Russia and the EU held another summit this week in Sochi. It was just the latest example of what has become a regular exercise in futility that has been taking place since 1997, when Russia and the EU signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which is due to expire next year. With this deadline approaching, both sides have been exchanging ideas about what to do next and how the two groups might fashion a meaningful relationship in the 21st century.

Overall, this relationship has been marred by mutual disappointment and a mismatch of objectives. Russia has not been satisfied with the relatively meaningless status of an EU partner with no prospect of eventual membership. The EU has been insisting that the relationship should be based on Russia’s acceptance and implementation of a whole set of EU norms and regulations.

The EU has steadfastly refused to discuss any upgrades in Russia’s status, while Moscow has been pushing some ideas of a special partnership on par with what Russia has with NATO in the Russia-NATO Council (RNC). That would have given Moscow some voice ­ but not veto power ­ over EU decisions.

In fact, as a principal supplier of energy to Europe for years to come, Russia already has a privileged status with regard to the EU, and would like that situation to be formally recognized. Brussels has responded by offering Russia coverage under the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) ­ together with Ukraine, Georgia, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.

Another EU initiative to give Russia special status was a proposal suggested by Germany, France and Great Britain to form four Common European Spaces to make the interaction more robust and down-to-earth. The plan was unveiled at the St. Petersburg summit in 2004 and has languished ever since.

Another big idea in the Russia-EU relationship has been President Putin’s call for visa-free travel for Russians in the 15 countries covered by the Schengen visa, all but two of which are EU members. Launched as part of Russia-EU negotiations over transit to Kaliningrad, the idea has found a life of its own. This week in Sochi, the EU and Russia signed an agreement to facilitate travel for Russian nationals to the EU states together with a readmission agreement for Russian immigrants living illegally in the EU.

On other fronts, cooperation has been rather difficult ­ and the dialogue acrimonious. The EU has been tough on Russia in terms of democracy promotion and defense of human rights, as well as very assertive in the former Soviet space. The EU’s support for color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, and open criticism of Alexander Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus have contributed to Russia’s irritation and disappointment.

The EU also tried to torpedo Russia’s new energy strategy and strongly objected to Moscow’s use of energy for political pressure on Ukraine and other former Soviet states. Although the EU later toned down its opposition to Gazprom’s dominance of the European gas market, and even agreed to continue the practice of long-term gas contracts, Russia was clearly upset with the intransigence and even threatened Europe with rerouting its gas exports to Asia.

In a meeting with members of the European parliament last week, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke forcefully against the EU’s attempts to preach democracy to Russia and insisted on Russia’s right to its own sovereign democracy.

So where do we go from here? Are we doomed to see another wasted exercise in European summitry with paltry results? Is there a need for a new grand vision in Russia-EU relations? If EU membership is not an option for Russia, and that seems to be the opinion both in the EU and in Russia, what might such a vision entail? What could the summit contribute to international efforts to resolve the looming crisis over the Iranian nuclear program? Recently, Russia and the EU have been pushing for some incentives for Tehran to abandon the enrichment program. Will they bear fruit?

Yury Fedorov, Senior Researcher, Chatham House, London:

I would welcome a new Grand Vision of the Russia-EU relationship, including an outline of how they plan to erect a model of fruitful cooperation and friendship ­ including Russia’s membership in the EU. Unfortunately, such a prospect is absolutely improbable today and, most likely, tomorrow as well. The Russia-EU relationship is not and will not be harmonious.

Hypnotized by huge energy export revenues and fast economic growth, Moscow seeks to establish Russia as the dominant power in the post-Soviet space; it also sees energy exports, especially gas, as a powerful instrument with which to influence Europe. It is difficult to assess how effective this instrument is. Europe imports about 30 percent of its gas from Russia and thus depends on Russia to a great extent. But the latter also needs Europe’s export markets because that is the main source of its economic growth ­ and the existing pipelines run west, not east.

The EU would like to diminish its dependence on Russia by diversifying its energy imports. Russia, for its part, is trying to consolidate its role as main energy supplier to Europe. And nobody is able to harmonize such an intricate array of mutual dependencies and controversies. But neither Europe nor Russia is able to let the other go.

