#34 - JRL 2006-178 - JRL Home
Russia Profile
August 7, 2006
One Question Answered, But Many Remain
By Dmitry Babich

One of the unusual aspects of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko’s decision to propose Viktor Yanukovich as prime minister to the Ukrainian parliament, the Virkhovna Rada, was that the decision was welcomed in both Russia and the United States. U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said that Yanukovich’s candidacy was approved “in a democratic way,” while Sergei Baburin, vice-speaker of the Russian State Duma said the decision would “stabilize” the situation in Ukraine.

Part of the reason for this unexpected unity of views was the need to resolve four months of standoff between the pro-Western Orange factions of the Rada and the pro-Russian ones.

Reaching a conclusion that will finally result in the formation of a government in Ukraine has required all parties involved to take a new look at each other. Since the Orange Revolution, Yanukovich has been portrayed as a “Kremlin stooge” who would “throw Ukraine into the embrace of Russia.”

But in his new position, Yanukovich will have to be more flexible than this assessment allows. “Ukraine will keep maneuvering between Russia and the West… The gas irritant in Russian-Ukrainian relations will stay. During the electoral campaign Yanukovich could afford to come out with pro-Russian slogans. In the position of prime minister he will have to fight for cheaper prices for Russian gas,” Russian daily Izvestia wrote on the day of Yanukovich’s appointment, dampening the expectations of observers willing to see Yanukovich as a pro-Russian figure.

Yanukovich’s role is also complicated by Yushchenko’s Universal (Declaration of Intentions), which the leaders of all Rada factions have signed, with the exception of Yulia Tymoshenko. The Universal proclaims Ukrainian as the sole national language, dismisses federalism and promotes Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO via a national referendum.

The Universal, aggressively promoted by Yushchenko, is supposed to help the various Rada factions find common ground on the most important issues. Few observers, however, view the Universal as the end of the argument.

“Yushchenko’s Universal is not a law, and you can’t force all political actors to fulfill it,” Russian daily Vremya Novostei commented. “Yes, it coincides with most of the points of Yushchenko’s Euro-Atlantic program of 2004, but the Universal is largely a symbolic document, and its fulfillment depends on both the goodwill of the parties that signed it and on Yushchenko’s influence, which has waned during the last few months.”

For example, the Universal couples Ukraine’s long-term goal of joining the EU with its intention to integrate into the Joint Economic Space (JES) with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The agreements on the JES were signed in 2003, but so far Kiev has been the most reluctant member of the alliance, which aims to unite the four former Soviet republics in a free trade zone and customs union. Even as the agreement was signed, however, the European Union made it clear that such a union would not further Ukraine’s EU ambitions.

“When Kuchma signed the JES agreement in 2003, EU Commissioner Guenther Verheugen came to Kiev and said that this move could dash Ukraine’s hopes of joining,” said Svetlana Glinkina, a senior researcher at the Institute of Economy in the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Additionally, the Universal suggests making Ukraine’s active membership in the JES dependent on the accession of group’s other members to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which Ukraine hopes to join before the end of the year. Russia is unlikely to join the WTO earlier because of an ongoing dispute with the United States, and Moscow is unhappy that Kiev may join first. Ukrainian membership in the WTO would force Russia to negotiate trade concessions with its eastern neighbor before its own membership could be approved, because all new members of WTO have to get an agreement of all old members before they can join.

The Universal does not present any way to resolve these differing views of Ukraine’s economic integration.

“In fact, the EU is not against a free-trade zone between Ukraine and Russia, because this would open the Russian market to EU-produced goods arriving via Ukraine, especially after a free trade agreement between the EU and Ukraine is signed,” said Glinkina. “But the EU is against a customs union between the members of the JES, because it would allow the former Soviet states to coordinate their trade and economic policies and ultimately become a single strong competitor to the EU. The situation could be remedied by a general improvement in Russia-EU and Russia-U.S. relations, but that is unlikely to happen in the near future.”

Moscow’s official position is that Russia is not against Ukraine’s membership in the EU and sees no contradiction in Ukraine’s membership in both the EU and the JES.

So far, Yanukovich has made conciliatory statements on this and many other issues left unresolved by the Universal, including federalism, the status of Russian language and NATO membership.

“A Ukrainian politician should be pro-Ukrainian,” Yanukovich said in an interview with Izvestia. “The most important issue for me is the unification of my country. Russia remains a strategic partner for Ukraine. This is a result of history and this won’t be changed. If we see Russia as a partner, we will be able to resolve the main issues, including the ones connected with natural gas.”

Most observers agree that under Yanukovich, Russian-Ukrainian negotiations will lose some of their dramatic character. Some experts, however, note that many important Ukrainian politicians do not agree with Yanukovich’s assessment of Russia as a natural partner, so the choice of government ministers will be of crucial importance.

“Ukraine’s current foreign minister, Boris Tarasyuk, did everything possible to create an artificial conflict between Russia and Ukraine,” said Sergei Markov, the director of the Institute of Political Research in Moscow. “For example, during economic negotiations with Moscow and other CIS members, he raised the issue of the 1930-1932 famine in Ukraine, which was a result of Stalin’s policy and has nothing to do with the modern economy. He opposed any sort of supra-national organs inside the JES, but without these, a customs union and a free trade zone between Russia and Ukraine are not possible. So, the question as to whether Tarasyuk will keep his post is important.”

On Sunday, the Ukrainian news agencies reported that Tarasyuk will keep his position, suggesting that Ukraine’s foreign policy priorities will not undergo a dramatic revision.

In Markov’s view, Ukraine’s cooperation in the JES framework may be a cause of friction between Yushchenko and Yanukovich. “The Ukrainian metallurgy sector, and business in general, which Yanukovich represents, is interested in free trade with Russia, so he will support the JES,” Markov said. “The reasons for Ukraine’s stalling on the JES is primarily political, and the impulse for this comes from Yushchenko’s side. We shall see who will win.”