Brought to you by the Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW * Washington, DC 20036
(202)332-0600 * Fax (202) 462-4559 * http://www.cdi.org
Edited by David Johnson
| ISSUE #33 | January 29, 1999 |
The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and
analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic,
social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie
Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based
Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education
organization.
The U.S.-Russian strategic arms
reduction treaty START II is finally dead. It
will never be ratified by the Russian
parliament or implemented by any future
Russian government. Of course, there still
will be lots of fuss surrounding
this ill-fated agreement. While President
Boris Yeltsin, who signed START II
in January 1993, remains Russia's head
of state, Kremlin officials will
halfheartedly try to push through START
II ratification. But in 2001, when
Yeltsin is out of the Kremlin and a new
administration sits in Washington,
START II may be officially pronounced
dead so that U.S.-Russian strategic arms
limitation talks can begin again from
scratch.
START II was a bad deal from the
beginning, an uncooked treaty speedily put
together by Yeltsin and his reformist
government in 1992 when internal Russian
political factors were the main influence
in decision making processes. At the
time Yeltsin and his supporters were preparing
for a violent showdown with the
Supreme Soviet. An arms reduction treaty
signed by Yeltsin and shoved aside by
Russia's parliament ensured that Western
political and financial aid would be
backing the right gang when it came to
shooting in Moscow. The plot worked.
When Yeltsin used armed force to dispatch
Russia's Supreme Soviet in 1993 and
then install a semi-authoritarian regime
under a new constitution, Washington
and the West supported him fully.
But START II has now outlived its
cause. Yeltsin is a political corpse. START
II ratification will not change his predicament.
Meanwhile, the United States
is moving to create a national missile
defense system, or NMD, and to rewrite
or to scrap the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile,
or ABM, treaty, thereby
forfeiting any military-technical rationale
Russia could have had in actually
implementing START II.
Of course, the U.S. government is
still trying to get START II ratified and to
change the ABM treaty at the same time.
During this week's visit to Moscow by
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,
U.S. diplomats and military
officials tried to persuade the Russians
that this is in "their best
interest." A U.S. generaltold reporters
during a briefing in Moscow that "NMD
will be deployed only in the year 2005
at the earliest;" that "a final
decision to deploy NMD will be made only
in a year's time and after thorough
consultation with Moscow;" that "the technical
feasibility of NMD is still to
be determined" and that "NMD will be a
very limited ballistic defense that in
no way could ever challenge Russia's nuclear
deterrent."
Russia's military planners actually
accept those arguments. They agree that
NMD cannot in the immediate future challenge
Russia's nuclear deterrent, since
its feasibility is still questionable.
A high-ranking U.S. general put it
bluntly: "NMD may be 80 percent effective,
or 50 percent effective, or 30
percent effective, or less - who knows?"
The Russian military also understands
that their U.S. counterpart is not that
enthusiastic over NMD. Tens and hundreds
of billions of dollars will be spent
on a system of yet unknown quality and
these billions will come from the U.S.
Defense Department budget. So NMD can
in effect forfeit many other more
effective U.S. military procurement and
development programs.
However, Russian military planners
cannot ignore NMD completely. In, say, 20
years the United States may develop an
effective ballistic defense system that
will render Russian nuclear intercontinental
ballistic missiles , or ICBMs,
"useless and irrelevant," as U.S. President
Ronald Reagan once promised. If
and when such a situation arises, shortfalls
of START II will become obvious.
START II forbids for ever the future
development and deployment of land-based
heavy ICBMs. But only such heavy missiles
can carry tens or even hundreds of
decoy warheads that could distract a U.S.
NMD system and allow real missiles
to get through. Since the Unites States
has finally decided that it wants to
have NMD, Russia will in the future inevitably
have to abandon START II and
redeploy heavy multi-warhead ICBMs.
But in 20 years Russia and the United
States may sign a follow-up START
III or even a START IV treaty. START II
could become an intricate part of a
framework of arms control agreements and
scrapping it would cause the whole
pile to tumble. Abandoning START II after
ratification could provoke a serious
international crisis that in itself may
be a cause of conflict. So it would be
more prudent for Russia not to ratify
START II now and renegotiate after
Yeltsin is out.
Pavel Felgenhauer is the chief defense correspondent of Segodnya.
Washington, D.C. -President Clinton's proposal
to provide a 68 percent
increase in funding for Cooperative Threat
Reduction programs won praise
from the Center for Defense Information.
"This is a wise use of $4.2 billion
over the next five years," said Dale
Bumpers, former U.S. Senator from Arkansas
who now is the Director of the
Center for Defense Information. "There
is no higher or better use of
defense dollars."
The President's initiative would
allow Russia to accelerate the
dismantling of its nuclear warheads, redirect
the work of Russian
scientists into civilian pursuits, and
tighten controls over biological and
chemical weapons and missile parts.
