August 25, 1997  
This Date's Issues: 1144 •1146  •

Johnson's Russia List
#1146
25 August 1997
djohnson@cdi.org

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Sam Rubin: Russian idea.
2. RIA Novosti: PRESIDENT YELTSIN FACES A BUSY WORKING 
WEEK.
3. RIA Novosti: MOSCOW'S PRICES OF HOUSING STILL HIGHEST 
IN RUSSIA.
4. Jamestown Foundation Monitor: RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC STAGNATION 
CONTINUES.
5. New York Times editorial: Russia and Its Tyrant Neighbor.
6. Izvestia: RUSSIA SHOULD NOT DRIVE ITSELF IN BLIND ALLEY.
Says Presidential Aide for International Affairs Sergei Prikhodko.
7. Interfax: Chubais Confirms Plans for Tighter Budget Control.
8. Interfax: Nemtsov Discloses Post-Vacation Plans.
9. Nezavisimaya Gazeta: Sea Breeze-97 Exercises in Ukraine Begin 
a New Phase in Russia's Relations with the West.
10. Pravda 5: Lukashenko Rejected Blackmail.
11. Sankt-Peterburgskye Vedomosti: The Great Grandfather Nationalized 
the Economy, So the Great Grandson Will Privatize It. (Boiko).
12. Vecherniy Peterburg: Are Old Soviet Ideas Stronger than Russia's 
Current Interests? 
13. The Straits Times (Singapore): Decline of Russian language
study in Britain.
14. Interfax: Russian Premier signs budget draft to 
be submitted to Duma.
15. Toronto Sun: Matthew Fisher, Russia mourns a beloved 
clown.
16. Novoye Vremya: Roman Stoyanov, "Disobedience Fete. Will CPSU 
Survive Until Year 2000."
17. Delovoy Mir: Podberezkin Urges CIS Integration Policy.] 

******

#1
Date: Sat, 23 Aug 1997 00:18:58 -0700
From: Sam Ruben <samruben@sprintmail.com>
Subject: Re: 1135-Danzer/Russia

A land motto is not without other examples to extrapolate from: Hawaii's
motto is "The life of the Land is reflected in the Righteousness of the
people."

*******

#2
PRESIDENT YELTSIN FACES A BUSY WORKING WEEK
MOSCOW, AUGUST 25. (RIA Novosti Correspondent) - Boris
Yeltsin will start his new working week today with a talk with
Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin, two of his deputies --
Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, as well as Valentin Yumashev,
head of the Presidential Administration. On the same day the
President intends to receive Yuri Skuratov, Prosecutor General
of the Russian Federation, and Foreign Minister Yevgeny
Primakov. The journalists learned this from the President's
press-secretary Sergei Yastrzhembsky. 
The President will spend Tuesday, August 26, in Saratov
where he intends to visit an industrial enterprise, acquaint
himself with the output of the Saratov Region's machine-building
industry, go on a sight-seeing walk round the city and meet with
the leadership of the Saratov Region.
The ceremony of presenting state prizes for science and
technology, in which the President will take part, is scheduled
for Thursday, August 28. 
Friday, August 29, will be devoted to the visit to Moscow
of President Levon Ter-Petrosyan of Armenia. The press secretary
stressed that Russia and Armenia are about to sign a large
bilateral treaty. On the program of the President of Armenia's
visit to Moscow will be talks with President Yeltsin, as well as
a number of protocol events. 

*******

#3
MOSCOW'S PRICES OF HOUSING STILL HIGHEST IN RUSSIA
MOSCOW, AUGUST 25. /RIA Novosti/ -- The prices of both
newly-built and existing housing in Moscow are still the highest
in Russia, the State Statistical Committee of the Russian
Federation reports. During the first half of 1997, the average
price of one square metre of housing space in new flats in the
Russian capital was equal to 7,066,000 roubles, while that of in
current use, 5,763,900 roubles. The second highest after Moscow
is the price of housing space in Primorye Territory (5,555,300
roubles per square metre).
Russia's average price of housing space in
newly-constructed blocks of flats stood at 2,702,400 roubles per
square metre; that of in the so-called improved houses,
2,990,400 roubles, and the price of one square metre of housing
space in the elite flats amounted to 5,071,100 roubles.
The housing prices have been climbing fastest in Western
and Eastern Siberia, up 11.6 and 17 percent, respectively, in
the course of the first half of this year. On the other hand,
the prices on the primary and secondary housing markets in some
regions of Russia have been declining. For instance, in the
northern region new flats went in price by 1.2 percent, while in
the Volga-and-Vyatka and the Urals regions prices dropped by 7.4
and 15.4 percent, respectively. 

*******

#4
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
August 25, 1997

RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC STAGNATION CONTINUES. Official data for the first seven
months of 1997 indicate that the Russian economy continues to stagnate.
(Russian agencies, August 18) GDP for the January-July period was down 0.2
percent compared to the same period in 1996, despite slight growth in
industrial production (1.2 percent) and retail sales (0.5 percent).

