#37 - JRL 2006-212 - JRL Home
Russia Profile
September 22, 2006
Russia Profile Experts Panel: The Debate Over Sovereign Democracy
Introduced by Vladimir Frolov
Contributors: Andrei Lebedev, Alexander Rahr, Sergei Shishkarev and Andrei Seregin

In Moscow, the heated discussion surrounding sovereign democracy is more than a purely academic debate ­ it reflects the intense power struggle in the Kremlin. Introduced in February 2006 by Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov, the concept of sovereign democracy was supposed to underpin United Russia’s platform and become the basis for the Kremlin’s attempts to control foreign influence on Russia’s political life.

But last June, Dmitry Medvedev, a first deputy prime minister and likely presidential candidate, poured cold water on the concept by saying that he prefers to speak about real democracy without any adjectives. He reiterated this position last week in another wide-ranging interview to a popular Moscow daily.

Many Russian political experts believe that Medvedev’s statements on sovereign democracy were designed to undermine Surkov’s political influence, and his most recent interview was only one more example of this, as was United Russia’s recent failure to adopt a blueprint for its political program, with sovereign democracy figuring prominently on the agenda.

President Vladimir Putin himself added fuel to the fire by essentially dodging the question on what Moscow means by sovereign democracy during his meeting with members of the Valdai Discussion Club. Many analysts in Moscow, particularly the media, interpreted Putin’s tepid remark that he did not want to “interfere with the debate among political scientists,” as another serious slight against

Surkov and some even rushed to predict the latter’s imminent and rapid departure from the administration.

And Surkov himself waded into the debate by telling regional media that he did not care about the term, but worried more about the concept. These comments were followed by a defense of sovereign democracy by prominent political analysts friendly to Surkov and high-ranking United Russia officials.

In the end, these events seemed like Surkov was trying to defend his positions because he finds himself under pressure from the siloviki who are seeking to control and tightly script the political succession in 2008. This does not appear to be a battle over terminology, but rather a major fight between clans inside the Kremlin for power, resources and political influence after Putin leaves office.

And there is still no universally accepted definition of what sovereign democracy means.

What does this seemingly semantic debate mean for the political future of Russia and the country’s relations with the West? What kind of political infighting in the Kremlin does the debate on sovereign democracy reflect? What does the Kremlin mean by saying it is building sovereign democracy in Russia? What in fact is sovereign democracy? Does it exist in the West?

Andrei Lebedev, Senior Associate, the State Club Foundation, Moscow:

No single state project emerges from nowhere; the “vertical of power” opposed Russian regional autocracy, whereas “sovereign democracy” appears to be an attempt to counter the concept of “democracy promotion,” preached by neoconservatives in the United States. And, of course, almost every project gets a code name, like Franklin Roosevelt’s “New Deal” and Mikhail Gorbachev’s “perestroika.” Or it may not ­ right now it is too early to say.

The new term coined by Vladislav Surkov closes the terminological gap after its linguistic predecessors ­ “vertical of power” and “monetization of benefits” ­ were put out of everyday use.

In Russia, however, any new turn, even a terminological one, attracts a train of zealots. They insist on explaining the concept’s origins and the details, sometimes unearthing insights that surprise even the author of the term. Equally, another group of zealots assumes the duty of the opposition. This is not unique either; it happened during Jimmy Carter’s administration when it became politically correct to become a “born-again Christian.”

An exaggerated attention to terminology often obscures the original essence of the project. Some discussions might even look like arguments (sarcastically narrated by Jonathan Swift) over breaking an egg upon its larger or smaller end ­ if not for the most serious nature of the project and the political forces striving to advance it.

Presidential elections are scheduled to happen two years from now. If the political elite is unable to agree upon a single candidate in advance, the election campaign’s most remarkable feature could be fierce competition among the various successors. While the political elite remains undecided, dry runs by potential candidates will inevitably occur with any pretext.

The sovereign democracy project is as good pretext as any for trying to draw the lines between the candidates that can be demonstrated to the electorate. Logically enough, Putin has abstained from taking a definite position on the issue. He evidently preferred not to tilt the balance with his authority in favor of this or that side. In a sense, this is an example of sovereign democracy at work: sovereign contenders compete democratically, without external interference.

Alexander Rahr, Director of the Korber Unit for Russia/CIS Studies, German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin:

Vladimir Putin’s decision to distance himself from the term has created confusion among the Russian political elite. Vladislav Surkov had introduced the term sovereign democracy into the Russian political landscape when the Kremlin still feared the outbreak of color revolutions in the post-Soviet space. After Yanukovich’s comeback, the fear of upheavals in Russia has dissipated. Putin now wants to install Dmitry Medvedev as his successor on a “democratic” and “pro-Western-minded” ticket that will demand the removal of artificial ideological barriers with the West. The debate on sovereign democracy will probably stop. The Kremlin has changed the tactics, and seems willing to engage in a discussion with a broad variety of Russian liberal forces on issues concerning the building of civil society in Russia. The attitude towards NGOs and their cooperation with Western partners has softened.

