August 12, 1997  
This Date's Issues: 1116 • 1117 • 1118

Johnson's Russia List [list two]
#1117
12 August 1997
djohnson@cdi.org

[Note from David Johnson:
1.Obshchaya Gazeta: Oleg Poptsov, "The Gods Warm Up, 
or Changing of the Guard on Olympus." (Nemtsov Seen Yeltsin's 
Current "Favorite.")
2. Moskovskiy Komsomolets: Aleksandr Khinshteyn, "Corruption": 
""The Man To Blame for My Death Is Mr. Ch...: What Makes Deputy 
Premiers Flagrantly Lobby Financial Tycoons' Interests."
(Chubays Accused of Stalinist Methods).
3. Sovetskaya Rossiya: Zyuganov, Others Address Patriots' Seminar. 
4. Moskovskaya Pravda: Oleg Zhirnov, "The Avenue of the Heroes of 
Capitalism." (Duma Helping Yeltsin Build Capitalism).] 


********

#1
Nemtsov Seen Yeltsin's Current "Favorite" 

Obshchaya Gazeta, No. 29
July 24-30, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Oleg Poptsov: "The Gods Warm Up, or Changing
of the Guard on Olympus"

A cheerful deputy prime minister--that is an accomplishment.
A cheerful government--that is almost a victory.
The government is young and may not get enough sleep. Boris
Nemtsov responded to Boris Yeltsin this way or almost this way at
their regular meeting.
It was without satisfaction that the President leafed through
the package of documents prepared for his signature. A slightly
cunning, unprepossessing smile crossed his face and you could almost
hear the unspoken triumphant tirade: "I looked and I found them.
I finally found them. I did not make a mistake here. Initiative
will spout like a gusher from them."
Our President is one of those who cannot conceal his affections.
It is a purely Russian trait. At various times various people have
ended up in the focus of the President"s affection: Viktor
Barannikov, Viktor Yerin, Pavel Grachev. Among them and not among
them were Aleksandr Korzhakov and then Oleg Soskovets. The nature
of this selection was externally strange but it is basically easy
to explain. All of them were functionally necessary. The majority
of these people did not answer for the state's security
so much as they guaranteed the security of the President himself.
All without exception were obligated to the President personally
for their advancement. Korzhakov does not count. He and Yeltsin
were linked by fate in different life circumstances, which the President
wrote about in sufficient detail in his book. Aleksandr Korzhakov"s
book still lies in the future, but we are not likely to learn from
it whether these two destinies in life and different professions
intersected so randomly as it seems. The existence of a legend for
a Chekist is a professional phenomenon and a rather ordinary one.
In this sense the legend of the selflessness of Sasha-Chekist is
not entirely clear and still awaits clarification.
The appearance of Oleg Soskovets in the inner circle was also
functional. The independence of a prime minister, in the understanding
of the high powers, must have an opposite pole. Hence this unwavering
confidence in first deputy prime ministers: In the past--Vladimir
Shumeyko and Oleg Soskovets, in the present--Anatoliy Chubays,
and now--Boris Nemtsov. Aleksey Bolshakov and Vladimir Kadannikov
escaped the President"s attachment.
But bringing someone close and having the President come attached
to them are far from identical phenomena, even when they coincide
in their manifestations.
Skakov was close to the President at one time, but Yeltsin
experienced no special attachment to him, and the same thing can
be said about Burbulis, Ilyushin, Filatov, and Yegorov. There were
exceptions here as well. The attachment to Mikhail Poltoranin, because
of his unpredictable character, which, incidentally, is very similar
to the character of Yeltsin himself, did not last long. And the
institution of presidential favor has its psychological modulations.
There are people who can rightly be called the President"s
favorites. The President considers them (I have already written
about this) his own discoveries. There are not many of them—only
three. They are Sergey Shakhray, Vladimir Shumeyko, and Boris Nemtsov.
All of them are presidential discoveries from the beginning of the
1990s. All of them come from the first wave Russian deputies, and
they were half discovered by Yeltsin the chairman of the Supreme
Soviet, and a little later—by Yeltsin the President.
Naturally, to these three one can add Yegor Gaydar and Anatoliy
Chubays. Anything is possible. But this simplified arithmetic would
be wrong. Those others were discovered by other people. It was later
that they became a part of Yeltsin"s team. Burbulis brought
in Gaydar. Gaydar brought Chubays into the stream.
As we know, Yeltsin entered the Russian political current
without his own team. Thus his own discoveries are extremely dear
to him.
What distinguishes the two groups? More confidential relations?
More significant assignments? Nothing of the kind.
First of all, age. In politics a difference of 10 years is
significant. Second. Those who are close and ultra-close who came
from the typical environment: the party-apparatus economic-director
past. Those who came out of Yeltsin"s own biography. They
are understandable. The main thing they spoke about in close communication
with the President was their devotion to him, and the perspicacity
and correctness of his decisions. Socialist history has taken its
toll.
The latter have a different biography. And the relations between
them and the President are not so much functional and official as
they are age-related, one might say, paternal.
The danger of the President"s predisposition is its
candor. Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, at one time called the
best and most respected minister in the Army, experienced this.
And Korzhakov, who received in the President"s book not
only a personal but also an extremely significant state certification.
And Vladimir Shumeyko, who loved to repeat the President"s
words: "You have never let me down. There has never been a case
when you have refused to carry out my instructions." Vladimir Filippovich
was unique in this much-touted obedience. Once he agreed to head
up the post of Ministry of the Press, which was very remote from
his professional experience. And Oleg Soskovets, who was taken by
a sense of his own self-importance for hours when the President
appointed him leader of his election staff.
And now, first Anatoliy Chubays and then Boris Nemtsov.
We will not try to discuss how these two will divide up the
President"s love. In general a family two young sons are
not equally loved unless they are twins. This possibility is ruled
out in our version. The willful Chubays received the energetic Nemtsov
as an ally. The President is increasing the government"s
reserve of durability. Which of these two will be Chernomyrdin"s
double if...
In 1993 when defending the privatization program at a meeting
of the Supreme Soviet, Chubays phoned Yeltsin during the recess.
I happened to be a witness to this conversation. After a brief recess,
Chubays would have to go through the procedure of answering questions
from the deputies.
Chubays said the situation was fairly nerve-wracking and the
deputies were feeling aggressive. It was quite likely that the discussion
would turn out negative.
Of course this was not a formal call, something agreed upon
beforehand. And Chubays did not need words of approval, although
they were heard and were extremely to the point. Chubays called
to make sure the President had not changed his attitude toward the
privatization program and hence had not changed his attitude toward
Chubays himself. At that point the political confrontation had reached
its apogee and anything could have happened. In politics the victims
are sacrificed spontaneously.
