which practically sidelines the State Duma and brings non-governmental organisations under direct oversight) which to some extent even resemble the duplication of government functions in parallel and party organisations of the CPSU. The parameters and procedures underlying the Kremlin’s decisions are intransparent as in Soviet times. On the surface, the hold on power is unchallenged since the political class and big business prefer the status quo to any change and the continued threat of terrorism assures the consensus on the essentials of power.

The political developments over the last two years rather corroborate views which compare the amalgamated system of political and economic group-interests with it’s philosophy of “What is good for Gazprom is good for Russia” to petro-states in the Near East. The institutional set-up, the rules imposed on the political process, and the priorities for the political agenda are off limits for a general public, let alone parliamentary, debate. Waging opposition in this environment equals treason. Low circulation print media critical of the situation are being tolerated as a fig-leaf for pervasive control of the electronic media. Liberal editors are walking a tightrope, permanently threatened by economic extinction.

The need to buy time

The ruling group (a coalition of post-Soviet political and security elites, rent-seeking new businesses, and a power-pious orthodox church, all united in the Russian tradition of competing for access to “the Kremlin”) is obsessed with the idea of omnipotence. Nevertheless, the temperature is rising in domestic politics: As the 2008 presidential elections are drawing nearer the growth rates of GDP and consumption are levelling off, despite the continued boost of windfalls revenues due to high energy prices. The investment climate has not recovered from the Yukos scandal, i.e.the investors are shying away from long-term projects outside the energy sector, vary of interventions by the state into their property rights. Ordinary citizens are painfully feeling the cuts in communal services and social welfare programmes and the unpleasant facts of a looming demographic crisis which dwarfs similar problems in the EU and of relatively short time-horizons until the production of oil and gas in Russia will have peaked are no secrets, at least for the better informed.

According to opinion polls of the Levada Center, the hitherto unconditional support of the public for Vladimir Putin has not changed and all the blame for lack of progress in living conditions is directed against the government. But having recentralised all power he has also become formally responsible for setbacks and mismanagement. From time to time, he criticised the inefficiency and corruption of the administration on all levels of the state, the deterioration of public services in health, education, and transport is nevertheless going on and public trust in vital functions of the state has not been reestablished. As in his first term, the technologists of power managed to maintain Putin’s image as the impersonation of hope, the rain-maker who is going to secure the turnaround. But when it comes to implementation in the real world of fighting corruption and modernising the state it is still hard to assess his personal power and influence.

The inner circle worries, if only in rather cryptic form. Dmitry Medvedev, one of the foremost candidates in the succession to Vladimir Putin, recently warned: "If we do not manage to consolidate the elites, Russia can disappear as a unified state". One wonders about the meaning of such dramatic apprehensions since the formation of a veritable opposition is not on the horizon, liberal intellectuals are completely sidelined and, at least on paper, the governors are under control. In search for a plausible interpretation, “consolidating the elites” may well stand for the need to deal with increasing tensions among relevant factions of the ruling clans and/or lack of an integrative “vision” capable of preserving public confidence in a glorious future.

The leadership is looking for ways and means to buy time. So the designers of a new nationalism routinely turn to the classic instruments of Soviet propaganda: The rebuke of “meddling in internal affairs”, criticism of Western double-standards, and the supposition of chronic “anti-Soviet attitudes” or ”Russia-bashing” respectively. Today these charges are topped by assertions of Russia being the last stronghold in the defense of European civilisation against the barbarian threat of terrorist Wahhabism – contrary to those decadent Western democracies. The causes for the systems’ underperformance are presented to be beyond control of the leaders because Russia’s statehood is under siege from a hostile strategy pursued by “some decision-makers” or “dubious structures” in the US and the EU who even encourage terrorist activities. They are blamed to foster a “fifth column” of NGOs and irresponsible defeatist media outlets with the intent to undermine the patriotic cohesion. This is seen as particularly dangerous because Russian society is deemed too immature to stand up against non-Russian ideas of democracy.

