The shaky foundations of the “new Cold War”
The conflict has little to do with Russia’s neo-imperialism, but a lot to do with Western reluctance to foot the bill of Soviet de-colonisation
By Vlad Sobell (vlad.sobell@dir.co.uk)

• The “genuine democracies” created in the former Soviet Union in the wake of the so-called “colour revolutions” are failing to deliver political stability and economic prosperity. Insofar as they have failed to reduce dependence on subsidised Russian gas, they are also implicitly failing to deliver real independence.

• Ukraine’s demands for continued supplies of cheap Russian/CIS gas in effect mean that Kiev is promoting the preservation of Soviet economic structures. Thus, it is implicitly promoting re-Sovietisation, a charge normally levelled against Moscow.

• These facts have been completely overlooked by the new Cold War warriors, who continue to accuse Russia of authoritarian backsliding and neo-imperialist policies in the CIS.

• Since the West wants to preserve the current situation in which Ukraine’s transition to independence is actually financed by Russia, it has offered Kiev an early NATO membership as a meaningless symbol.

• Moscow is unlikely to fall for this unseemly trap, with further tensions certain to emerge on the horizon.

The ineffective colour democracies

While the former Soviet republics of Ukraine and Georgia (and to some extent Kyrgyzstan and Moldova) have come to be seen as advancing to “genuine democracy” ­ mainly because of their Western geopolitical orientation ­ it is striking that these supposedly democratic leaders in the CIS also seem to be chronically unstable and their governments ineffective. Even well disposed observers might find it hard to deny that the new regimes’ performance in delivering structural reforms and political stability has been disappointing. A cynic might say that they, and their Western backers, have been long on superficial “colour” attributes, but disturbingly short on delivering substantive structural change.

The protracted post-election political manoeuvring in Ukraine, with the new government unlikely to be in place before the end of June, is the most recent, and perhaps the most telling example of this malaise. This is not a coincidence, as similar such post-authoritarian processes farther afield ­ most spectacularly in Iraq ­ also point to an interminable lag between the collapse of the ancient regime and the creation of a functioning democracy. (In the latter case, of course, democracy, should it at all materialise, will need to be probably indefinitely nurtured by massive US economic aid and military presence).

This is not a mere academic issue, but a daunting problem of post-authoritarian transition, for it raises some troubling moral and practical questions. For example what was the point of instituting “genuine democracy” if that democracy chronically fails to deliver political stability and economic prosperity? Ultimately, one should ask whether such a state of affairs really deserves to be called democracy, if it is too weak and ineffective and unable to implement deep structural reforms, without which it would never become self-sustaining.

The cases of the former Soviet republics of Ukraine and Georgia furthermore raise the pertinent question of exactly what kind of “independence” the new regimes are building, when they are manifestly failing even to begin addressing the sources of their countries’ reliance on cheap gas, implicitly subsidised by the “empire”? This dependence, of course, has deep structural/historical roots and can be addressed only over the medium term. But there is no reason why a responsible, truly effective and hence sovereign, “genuine democracy” should not swiftly negotiate, on its own initiative, a medium term road map to European gas prices, accompanied by a programme of requisite structural reforms.

The Orange regime in Ukraine did, indeed, in the course of 2005 attempt to make such a move. But it flinched, when faced with the full ramifications of steeply rising prices of Russian/CIS gas. Kiev has failed to back its political drive for independence by a corresponding programme of structural reforms.

It seems, therefore, that instead of pursuing real independence ­ by seeking to implement such reforms at the fastest possible pace ­ the political classes of the former Soviet republics focus their efforts on nominal, and in practice meaningless, symbols of independence, such as the membership of NATO, and/or on picking up sterile and damaging fights with Russia, which are meant to demonstrate the Kremlin’s “neo-imperialist” intentions.

Unfortunately, this strategy ­ for thoroughly opportunistic reasons supported by the West (more on this below) ­ may actually yield degradation, not strengthening of democracy in the former Soviet Union. If democracy is conceived of as a means to an end ­ the delivery of stable, liberal, prosperous and law-based society ­ and not as an abstract, theoretical construct, then by most objective standards the “colour regimes” are failing this ultimate, real-life test.

On the other hand, a soft authoritarian regime, such as that of President Lukashenka in Belarus, seems to be meeting the test surprisingly well, having avoided the traumas of post-Soviet transition, the instability (and inequity) of “oligarchic democracy”, and having delivered superior social security as well as a measure of prosperity.

True, the Belarusian “economic miracle” clearly is the result of Belarus’ extensive dependence on trade with the booming Russia (as has been the stellar pre-2005 performance of the Ukrainian economy). But why should this, and its consequent pro-Russian orientation, be seen as a “weakness”, or almost as the regime’s betrayal of the populace? Conversely, why should the post-revolutionary Kiev’s strategy of “biting the hand that feeds it” be regarded as wise and democratic economics and come to be applauded by the West?

In this context, it is conceivable that the Lukashenka regime might be seen as a preferable, alternative path to prosperity and eventually mature democracy ­ especially, when we assume, as we should, that Belarus will one day mature to a full democracy regardless of what Mr Lukashenka may be doing at present. The most reliable assessment, though impossible to carry out, might be by considering how many “fully liberated” Ukrainians might in fact settle for the relative economic security and prosperity delivered by Europe’s “last dictatorship” in neighbouring Belarus.

A new Cold War?

These issues are at the roots of what is increasingly seen as the new Cold War between Russia and the USA (and to a lesser extent some other Western countries). Washington argues that countries such as Ukraine and Georgia have transferred to what it calls “genuine democracy” and that their “colour regimes” must be supported come what may, even if they place real independence on the backburner by their failure to reform the economy.