Several of the President"s sentences in this telephone
conversation were remarkable. "Hang in there," said the President,
"they are punishing you because of your youth. Russia has no pity
for young reformers." The President was silent for a minute and
then added: "Or for those who are not so young."
Anatoliy Chubays has aged four years since that time. His
opponents, not without grudging respect, say: "Chubays has grown
up. For the irreconcilable opposition, Chubays is the spring that
throws the opposition back. In this sense he is undoubtedly the
leader of the democratic forces. But Nemtsov has behind him the
four-year school of governorship, regional practice which the Gaydar
government was lacking.
To some degree the path of our reforms, beginning with Yavlinskiy,
is paradoxical. It was a breakthrough in education and not a triumph
of knowledge. From the first steps of the reforms one could see
that it would be fairly difficult to join young theoreticians to
the practical men made wise by economic experience, essentially
people of different generations. And most likely it would not produce
an ideal alliance in the government but would generate a chain of
antagonistic contradictions. That is what happened. This conflict
was plainly marked even in Silayev"s government.
The time has come when the new demo-reformer generation has
its own successful (and this is fundamental) practical experience.
Titov, Nemtsov, Sysuyev, and dozens of governors, and there is a
promising result of a strategic nature.
One gets the impression that Yeltsin selected Nemtsov.
This selection microcircuit has two stages. First it is the
selection of four. If one assumes that Gaydar, Chubays, Nemtsov,
and Sysuyev are united, agreement among them becomes fundamental.
And it, this agreement, if you look at it logically, has occurred.
Number one is Nemtsov.
Of course, the choice made by Yeltsin was prompted by this
agreement—we place our bets on Nemtsov, but he has complicated
the situation outside this quarter extremely. In this sense, the
President"s "love" can turn out to be fatal. The enthusiasm
and compliments from Yeltsin that have poured down on Nemtsov in
some way psychologically advance the activity of the first deputy
prime minister, but to the same degree they inevitably create a
zone of alienation and jealousy around him.
Favoritism is a traditional phenomenon for Russia and it has
a long historical past. It was generated by the autocratic regime
or, rather, when the top person in the state had all power. There
is a certain illogicality in this. With royal succession in the
family, favorites could not inherit high power, but they inevitably
accompanied each of the succeeding monarchs. Our modern crown princes
are fragments of that same historic series. Of course, there cannot
be a repetition of the situation in all its details, but...
The possession of any power, especially the highest power,
creates a lonely space. Separation from the ordinary world takes
place rapidly. Friends are afraid to remember themselves to you
because from that moment on you are the power, and the circle of
your concerns has moved to a different galaxy. And between you and
your friends there appears a new segment of people called the apparatus
of power for whom your friends are a medium that impedes them from
influencing the high power.
It is not easy on the family either. It becomes necessary
to share both time and closeness and, although to a lesser degree,
to be in a closed space. The cordon, the guard, the special telephones,
and as a finale—the triumph of an unshakable principle—the
people in power are supposed to communicate and become friends only
with other people in power.
In this case feelings, singling out special people to trust,
and showing predispositions are essentially the escape of the power
holders from their isolation. An imitation of communication with
the ordinary world they have lost.
Typically this trust, as a rule, goes beyond the limits of
official space and is manifested in the informal environment: Be
it the tennis court, the volleyball court, the bath house, or the
dinner table. But this kind of informal communication requires a
biographical similarity, the same experience of age, which can by
no means be provided by new people around the President who have
a considerable age difference and a different mentality of interests
and education. From here on it is merely a coordination of variables.
He is the President. They are members of the government whom he
has appointed. But the attraction to close, trusting relations remains
and searches for an outlet. This means that changes in the nature
and form of these relations are inevitable.
Only under these conditions and no others would it be possible
for the President"s younger daughter actually to appear
as the adviser to a high state figure. And election campaigns have
nothing to do with this. With all the things against it, which,
of course, exist, the presence of a younger daughter with the President
is a good thing. The daughter is not helping the President to change
his image. Yeltsin is stubborn and he will always be Yeltsin. Tatyana
Dyachenko"s task is incomparably more difficult—to
adapt the President to the different age environment of the politicians,
those who have been forced by the situation to be his closest advisers.
A new group of up-and-comers is undergoing the test of the
President"s good graces. Everyone who has been tapped and
brought close to power has his finale. It is like a coffee table
book for the crown princes who have taken up the watch.
Boris Nemtsov likes to be in power. For the last four years,
power has been his work. But power is not only work, it is also
a medium of life. As a rule, people in power are destroyed not by
work, they are not without something to do there. They are destroyed
by the environment of power.
Boris Nemtsov is lively and open to communication, and he
has a charming smile. Sometimes it seems that performing government
duties for him is a fun game in which he is happy to participate.
He likes being the President"s man.
They, those who have recently climbed Olympus, flatter the
Supreme Being in their own way. They do not repeat the words of
Schwartz"s comedy "I Will Tell You Plainly: You Are a Genius,
Your Majesty." They have a different vocabulary: "The President
decides everything," "what he says goes," "the President has the
last word." This reaction might be called irreproachable. The President
likes it too--it is like a resounding echo. No matter which
way you turn, you hear: "The President decides everything!"
It is as though Boris Nemtsov materializes the President"s
desire to return to the principles of open politics. This is gratifying.
But quantity inevitably changes into a different quality. A persistently
reproduced Nemtsov could turn out to be the victim of his own reproduction.
Our compatriots are predisposed toward historical analogies. Some
compare themselves with Deng Xiaoping!
At one diplomatic reception I heard this remark: "Nemtsov
is to Yeltsin was Zhukov was to Stalin; he is thrown in at the most
critical places." The speaker winked and added: "And so far he is
not losing." Having heard these words and remaining in the world
of historical allusions, one can only note, sighing: "We are still
a very long way from taking Berlin. We might not even reach it."
Every myth is a parable. The myth of Icarus who flew too high
toward the sun, whose rays melted the wax of his wings, after which
Icarus plunged to earth, is a kind of intra-power prophesy for those
upon whom the tsar has looked fondly. The new generation of politicians
undoubtedly has a chance. The main thing is not to singe their wings
in the next three years.