Although the absence of an economic recovery comes as a surprise to most
foreign observers, some hopeful signs are apparent. Production in 25 of
Russia's 89 Federation subjects is expected to rise this year, and growth in
Murmansk, Perm, Ryazan, Tatarstan, Ulyanovsk, and Udmurtia is forecast at
3-5 percent. The unemployment rate (calculated according to International
Labor Organization methodology) at the end of July had fallen to 9.3
percent, from close to 10 percent this spring. Both consumer- and
producer-price inflation had down below 15 percent on an annualized basis at
the end of July, and producer prices actually declined by 0.1 percent last
month. Real household incomes during the first seven months rose by some 5
percent, thanks in part to progress in paying off budget-sector wage
arrears. The service sector accounted for an estimated 50.3 percent of
Russian GDP, while small firms and firms with private capital were chiefly
responsible for the growth in industrial production.

In effect, Russia seems to have experienced three different macroeconomic
phases this year. The slight growth in Russia's GDP recorded during
January-February was more than negated by the larger decline in output
registered during the March-May period. The June-July phase was essentially
one of no growth, thereby prolonging the slight recession recorded during
the first five months. Russia's 1997 economic performance may well be
determined by developments in the second half of the year.

*******

#5
New York Times
25 August 1997
[for personal use only]
Editorial
Russia and Its Tyrant Neighbor

Last week, Belarussian television featured a supposed confession from an
arrested Russian reporter stating that his entry into Belarus was part of a
wider conspiracy and asking for forgiveness. 
"I was a pawn," Anatoly Adamchuk said in a letter, written after two
days of interrogation by Belarus's K.G.B. Journalists who saw a tape of his
"confession" said that Mr. Adamchuk's eyes appeared dead and his manner
robotic. 
Mr. Adamchuk and four other reporters for Russia's state-owned ORT
television network were held on charges of illegally entering Belarus. They
were released late last week, after Moscow made it clear that keeping them
in custody would imperil the planned federation of Russia and Belarus. 
Such pressure was especially welcome because Russia is the only nation
with real influence over Aleksandr Lukashenko, the Stalinist leader of
Belarus. Until now, Russia has been far too willing to appease Mr.
Lukashenko and has thus given him little incentive to change his thinking
and behavior, which are smothering his country. 
It has been a long time since an apparently forced confession has graced
television in this part of the former Soviet Union. But the treatment of
Mr. Adamchuk is not surprising. 
Mr. Lukashenko, a former manager of a state farm, is not at all choosy
about his totalitarian models. 
He is an open admirer of Hitler and claims that his countrymen want him
to bring back the Stalin era. 
He has installed his supporters in the legislature and the courts,
closed independent media operations and arrested leaders of the opposition.
Since Belarussians can understand Russian and receive Moscow television,
Mr. Lukashenko has also cracked down on Russian journalists who report on
street protests against his tyranny. He has stripped ORT of accreditation
for any journalist. The company's bureau chief, who has Belarussian
citizenship, was arrested for unlawfully crossing the border with two
colleagues in July and now faces five years in prison. 
Moscow initially endorsed Mr. Lukashenko's statement that the arrests
were legal. 
This was not surprising. Mr. Yeltsin has treated Mr. Lukashenko gently
to avoid endangering the federation, which Mr. Yeltsin embraced partly to
please Russia's nationalists and Communists, who are howling that he gave
in too easily to NATO's proposed expansion eastward. Federation is
attractive to many Russians because it would expand Russian influence and
give the country a long border with the West. 
Mr. Yeltsin's advisers, however, are divided on the wisdom of cozying up
to Belarus. 
His new toughness last week shows the influence of the liberals, who
succeeded earlier this year in softening the integration agreement and
diluting Mr. Lukashenko's power. 
Mr. Lukashenko is believed to harbor ambitions of ruling the federation
someday, and he desperately wants a strong union. This gives Mr. Yeltsin
real leverage if he does not squander it. Belarus's economy, which looks
the same as it did 10 years ago, is so feeble that it makes Russia's
economy look robust. 
Unless Mr. Lukashenko carries out reforms, joining the two economies
would simply drag Russia down. 
Mr. Lukashenko is also an ally of the Communists and nationalists who
oppose Mr. Yeltsin and endanger Russia's democracy. 
Mr. Lukashenko's release of the journalists is a heartening reminder
that he is not immune to pressure. Moscow should take note. Neither the
people of Russia nor those of Belarus are served when Mr. Yeltsin caves in
to the Stalinist next door. 