The Russian-German Petersburg Dialogue in Dresden next month include leading representatives of genuine civil society in Russia, such as the leader of Memorial, Semyon Roginsky. He and other civil rights activists will be sitting with Russian officials, businessmen, United Russia party members and other delegates at the plenary meeting of the Petersburg Dialogue, presided over by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Putin.

When asked at the Valdai Club meeting about the nature of differences between Russia and the West, Putin replied that, from his point of view, the present quarrels emerge from commercial competition and not ­ as often perceived in the West ­ from different attitudes to “European

democratic values.” Putin, it seems, does not want to be remembered in history as the Russian leader who “lost Europe.” Although Putin openly applauds the success of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and praises high-level partnership relations with China, he must be skeptical about the unilateral orientation towards China. The SCO member states welcome the Russian debate on sovereign democracy as a tool to reduce Western democratic transfer to Eurasia.

Another problem for the Kremlin is the introduction of a multi-party system in Russia. Putin seems to support Surkov’s idea of establishing a functioning two-party system. Radical forces on the left and the right have to be absorbed into two more or less centrist parties, both controlled by the Kremlin. United Russia, however, is reluctant to accept the emergence of a second pro-Kremlin force, which would also enjoy access to the “administrative resources.” The merger of Rodina and the Party of Life has created such an alternative party of power already. United Russia thus wants to stick to the sovereign democracy slogan in order to preserve its political monopoly.

Sergei Shishkarev, Deputy Chairman, Russian State Duma Committee on Energy, Transportation and Communications:

Surkov wants a genuine public debate on what sovereign democracy might mean in Russia, and he does not want to hear only the sycophantic voices of support. His idea of sovereign democracy envisions a developed democratic state and civil society that prevent outside powers from influencing domestic politics and its international behavior in ways that are contrary to the state’s national interests. While it is true that Surkov became interested in the concept following Ukraine’s Orange Revolution he now seems to view it much more broadly ­ in ideological rather than geopolitical terms. That’s why he wants a public debate ­ to test the term’s viability as an ideological doctrine for United Russia.

Medvedev’s public comments that he views sovereign democracy as an unfortunate term because what really matters is genuine democracy, provided a quintessential Surkov moment. He himself had engineered this “dissent” in order to let Medvedev stake a much more liberal, pro-Western position.

It is important to see how Surkov defines sovereignty. He calls it the political equivalent of global competitiveness. He wants Russia to be internationally competitive and constantly talks about the

need to diversify Russia’s economy and reduce its dependence on high oil revenues. In fact, he sees the United States as a practitioner of sovereign democracy in its purest form, a country that has been shaped around the notion of democratic sovereignty, derived from the will of the American people.

Public criticism of sovereign democracy should not be construed as something that undermines Surkov’s influence in the Kremlin. The man is very much in the driver’s seat, and his power was demonstrated by the destruction of the nationalist Rodina party, the most serious potential challenger to United Russia in the 2007 federal elections. By merging Rodina with Sergei Mironov’s laughable Party of Life, Surkov closed off all avenues for a political come back by Dmitry Rogozin, the fiery nationalist former leader of Rodina. Now Rodina is likely to be dissolved completely while Rogozin, the only serious threat to Putin’s successor, is completely marginalized.

Surkov is the Kremlin’s Karl Rove. He is the only political manager in the country who can boast of carrying out two successful Duma and presidential campaigns. Putin needs Surkov to ensure a smooth succession to his regime and its spectacular political legacy.

Andrei Seregin, Senior Political Analyst, National Laboratory for Foreign Policy, Moscow:

Much of the battle of words waged recently around the term “sovereign democracy” derives from a mere misunderstanding. Since the official transcript of Putin’s Valdai Club talk was not released in time, Russian media were left to use retranslations from western media sources.

In fact, the president didn’t seem to even slightly criticize the term coined by Surkov. All he intended to say is that he didn’t want to interfere with an academic debate, which seemed to him to be purely linguistic and legalistic in nature. Russian media simply misled the public in stating that Putin had criticized Surkov’s concept.

The media were rather quick to observe that Putin’s apathy towards the term was a huge blow to Surkov’s political position. Surkov’s reaction was quite logical ­ “never mind the term, mind the essence.” In fact, the concept of sovereign democracy, or whatever else it might be called, is at its core a reflection of the basic principles of American democracy ­ the sovereign will of the people is superior to all, including the interests of all other nations. This concept has it right: the people should have the power to govern themselves, using democratic procedures and without being influenced from abroad.

Unfortunately, the hasty pursuit of a hot issue of the day has become one of the most evident characteristics of political journalism in contemporary Russia. The media understood the president’s hint ­ that he desires to maintain some distance from the ideological battle between “liberals” and “siloviki.” But sometimes oversimplification does not work.

My guess is that the debate over sovereign democracy should certainly be regarded within a broader context. It’s an obvious reflection of infighting between the Kremlin’s factions. But this ideological discussion does not play a major part in the clash inside the Kremlin. Those opposing it are using everything at their disposal to limit Surkov’s influence on United Russia. But they are also well aware that the term is the only accurate and apt description for Russia’s political system. And the only way to kill Surkov’s term is to coin another one ­ much better, much more telling and more understandable.