***********

#2
Chubays Accused of Stalinist Methods 

Moskovskiy Komsomolets
July 17, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Aleksandr Khinshteyn under the rubric
"Corruption": ""The Man To Blame for My Death Is Mr. Ch...:
What Makes Deputy Premiers Flagrantly Lobby Financial Tycoons"
Interests"

"Should something happen to me, you should know that the persons
to blame will be Chubays, Kokh, and Mostovoy."
Viktor Paliy, general director of AO [joint-stock company]
Nizhnevartovskneftegaz [NNG], is not afraid to call things by their
real names.
Anyway, it does not make sense for him to fear anything now.
Having begun an unequal battle with Chubays & Co., Paliy
has gone beyond the point of fear.

1. Frenzy Around the Pie

When the President signed the edict on the beginning of a
new phase of privatization in May, the politically savvy immediately
figured out that Russia was facing another round of bloody passions,
pursuing one goal: grabbing until recently unavailable pieces of
the sweet pie called property.
They did not have to wait long. A scandal comparable in intensity
perhaps only with the gangster wars in Chicago in the 1930s, very
soon started brewing around one of the country"s largest
raw material company—the Tyumen Oil Company.
Moskovskiy Komsomolets has already commented on several occasions
on this unprecedented story, but the events of the past few days
compel us to return to this topic again. The situation in Tyumen
is moving toward an endgame.
The Tyumen Oil Company [TNK] possesses the largest prospected
reserves of "black oil" in Russia. Developed back under Soviet power,
the Samotlor fields have long been the source of envy for some financial
tycoons. This is understandable: TNK brings in real money. Huge
amounts of it.
Until the spring of 1997, however, the money sharks could
only salivate on eying the company. More than 92 percent of TNK
was owned by the state.
With the presidential edict, the situation has changed dramatically.
It was decided to put 40 percent of the TNK stock up for sale. The
auction was set for 17 July.
This is when numerous "new Russians" jostled forward. They
would stop at nothing to make their dream come true.