*******

#6
>From RIA Novosti
Izvestia
August 23, 1997
RUSSIA SHOULD NOT DRIVE ITSELF IN BLIND ALLEY
Says Presidential Aide for International Affairs Sergei Prikhodko
By Konstantin Eggert, Izvestia

"I believe that very soon our public itself will be able
to answer the question whether the leadership of the country
sacrifices democratic principles in the situation concerning
the journalists in Byelorussia," said presidential aide for 
international affairs Sergei Prikhodko to Izvestia. 
In his first interview given to the newspaper, Prikhodko,
former deputy director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's
second European department who was appointed to his present
post four months ago, was very cautious. 
Question: How do you explain the Kremlin's silence during
the whole crisis caused by the detainment of the ORT
journalists?
Answer: Firstly, the statements by the President, the
Prime Minister and the Russian Foreign Ministry contain all
official appraisals of the incident. Secondly, I stand for a
thorough and persistent work with the Byelorussians, not for
sound statements. I assure you that this work is going on
permanently. 
Question: The impression is being created that after
signing the Russia - NATO Founding Act, the theme of relations
with the alliance has receded into the background. Is that so?
Answer: No, that is not so. Experts are conducting
preparatory work to ensure the beginning of the activity of
the Russia - NATO Joint Council. President Yeltsin personally
controls this matter. 
It is very important for Russia to embody the provisions
of the military-political chapter of the Founding Act.
Speaking more precisely, one of the main problems to us today
is the adaptation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Treaty. Moscow's strategic aim is not only to combat NATO's 
expansion, though the negative attitude to the idea remains,
but also to create a clear structure of relations with the
alliance. 
Question: It is not the most popular point of view, is
it?
Answer: You are right. Many politicians in our country do
not like the development of realistic partnership with NATO.
They would like to bring everything to the struggle against 
the expansion. But this way leads to a blind alley. Russia
must try to influence the alliance, try to make it transform
itself. 
Question: Will former Defence Minister Pavel Grachev be
appointed to the post of the extraordinary plenipotentiary
ambassador at NATO?
Answer: I do not know anything about such plans.
Question: What are main tendencies of Russia's foreign
policy today?
Answer: This policy is becoming directly dependent on the
economic situation in the country. Nobody will deny the 
especial importance of our state's integration into European
and world economic structures. We are flatly against the
infringement on the interests of Russian exporters and
commodity producers. The point lies in quite concrete jobs in
Russia itself. A variety of economic contacts, including
relations with USA, the European Union, as well as with China,
the South East Asian countries and Japan, are absolutely
necessary.
Question: In the past few years there was an obvious turn
to China in Russia's Asian policy. How would you explain this?
Answer: We are conducting a dialogue with Beijing,
proceeding from a long-range perspective. However, China is
not the only trend in our work in the Far East. For instance,
our relations with Japan, which were not very active up to
this time, are entering a new stage now. Our cooperation with
India is also going on very well. 
Question: Does not the idea of the so-called
"multi-polar world" seem to you personally extremely
ideologised, aimed against the West?
Answer: Perhaps, there are some reasons to think so. But
I believe that it is time which decides the fate of such
ideas. However, we should not forget that this is a reaction
to the attempt to impose the idea of a one-polar world.

*******

#7
Interfax
24 August 1997
Chubais Confirms Plans for Tighter Budget Control 
MOSCOW -- Russian First Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Anatoly
Chubais confirmed government intentions to tighten control over budget
resources during a Sunday night television broadcast. 
He said this was the purpose of the decision to transfer budget accounts
from commercial banks to the central bank or Federal Treasury. 
At the beginning of next year "the development of the treasury system
should actually fully withdraw budget money from commercial banks," Chubais
said. 
"The government will, in fact, control what it should control, by no
means trying to restore total control over the economy," he said. 
"Business in Russia will never determine the direction of development,
the state will always be bigger than business and above it, and no
commercial group will be given controlling rights to run the country," he
concluded. 
Chubais also flatly denied rumors of his dismissal from the post of
finance minister and an overhaul of his ministry. 
The media reports to this end "are a complete fantasy by their authors,"
he said. 
There will be no major reshuffles at top government level in the near
future, he said. 
However, Chubais admitted that he spends most of his time performing the
duties of first deputy prime minister and is dissatisfied with the
attention he pays to the Finance Ministry. 
Even though his first deputies, Vladimir Petrov and Alexei Kudrin, "are
keeping the situation in the right channel, it would be better if I paid a
little more attention to the Finance Ministry than now," Chubais said. 
He said "there is a strong team" at the Finance Ministry capable of
fulfilling its complicated tasks professionally. 
"In this context it is strange to read reports that the Finance Ministry
is uncontrollable and some of its departments will be closed as
unnecessary. That is absolute fiction," Chubais said. 