The program, a significant portion
of which is frequently referred to as
"Nunn-Lugar" after its original sponsors,
former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA)
and Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), "gives
the United States more security
per dollar than any other program in the
Defense Department's budget,"
according to Senator Bumpers.
Congress passed the initial threat
reduction legislation in 1991 as the
Soviet Union disintegrated. The program
was designed to assist the former
Soviet states in consolidating and dismantling
their nuclear weapons
arsenals and in securing fissile materials.
In the intervening years,
approximately two billion dollars has
been appropriated for the program.
"I cannot see anyone seriously objecting
to this increase," said Bumpers.
"Any initiative that gets rid of these
weapons instead of adding to the
world's nuclear arsenals must be counted
as a positive step toward reducing
the potential for further proliferation
and ultimately reducing the
possibility that someone will actually
use one of these weapons."
Arms Buildup or an Arms Race?
By Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst,
Center for Defense Information
tvalasek@cdi.org
Russia has stepped up its military
assistance to Armenia, a former Soviet
republic and now a part of the Moscow-dominated
Commonwealth of Independent
States. Russia replaced its aging Mig-23
aircraft at its 102nd base in
Gyumri with five Mig-29s in December 1998.
According to the Russian press,
ten more Mig 29s will arrive at Gyumri
in the coming days.
Russia also plans to deploy in Armenia
the S-300 anti-aircraft missile
system which would form a part of the
joint air-defense structure of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Currently, Russia, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan take part in the CIS air-defense
cooperation.
Russian weapons supplies triggered
protests from Azerbaijan, Armenia's
traditional rival in the region. Armenia
and Azerbaijan broke off all
relations in the early 1990s during the
war over the Nagorno Karabakh
region, a district formerly controlled
by Azerbaijan. The war ended in a
cease-fire agreement in 1994, which left
Armenian units in control of not
only Nagorno Karabakh but large swaths
of Azerbaijan as well.
Vafa Guluzade, the foreign policy
advisor to Azeri president Heydar Aliyev,
accused Moscow of undermining his country's
security and called for U.S.
and NATO assistance. "Azerbaijan faces
a big threat from Russia, which is
waiting to use Armenia to strike at us
and to restore the Soviet Union,"
Guluzade said, adding that "it would not
be so bad to move the U.S.
military base in Turkey, at Incirlik,
to the Apsheron Peninsula [in
Azerbaijan]." President Aliyev has since
toned down his advisor's
statements, warning "not to get ahead
of ourselves" and saying the
U.S. base issue "is not on the agenda
now."
Russia's involvement in the region
is not new. After the breakup of the
Soviet Union, Moscow negotiated agreements
with some successor republics
to keep its military bases on their territory.
There is one Russian base
in Armenia and three in neighboring Georgia.
The base in Gyumri falls under
the Russian Defense Ministry, and Moscow
emphasized that its recent arms
deliveries are not going into Armenian
hands. But such assurances are
undermined by Moscow's covert support
for Armenia during the Nagorno
Karabakh war with Azerbaijan.
Russia's involvement cannot help
but reverberate through this tense region.
Azerbaijan responded to the tightening
Russia-Armenian ties by pursuing an
alliance with Western countries. The government
of Heydar Aliyev has used
the West's interest in Azeri oil reserves
to call for protection -- a
"special relationship," with NATO. Although
Azerbaijan is a member of
NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program
and took part in a number of
PfP exercises, recent calls from his Administration
for a NATO base are
not likely to be heeded. "We don't even
plan basing large conventional
forces in the three invitees [Poland,
Hungary, Czech Republic]...the idea
of a NATO force for Azerbaijan is quite
far-fetched," an alliance official
told CDI.
Furthermore, the U.S. Department
of Defense is legally prohibited from
cooperating with Azerbaijan. Section 907
of the Freedom Support Act,
passed by Congress in response to the
Azerbaijan-initiated blockade of
Armenia during the Nagorno Karabakh war,
prohibits most kinds of
government-to-government assistance from
the U.S. to Azerbaijan.
Talk of an arms race in the region,
spawned by the Russian deliveries, may
be premature. Azerbaijan cannot at present
afford a large-scale military
buildup, although future oil income could
provide the necessary money in
the long run. Any U.S. aid is hampered
not only by Section 907 provisions
but also by concerns in Washington about
the response from Azerbaijan's
neighbors, Iran and Russia. Tehran warned
that an American military base
in Azerbaijan "can have the most unpredictable
consequences." Active
U.S.-Azeri military cooperation would
ruin Washington's tentative efforts
for a rapprochement with Iran, made possible
by the election of President
Khatemi. While the U.S. has sponsored
plans to expand NATO eastward in
spite of Russia's opposition, the Administration
has refrained from active
military involvement in the Caucasus,
where Russia has a strong armed
presence.
The White House did not comment on
the possibility of a NATO base in
Azerbaijan. Privately, both the State
Department and the Pentagon deny any
plans for stationing troops in Azerbaijan.
