Although it would seem that Vladimir Putin has placed Russia on a collision course with the West over a bloody war in Chechnya and a very nuclear National Security Concept, foreign critics of the new acting president are surprisingly hard to find.

The former KGB agent now primed for the Russian presidency has had little to say about his political agenda, but his recent resume - standing tough on the grisly Chechen campaign and signing off on an aggressively isolationist security doctrine - should have the West on high alert.

Instead, public response in the West to Putin's ascendancy has ranged from warily accepting to flatly optimistic. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright set the tone Tuesday, calling him a "model" Russian president and forecasting an era of positive economic and political change under his rule.

"He, from what we can tell, seems determined to move reform forward," Reuters quoted Albright as saying. Even as she acknowledged his KGB career and iron-fisted stance on Chechnya, Albright, due to travel to Russia at the end of the month, praised him as a "leading reformer."

Even State Department spokesman James Rubin, addressing the uncompromising terms of the new 21-page National Security Concept, which challenges NATO's eastern expansion and now allows Russia the option of nuclear response to even conventional armed aggression, was surprisingly low-key.

"We ... do not believe that it represents a significant, major departure from Russia's concept issued in 1997" - which provided for a nuclear offensive only in the instance that national sovereignty was threatened - "or that it makes the use of nuclear weapons more likely," Rubin said at a news briefing Wednesday.

According to analysts, however, such decorum is nothing more than a cautious response to a virtually unknown political entity. Comments like Albright's "are the polite statements you make about somebody in power, hoping they will get off to a good start," Mark Smith, a specialist in conflict analysis, said while speaking from England's Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.

Oksana Antonyenko, a research fellow with the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, agreed. "Putin is young, dynamic and healthy - unlike [former President Boris] Yeltsin - and people realize that it is entirely possible that he may rule Russia for up to 10 years," she said. By playing nice, the West may simply be taking a pragmatic approach to a situation they have little control over, she said.

Still, analysts said, it's more than Putin's power that has the West cautiously singing his praises. After years of wrangling with a blustery and often elusive Yeltsin, Western diplomats and politicians have found much to appreciate in Putin's polished demeanor and trim single-breasted suits.

"Putin is a relief because you needed an interpreter, even in Russian, for Yeltsin," said Dmitry Trenin, a military analyst with the Moscow Carnegie Center. "[Putin] speaks clearly and understandably, dresses nicely and could very well be the first real post-Soviet leader."

"Certainly I've noticed the turtleneck sweaters that give the impression of a cool, sophisticated person," Smith said. "He's tough and smooth at the same time. And most likely his image-makers are aiming this at the West. By dressing like a Westerner, he's creating the impression that he is like us."

To the West, Putin, 47, is an intelligent and educated alternative to fist-pounding Soviet-era politicians of Yeltsin's ilk. Fluent in German and conversant in English, Russia's acting president has seemingly few vices - he doesn't smoke or drink vodka - and is accomplished at judo.

Beyond a healthy lifestyle, however, relatively few insights into Putin's personality are available. The leader himself offers only vague, albeit self-assured, references to his character: "Frankly speaking, I do not experience any internal conflict, vacillation or torment," a Jan. 13 article in the Russian daily Obshchaya Gazeta quoted Putin as saying on national television several years ago.

Much has been made of Putin's ability to adapt to changing situations - a talent that gained him considerable advances during his years as a KGB agent in Germany, where he enjoyed a successful history "recruiting the enemy," Obshchaya Gazeta reported.

"Germans are hard to recruit. Neither money nor compromising material has any great effect on them. It is only possible to build something on personal contact: If a person believes in you ... then he will work with you. Putin's results were simply fantastic. He knew how to establish the closest contacts with ideological opponents."

A recent article in The Washington Post admitted the wariness of some Western onlookers. "Putin is a cool character," the article quoted a White House official involved in Russia policy as saying. "He's smart, he's hard to read ... he's more opaque."

Still, actions like Tuesday's signing of the security doctrine make clear Putin's intention of becoming a significant world player. Although analysts say the concept is unlikely to completely resurrect Cold War tensions, the doctrine says much about Putin's view of his country's future.

"The new tone is that [Russia] stands alone in this world. We're not a part of anything but us - we have no alliances," Trenin said, describing the doctrine as a realistic and pessimistic reaction to Russia's internal and external threats, both real and perceived.

"It's a response to NATO, especially to Kosovo and to Chechnya, but most of all, it's a realization of Russia's extreme weakness."

Smith, describing the doctrine as largely symbolic, said it was nonetheless "a way of telling the outside world that Russia will not be trifled with."

Others took the National Security Concept as a more serious indication of the new tone Russia will take with the West in the years to come.