*******

#8
Interfax
24 August 1997
Nemtsov Discloses Post-Vacation Plans 
MOSCOW -- Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, who has
returned from vacation in Sochi on the Black Sea, will meet with President
Boris Yeltsin on Monday to discuss a number of socioeconomic matters. 
He said Sunday he expected they would focus on the 1998 draft budget,
the payment of debts to servicemen and preparations for the winter season
in the economy. 
Nemtsov said he would soon deal with problems related to army reform,
primarily the program of providing housing to acting and retired servicemen
and officers through the distribution of loans and housing certificates. 
He said he would make a number of working visits to the provinces, in
particular to Western Siberia, where he intends to investigate "the
possibilities of further increasing the efficiency of the oil industry." 
Nemtsov also said he planned to visit Sakhalin where "the first major
production-sharing agreement in Russia is being carried out." He said he
hoped this agreement would bring billions of dollars in investments to the
country. 
He said he would continue organizing auctions to sell government
officials' foreign cars. He said some 50 cars would be put up for sale in
September and expressed confidence that all of them would be sold. Nemtsov
added that "the first comfortable Volgas made especially for government
officials have arrived in Moscow." 

*******

#9
>From Russia Today press summaries
http://www.russiatoday.com
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
25 August 1997
Lead story
Sea Breeze-97 Exercises in Ukraine Begin a New Phase in Russia's Relations
with the West 
Summary
The Sea Breeze naval exercises, which start in Sevastopol Saturday, are
the largest of their kind in Europe since the new geo-political situation
emerged, and a new division of forces between NATO and Russia. 
The Russia-NATO Founding Charter that was signed in Paris this spring
gave Russia at least some chance to influence those decisions of the West
which it deems unsuitable. 
Sea Breeze '97 is a concrete example of the new situation. The
exercises, which were announced some months ago, were first based on a
fictional "insurrection of separatists in an island, supported by a
powerful neighbor state," which hinted directly at the possibility of a
Russia-Ukraine war over the Crimea. This scenario was later changed to a
banal "earthquake." 
Thus Moscow was unable to prevent the exercises but could make at least
some changes to NATO's plans. The scenario, which had been developed by
Ukrainian military officials, was changed after the tough rhetoric of
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov. The decision did not come from
Ukraine, but followed a meeting between Primakov and U.S. Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright. 
Russia also managed to change the list of countries participating in the
maneuvers. Two countries, Greece and Romania, refused to take part. Sea
Breeze now includes the naval forces of the US, Georgia, Bulgaria, Turkey
and Ukraine. Italy, Greece and Romania will be observers. Russia refused
observer status. 
The daily also wrote that Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev plans to visit
the Russian Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol this week. By Sept.
1, the Novorossisk naval region will be reorganized into a military base of
the Black Sea Fleet in order to strengthen it. 

********

#10
Russia Today press summary
Pravda 5
25 August 1997
Lukashenko Rejected Blackmail 
Summary
The daily wrote that Belarussian President Aleksander Lukashenko's
decision to release a group of ORT journalists should not be perceived as
forced by the tough talk of Russian presidential spokesman Sergei
Yastrzhembsky. 
Addressing the issue, Lukashenko said: "I am keeping my promise (to free
the Russian journalists), but I want the Russian Foreign Ministry to answer
our notes, which we sent there long ago." 
The Russian Foreign Ministry, however, left the Belarussian address
unanswered, because it did not want to admit that the two ORT groups really
committed a crime, having trespassed on the Belarussian-Lithuanian border. 
The daily said the whole scandal resulted from a provocation arranged by
ORT executives. It quoted a statement by one member of the two arrested ORT
crews, Anatoly Adamchuk, who said his bosses needed a scandalous report
from Belarus. In phone conversations, they spoke with Adamchuk about
possibly crossing the Belarus state border and recommended he do it at the
same place where Pavel Sheremet did. 

*********

#11
Russia Today press summary
Sankt-Peterburgskye Vedomosti
25 August 1997
The Great Grandfather Nationalized the Economy, So the Great Grandson Will
Privatize It 
Summary
Maxim Boiko, 38, was recently appointed to the difficult and dangerous
position of head of the State Property Committee. 
Boiko typifies the generation of reformers that has grown up under the
tutelage of reformist Yegor Gaidar. Boiko resembles him closely. Both come
from families of prominent Bolsheviks. Boiko's great grandfather was even a
close colleague of Lenin, and his parents are both professors now living in
the U.S. 
Boiko was educated in the USSR's best schools and later went on to
become a close adviser to Anatoly Chubais when he was head of the State
Property Committee. Boiko has always been Chubais' lap dog, said the daily,
ready and willing to do whatever he says. 
Boiko promises to carry out privatization in an honest and open manner.
But in fact, said the daily, there is nothing honest about the process. 
Sooner or later, the daily concluded, Boiko along with Chubais and his
team will be forced out of power. 