Prospects for change

The official world-view, consistent with Soviet traditions as it appears, is reversible only if the elites should be willing to face up to the issues of good governance and economic competitiveness on a global scale. Prospects for this to happen are extremely dim, however, as the Russian leaders painted themselves into the corner of a political system with redundant safety precautions against change at large which is deemed destabilising. In their perspective changing the legal system makes no sense as it tends to jeopardise the role of the state as the only guarantor of property. Why upgrade the contract law, as long as access to those in power has become the essence of all political and economic endeavours? Why change a political system where parlamentary controls of the conduct of power are close to irrelevant, where political parties only simulate their intention to seize power, where judges are conditioned to be susceptible for discretionary considerations of raison d’etat, where the journalists are thinking twice before they run the risk of criticizing authorities, where the church indulges in sanctifying nationalistic mobilisation, and where the vast majority of Russian society, paralysed as it is in it’s reflexes of self-organisation, remains mesmerised by symbolic acts of overwhelming state power?

Thus, the quest for stability renders systemic rigidity and political stagnation: In all probability, there will be no third term for Valdimir Putin, but the established procedures for electing president and parliament warrant the desired continuity, the new president will depend on the same “structures” as his predecessor, and political parties are politically irrelevant anyway.

Foreign policy aspects

Conventional wisdom has it that regime change in Russia complicates relations with the outside world and therefore the French motto applies: “Aime ce-que tu as”. Yet, continuity of the kind described above also implies increasing volatility as the leadership has full sway in shifting political priorities in the agenda of foreign relations. Freed from any substantive balances or restrictions at home, Russian foreign policy is open in more than one direction.

Joining the coalition against global terrorism five years ago came as a pleasant surprise, but it was a superb act of opportunism reducing the political leverage of foreign creditors as well as critics of the repressive actions in Chechnya and it generally raised the country’s protocollary status. Today, with the new abundance of revenues from exporting energy at current high prices in international markets and with prospects of continued global excess demand for oil and gas the Russian leaders have gained an additional degree of freedom in critical areas of foreign and securitity policy. This windfall encouraged them to test the waters in ever bolder steps - from blocking the operations of the OECD to attempted blackmail of EU states about their contacts with Chechen dissidents, aggressive strategies for buying critical assets of industries and infrastructure in the near abroad, and recent moves to destabilise inconvenient governments there.

This assertive design of Russian foreign policy ignores the opportunity costs of Dutch disease at home and of growing suspicions among neighbours and clients, particularly in Europe. The positive-sum game of economic interdependence has tilted towards the zero-sum thinking of political power-games with their logic of minimising exposure on both sides - and suboptimal growth in trade relations. The economic costs may be felt primarily in the medium term (1) once the European economies will have diversified their imports and succeeded in conserving energy and (2) when the growth in Russia’s production of oil and gas will peak (2015 and 2030 respectively) and exports will simultaneously have to be reduced in favour of domestic uses. Most important, however, is the loss of good will among foreign investors since Russia needs capital imports of some 935 bn $ and advanced Western technologies to modernise the equipment of it’s overstretched energy sector.

Nevertheless, the strategic planners in Moscow seem to be carried away by the sweet feeling of near-monopolistic power over critical parts of energy production and distribution in Europe. They are unlikely to change their perception of the world and of Russia’s place in an increasingly complex international system as long as the economic decision makers in the Kremlin become politicised by cooptation to the ruling clans and political actors become personal beneficiaries of strategic assets in the oil and gas sector. It would be naïve to expect that they might seriously consider such issues as the low international competitiveness of industrial products or the growing social disparities at home.

Gasprom’s heavy-handed policy of price increases for the deliveries of natural gas to Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, particularly the timing and the brutality of shutting down pipelines in the middle of winter, cannot but be seen as politically motivated. This campaign may, however, turn out to be self-defeating for those who expected to make political hay from showing their resolve to brinkmanship; Gazprom (and the Russian federal budget) cannot afford long disruptions of revenues. More important: this crisis came as a wake-up call for policy planners all over Europe. As the expectations of responsible behaviour of Russia in a sensitive business such as of energy trade have been thwarted the debate now expands to the risks of bilateralism materialised in “exclusive” pipelines linking Russian gasfields with West European distributers.