"Putin is an unknown and so far he hasn't given the West anything consistent," Antonyenko said. "The national security doctrine diverges from his usual rhetoric of 'Russia never going back' and establishing better relations with the West, in that it gives a clear sign that the tone is now anti-Western."

"They even scratched the word 'partnership' out of the doctrine and replaced it with 'cooperation,' which raised a few eyebrows in London," she added.

#2
Russia: Pro-Reform Grouping Represents Weak Alliance
By Sophie Lambroschini

Moscow, 19 January 2000 (RFE/RL) -- The Duma plunged into political dispute Tuesday when an alliance between Vladimir Putin's party, Unity, and the Communist Party provoked an uprising among smaller, reformist factions.

The alliance between the Communists and the pro-Kremlin Unity group makes sense, from their point of view. With a solid majority between them -- around 285 votes out of 449 -- the two parties can dole out committee posts. In the first move by the new alliance, Communist Gennady Seleznev was re-elected speaker.

Boris Berezovsky, the self-styled Kremlin insider whom the Russian media suspects of being behind the implicit alliance, explained the move Tuesday. He said an alliance with the Communists is in line with Putin's repeated calls for consolidation and cooperation between the Duma and the government.

"[The Communists] are a real political force in the country. And despite the fact that I often said that in the previous period their role was essentially negative, I think that in many cases [now] the Duma won't be in opposition to the authorities. And that's the most important question for Russia today -- consolidation of power."

To counter this new majority, those of Russia's main democratic reformers who were not supporters of Putin have banded together. When the alliance became apparent during the Duma session on Tuesday, members of Yabloko, Fatherland, and the Union of Right Forces got up and left the Duma. The three parties withdrew their candidates for speaker and walked out of the session.

Grigory Yavlinsky of the Yabloko party and Yevgeny Primakov of Fatherland announced Tuesday that they were joining forces together. Sergei Kirienko of the Union of Right Forces also joined the bloc, although he expressed his support more hesitantly.

Together, the three groups have created what they call a "common coordination council" in the Duma. On Tuesday Yavlinsky and Kirienko used the word "union." But today (Wednesday), Primakov seemed more restrained, explaining that the council will not be superior to the parties but will work for "consultation and coordination on legislative issues." The council seems to be emerging as a cooperation agreement, not a coalition.

The three parties boycotted Wednesday's Duma session, which was dedicated to assigning committees, but it is unclear whether they will refuse committee assignments if they are given.

Yavlinsky has already expressed the hope that the discontent with Unity's move may spur a united opposition into presenting a single candidate for president, to run against the heavily favored Putin.

But those expectations of a united front may be too optimistic, as the three parties do not agree on who their enemy is. They have different views as to whether they oppose the pro-Putin Unity party, or whether they oppose the Communists, or whether it is the idea of a Unity-Communist alliance that they oppose.

By boycotting the Duma vote, Yavlinsky was set on denouncing both the Communists and the Kremlin as opponents of democracy. On a talk show Tuesday night (NTV's "Vox Populi"), Yavlinsky said the alliance was a public demonstration of the communists' long-standing cooperation with the Kremlin. In a statement today (Wednesday) he directly accused Putin of being responsible for what he called the first parliamentary crisis since 1993.

Kirienko, however, is mostly opposed to the Communists, as his Union of Right Forces promotes an aggressive platform of market reform that is incompatible with communist ideas. Kirienko said he will continue to support Putin as a presidential candidate as long as the president does not change his conomic views under Communist influence.

Primakov, on the other hand, had good relations with the Communists in the Duma when he was prime minister in 1998 and 1999. His response to the Unity-Communist alliance was simply to express disgust with the secret wheeling and dealing. He said Tuesday that if such practices continue, parliament will lose credibility.

"This deal of one group of deputies trying to impose [their decisions] on another group of deputies. In these conditions, the Duma cannot work for the well-being of society. You can applaud if the Duma is not ushed to a state where no one will take it into account anymore."

Ironically, during parliamentary elections the Kremlin tried to win over voters to Unity by discrediting the very thing it is now doing. Unity campaigned partly by criticizing Primakov's working relationship with the Communists. Primakov was presented as a communist in disguise, who would give up his democratic views after elections and form an alliance with the Communists.

A special office has been created for Yastrzhembsky, and he will beoverseeing the press services of the armed forces and other Russianagencies, including the Federal Migration Service, involved in the current military operations in Chechnya.

"Both the Russian Information Center and liaisons with the mass media are being placed under his control," a Kremlin source has told Interfax.

Yastrzhembsky's appointment is without a doubt a significant event.It shows, if indirectly, that Putin is not ignoring what theinternational community thinks of the war in Chechnya.