*******

#12
Russia Today press summary
Vecherniy Peterburg
25 August 1997
Lead editorial
Are Old Soviet Ideas Stronger than Russia's Current Interests? 
Summary
The daily said news reports from Belarus show that the declaration of a
Russia-Belarus union is quite different from what is happening in reality. 
Each country has its own interests and plays by its own rules. Each
year, Belarus benefits to the tune of billions of dollars from smuggling
and unpaid taxes, said the daily. President Aleksander Lukashenko embraces
the opposition Russian Duma, but the Kremlin keeps quiet. 
Once again, Russia is the vassal and hostage of a small and
insignificant state, said the daily. As long as Belarus pretends that it is
with Russia, the Kremlin remains satisfied. The Russian government acts the
same way with Chechnya. Politicians tell us that the indivisibility of the
Russian land is of primary importance. This myth needs to be preserved at
all costs, and if it cannot be preserved then it needs to at least appear
to be preserved. Only this explains Moscow's lenient attitude to
recalcitrant republics, the daily said. 
Surprisingly, Russia is only severe with NATO, which in fact poses
little immediate and genuine threat. During negotiations last spring, all
of Russia's diplomatic resources were thrown into the battle with NATO. 
The government remains trapped by Soviet habits -- it is used to
expending great energy and resources on external problems, while ignoring
internal ones which are no less pressing. 

******

#13
The Straits Times (Singapore)
25 August 1997
[for personal use only]
Grand old Moscow to mark 850th year...
[DJ: Title seems in error. Subject in Russian language study in Britain.]
LONDON -- Russian, the language of the Cold War and glasnost, is being
spurned by British undergraduates in the wake of the break-up of the Soviet
Union. 
The number of undergraduates studying Russian has fallen to its lowest
level since 1980. There are two main reasons. Russia's image -- that of a
Wild West region, ruled by gangsters and plagued by diseases -- is making
students balk at studying a language which involves a year's residence in
the country. 
Also, the comparatively dull period of Russian politics after the
euphoria of the Gorbachev era has failed to spur interest in the language. 
Russian departments in many British universities, which usually fill
their places before the A-level results are released, still have vacancies.
-- The Independent. 

*******

#14
Russian Premier signs budget draft to be submitted to Duma
MOSCOW, Aug 25 (Interfax) - Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin has
signed the draft of a 1998 budget to be submitted to the Russian Duma by
midnight August 25, government sources reported. 
Federal budget revenues are expected to stand at 340 billion
redenominated rubles, expenditures at 472 billion rubles and the deficit at
132 billion rubles. The primary budget deficit, i.e. excluding servicing
the state debt, totals only 11.5 billion rubles, the source said. 
Priority financing categories were singled out in line with the
presidential message on the budget, the source said. National defense
expenditures will be increased considerably to 81.7 billion rubles next
year. Spending on the judicial branch will rise to 4.4 billion rubles.
Larger allocations will be made to science and space. However funds
earmarked for education, culture and the social sphere will remain at
current levels. 
Financial aid to regions will be cut sharply, in accordance with the
draft. 
Only 13% of the total tax base will be allotted to the regions next
year, compared to 15% this year. 
Therefore, regions will receive a total of 38.5 billion rubles in 1998. 
When the state budget is debated in the Federation Council, "the
dialogue of the government with senators is likely to be more complicated
than with the deputies of the lower parliamentary chamber," the source said. 
At the same time, Cabinet ministers hope to engage in a constructive
dialogue with parliamentarians, he said. They are ready to take into
consideration all sensible proposals made by deputies. 