Commenting on the Russian
aircraft delivery, a State Department
spokesman said the United States
"sees no military need for stationing
such equipment."
Lacking a promise of substantial
support from NATO and the U.S., Azerbaijan
has turned to its neighbors. Last week,
the defense ministers of
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine met to
discuss a proposal for a joint
battalion. (Moldova also takes part in
the so-called GUAM process but did
not send a representative to the last
meeting.) The GUAM battalion would
protect the planned oil export pipelines
and provide general security to
the Caspian states. It would operate under
GUAM auspices only and without
authorization from the U.N. or other international
organizations. GUAM was
conceived during negotiations on the Conventional
Forces in Europe Treaty,
when the four countries joined in an effort
to curb Russian military
presence in the south of the former Soviet
Union. Georgia and Azerbaijan
also share an interest in building oil
pipelines that would export Azeri
oil from Azerbaijan to Western Europe
via Georgia.
Everyone is asking me with concern
how I am feeling. In particular, one friend
asked, "Isn't it a huge wrench to be leaving
the Caucasus." I felt guilty for
not having even thought about it. Since
then, of course, I have been thinking
about it nonstop and needless to say I
am very sad to be going.
When the shippers took my boxes,
they asked me was a year in Baku enough. My
reaction was: "No, no, I could stay a
year or two more." It's true.
I love the bright sun, which is warm
even on a January day like today, the
architecture, the food and, of course,
the Caspian Sea. However much oil and
sewage the Azeris manage to chuck into
it, it is still beautiful. I'll never
forget the first time I saw it, its creamy,
jade green waters - a balm after
the ashes of Grozny.
Letting go of Chechnya is going to
be a real wrench. I will miss the people,
their larky humor and their extraordinary
ability to make light of misfortune
and to make you feel everything will turn
out right in the end.
But maybe it is time. One friend,
when he heard I was leaving, asked "What's
going to happen to Chechnya?" I think
it will cope on its own, like it always
has.
Georgia, Abkhazia, Armenia and Azerbaijan
will all sort themselves out
gradually too, of that I am sure. There
are some intractable issues, and some
very hot heads, but people will carry
on and live with them. There may be some
more skirmishing but not a full-scale
war, God forbid.
I am not so sure about the North
Caucasus. The place is ripe for trouble and
the reaction of Russia's leaders, both
current and future is as unpredictable
as ever.
There will be changes I will be sorry
to miss. Heidar Aliyev seems to be
pretty ill - still not back from medical
treatment in Turkey after 10 days -
and there could be a change of power sooner
than we had anticipated. There is
already an air of back-room deals in Baku,
as people prepare for changes at
the top.
Next door, Eduard Shevardnadze might
be out at the next elections. And for a
bit of fantasy, there could even be another
coup in the region - old hands say
Turkmenbashi is the one who could topple
from an inside revolt as exasperation
with his ridiculous whims spills over
among the more talented ministers.
We could also see some movement in
the Great Game, that geopolitical
jousting
for influence, that tricky play with the
"uneven pitch" and the "blinding
light" of Central Asia. It remains in
the balance between Russia and the
United States, with Iran and China circling.
Russia still holds the candle. But
this is a long game and over time I think
the balance will shift. The United States
- and Britain and France among
others - now have big oil interests in
the Caspian and will take a stronger
stand if they need to.
Who knows what Russia will do but I cannot see it winning the next round.
The nice thing about leaving is that
these countries should be better off in
the future, whenever I manage to return.
If they can avoid fighting, they will
prove to be real jewels.
This is Carlotta Gall's last column.
Moscow, Jan 26 (Interfax) -- The Russian
government has approved
drafts of memorandums on coded telephone
communication lines withWashington.
According to Russia's Foreign Ministry
and other departments, these
lines will link the Russian Prime Minister
and U.S. Vice President, the
Russian Security Council Secretary and
the U.S. President's National
Security Adviser as well as the Russian
Foreign Minister and his
UScounterpart.
The government's ruling, signed by Prime
Minister Primakov, instructs
the Foreign Ministry to sign these memorandums,
"permitting, if needed, to
enter in the proposed draft amendments
of secondary importance."
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
27 January 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Report by Yuriy Yershov: "Better
To See Once..."
The official visit by Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright to the
Russian capital was probably timely.
In the past month or two both sides
have built up a lot of questions for each
other, and the time had come to
move from verbal bickering across the
ocean to a one-on-one dialogue.
Admittedly, you might get the impression
that the head of the U.S.
diplomatic office was in a more favorable
initial position. It is no secret
that the provision of the financial aid
that our weakened country
desperately needs will depend on Washington.
The Russians may grumble,
Time's corespondent wrote, but they will
have to accept the U.S. proposals
-- after all, beggars can't be choosers.
Nonetheless, we think that our American
colleague was jumping to
conclusions. Before the Moscow talks
between "iron" Madeleine and her
Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov, Premier
Yevgeniy Primakov, and State Duma
Chairman Gennadiy Seleznev got underway,
we could have guessed that Moscow
would not accept Washington's approach
toward the resolution of problems
such as, for instance, Kosovo or Iraq.