Putin’s Kremlin, on the other hand, believes that democracy remains an empty and meaningless concept, unless it delivers effective government, political stability and economic prosperity. On this basis the Kremlin has rejected Russia’s own “genuine democracy” of the 1990’s and is now building its “sovereign democracy”, which places emphasis on independence, responsibility and economic regeneration.

This pragmatism and the transfer to full market, hard-nosed economics, is also the reason why Russia is demanding progressive phasing out of its implicit subsidisation of the former Soviet republics, not only in regard to “hostile” countries such as Ukraine but also its geo-political “friends”, such as Belarus. The Kremlin’s “sovereign democracy” thus in practice leads to de-Sovietisation of the former Soviet Union ­ not a Soviet restoration ­ while, paradoxically, the “real democracy” of the colour revolutions appears to be promoting a continuation of Soviet economic structures.

Emotions driving the new Cold War have intensified in the run-up to the July summit of G8 leaders in St Petersburg, as Russia’s critics aim to exact maximum leverage by threatening to spoil the Kremlin’s party. Russia’s American and European adversaries want to ensure that the summit is not turned into what they fear would amount to the ultimate legitimisation of Putin’s “authoritarian backsliding” and “neo-imperialist” expansion. The most hostile pitch to date was delivered by US vice president Dick Cheney at the summit of East European “new democracies” in Vilnius on 4th May. In his address, Mr Cheney harshly criticised what he sees as Russia’s internal authoritarianism and neo-imperialist bullying of its former Soviet neighbours. His statements have widely been interpreted as jacking up the tensions between Washington and Moscow to a new, post-Soviet level.

Ukraine is the central battleground

Since Ukraine is the largest former Soviet country, and since it has been most intimately integrated with Russia (culturally, ethnically as well as economically), it has naturally become the central battleground in the new Cold War. By moving over to pro-Western “genuine democracy”, the arrival of Orange Ukraine in early 2005 has marked a major advance by the West and a corresponding setback for the Kremlin.

Paradoxically, however, Ukraine is also presenting the most spectacular manifestation of the shaky foundations and failure of “genuine democracy” as well as the bankruptcy of its “independence drive”. It is troubling that neither Kiev nor the West even appear to be aware of the ramifications of this failure ­ or rather, they most likely are aware of them, but they refuse to contemplate footing the bill of Ukraine’s independence, preferring it to be picked by the “neo-imperialist” Russia.

Whatever the rhetoric in Washington, Kiev or elsewhere, it is clear that Ukraine is going nowhere and is unlikely to be going anywhere in the foreseeable future. Not only is Ukraine’s external trade is dominated by Russia, with the West hardly being in sight. Its exports, moreover, remain competitive and, indeed, large swathes of domestically oriented production remain in operation, only because they receive “cheap” (in comparison with EU prices) Russian gas. Russia has, therefore, been implicitly subsidising Ukraine to the tune of several billion dollars a year. Beyond running into a fruitless fracas with the Kremlin in January over the prices of gas, the Orange regime has made little perceptible impact on this situation. Fifteen years after the Soviet collapse, the Soviet-style Russian-Ukrainian economic structures remain alive and kicking, with alternative Western structures being conspicuous by their absence.

As noted above, the road map to real, as opposed to nominal, independence must lead through radical, medium-term structural reforms, which, in co-operation with Russia, would gradually eliminate Russia’s implicit subsidisation of the Ukrainian economy. But, amazingly, some sections of Kiev’s political class are calling for renegotiation of the January gas price agreement, presumably with the view of reducing rather than further increasing the prices of imported gas. In a bizarre twist, this yearning for the Soviet vestiges is being widely interpreted as a drive to independence.

Is Ukraine being misled by the West?

The apparently interminable political paralysis in Ukraine is normally attributed to this country’s regional/ethnic fault-lines, as well as to its lacking tradition as an independent, fully sovereign state. In addition, Ukraine is suffering from the standard weakness shared by most former communist states ­ the absence of strong, ideology and class-rooted political parties and the corresponding prevalence of oligarchic politics. (These systems do not, and cannot, have genuine party-based competition, with politics being dominated by competition among oligarchic clans for the available streams of revenue, such as the discounted Russian gas).

Unfortunately, however, the West appears to be playing less than fully constructive part in this unseemly scenario. First, it has so far failed to underwrite Ukraine’s shift to “genuine democracy” by offering Kiev a credible road map to EU membership as well as financial support to help it cushion the impact of the gas prices. It has also failed to impress on the Ukrainian political class the need for structural reforms as the only credible path to real independence. And, finally, it has indulged Kiev in the pursuit of irrelevant objectives such as entry to NATO, which, with the flare up of the new Cold War, now appears to be as the highest priority. (Georgia and Moldova cannot at present qualify for NATO membership, as they have unresolved ethnic and territorial conflicts on their territory).

A Russian commentator has aptly pointed out that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is really a conflict between Russia and the West over who should foot the bill of Ukrainian independence.

Moscow clearly (and rightly) believes that it should not be paying, as it has other priority items on its spending programme ­ besides the obvious thought that no-one wants to pay to support one’s adversaries. The West on the other hand clearly remains determined to avoid assuming responsibility, while simultaneously not being averse to taking Ukraine into NATO. Such an absurd state of affairs surely is unprecedented in modern European history.

Since it is unimaginable that Putin’s supremely pragmatic, but also increasingly assertive Kremlin would go along with a wheeze of these dimensions, the ensuing Cold War over the consequences of Soviet de-colonisation will rumble on for some time to come.