******

#15
Toronto Sun
25 August 1997
[for personal use only]
Russia mourns a beloved clown
By MATTHEW FISHER
Sun's Columnist at Large
 MOSCOW -- It was as if the silver-haired man with the deep voice who works
in the Kremlin had died last Thursday. 
 Russian television cancelled all regular programming to run films and
interviews honoring the memory of Yuri Nikulin, who died hours earlier
after a long battle with heart disease left him so weak he was unable to
have a bypass operation. 
  John Wayne and Jimmy Stewart might come closest, but it would be hard to
find a western show business personality who meant as much to his public as
Yuri Nikulin did to generations of Russians. 
  In a society where people always love telling ironic jokes, but have
often had trouble laughing openly, the rubber-faced comic had the rarest of
abilities. He could make his otherwise sombre compatriots laugh themselves
silly. 
  Nikulin was the Soviet Union's most famous clown before becoming a
hugely popular singer and film and television actor. Born with Walter
Matthau-like jowls, and a perpetually sardonic expression on his face, he
will long be remembered here for such songs as, Ah, it's All the Same to
Us, and his hilarious portrayal of the leader of a group of inept thieves
in The Caucasian Prisoner. 
  When Nikulin died on Thursday at the age of 75, he had returned to his
first love. He was the head of the still renowned, but increasingly
threadbare Moscow Circus. 
  I met Nikulin while working for another Toronto newspaper not long after
he rejoined the 117-year-old circus in the spring of 1990. Typically, he
was in a dither because many of the best young clowns were leaving Mikhail
Gorbachev's Soviet Union. 
  "Unfortunately, I must say to you that I am more than a little worried,"
Nikulin said. "We have not had so few good clowns since the end of the
Second World War. 
  "Perestroika means restructuring and that can be painful. It used to be
we could get permission to work overseas for just three months a year, but
now we have a free hand to go where we want and you know where everyone
wants to go -- the West." 
REQUESTED ASYLUM 
 In Soviet times, writers, musicians and ballet stars might defect, but
no one, Nikulin boasted, had ever left the Moscow Circus when it was on
tour abroad. But that suddenly changed in 1990 when several big name clowns
requested asylum overseas. 
 "Twenty or 30 years ago there were many teams of clowns and the public
knew who they were," Nikulin said. "Now some of the old guard like Popov
are still around, but the new ones just don't have it." 
 This was apparent the next evening when Nikulin invited me to see a
performance of his circus. As some in the packed house whispered their
disappointment, two clowns tried without success to get people to laugh at
a long skit in which one of them struggled to lift a table while the other
hid on top of it. 
  Nikulin got his start in an unlikely way. During lulls in fighting in
what Russians still call "the Great Patriotic War," Nikulin would entertain
the soldiers in his unit by goofing around. He soon began to act in
military revues which toured the various Eastern Fronts. 
  Turned down by Moscow's prestigious acting schools after the war, he
finally was accepted by a special school for clowns organized by the Moscow
Circus. It wasn't too long before he was the circus' star attraction, as
recognizable to any Soviet citizen as old Joe Stalin. 
  Although by Soviet standards he undoubtedly led a privileged life,
Nikulin certainly did not have everything. When I asked him what I might
give him as a present for taking so much of his time, he replied that he
needed a blank videotape to record one of his movies. It seems incredible
now, with video shops to suit every taste all over Moscow, but only seven
years ago it was impossible to obtain a blank tape anywhere in the capital. 
  One of Nikulin's last duties was to personally select the 75 performers
who sign on with the Moscow Circus every summer. Of particular professional
interest were the clowns. 
  Nikulin's obsession with finding what he called "the perfect clown" is
over. But the comic will not be forgotten. His corny routines will live on
as a staple of Russian television for years to come. His original antics
are also widely copied now by those trying to succeed him. 
  "A circus can be without an acrobat, the elephant may be delayed and
miss the show," Nikulin told me. "But the clown must be there or the people
won't laugh ... You can't find a clown, you know; it's in the milk of his
mother." 

*******

#16
Novoye Vremya in Russian No. 33, 24 Aug (Signed to press 19
Aug 97) p 6
[Article by Roman Stoyanov: "Disobedience Fete. Will CPSU Survive
Until Year 2000"]