Nor were major Russian concessions
to be expected on the bilateral disputes
that have suddenly arisen.
In particular, Russia does not agree
with the Americans' proposed
revision of the 1972 ABM Treaty.
Washington's argument is that America
allegedly requires such defense not from
Russia, naturally, but from
unpredictable countries -- North Korea,
Iraq, and Iran. But the ABM
deployment option in the United States,
in the opinion of the Russian
military, would also protect the United
States from Russian missiles --
which would be tantamount to negating
the ABM Treaty.
This treaty was the main issue at
M. Albright's meeting with Grigoriy
Yavlinskiy. The secretary of state,
according to him, supported the
"Yabloko" leader's stance that nuclear
terrorism is a real threat and that
both Russia and America are entitled to
defend themselves against it. But
the ABM Treaty was not touched upon in
the talks with Governor Aleksandr
Lebed of Krasnoyarsk Kray, they mainly
talked economics.
In response to the official Russian
rebukes about ABM defense there
have been justifiable U.S. rebukes about
START II. Moscow has delayed
ratification of the START II Treaty that
was signed back in 1993 to an
unseemly extent. And this is preventing
progress to talks on START III --
a treaty which would benefit ourselves
and the Americans alike. It seems
as though the Duma has finally realized
this in promising to submit START
II for ratification in February.
The secretary of state very much
hoped if not to see President Boris
Yeltsin at least to talk with him by telephone.
They did talk and
discussed a range of economic and political
issues -- ratification of the
START II Treaty, progress toward START
III, regional security issues, and
problems of bilateral relations.
Both sides, describing the talks
as a whole, stressed that they had
been held in a "constructive and businesslike
atmosphere." At any rate, M.
Albright's visit was of use, if only because
Moscow and Washington now have
a clearer idea of their positions and
arguments.
Moreover, important tripartite documents
relating to Russian
commercial launches of U.S. satellites
were signed with Kazakhstan.
[Rossiyskaya Gazeta -- Government daily
newspaper.]
MOSCOW, January 28 (Itar-Tass) - U.S. Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright's
visit to Moscow "confirmed Russia's principled
policy and the strengthening of
the U.S. strategic partnership aimed at
the 21st century," Foreign Ministry
spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin said.
Speaking at a press briefing on Thursday,
Rakhmanin said that during the
meetings, the sides expressed satisfaction
"with the dynamic development of
bilateral interaction and cooperation
on the international arena."
The spokesman said that the Russia
and the U.S. noted the coincidence of
positions on such fundamental strategic
goals as global peace and security.
Rakhmanin stressed that the disagreements
between Moscow and Washington --
sometimes serious -- on a number of issues
"reflect various
approaches towards the solution of problems
and cannot create obstacles to
further positive development of Russian-
American relations."
The sides expressed readiness to
continue to coordinate efforts within the
framework of such multilateral mechanisms
as the G-8, the Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the
Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council
and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
They said that the U.N. and its
Security Council should play a special
role in interstate relations.
The U.S. explained to Russia its
position on the new initiative to expand
humanitarian assistance with the participation
of the G-8 and other
international institutions. This initiative
was aimed at convincing Russia to
implement its obligations concerning weapons
control and the non-proliferation
regime, as well as conversion projects,
Rakhmanin said.
Russia praised the U.S. efforts in this
direction and called for
continuing adialogue on this issue, including
as part of the talks on financial
and economic assistance to Russia, the
spokesman said.
By discussing economic problems,
Albright confirmed the U.S. support for
Russia's reform and its further integration
into international economic and
financial structures. Russia noted the
importance of stimulating the real
economic sector and expanding social market
reform, he noted.
Much attention was paid to the improvement
of access to the markets and the
expansion of investment cooperation. Ivanov
and Albright noted the key role of
the Russian-U.S. joint commission on economic
and technical cooperation in the
strengthening of interaction in this field,
Rakhmanin pointed out.
During the talks, the sides also
stressed the need to boost law enforcement
cooperation. They reached agreement on
the creation of a bilateral working
group as part of the Primakov- Gore commission,
the spokesman said.
He added that as a whole the visit's
results permit to state that Russian-
American cooperation remains a key factor
of maintaining peace and security
and gives a new impetus.
Heart surgeons are like athletes.
Their best work requires tremendous
endurance for feats of physical precision,
coordination, and ingenuity. This
is why the best surgeons are past their
prime by the age of 50. That's when
the strength and control that flows from
brain to fingertips begins to ebb.
At more than 80 years of age,
Michael DeBakey of Houston, Texas, is long
past wielding the scalpel as he once could.
His mind isn't clouded, though, and as
a cardiological consultant, he has devised
a specialty that's never been
thought of before.