2. Procurator"s Protest

I have in my possession a letter from General Procurator of
Russia Yuriy Skuratov to the President. In it Skuratov writes: "The
sale of the OAO [publicly held joint-stock company] TNK stock causes
one to doubt that the auction organizers are acting in the interests
of the state."
The organizers of the investment bid are known—the
GKI [State Committee for the Administration of State Property] headed
by Chubays"s loyal privatizer Alfred Kokh, and the FIRST
PERSON personally. Chubays, that is. It was Kokh who approved the
terms of the auction, which in fact is nothing but a run-of-the-mill
swindle.
I assume that every reader has seen at least once how "thimble"
is played. The investment auction "game" is right in the same category.
Its terms state: The bid winner is obligated to purchase the
AVT-2 primary oil refining unit owned by a certain AOZT [closely
held joint-stock company] Sunrise. As well as the controlling share
of stock of the design bureau developing Connas submersible oil
pumps. As an investment.
The unit is appraised at $40 million, and the design bureau
at $35 million.
In this connection, Skuratov maintains: "It is clear from
the terms that there will not be any auction, since the winners
will be the owners of AVT-2 and the controlling share of Connas.
If a different investor wins, however, he is obligated to purchase
the aforementioned unit and stock at the stated price, that is,
what will occur is lobbying in the interests of commercial structures
to which substantial profit will accrue."
And the profit is considerable, one has to admit. Because
in December 1993 the Ryazan Refinery (a component of TNK) transferred
this very AVT-2 to AOZT Sunrise for...$2,370. The same goes for
the design bureau. In specialists" estimates, the market
value of its controlling share of stock is $350,000.
The owners of Sunrise and Connas come out ahead under any
outcome. Either they get for free a considerable share of Samotlor
oil. (After all, they are not buying TNK stock for the full price.
The "fake" $75,000 million will be subtracted from it.) Or the profit
from the speculative idea comes to practically the same $75 million.
Net.
Not a bad addition to one"s pension.
The explanation is simple: The founder of the mysterious Connas
Design Bureau is the famous Alpha financial-industrial group. Headed
by Chubays"s old comrade, former Foreign Trade Minister
Petr Aven.
Alpha also owns the "priceless" AVT-2, which was transferred
to it under a certain agreement.
Alpha was also one of the main bidders for TNK. And in the
end it would have gotten the Samotlor oil, had it not been for the
stubbornness of some hard-headed Siberians.

3. "Get Him!"

The Tyumen Oil Company is a holding that includes three major
companies: the actual Tyumen oil fields, the Ryazan Refinery, and
Nizhnevartovskneftegaz.
The tone for everything is set by Nizhnevartovskneftegaz.
It produces almost all TNK oil. At the same time, only 30 percent
of Nizhnevartovskneftegaz stock is owned by the company. The remaining
69-plus percent is owned by its stockholders. The state owns less
than 1 percent. (The reason I am describing the mechanics in such detail will
become clear later.)
Nizhnevartovskneftegaz general director Viktor Paliy was one
of the people who categorically resisted the impending July auction
swindle. Paliy was and is of the opinion that the price set for
the 40-percent block of TNK stock is frivolously low. Much lower
than its real value.
He firmly believes that the company"s fixed assets
must be reappraised. The $3 million charter capital approved in
1992 is laughable.
As you understand, without the support of the chief "trend-setter,"
the sale of the Tyumen company was becoming a very difficult task.
One could expect anything from Paliy.
Then the "Moscow patrons" decided to stake their all. They
had to get Paliy fired and put a man subservient to them in Nizhnevartovsk.
They did not have to wait long for the occasion. TNK"s
out-of-turn stockholders meeting, at which the question of electing
a general director would be on the agenda, happened to be set for
6 June.
Thus on 5 June a government cable arrived in the FSB [Federal
Security Service] Tyumen Oblast Administration [UFSB]. UFSB chief
Anatoliy Antipin was ordered to hand deliver to Moscow"s
"agents of influence" in Nizhnevartovsk—the TNK representative
at the stockholders meeting and others—a letter signed
that very day by Chubays and Kokh.
A very interesting letter, one must say. It was written in
the best traditions of Communist times. Citing government concern
over the "unfavorable financial condition of OAO Nizhnevartovskneftegaz,"
Chubays and Kokh prescribed (yes, the exact word used: "prescribed"):
"ensure the vote "against" V.O. Paliy"s
appointment as general director of the company."
"Otherwise," it went on, "the Russian federal service on insolvency
and financial recovery affairs will initiate bankruptcy procedures
and appoint an outside manager."
The stockholders did not listen to the vice premiers. Paliy
was reelected by an absolute majority of the vote.
Then Chubays showed everyone "who was who." Four days later,
speaking at the Federation Council, he openly said:
"...have analyzed the situation at TNK and NNG. Here we have
taken more severe measures--direct bankruptcy of the enterprise
and firing of the general director." 
Chubays was twisting the facts again. He, of all people, knew
perfectly well that things had started getting better at Nizhnevartovsk
lately. The company had begun paying off arrears to the state. Last
year it had earned a more than R50 billion in profit. It is not
accidental that even Petr Mostovoy, head of the Federal Service
for Insolvency Affairs, speaking at the government Current Affairs
Commission, had to admit: "Over the past year,
Nizhnevartovskneftegaz"s situation has indeed improved."
Chubays also knew that Nizhnevartovsk"s entire debt
was the result of the activities of Yuriy Shafranik, former minister
of fuel and power generation and his own, Chubays"s, buddy.
From 1992 to the beginning of 1994, NNG had to follow the ministry"s
direct instructions and sell oil without any profit for itself.
How did this come about? Why did Chubays dare to do this?
The answer is simple: The first deputy prime minister was personally
interested in Paliy"s ouster. And, consequently, TNK"s
sell-off for peanuts.
I do not know whether he acted out of love for Alpha"s
head Aven—the main contender for the throne. Or out of
other, more mercenary motives. The fact remains that Chubays used
his authority solely to the detriment of the state.
The directive he sent was a gross violation of current laws,
in particular, the federal law on "On Joint-Stock Companies."
State officials have no right to "pressure" stockholders meetings
and tell them whom to elect. This is the stockholders"
business.
Even more, nobody gave the first vice premier the right to
openly blackmail a nongovernment company. If you elect Paliy—we
will declare you bankrupt. If you do not—you will live
in clover.
This makes the Federal Service on Insolvency affairs look
like the first vice premier"s guard dog. As soon as Anatoliy
Borisovich shouts "Get him!"—Mostovoy is at the ready.
NNG"s financial condition does not depend at all
on whether Paliy is reelected. The situation cannot change overnight.
If the company is in bad shape--go into bankruptcy. If not--leave
the company alone.
I think Chubays already regrets launching such an open attack.
He could, after all, do so quietly. Without writing a letter that
ends up in the press.
And although some journalists (including at our newspaper)
idealistically assumed that the letter was a forgery, it turned
out to be absolutely genuine. Chubays"s secretariat confirmed
this. And the author himself reluctantly admitted it at the meeting
with the Russian Regions deputy group.
As usual, however, Anatoliy Borisovich got out of it unscathed.
All the blame fell on the other signatory--Alfred Kokh.
According to our information, after all that happened, the prime
minister gave the GKI head a very hard time, and even hinted that
he may rethink whether the latter is fit for the job.
A laudably speedy reaction.