The CPRF's [Communist Party of the Russian Federation's] Duma
leaders have suddenly begun to advocate the idea of imperative
mandate [imperativnyy mandat]. Let me remind for the benefit of
those who do not know that such a mandate is handed to a deputy
by his party and is transferred to the next man on the list once
the deputy leaves his faction or seriously breaches the
faction's discipline.
It is easy to appreciate the position of Mr. Zyuganov and his
supporters considering the scandal that has erupted among the CPRF's
ranks. It was caused, as many people know, by Vladimir Semago,
chairman of the anti-corruption commission. The scandal was
occasioned by accusations of corruption he made against his fellow
party member Seleznev, State Duma speaker. Put in brief his stance is
as follows: - The Duma is spending more and more every day for the
upkeep of the speaker's staff while the president invariably cuts
back funds for the Duma and its deputies have long been short of
funds for the most essential things in their work; - It is absolutely
obvious that the speaker is getting money from some source. There is
reliable information that commercial banks grant the Duma
preferential credits. It is hard to believe that the bankers are
unselfish. This means this must be a case of commonplace bribery; -
Had Mr. Seleznev had clear conscience, it would have been easy to
deny all the above. He and his staff, however, refuse to provide any
information on the subject, even to the chairman of the commission on
combating corruption. This means they are afraid of exposure; -
Parliament is obliged to regain the functions of control over the
executive hierarchy. However, it is supposed to have the moral right
to such control. Hence it is supposed to start by cleansing itself
first and relieve as soon as possible of the position the chairman
who has disgraced himself. Vladimir Vladimirovich [Semago] presented
these views in his long interview for Pravda, a newspaper, strange as
it seems, which has no sympathy for the CPRF's leaders. It, however,
has become well-nigh a vogue of the season with our "leftists" to
dislike them. The Working Russia members, let alone the radicals who
are small in number, used to brand them for being opportunistic and
revisionist. Both have been joined recently also by less radical
politicians -- Podberezkin, Kurginyan, and others. They have been
criticizing the high-level party officials for resisting change, red
tape, lack of will, and advocating ideas which are not serious.
Finally, some CPRF and NPSR [People's Party of Free Russia] have
managed to successfully become integrated in power structures. They
have quite openly exchanged their party allegiance for a fat piece of
their master's pie. Now, no "secret centers" of the opposition can
influence them. Preferring the "winning-over" tactics to offensive
and defensive tactics, Yeltsin has succeeded in making allies out of
very many yesterday's adversaries. Whatever anyone may say, men like
Tulyeyev and Ritskoy are inside the party of power. The path they
have trodden has been increasingly openly followed also by Gennadiy
Nikolayevich [Seleznev] even if his rhetoric has not been
complimentary with regard to the Kremlin and the White House. The
latter's [Seleznev's] conflict with the CPRF leader (quiet and kept
under wraps] was programmed right from the start, of which I already
had an occasion to write in NV [Novoye Vrema]. It is of a purely
status nature: Zyuganov is the boss in accordance with the party
hierarchy, Seleznev is a boss in accordance with the government
"table of ranks." Both are courtiers of sorts. They would not
challenge one another to a duel and would not try to shout each other
from the speaker's box. But they are finally bound to fall out with
each other. Zyuganov's biggest achievement has been in the final
analysis the title of honorary leader of the entire left-wing
opposition. As for Seleznev, he is inspired by the example of not
only the above turncoat politicians but also of Nikolay Ryabov or
Ramazan Abdulatipov. They, too, used to be zealous oppositionists. 
In 1999, today's speaker will be a long way from the pensionable age,
and it is a good idea for him to think of a future job right now. 
Indeed, Gennadiy Nikolayevich is simply a more conspicuous figure
(thanks, in particular, to Mr. Semago), but it is the most typical. 
There are enough and to spare party activists in positions of power
who have broken off with their comrades -- especially in the regions.
They could not help it: the could not afford to be in opposition,
and they used to sit in raykoms. Thus, Mr. Zyuganov is in the center
of an unnatural association of the untraright radicals with ultraleft
radicals. ideological oppositionists with cynical state apparatchiks,
sufficiently young and ambitious politicians with moss-grown old men
who have used to toeing the line. It was only possible to knock
together a bloc from such a material in advance of the last
elections. The temptation to take over power was too great. The
attempt failed. They could have succeeded for all I know, something
educated and energetic leaders like Podberezkin and Semago cannot
forgive their leader. As for him, he had only soberly assessed his
potential. Yeltsin said: "I will not surrender power," and
Zuganov's heart sunk: "Why fight if he is not going to surrender?" 
Now he is trying to justify his actions: "We are going to oust the
enemy from all the offices after all." The general secretary and his
associates act like preachers of a sect who think the world outside
it is one solid evil which is going to die a natural death. In the
meantime, one should wait, listen to his superiors and diligently
pray. Very many who joined the party after its reinstatement expected
other things. Their disaffection is boundless. And many are now
swelling the ranks of supporters of Anpilov or Lebed. To cut the
long story short, the Zyuganov bloc was to fall apart to the extent
of a split in the CPRF itself. Vladimir Semago, a perceptive person
of with more than an average sense of humor and seasoned participant
in the KVN [television contests of wits]. Correspondingly, he is
playing a subtle game using all the range of tactics one of which is
political speculation on inertia and obedience of the party masses. 
He is also a successful owner of a gambling business. One of the
tough guys, as they say. In a nutshell, any way you look at it, he
does not fit into the party worker stereotype. He is different
psychologically. He was simply fated to set an example for his
comrades to emulate, to let them know it was time to draw boundaries
between them. Generally speaking, Vladimir Vladimirovich did
something in this regard early in the year. He is said to have
conducted talks on joining Ryzhkov's and Baburin's Power of the
People [Narodovlastiye]. or Russian Regions run at the time by three
Medvedevs. Strange as it seems, Zyuganov made much effort to set his
comrade on the path of truth. He must have realized that this
desertion would be a cue for very many other people. At that time
the whole time boiled down to backstage negotiations. Now Vladimir
Semago has challenged, in fact, quite openly all of his own party
making the others to show their cards. Will it prove possible to
hush up the new scandal, to keep Semago in the lap of the party or at
least part with him alone? It was obvious to all observers that the
day of disintegration of the single opposition would come, and very
soon. Has it come already, perhaps?

*********

#17
Podberezkin Urges CIS Integration Policy 

Delovoy Mir
August 15-18, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Statement by Aleksey Podberezkin, deputy chairman of the State
Duma committee for internatinal affairs and chairman of the
Spiritual heritage Movement central council, recorded by Boris
Krotkov under the "Commonwealth" rubric: "To Put Policy of
Integration in the Forefront" -- first paragraph is introduction