DeBakey is the world's expert on
the heartbeat of foreign politicians whose
survival is a national interest of the
Clinton Administration. You might say
he's more than a cardiological expert.
He's the human equivalent of the
pacemaker -- that battery-like gadget
that, when implanted in the body,
monitors the natural heart muscle, and
gives it an electrical charge when it
falters a beat or two.
When DeBakey visits a politician,
you know Washington believes the
patient is so sick, he may drop dead at
any moment. And when DeBakey
announces the patient is brimful of health,
you know the Houston Pacemaker is
at work. DeBakey's job is to convince
men, who claim to be omnipotent, that they
will survive -- because the U.S. Government
wants them to. In those circles where
surgeons are terrified of offending their
powerful patients, that's reassuring
advice. It's also a powerful reason against
resigning, if that's what the
mortally ill politician was thinking of
doing, or what his political opponents
were demanding. The Houston Pacemaker
isn't for lame ducks.
A few days ago, it was reported that
DeBakey had been to Baku, Azerbaijan,
where he met President Heydar Aliyev.
Because the press claimed DeBakey was
there to discuss the establishment of
a cardiological clinic, and apparently
omitted to explain how pink Aliyev's condition
was, it was naturally assumed
that Aliyev was in danger. By the time
Aliyev appeared last week in a Turkish
hospital, it was too late for the Houston
Pacemaker to do his job. Doubt had
begun to do its dirty work.
DeBakey has visited Russia many times.
On the occasions that have become
public knowledge, DeBakey has pronounced
his chief patient, President Boris
Yeltsin's heart, to be in the pink of
condition. Understandably, although red
is the color of a healthy organ, that
isn't the politically correct adjective
to use. DeBakey has done his adjectival
best, though.
What hasn't been revealed is just
how many Russian patients would like the
Houston Pacemaker to visit them. Some,
like Victor Chernomyrdin, have already
had their cardiological surgery turn out
encouragingly. Others are less
worried about missing their heartbeat
than losing the attention of the Clinton
Administration. The nice thing about the
Houston Pacemaker is that it's wired
in two directions -- to the patient, and
to the Situation Room in the
Washington White House.
When presidential candidate Grigory
Yavlinsky suffered his cardiological
setback late last year, DeBakey wasn't
there to give reassurance. The
Situation Room didn't care. Yavlinsky
had to fly to Germany for surgery
instead. The political meaning was unmistakable
-- Yavlinsky's heart is dead
meat in Washington.
Governor Aleksander Lebed has at
least one of the risk factors for
cardiological disease. He smokes. But
he doesn't drink; he appeals to love the
one wife; and he manages to express the
emotions that raise blood pressure and
put strain on the heart muscle, if they
are repressed. It's too early for him
to receive DeBakey.
But what about those Russian politicians
whose political infarcts the
Clinton Administration has helped bring
on -- Yegor Gaidar, Anatoly Chubais,
Boris Fyodorov, Aleksander Shokhin, Sergei
Kiriyenko?
It is said that DeBakey's appointment
diary mentions more than one of these
names. Which of them is a secret that
is darker than a chest cavity? It would
give the game away entirely, if DeBakey
were to announce publicly that he had
been consulting these men on their cardiological
condition.
It was embarrassing for Gaidar when
George Soros recently revealed that last
August, when Kiriyenko was supposed to
be prime minister, Soros and the U.S.
Treasury negotiated with Gaidar over the
financial terms required to save the
government. If DeBakey had said, then
or since, that Gaidar was in perfect
health, everyone would realize that Gaidar
was the man Washington intended to
rule Russia for as long as his heart could
be made to tick.
As events turned out, Gaidar was
saved, and Kiriyenko went down. Now it
should be Kiriyenko's turn to apply to
DeBakey for a cardiological consultation.
Perhaps the two of them met when Kiriyenko
was at Harvard, trying to convince
the American establishment of his political
resuscitation. He should have gone
to Houston, instead.
MOSCOW, January 28 (Itar-Tass) - Chemical
weapons in Russia are reliably
guarded and it is impossible to steal
them, Colonel-General Stanislav Petrov,
commander of the radiation, chemical and
biological protection forces of the
Russian Defence Ministry, told Tass on
Thursday. He commented on the editorial
in the New York Times, January 22 issue,
which questions the reliability of
the protection of chemical and nuclear
materials in Russia.
"The leakage or transfer of chemical
weapons to other countries is out of
the question. Russia strictly complies
with its international obligations and
Russian scientists do not help anyone
to create such weapons", Petrov said.
"Our mentality is different. It is not
everything that money can buy".
He said the publication falsely treats
matters of safeguarding chemical
weapons. Assertions that Russian chemists
may help other countries and that
some materials may be sold, for instance,
to Iraq, Libya, North Korea or
Serbia hold no water.
Foreign military delegations visited
all Russian bases where toxic agents
are stored, the general said. They familiarised
themselves with stocktaking of
materials and protection of facilities.