Also, after the last wave of EU expansion, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova are its new eastern neighbors. Today, Brussels cannot ignore developments in these three states. Moscow sees European intervention in Ukraine and Moldova as an encroachment on its national interests and an intrusion into its zone of exclusive influence. But both Russia and the EU are interested in preventing chaotic developments, unpredictability, and instability in the areas lying between them.

There is one more position that Russia and the EU hold in common, although for different reasons, and this is regarding U.S. policy towards Iran. Adhering to sophisticated diplomacy and “soft” power, Europeans are afraid that the Bush administration may lose its patience and unleash another war in the Middle East with unpredictable consequences. If the U.S. military is not able to control the situation in a post-war Iran, a hotbed of terrorism and extremism will emerge near Russia’s southern borders.

These points illustrate the general character of the Russia-Europe relationship. They irritate and dislike each other, but cannot change the underlying geographic and economic realities. Therefore they have to talk with each other, even if talks are difficult and far from pleasant, and produce minimal results. Thus the Sochi summit will be neither an exercise in futility, nor a breakthrough; it will be one more effort to build a more productive and less contradictory relationship.

Anthony T. Salvia, Former Director of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Moscow Programming Center:

The Euro-Russian summit at Sochi could prove to be yet another in a series of "exercises in futility," or it could serve to enhance energy security ­ an issue of vital concern to both sides. Europe remains Russia's most important market for key energy products, and will be for some time. Russia cannot easily redirect its energy exports to Asia without massive investments in infrastructure which will take years to realize. Thus, Russia and Europe, like it or not, are joined at the hip.

Rather than mourn this state of affairs, Russia, Europe and the world should welcome it. The fact is that the entire European zone, from Lisbon to the Urals, faces similar challenges in the form of demographic decline, the rise of Islam, and insecurity about its strategic role in world affairs. Thus, there is a solid basis for common action on the governmental and non-governmental levels across the continent. Moreover, Europe has acute energy needs and Russia the ability to supply them.

This is a potential marriage made in heaven. Each side has what the other wants and needs. Common challenges such as demographic decline are intimately related to the onslaught of secular materialism throughout the whole of Europe for more than a century. The antidote is Christianity, whose division made the rise of secular materialism possible in the first place. Again, one half of Europe (Latin) has what the other half (Byzantine) needs, and vice versa. A true European union will emerge only when Latin and Byzantine parts of Europe forge strong bonds of friendship and solidarity in the face of common challenges. Happily, the recent meeting in Vienna between high-level Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic prelates indicates progress in relations between the two churches. The grassroots, transcontinental revival of European culture, not achievable through the EU alone, but in conjunction with ecumenical solidarity, will also cast the challenge of the growing presence of Islam’s growing presence in Europe in a new light, transcending the terms in which we normally consider the matter.

The issue of Russia's alleged backsliding on democracy should not be given more attention than that given to the EU's questionable practice of holding new elections on defeated pro-EU referenda until the various constituencies vote the way Brussels wants them to vote. In fact, Russia needs an effective opposition, which it was beginning to acquire until the Kremlin derailed Dmitry Rogozin ­a serious blunder from my point of view. But the matter of democratic shortcomings on both sides is better addressed after a strategic understanding has been reached, not as a prelude to one.

Europe needs to wake up and realize that there is greater benefit in friendship with Russia than in cultivating relations with Georgia and Ukraine, which presents Russia with unpalatable strategic options. The division that has prevailed since the Great Schism of 1054 and even from the time of the Roman Empire must be overcome once and for all. Europe will reap a significant harvest in the form of a new sense of civilizational well-being, purpose, and, oh yes, energy security.

Until Western leaders and the wider public begin to appreciate the vast potential of such a partnership with Russia, events similar to the Sochi summit will fail to achieve their full potential.

Andrei Zagorski, Associate Professor, MGIMO-University:

The overall picture of Russia-EU relations is certainly not as gloomy as it is often portrayed.