Last week Konstantin Zatulin, director of the Institute of CIS
Countries, shared his thoughts on the October summit of heads of CIS states
with readers of Delovoy Mir (No. 121). Today Aleksey Podberezkin, the
deputy chairman of the Duma committee for international affairs and the
chairman of the Central Council of the All-Russia Spiritual Heritage
sociopolitical movement, ponders the situation in the Commonwealth.
I do not want to be a Cassandra, but in the fall we will come up
against a new geopolitical situation. The government doe not want to talk
about the inevitability of its arrival. Nor does the opposition want to
take notice of it. But this will not make the problem disappear. Its
essence is that the space that was once called the USSR and today is the
CIS will continue to be eroded. After all, right now entire geopolitical
chunks of this territory are beginning to come under the influence of third
countries, mainly the United States. Very soon, perhaps in a half a year,
we will see that Russia has lost its influence in the Caucasus, in Ukraine,
and in Central Asia. This is not scaremongering, I do not intend to
intimidate anyone. It is simply that this is the policy that the West is
conducting -- well-thought-out, well-calculated. At first it graciously
takes leave of Russia. But then, of course, it begins acting as Russia's
opponent in these regions. As a result, we are no longer the ones taking
part in determining a joint policy for the Commonwealth states, the West
is.
Today there are at least three such regions: Georgia, where Eduard
Shevardnadze is successfully manipulating Chechnya and his relations with
the United States; Azerbaijan, whose strategic partner is not our country
but rather the United States -- and I fear this is forever; and Ukraine,
where the effectiveness of our influence is comparable with that which the
Americans are exerting there. And here is the paradox: All of this is
happening not because Western politicians are making some sort of super
efforts to squeeze out Russia. But because Russian politicians are doing
little to retain their influence there. I am afraid that in Central Asia
it will reach the point where this region will also be lost to us.
I will repeat the thought that I started with: If everything keeps
going the way it is going, we will soon run into a situation where we will
see that the CIS does not exist as a geopolitical reality. And then
everyone will realize that any talk of integration within the framework of
the Commonwealth is in vain.
A legitimate question is: Why is everything happening like this? I am
sure that if not four fifths, then three quarters of the matter here has to
do with the Russian leadership,. Having toured the now independent
republics, I became firmly convinced that the disintegration tendencies in
these countries are by and large explained by Russia's behavior, and not
just the policy of the ruling elite there. I am sure that if the Russian
leadership launches a major propaganda campaign tomorrow, particularly on
the television channels, for the restoration of a single state, the nations
of the former Soviet republics could quickly change the situation. But, as
we know, it is not doing this because it still does not have a single
concept about what to do with the ruins that were left after the USSR.
Unlike the U.S. Government, which resolved in advance to remove all former
Soviet republics from under Russia's control. Whereas in our country it is
only recently that we have been starting to trace something in terms of no
longer ignoring the interests of the CIS member states. And even this is
being done more in the form of rhetoric than specific projects.
Of course we cannot help but take into account the fact that Russia
today is a weak state which is not capable of exerting the necessary
influence on the regions that once made up the Soviet Union. But this is,
in my opinion, nonetheless a secondary factor. As proof, I will cite the
following example.
It is known that the United States is bringing pressure to bear on
Ukraine. In financial terms the force of this pressure is assessed at $350
million a year. Russia, as we know, is investing far more in Ukraine. And
if we add to this other factors of influence -- the possibility of, say,
providing work to Ukrainian citizens on Russian territory, delivery of gas,
immigration privileges, and other such substantial issues -- then the force
of our influence should be even more significant. But in reality? In
reality, the effectiveness of our influence there, if we take into account
the material basis, is half what it could be. That means that for less
money, the Americans have just as much as we do. And maybe even more.
Nonetheless, it is possible to change the situation in the CIS. Even
in the time that remains before the October summit. What needs to be done?
First and foremost, it is necessary to radically change the attitude of
Russian officials toward the Commonwealth and the attitude of the executive
branch of the Russian Federation toward the former Soviet republics. How? 
Simply by forcing it to perceive relations with the CIS countries as a
priority. I would even go so far as to have a first vice premier, with the
most extensive powers, manage relations with member states of the
Commonwealth in every field -- political, economic, in military and
humanitarian affairs - - in the Russian Federation. Second, with the help
of targeted propaganda, people would be made to believe that integration
is not just possible, but necessary. Vitally necessary! Moreover, with
the help of the media, mainly the electronic media, I would show the true
face of those who are opposing integration. Show theiregotistical
interests. Many sensational and instructive things can be seen here. And
all this should be started right now. But it is not being done. Why not?
I do not want to use bad words like conspiracy and betrayal, I will
speak of something else: of Russian laziness, of the inability to do
things properly, of Russia's lack of organization. All of these factors are
present -- to the delight of the national elites who have gotten the power
they wanted. As for the rank-and- file citizens of the Commonwealth
states, I declare with good reason that the overwhelming majority of the
population of the CIS, including Russia, naturally wholeheartedly supports
the idea of maximum integration. And if we appeal to them, they will
influence their leaders.
What will the next summit lead to? Just a lot of talk, I fear. And
worse, to the legal registration of documents on which no one intends to
act. And this is the worse thing, because adopting such documents is not
only useless, but very dangerous: It instills vain hopes in people, after
which bitter disappointment and apathy are inevitable.

********