"All representatives of these
delegations spoke highly of the way materials
are stored. Guard of the bases
has been tightened and the management
of the units guarding bases is under the
control of the general staff of Russia's
armed forces," Petrov said.
Petrov said Russian scientists now
work on technologies to utilise 40
thousand tonnes of toxic agents Russia
has. In contrast to US specialists who
chose the method of destroying chemical
weapons by burning them and thus getting
into conflict with environmentalists,
Russia created unique technologies making for
toxic agents' reprocessing without damage
to the environment.
Petrov does not rule out that the
uproar raised by the Western press now and
again about the possibility of Russia's
selling chemical weapons to other
countries may be aimed to get legislators
to allocate more funds for their
countries' programmmes.
Petrov does not overlook political
undertones of the problem. For instance,
the newspaper mentions Serbia as a potential
buyer of Russian toxic agents.
This may be the manifestation of the striving
to cast a slur on Russia's
relations with Serbia, Petrov notes.
MOSCOW (CP) - Several countries including
Canada have offered gifts of food to
help Russians through their worst winter
in decades, but critics in Russia say
the programs could fuel corruption and
undermine local agriculture.
"There is little chance most of this
assistance will end up feeding the
needy," says Alexander Chepurenko, deputy
director of the Institute of Social
and National Problems in Moscow, "and
every possibility it will undercut
domestic produce in Russian markets and
profit only a few greedy insiders."
The United States and the European
Union have put together separate packages
totalling almost $2 billion US to deliver
grain, meat, dairy products and
processed foods to Russia.
In both cases, the food is to be
turned over to private companies that are
supposed to sell it on open markets at
prices Russians can afford.
Canada has mounted a much more modest
effort which involves targetting
vulnerable groups, particularly in Russia’s
economically blighted Arctic, and
delivering basic food and medical supplies
directly to them.
"There is no doubt that Russia is
in a bad way this winter, and many
sections of the population require help,"
says Tatiana Maleva, an expert
with the Carnegie Endowment in Moscow.
"But one has the impression that
these (donor) governments are satisfying
their own constituents and have given
little thought to getting the aid to
Russians who need it."
Opponents of the foreign humanitarian
aid point out that Russia exported
almost two million tonnes of grain to
world markets in the second half of 1998
even as it was accepting offers of a similar
amount of grain from foreign
donors.
The breakdown of the domestic distribution
network, though, has left remote
areas staring at supply shortages and
high prices.
"There are two kinds of hunger,"
says Vilen Perlamotrov, an economist
with the independent Institute of Market
Problems in Moscow.
"The first kind is famine, when there’s
an absolute absence of food ... and
therefore people are starving.
"The second kind results from poverty,
when there is food available but some
people can’t afford to buy it," he says.
"Russia has only the second kind
of hunger, but most of the food aid
programs appear to be trying to address
the first kind."
He says this year’s influx of aid
seems likely to repeat the experience of
1991-92, when western food assistance
to the crumbling Soviet Union was dumped
on unprepared markets.
"The main effect was to drive Russian
agricultural products off the
shelves,"he says. "The only people it
benefitted were a few corrupt officials
and the private companies they turned
the food over to."
The Canadian assistance program seems designed to avoid those pitfalls.
Early this month, Canada financed
a charter flight bringing 14 tonnes of
relief supplies from Ottawa to hard-hit
native communities in the Russian
Arctic region of Chukotka. Canadian monitors
followed the provisions as they
were delivered to three remote villages.
"It went very smoothly," says Eric Yendall,
head of the Canadian
government’said mission in Russia. "About
1,300 people received 15 kilograms of
basic supplies each, placed directly into
their hands."
But the Chukotka effort has been
criticized for costing the Canadian
government $400,000 Cdn to deliver just
$30,000 worth of aid packages.
"Admittedly, it wasn’t cost effective,"
says Yendall, who took part in the
operation. "It was driven mainly by our
need to do something quickly and
directly."
This month Canada also gave $450,000
to the International Red Cross to help
the hungry in Russia’s far northern territory
of Yakutia.
Borje Sjokvist, head of the Red Cross
delegation in Moscow, says the money
will be used to buy food and supplies
in parts of Russia where they are
available and transport them to places
where they are required.
"There is clearly an urgent need
among certain groups in specific
localities, particularly in the Arctic,"
Sjokvist says.
"The solution is to do your homework, find
out exactly who needs what, and
then target the aid rigorously."
Moscow, 28 January 1999 (RFE/RL) -- Ailing
Russian President Boris Yeltsin
has given abundant proof that he hates
the idea of being sidelined.
However, his continuing bad health and
recent political developments in
Moscow indicate that Yeltsin, who turns
68 next Monday, may soon find
himself squarely in that position.
Last Friday, Prime Minister Yevgeny
Primakov sent to the leaders of both
houses of parliament and to the presidential
administration a letter and a
package of documents outlining his plan
for a political compromise between
the Kremlin, parliament and the government.