The lack of a grand vision on the Russian side is not disappointing. Moscow does not lay a claim to a possible EU membership. Instead, it rejects any such idea and emphasizes that it wants nothing but a contractual relationship. The concept of partnership serves this interest perfectly well. The agreement signed last year on the four Common European Spaces specified areas where both parties will aspire to harmonize legislation and standards and thus facilitate future cooperation.

Many in Europe would claim that the EU is disappointed by developments in Russia. However, the EU and its member states lack any real policy aimed at democracy promotion in Russia. They have silently accepted Russia’s political development, occasionally voicing their concerns to no avail. The economic benefits ­ and a rather idealistic expectation of a partnership in world affairs ­ clearly outweigh any concerns over democracy.

The bargaining over economic issues is anything but easy. And it is not as simple as exchanging deliveries of gas for Gazprom’s access to downstream markets in Europe. This dependence is mutual. The exports supplied through existing pipelines and contracted for those under construction are bound for Europe. To fill the pipelines, Gazprom largely depends on investment and technologies from the West. If Moscow wants to benefit from participation in the European market, it should show more reciprocity and take steps to liberalize its own market.

There are, and there will be, disputes in many areas. This should be taken as a sign of normalcy. Much of the Russia-EU agenda goes beyond the summit meetings and does not leave much room for spectacular breakthroughs. Not every summit will produce landmark agreements. We should rather take them as an important part of the routine mechanism of fixing what is bad and leaving those elements which function well.

Measured in this way, the Sochi summit brings us further to facilitating the movement of people across borders. It is also expected to take us a step further toward the new basic agreement that will replace the one expiring in December 2007. What I do not expect, however, is any significant progress on Iran. If Moscow was ready for a compromise, it would strike a deal with the United States, not with the EU. And if Iran was ready to make a deal, it also would make it with the Americans. This highlights a clear weakness of the Russia ­ EU link but it could be hardly removed by establishing a new council. The weakness is structural, not institutional.

Alexander Rahr, Director of the Korber Center on CIS/Russia Studies, German Council on Foreign Relations:

Russia and the EU face serious problems of communication and interaction.

Although politicians on both sides are always quick to praise the results of cooperation over the past years, the danger of a deepening split between Russia and the EU is very realistic. For example, a failure to agree on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, due to expire in 2007, will call into question the present strategic partnership.

First of all, Russia wants to be respected by the EU countries as a leading European power. Russia regards itself as part of Europe and European civilization. Russia is interested in a close economic partnership with the EU and ­ in the long run ­ some sort of security alliance (a modified NATO). But at the same time, Russia does not want to become part of the West and it is reluctant to adopt Western liberal values. The majority of Russians seems to think that the Western democratic model, with which the country sympathized in the 1990s, is unacceptable for Russia. Russia’s present problems with the EU are connected to the false perception that the West wants to harm Russia.

The EU wants close economic cooperation with Russia, but it is also pursuing a partnership of values. The EU fears that a Russia that does not share the same democratic values as the West will remain a potential threat for the rest of Europe. It is eager to transfer liberal ideas and EU standards further into the post-Soviet space and, eventually, to Russia itself. The majority of the EU countries are prepared to quit a bilateral partnership if it is not based on values, but only on pragmatic interests. The EU’s problem is fundamentally a lack of patience in dealing with Russia.

The majority of observers in the West may still think that Russia has no option but to orient itself towards the West (and Western values). Russia’s present flirtation with China and India is not taken seriously. The EU is, and will remain for many years, Russia’s main trading partner and the principal market for Russian energy exports. However, the EU is reluctant to honor Russia for its "Europeanization." Presently, European countries envision a future continent made of a strong EU-Europe and an EU "strategic neighborhood.” But a lack of support for a "Common European House" will become a serious obstacle for the historic unification of the entire region.

The present EU seems not to care if it "loses" Russia. Some EU countries have even called for a new policy of containment against Russia. Unfortunately, Russia’s supporters have little to say these days. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who tried to bind Russia and the EU through an energy alliance, is fiercely criticized for his approach. The growing discontent with the EU inside Russia will, unfortunately, further complicate any rapprochement.