The notion of “strategic relations” between the EU and Russia, degraded as it has become by inflationary use in the public statements of European politicians and business representatives, is to be questioned. The positive connotations of “strategic” in the context of transnational relations - long-term reliability and predictability - will not materialise only by declarations or the demonstration of good personal relationships between statesmen. These cannot substitute the indispensable framework of compatible institutions, converging political and economic interests, and values shared by elites and the general public on both sides. Measured against this canon current relations between the EU and Russia can be rated “strategic” only in the sense of a programmatic statement, not an accomplishment. The lack of common political substance has become more obvious than ever.

The “vision thing”

"The main political-ideological task is the development of Russia as a free, democratic country" – this message of the Russian president in his State of the Nation address of April 2005 is a reminder of earlier visionary declarations rather than the description of consistent efforts. In the West the initial excitement about “Russia joining” has been replaced by a more philosophical optimism based on the undeniable fact that developments in Russia have not fallen back to communist patterns. Optimists would also subscribe to the hypothesis that – at least in the longer run – the growth of a new middle-class will secure the victory of freedom and democracy.

This hopeful approach is self-explanatory since Russia is an important partner for the EU in central areas of regional economic, foreign, and security policies, for good or for bad: The comparative advantage of trading European capital goods for up to 40 percent of Europe’s total energy needs from Russia is more than obvious. This complementary pattern of trade holds considerable growth potentials in view of the overdue technical modernisation of Russia’s industries and infrastructure. • Unfinished and precarious transformations in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia demand a multilateral approach to crisis management and the creation of sustainable structures of cooperation. Russia’s role in this process is paramount. Unfortunately, it’s attempts at dominance by blackmail and it’s tolerance for outright dictatorial regimes does more harm than good for the common goal of long-term regional stability. • In today’s interdependent world any disruption of the internal security of Russia has repercussions in the European neighbourhood. Accordingly the consistent cooperation of Russia to amend and preempt the dangers from a whole range of issues (terrorisms, pandemics, environmental and technical catastrophes) is critical.

The scope for cooperation remains limited, however, due to the incompetence and corruption of Russian bureaucracies and a growing sense of complacency among the country’s leaders in dealing with painful issues which affect the whole of Europe such as mismanagement of conflicts in the Caucasus, a looming demographic crisis, and the fall-out of a badly damaged environment. Enormous stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction on Russian territory - the ugly legacy of the Cold War - are still considered not safe and the process of dismantling them is grossly behind schedule. Instead, the Russian President boasts with new strategic weapons capable of penetrating any anti-ballistic missile defense system – nothing less than threatening with the first strike against whom it may concern.

Enlightened realism

In spite of the pomp and glory of well-staged summitry one can expect as President Putin will be hosting the G8 the sorry state of relations between EU and Russia will not go away. The political goals and underlying value systems on both sides may well drift apart even further with the implication that trade with and capital-flows to Russia will be constrained by a critical residual insecurity about future legal frameworks and unpredictable moves in Moscow.

Support for systemic transformation, therefore, will have to be part and parcel of any Western design in order to reshape the relations. The essence of this design is: (a) to resist any temptation to condone unacceptable Russian behaviour at home and in the near abroad and (b) to try consistently to convince the leaders in Moscow that the current way of running their country blocks modernisation and even jeopardises stability. Since the trap of bureaucratic authoritarianism in Russia can be opened only from within it will be crucial to make a convincing case for the advantages of clear seperation of powers, predictability of legal decisions, and representation of all relevant groups of society in free and fair elections. This argument of “enlightened realism” is not confined to the high grounds of moral standards and legitimacy. One basic consideration of realpolitik has a much better chance to be heard by those in power: There is no way to allure indispensable foreign direct investment without further reforms of the judiciary and consistent action against corruption. The latter will be possible only on the basis of more transparency, i.e. parliamentary oversight and freedom for the press.