4. Life Goes On

"Chubays and Kokh are shamelessly lobbying Alpha"s
interests," maintains Nizhnevartovskneftegaz general director Viktor
Paliy. "They want me out at any cost."
Meanwhile, a TNK stockholders meeting was held in Tyumen on
19 June. A certain Furman was elected chairman of the board of directors.
"One of Alpha"s commandos," as Paliy put it.
But the opposition was not asleep either. (By opposition I
mean those who do not want the "black gold" reserves to fall into
black hands for a song.)
On 4 July, Skuratov sent the President the letter quoted above,
in which he demanded that the investment auction on the sale of
TNK"s block of stock be invalidated.
On 9 July the Tyumen Oblast Arbitration Court prohibited the
Russian Federal Property Fund from holding this auction.
On 11 July, the Nizhnevartovskneftegaz board of directors
refused TNK"s demand to urgently replace Viktor Paliy.
Chubays and his "merry friends" suddenly ended up on the losing
side. But for how long?
It is obvious that they are not planning to give up yet, and
will keep trying to grab, by hook or by crook, the coveted oil Klondike.
Not in order to develop the field. But in order to shamelessly
make money on it.
"Investment must be aimed not at enriching dishonest
individuals--it
should be used for modernization of the Samotlor oil field," says
Gennadiy Raykov, State Duma deputy from the 179th Tyumenskiy Electoral
District.
The whole situation surrounding Tyumen graphically shows the
true mores of today"s rulers of Russia and their moneyed
partners.
In their drive toward the goal, they stop at nothing. For
them, violating the law is like spitting. (It is not accidental
that in September last year an assassination attempt was made on
TNK president Yuriy Vershinin. Fortunately, it failed.)
Too much money is at stake to think about such trifles as
laws...
Not long ago Anatoliy Chubays spoke at the Democratic Choice
of Russia [DVR] congress. He said that very soon the reformers"
success will put the Communists in their place.
Chubays loves to pontificate on the "red threat." But in fact,
he is a much greater Communist than Zyuganov and his comrades.
It is quite possible that the authoritarian, purely Stalinist
methods he is used to are necessary today. That Russia cannot be
changed by gentle persuasion.
But one has to be honest about it. If so, Chubays should immediately
resign from the DVR and never even breathe anything about democratic
ideals. And hang over his desk Lenin"s portrait by Zhukov.
Then he will be within his rights to send angry, unceremonious
cables, bang his fist on the table, and remove people he does not
like.