Andrei Lebedev, Senior Associate, the State Club Foundation:

Ever since the birth of the European Community, EU’s predecessor, Russian interests in Western Europe have always been country-oriented. The Cold War prevented our country from evolving toward an equitable partnership with the EU that is based on more than just words, leading perhaps to some kind of privileged membership. Now, one is tempted to assert that the status quo is satisfactory enough not to strive for more. After all, the same countries that are well-disposed toward Russian attempts to advance a bilateral partnership with them oppose Russian efforts to strengthen ties with the EU.

Of course, that is not enough. Economically as well as politically, developed ties with the union mean much more than a simple sum of the ties with its members. Culturally, Russia is mostly a European country. So, it is in Russia’s best interest to upgrade relations with the EU as a whole to a much more dignified level.

It is also in the European Union’s interest. Leaving Russia out in the cold is a short-sighted policy. Would the EU prefer to see Russia develop closer ties with the Far East or Southern and Southeast Asia? Reorienting Russian oil and gas exports would serve as a perfect basis for strengthening economic ties with that part of the world. Granted, at the moment this is considered to be a distant threat. But the markets are there waiting. One should witness the bewilderment of Indian businessmen, for example: why are their multiple proposals mostly ignored by their Russian colleagues? Sooner or later, the inertia of the necessity of doing business with Europe will wear out, and sound market considerations will prevail in this country. It will surely happen sooner with the EU’s haughty policy. Should one thank Brussels for that?

Sergei Shishkarev, Deputy Chairman, Committee on Energy, Transport and Communications, Russian State Duma:

It is welcome news that the anti-Russian hysteria, currently raging in the United States, has not affected the pragmatism and common sense of the European elites. The EU leaders appear to understand that the Russia-bashing rhetoric coming from Washington reflects a growing desire on the part of the United States to increase American influence in the former Soviet space and in Eastern Europe. Although the United States and the EU are strategic allies, it is unlikely that such American policy meets with absolute approval in the EU. Russia and the EU are close economic partners and needlessly engaging in “megaphone diplomacy” serves no one’s interest.

It is very important that the so-called Road Maps, adopted at the 2005 Russia-EU summit in Moscow, are gradually turning into viable tools of everyday cooperation. Easing visa restrictions on travel to the EU for Russian nationals will greatly contribute to further economic and cultural integration between the two geopolitical giants.

And there are signs that Russia and the EU will find a workable formula for meeting each side’s objectives on Russian gas supplies to Europe, ensuring both the stability of supply and the stability of demand that Moscow seeks.

For example, European Commission spokeswoman Emma Udwin said in Brussels on May 23 that the upcoming twice-yearly Russia-EU summit will highlight the importance of energy in relations between the two parties and that the EU wants a "deeper energy relationship" with Russia. "This is a two-way street,” she said. “It is true that Russia is a very, very important supplier for the EU, providing about 25 percent of our oil and gas. But it is also the case that we are not just any customer for Russia. We are, at the present time, the [most important] customer for Russia, accounting for...[65] percent of their gas exports." Udwin nonetheless acknowledged Russia's repeated refusals to ratify the EU's Energy Charter that would end Gazprom's monopoly over Russia's pipeline system.

European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said in Brussels on May 23 that the letter he received from Russian Energy and Industry Minister Viktor Khristenko the previous day is "very assuring and [reflects] a good spirit". Khristenko wrote that there is "no reason to doubt" Russia's reliability as an energy supplier. Barroso said that the EU wants a "win-win" energy partnership with Russia in which both sides' interests are taken into account. "It is in the interest of both sides to remove potential barriers to investment," he stated. "I believe transparency [and] reciprocity [should be the] key elements in our relationship."

And the EU seems to have agreed with a Russian proposal to replace, rather then extend, the outdated Partnership and Cooperation Agreement when it expires in 2007. Although a new treaty is not likely to offer Russia even a hint of an EU membership, it will most probably be an improvement over the current unworkable document.

We should not expect too much from such a routine diplomatic meeting as another Russia-EU summit. But neither do we have to prejudge its outcome by taking into account only the negative preliminary assessments. Life will tell.