Considering the increased bargaining power of the Kremlin it is not easy for Western politicians to keep the balance between pragmatism and faithfulness to Western democratic values. Following the textbooks of soft-spoken diplomacy the Europe states and the EU will not make any impact. The chanels of private diplomacy will have to be complemented by public appeals in order to increase public awareness in Russia of the opportunity costs of the present trend. Russian society must not be surrendered to the manipulation of political technocrats who still worship the antiquated idols of strong state and great power. The direct sponsoring of democratic activists must go on, even at the risk of drawing the wrath of the ideologues of a “Russian way”.

This approach has been pursued by the European institutions and, since the summit meeting in Bratislava of spring 2005, by the Bush administration. Remaining firm is of essence when it comes to defending the principles of the European Charta, to preserving the right of OSCE and European Parliament to monitor elections and to screen other indicators of comparative democratic performance, and to insist in the implementation of the EU-Russia Roadmap. Unfortunately, the European Union has been handcapped by the refusal of some member states to join in a consolidated strategy under the leadership of Brussels. They will have to be disciplined in their reflexes which tend to gravitate towards exclusive bilateral arrangements with the Kremlin. As members in the EU and neighbours to the countries “in between” they have a special responsibility to actively promote the vision of a democratic Europe as it has been set out in the strategy paper on European neighborhood policy: rule of law, good governance, compliance with human rights including minority right, and the advancement of good-neighbourly relations, principles of market economy, and of sustainable development.

Moscow will hardly abandon it’s preference for selective “a-la-carte” cooperation. Working under the prevailing circumstances for partial adaptation of economic and technical norms is certainly better than open confrontation and limited cooperation since, by it’s inherent logic, it also promotes convergence. As the existing commitments tend to erode the negotiators of the EU will have to work hard for closing the “implementation gap” which should not be papered over in high powered documents of the G8, a renewed Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, or any update for the “Four Common Spaces”. We will have to put up with polemics and frustrations as long as only the external threats are shared and related interests overlap.

The value gap may be closing in the painful learning process of global and regional interdependence. To expect a politically relevant common vision for Europe’s future in Brussels and Moscow soon is a forlorn hope. We may rather be about to slide back into the world of “Change through rapprochement”. In retrospect, however, it cannot be denied that this paradigm once worked quite well, even if it took some time. 28.01.06

Literature:

Adomeit, Hannes: Putins Westpolitik – ein Schritt vorwärts, zwei Schritte zurück, SWP- Studie S08, April 2005

Götz, Roland: Russlands Erdöl und der Weltölmarkt, SWP-Studie S40, December 2005, idem: Nach dem Gaskonflikt, Wirtschaftliche Konsequenzen für Russland, die Ukraine und die EU, SWP-Aktuell, January 2006

Levada Centr (Public opinion polls on all aspects of Russian politics): http://www.levada.ru

Luxemburg Institute for European and International Studies and The New Eurasia Foundation (Eds.): Reinventing and Reinvigorating Relations with Russia – Executive Summary of a Conference held on April 8-9 2005 in Castel Bourgminster, Luxemburg

Schütte, Rolf: EU-Russia Relations: Interests and Values – a European Perspective, Carnegie Papers No. 54, December 2004

Shevtsova, Lilja: Rossija – god 2005: Logika politicheskogo stracha, in: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moskwa, December 13 and 16, 2005

Timmermann, Heinz: Die Beziehungen zwischen Russland und der EU, in: Russlands Rückkehr – Außenpolitik unter Vladimir Putin (Mangott, Trenin, Senn, Timmermann Hrsg.), Baden-Baden 20005, pp. 203-265

Vogel, Heinrich: How not to deal with a backsliding Russia, in: Internationale Politik/Transatlantic Edition, vol.6, Winter 2005, pp. 58-61.