*********

#3
Zyuganov, Others Address Patriots' Seminar 

Sovetskaya Rossiya
August 5, 1997
[translation for personal use only ]
Article by Sergey Ivanov: "Seminar of Patriotic Movement Activists
in St. Petersburg. First Anniversary"

St. Petersburg -- Last Saturday [2 August] the People's Patriotic
Union of Russia (NPSR) held a seminar to which representatives of regional
branches arrived from the country's seven northwestern oblasts.
In the past the festive, showy aspect used to be considered an
indispensable attribute of such happenings -- a large hall and prolonged
applause turning into ovation. This time the organizers tried to maintain
a business-like tone in everything, from the choice of building to the work
style.
Such NPSR meetings are held on a regular basis, but the latest one
also marks a specific stage -- on 4 August the movement is exactly one year
old. But despite the very young age, it already has great life experience.
Opening the meeting, NPSR Chairman G. Zyuganov reminded the audience about
yet another anniversary -- on 23 June six years ago the well-known "Address
to the People" appeal was published. It is believed to have paved the way
for an organized people's patriotic movement, which, after many stages --
the Russian Congress and the National Salvation Front -- has developed into
the NPSR, which has now become the country's largest political organization
capable of challenging the party of power in presidential elections.
The growing influence is, undoubtedly, an encouraging fact. But Mr.
Yeltsin has been in power for exactly the same period of time and has not
been idle either. Over this period of time 50 percent of the country's
industry has been destroyed and now, according to Zyuganov, the very
foundation of Russian statehood is being finished off. Take at least
Svyazinvest as an example -- these eyes and ears of our country have fallen
into the hands of foreign stock-exchange speculators.
Just look at which 19 major laws have been turned down by the
president. The Land Code which banned the sale of agricultural land is
among them. According to M. Lapshin, chairman of the Agrarian Party, who
attended the seminar, the rejection of the law is giving 13.7 million
hectares of Russian land to the very same sort of speculators.
The same fate has befallen the "Law on the Freedom of Conscience,"
which, as V. Zorkaltsev, State Duma Deputy and NPSR deputy chairman [also
chairman of the State Duma Committee for the Affairs of Public Associations
and Religious Organizations], put it, "would not have made it possible to
trade in human souls." As he said, the resistance to that law has
political implications. Yabloko turned out to be its outspoken opponent. 
However, sociological studies have shown that religious people mainly voted
for the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] in the last
elections (31 percent against 6 percent of votes given to the NDR ["Russia
Is Our Home"]). But unexpectedly, according to sociological data, Yabloko
also got many supporters from among religious people, even though it was
never noted before as a sympathizer of Russian Orthodoxy. In Zorkaltsev's
opinion, the paradox can be explained by the fact that members of various
sects and foreign preachers constitute the bulk of Yabloko's religious
electorate.
Nor did the delegates ignore the destruction of the Army. "Reform
requires an expenditure ranging between 5 and 7 percent of the GDP, but
just 3.4 percent has now been envisaged by the budget for this purpose. In
terms of U.S. dollars, this is one-third of Great Britain's defense
expenditure. Our estimates indicate that if such type of financing
prevails, regular troops will lose their combat readiness within four to
five years and strategic troops -- within 10 years," Zyuganov said. The
NPSR chairman formulated the movement's tasks. Something out of the
ordinary has emerged in addition to legislative activity and strengthening
of the country's patriotic zone. Zyuganov mentioned that three conditions
are necessary for the creation of a party or of a public movement of
consequence: attractive ideas, personnel, and money. The opposition has
the first two in excess. But an acute shortage of money is making itself
felt. To make up for the gap, the NPSR organizations were recommended to
create their own cooperatives whose funds will be used for the needs of the
movement.
The NPSR's plans for the near future include organizing civil protest
actions in the fall demanding Yeltsin's resignation, early presidential
elections, and the formation of a government of national interests. Over
two months, 3.5 million signatures have already been collected in support
of these demands. It is planned to send them to the president, government,
Federal Assembly, and Constitutional Court. And unless urgent measures
follow, the country is facing an all-Russia political strike; preparations
for it have already started.
The opposite side does not intend to remain idle either. The NPSR
chairman said that some of the Kremlin's specialists in "pyrotechnics" have
the intention to drive the trade unions into organizing strikes during the
period between 30 October and 7 November in order to give vent to passions
and cause a split in the mass movement. There is also information that,
contrary to the law, the authorities are now directing the FSB [Federal
Security Service] and other power structures to combat the opposition. 
But, according to NPSR cochairman A. Podberezkin, a surprise prepared by
the government awaits the FSB itself this coming fall. He said that the
planned budget sequestration in fact constitutes the trimming by the state
of our vital structures. There is a proposal to cut even the FSB to its
very neck; and even allocate a mere 75 percent of the sum required for the
payment of salaries to its officers. And all this despite the fact that a
senior officer, usually a 40-year-old colonel, now gets 1.5 million
[rubles] a month. And generally speaking, according to Podberezkin, the
"reformers'" offensive against the FSB, Foreign Intelligence Service, and
also against the Prosecutor's Office and courts should be expected by the
beginning of the fall. The data bases of operational information that are
stored in those departments are the tidbit. Recently, in the center of
Moscow, an FSB colonel was killed -- he had occupied the post of
Operational Information Department chief.
An opinion was voiced -- in order to proceed, the NPSR should go
beyond its own framework. As in the past, under Ivan Kalita [14th
century], there was a process of gathering-in the lands, the gathering of
people together has now become the main task. A. Podberezkin: "It is
common knowledge that world resources have been divided, but few people
know that the world financial market has also been divided. The United
States has created its own worldwide financial system and, by controlling
it, it is getting money just for nothing. For example, it prints
eurodollars and by injecting them into the European market, it earns
between $350 billion and $400 billion a year. It sets the rates of
currencies in the fall and in spring -- this gives it another $300
billion-$400 billion. Thus, by just controlling the financial system, the
United States earns over $1 trillion simply through printing money."
On average 30 times more resources are set aside for an American than
for a Russian. And this concerns everybody -- our entrepreneurs and
bankers to a no lesser degree than inveterate oppositionists. You should
know, A. Podberezkin continued, that not all owners are indifferent to the
country's fate but that there are compradors and patriots among them.
The usefulness of such seminars is obvious, because the theoretical
thought of the metropolis clashes there with the stern truth of life. And
this clash produces the spark of truth. For example, S. Potapov, a Vologda
Oblast delegate, quoted the following example: "In our [city of]
Cherepovets a group of young entrepreneurs first appropriated our
metallurgical giant, and now they have also privatized power in the city. 
According to reliable rumors, the new authorities would now turn down
bribes less than a million dollars -- they disdain such peanuts. But yet
another team from Moscow also keeps an eye on the combine, and a squabble
has now started between them. So how can one figure out which of them are
patriots and which compradors?"
Original proposals were also voiced. Karelian representative
Selivanov proposed a way to break through the information blockade. He
suggested that we should remember the international solidarity of the
working people and go on the air with the help of fraternal foreign parties
-- by organizing our own radio station abroad. So to speak, a variation on
Lenin's Iskra newspaper in electronic form.
But on the whole we should remember that the People's Patriotic
Movement is just one year old and much can be explained by the growing
pains it is going through. The time for its development and maturation is
still ahead.