The documents are aimed at
ensuring political stability in the run-up
to forthcoming parliamentary and
presidential elections.
The proposal included the draft
of a bill expanding article 91 of the
Russian Constitution and effectively offering
Yeltsin an incentive for
retiring before the end of his term next
year. If approved, the bill would
give Yeltsin full immunity from prosecution
after his term ends in mid-2000
-- but also in case of early retirement
-- along with a seat in the
parliament's upper chamber. He also would
be assured bodyguards for himself
and his family, a government residence
and a number of other privileges,
going as far as free health coverage and
transport. As it currently stands,
Article 91 simply reads that "the president
of the Russian Federation
enjoys immunity."
Primakov's plan was leaked to the
media on Tuesday and the Kremlin's
hesitant reaction fueled speculation that
Yeltsin was not fully aware of
the initiative and did not entirely back
it.
On Wednesday, presidential spokesman
Dmitry Yakushkin denied reports that
it had taken the Kremlin by surprise played
down the significance of the
documents and said they were simply the
basis for further discussion.
Under the proposal, parliament, the
government and the Kremlin would give
up voluntarily some of their constitutional
powers, until the election of a
new president.
The president would promise not to
use his power to dissolve the Duma and
to sack the government for the rest of
his term.
In return, the State Duma would agree
to drop impeachment proceedings
against Yeltsin. The Lower House and the
government would avoid initiating
a no-confidence vote in the cabinet.
According to Yakushkin, Yeltsin "would
not mind" if the State Duma would
drop impeachment procedures and offer
him lifetime immunity. However,
Yakushkin said Yeltsin is unlikely to
tie up these issues with the goal of
strengthening political stability.
Yakushkin said Yeltsin "does not
intend to start any kind of bargaining" on
the issue. He repeatedly said that Yeltsin
would not agree to a surrender
of his constitutional powers.
Earlier on Wednesday, Yeltsin
held an unannounced meeting with Primakov at
the Central Clinical Hospital where the
president is recovering from a
stomach ulcer. Russia's ORT Public Television
showed a brief clip of the
two men chatting amiably.
The meeting, and the television footage
-- the first of Yeltsin broadcast
since he was taken to hospital on Jan.
17 -- preceded the press conference
in which Yakushkin said that "there is
full mutual understanding and there
is no friction between Yeltsin and Primakov."
However, Yakuskin acknowledged that
only on Monday the administration had
informed the president that Primakov's
proposal had arrived three days
before.
According to Yakushkin, the president
"did n-o-t actually see" the letter
and the attached documents. Yakushkin
said talks on the necessity to
promote further political stability are
not new and Yeltsin had asked
Primakov and presidential administration
head Nikolai Bordyuzha to draw up
an agreement among Russian institutions
on the issue.
Primakov is scheduled to hold consultations
with parliamentary leaders on
his proposal next week.
Yakushkin said Yeltsin had instructed
Primakov and Bordyuzha to convene a
meeting of the advisory Security Council
[of which Bordyuzha is secretary]
to discuss the conclusions of the consultations.
He said that "if there
will be results, they will report to the
president and he will take the
final decision."
But some Russian observers question
whether a weakened Yeltsin will be able
to change at the last minute settlements
already agreed upon. Some in the
Russian media have suggested that, with
the initiative, Primakov has
already taken over the helm of power.
Yakushkin said Yeltsin would probably
stay in hospital until the end of
this week and would need a period of rehabilitation
beyond that. Therefore,
he added, the Security Council meeting
that will take place, in his words,
"very soon" will likely be chaired by
Primakov and Bordyuzha.
HUNDREDS OF ARMY DESERTERS ARRESTED; PROBLEMS
REMAIN.
The Russian military prosecutor's office
announced yesterday that military authorities
have arrested nearly 1,000 soldiers guilty
of having deserted their military
units. The announcement follows a major
four-day military operation aimed at
locating and apprehending deserters. According
to Chief Military Prosecutor
Yury Demin, the majority of those apprehended
were found in the Urals,
Volga, Moscow and North Caucasus regions.
Demin said that military
authorities would now continue their search
for deserters on a long-term
basis, and vowed that authorities would
manage "sooner or later" to find
"everyone who has evaded military service."
Demin provided no figures on how
many deserters were actually on the loose
in Russia today. He did say,
however, that they numbered about 6,000
last year. An amnesty declared by
the Russian State Duma reduced that figure
by one-third, Demin claimed
(Russian TV, January 22; Itar-Tass, January
25).
That amnesty has now expired. Apprehended
deserters face prison sentences of
up to five years. Previous Defense Ministry
statements have suggested that
there could be more than 40,000 deserters
in Russia today. That figure,
however, may include those who simply
evade the draft. The Russian army
drafts approximately 150,000 conscripts
every six months. Because of a wide
variety of available deferments--not to
mention widespread draft
evasion--less than 10 percent of Russian
draft-age youth are inducted in
each conscription period.