**********

#4
Duma Helping Yeltsin Build Capitalism 

Moskovskaya Pravda
August 1, 1997
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Oleg Zhirnov under the "Politics" Rubric: "The Avenue of
the Heroes of Capitalism"

The authorities have withdrawn to the "Volga cliff" [Volzhskiy Utes --
Yeltsin's summer residence near Samara]. The opposition has dropped out of
sight altogether. Now is just the right time for us to stand away from
them and take a look: Who are they really? And what, in fact, are they
doing?
In the early summer the "Red" Duma rejected most of the government's
supposed reform undertakings and, slamming the door, went on vacation. On
the outside this looks like the apotheosis of a violent battle. But take a
closer look and it will remind you of a battle "between Nanay boys" [mime
show where one person creates the impression of being two combatants],
where one and the same creature is battling with itself for fun. Yeltsin
and Zyuganov, Chubays and Seleznev are like the fingers of one hand. The
only difference is between the thumb and the little finger.

"Communists -- To the Rear!" [Subhead]

Having lost the presidential election last summer, the Communists
changed their strategy and launched a battle for the regions in the shape
of the governorships and the sympathies of the local press. Their current
defeats in the highly important Nizhniy Novgorod and Irkutsk provinces do
not portend success for the entire regional campaign. But even if posts do
fall into their hands, the behavior of governors like Tuleyev and Rutskoy
attests that the "battle for the regions" in actual fact results in giving
the regime zealous servants to do the dirty work of suppressing a strike
movement. The new strategy has become a way of implanting the opposition
in the existing political system.
In the final days of the Duma's work, a draft bill "On Legal
Guarantees of Opposition Activity in the Russian Federation" flashed
through it, revealing the true self-awareness of the opposition. It was
prepared by the Communists, who clearly devised it to suit their own taste.
The draft bill fortified the Duma's role as a bastion of the opposition
forces. It introduced the concept of "socially beneficial opposition
activity," demanded that the state cooperate with the opposition to prepare
personnel for higher education establishments, priority rights for it
non-appearance in the media [sentence as published].
If you really want to take actual power in the Kremlin and are sure of
it, then why care about guarantees of political existence for your enemies?
About turning the parliament into a bastion for Chubays and Gaydar? About
the chances of their cultivating their own followers in higher education
establishments? With this draft project the Communists have in fact said: 
We consent to coming "second," to living life in the Duma trenches.
Here is another program proviso: The fourth CPRF congress was a call
"to fight for changing the Constitution" (meaning reallocating authority
between the president and parliament). Since the real power in Russian
conditions is the presidency, if you want to achieve that power, then why
take away the scope of his authority by pulling the blanket over onto the
parliament? Once again they have shown that they agree to be "second." In
fact, to playing a role as "Yeltsin's shadow." And, as we known, the
shadow lives the life of its master.

What Does the Duma Have in Common with Mao Zedong? [Subhead] 

The current Duma is "Red on top, and White if you scratch the surface."
The
comparison to a radish, which Stalin once used to describe Mao Zedong,
perfectly suits our supposedly oppositionist parliament. There was so much
moaning in the last Duma, under Rybkin, about its lack of a parliamentary
majority! About the fact that, without it, a consistent line in
legislation could be pursued. And then a majority appears in this
parliament, Seleznev's, under the Communists. Rubber-stamp any laws you
like! Press that consistent policy of yours. So what has the "Red" Duma
rubber-stamped? What is the final and combined product of its legislative
activity?
The president and other democrats are needling the deputies over the
abundance of political declarations, the rejection of the "Belovezhskaya
Pushcha," the hounding of Chubays, the reluctance to give the green light
to trade in land, the maintenance of inconceivable social privileges, an
unrealistic budget.... Sly criticisms, superficial quibbles! Because at
the same time in the kitchen of the "Red" Duma, filling, hearty,
fundamental dishes were being baked, which the democrats were devouring
without any protest, and rumbling from satisfaction. They were the ones
who put together the epochal "White" essence of the work of the "Red" Duma.
Laws on privatization, bankruptcy, mortgaging, licensing, and
limited-liability companies. Blocs of codified legislation -- the Tax and
Budget Codes, the codes on land, criminal trials, water, forests, urban
planning, etc -- in aggregate have created a legislative foundation, and
even the walls of some kind of building. So what should we call this
building?
Everyone feels somewhat awkward about their own name. An allergy to
this word has developed in the past 70 years. The "continuation of
economic reform," "the development of market relations," the "market
economy" are allegorically extolled. And here is Gaydar telling it
straight from the shoulder: They are building capitalism in the country. 
What makes this situation so poignant is that it is also being built by the
Communists, who are by no means playing last fiddle in this affair.
The historical mission of laying the legislative foundation and
erecting the walls of capitalism in Russia has fallen to the lot of the
Zyuganov-Seleznev Duma, not of the previous Rybkin one. And it is
fulfilling it, laying blocks of real laws, and not ephemeral presidential
edicts, into the foundation. It is a paradox, but the "Red" parliament is
a work horse, pulling the cart of Russian legislation in a direction that
is meant to be hateful to the Communists.
And the opposition to the introduction of private ownership of land
and similar "rearing up" are perceived merely as historical slacking off to
keep the cart from overturning on this bumpy road to capitalism. Like a
gloomy mythological creature that has been tamed and put on the chain of
"civilized parliamentarism," the Communists are making their contribution
to the compilation of a "code of laws governing capitalism." Their
resistance and opposition are like the final touches of polish on a
surface. But the building is still only being built....
In spite of the purple of the banner and the adherence to Soviet
symbols, in a legislative sense the Duma is being rather zealous about
erecting this building of a "bright future," of a socioeconomic system that
it opposes. If the construction is a success and grateful descendants
create some sort of "gallery" or "avenue of the heroes of capitalism" (the
way they used to build "avenues of the heroes of the cosmos"), the busts of
Yeltsin and Zyuganov, Chubays and Seleznev will probably be standing face
to face with one another in it. And if the construction fails, the same
people will wind up sitting in the historical dock together.

President Keeps Hacking Away [Subhead]

In the same way as it took our toothless Communists to give Yeltsin a
chance to win a second presidential term with a starting level of 6 percent
of the voters' support, now it takes the current unpredictable and
voluntaristic president, who is increasingly reminiscent of Khrushchev or
Brezhnev, to give the "second-placed team" a chance to score a political
victory at a time when they practically no longer have any desire to play. 
And he is giving them that chance nevertheless.
It seems that the Communists themselves are agreeing to be in eternal
opposition. Yet power could fall into their hands thanks to the chaotic
actions of the other side. What is the president, who professes that he is
recovered and has initiated the offensive of a new liberal government,
doing? In a purely political sense, he is cutting one after the other the
"boughs" on which he himself and this government are sitting. Through
military reform he has alienated the army and the generals. With the
comedy over filling out tax declarations he has made a laughing stock of
local leaders and antagonized the gubernatorial corps. The governors are
also angry over the encroachment on their authority, and over the fact that
the president's wrath is extending to them but bypassing the heads of the
republics that are part of the Russian Federation. B. Yeltsin's refusal to
sign the law on freedom of conscience is casting some powerful hierarchs of
the Orthodox church into the opposition camp. The social basis of the
current authorities is being cut down, in spite of the televised
demonstrations of its "successes."
If a discontented Army, given the silent acquiescence of the other
"offended forces" listed here, silently pushes the current regime out of
power, then the tamed and domesticated Communist parliament will stop
polishing and smoothing the laws necessary for the building of Russian
capitalism. The energy of the Communists, which is now bound, will break
free and, as in the old days, they could become the "gravediggers of
capitalism." For now, on the whole, all the authorities are at one.

*********