According to the Russian General Staff,
the autumn 1998 draft period went
rather well. The armed forces reportedly
inducted 158,000 young men, 110,000
of whom went iton the army and navy. The
110,000 was enough to meet the
military's needs. The other draftees were
sent to military units fielded by
the country's various security ministries,
including
the Federal Border
Service and the troops of the Interior
Ministry. The General Staff claimed
that the quality of this year's draft
had even improved somewhat over past
years (Nezavisimaya gazeta, January 20).
Even if the General Staff claims are true,
however, the Russian military
continues to face monumental morale and
personnel problems in both its
conscript and professional forces. Defense
Ministry statistics released at
the close of 1998 revealed, for example,
that crime and suicide rates in the
armed forces continue to rise, while the
number of noncombat deaths--a major
problem for more than a decade now--has
declined only slightly.
Approximately 500 servicemen were killed
on active service in 1998, the
Defense Ministry said, compared with 600
in 1997. More than 800 soldiers,
meanwhile, were said to have died in off-duty
incidents in 1998, compared
with approximately 1,000 in 1997. The
number of suicides had reportedly
risen to approximately 350 last year.
Some 60 percent of those committing
suicide were officers (AP, Russian agencies,
December 1).
Statistics, however, cannot fully reflect
the horror which military service
has become for many Russian young men.
Declining military budgets and a more
general demoralization of the armed forces
has greatly worsened what were
already substandard living conditions
for many of Russia's soldiers.
Brutality in the barracks--a feature of
the late Soviet period--also
continues to take its toll on Russian
conscripts, while Defense Ministry
efforts to address such problems have
generally been inadequate. The result
has been a series of widely publicized
incidents in recent months--some of
them involving the death or murder of
conscripts--which have further
discredited the military leadership and
reinforced fears among those being
asked to serve in Russia's armed forces
(Nezavisimaya gazeta, December 23;
Washington Post, December 29)
FOR anybody who cared to notice,
Mikhail Gorbachev came to St. Petersburg
last week.
I counted about a dozen reporters
Friday at a round-table on Russia's
political situation Gorbachev chaired
at the Mariinsky Palace. I couldn't help
but think that not long ago the world
hung on nearly every word this man
uttered. He won the Nobel Peace Prize
and was named Time Magazine's "Man of
the Decade" for the 1980s. The renowned
author Gail Sheehy appropriately
titled her biography of Gorbachev "The
Man Who Changed the World."
The first time I saw Gorbachev in
person was a few days before the 1996
presidential elections when he made a
campaign stop here. After one of his
appearances, I decided to approach him
and introduce myself. After all, how
often does one get the opportunity to
meet an historical figure of this
magnitude? "Mikhail Sergeyevich, I've
always wanted to shake your hand," I
said nervously, forgetting for a moment
that I was supposed to be an objective
reporter.
A few months later, I went to Moscow
to cover a Yabloko party conference
where Gorbachev was one of the invited
guest speakers. Back in St. Petersburg,
when I was listening to a tape of the
conference, one of my Russian colleagues
overheard Gorbachev's voice on my cassette
player. "Is that Gorbachev?" she
asked. "God, I miss him!"
I agreed and still agree. But what is it that we miss?
During perestroika the stores were
empty, the economy was going through the
final death throes of central planning
and public trust was breaking down.
Dissidents were still being persecuted
right up through 1991, while the Baltic
independence movements in Riga and Vilnius
were brutally suppressed.
But despite all that, for many the
Gorbachev years were a time of hope.
Hope, however naive, that Russia was actually
making progress towards
democracy. Every development - Andrei
Sakharov's release from internal exile,
multi-candidate elections, revoking the
Communist Party's monopoly on power, the
publication of Joseph Brodsky or Alexander
Solzhenitsyn - seemed to confirm
the optimism. People actually turned up
for pro-democracy demonstrations. The
glass looked half full, rather than half
empty.
Now Russia has an elected president
and a multi-party parliament, one
dominated by communists, the other rife
with corruption. Governors behave like
medieval barons; democracy and the free
market are dirty words and elections
often resemble war zones. The Prosecutor
General's Office, the Interior
Ministry, the courts and the Federal Security
Service are political tools.
Public trust has disappeared and the glass
now looks half empty at best. On
Friday, Gorbachev said Russia has yet
to hold a free and fair election. "The
elections from 1989 to 1991 took place
in a different country and we can
hardly call the elections in 1993, 1995
and 1996 fair," he said.
I recently asked a friend how working
on an election campaign in the late
1980s differed from today. His matter-of-fact
response was chilling: "Then the
KGB harassed us and now the mafia hassles
us. They're really the same thing so
there's no difference."
Hope dies last, and now it even appears
to be on the verge of collapse.
Every time I hear the voice of the former
Soviet president - the man who changed
the world - I remember the hope people
once had. And that is what I miss about
Gorbachev.
Back
to the Center for Defense Infomation Site
Back
to The CDI Russia Weekly Site