Some sources say the last straw for Putin was his recent meeting with a delegation from the parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

The meeting lasted three hours, three times as long as planned. The result is well known: the delegation, which had come to Moscow to warn that Russia might have its membership in the Council of Europe suspended, changed its general attitude during its visit after seeing what was happening and apparently coming to better understand Moscow's arguments.

The Kremlin apparently came to the conclusion that if one handlesn the job professionally - and Yastrzhembsky is undoubtedly an top professional - one could not only make the West see the motives for Russia's actions in Chechnya, but in some cases enlist Western support, seeing as how terrorism is an international and not simply a Russian evil.

Russian and foreign journalists know Yastrzhembsky as probably the most vivid Kremlin spokesman of the last decade. Yastrzhembsky, a career diplomat who turned 46 in December, has at various times been a Foreign Ministry spokesman, a Russian ambassador in Bratislava and a spokesman for President Boris Yeltsin, while simultaneously being Kremlin deputy chief of staff. And this is far from being a complete list of his prior jobs.

Another interesting point: until recently, Yastrzhembsky was a member of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov's team, having joined during a governmental crisis in the autumn of 1998. For a little more than a year he was deputy head of the city government, in charge of the city government's international contacts. During this time he organized eight foreign visits for Luzhkov, who was welcomed at a high or the top level during his trips.

Nevertheless, it is no secret that Yastrzhembsky always seemed a kind of black sheep on the Luzhkov team. It is no accident, therefore, that some in the mayor's entourage blamed him for the poor showing of the Fatherland-All Russia coalition, of which Luzhkov is one of theleaders, in December's parliamentary elections.

Until quite recently, one's departure from the Kremlin had spelled the end of one's political career, at least at the national level. By bringing Yastrzhembsky back, Putin has broken an unwritten rule, making it clear that a politician's professional skills are an absolute priority for him.

But the human factor should not be disregarded either. In the last few days, Putin has had several meetings with Yastrzhembsky, whom he has known for a long time and whom he likes.

Moscow approved Thursday a five-month mission to keep Mir -- which was to have been consigned to the cosmic scrap heap last August -- in orbit while Earthlings find the cash and the clients to make the bid commercially viable.

Mir's operator, Russia's Energiya corporation, has taken a majority stake inthe newly-created MirCorp set up to attract investors to the project, which will run Soviet-built Mir along resolutely capitalist lines.

"Here is a project started by the Soviet government, and now it's a joint international project," MirCorp President Jeffrey Manber told AFP in a telephone interview from the United States.

"We think it's going to capture the attention of the world."

Venture capital outfit Gold and Appel (eds: correct) had committed "in the 20s of millions of dollars" to the project, which would offer opportunities to the pharmaceutical industry, satellite repair, satellite manufacture, he said.

Military research will be banned, he added.

Firms interested in beaming live images to Earth for cable and the Internet could also be attracted by the project, as well as travel agents keen to attract a new generation of tourists known as citizen explorers.

So how much would a cosmic ticket to the final frontier cost? "A lot, anywhere between 20 and 40 million dollars," said Manber.

"Energiya has a history, it has sent several people to space," he said, citing the example of Japanese journalist Toiohiro Akiyama, who took part in a mission on the Russian space station Mir in the early 90s.

Manber said Mir would not rival the International Space Station project. "We believe in the private sector. We believe that we can find markets that the governments will never look at," he said.

"We believe the Mir will have a wonderful place fulfilling the dreams and excitement of people world-wide by being a commercial station. Mir is the stepping stone to opening space up to everybody," he added.

MirCorp will be seeking 200-300 million dollars in services over the next year, he said. "We will be looking for corporate sponsors, just pure corporate sponsors, soft drink companies, we've had some discussions with a travel agency ... with other folks," including the film industry, he said.

Adverts have already been filmed on Mir.

Gold and Appel's cash injection will go a long way toward meeting the 750 million rubles (26 million dollars) that Yury Koptyev, head of the Russian Space Agency, said would be needed to finance the new mission to Mir.

A resupply vessel will be sent on February 1, and "a crew will follow in late March or early April, to stay on Mir until August," Koptyev said after a cabinet meeting here.

The government has asked the finance ministry to find "non-budgetary resources" for the mission.

Russia's cash-strapped space programme was forced to abandon Mir last year because it could not cover its operating costs and at the same time participate in the multi-nation International Space Station project.

But while no longer this year's model, Russian space executives insisted Mir remained viable despite a string of problems which made the veteran orbiter a byword for accidents.

Manber said MirCorp, which is to be based in the Netherlands, hoped to revamp Mir through a series of tie-ups and investment deals.

An ITAR-TASS correspondent has learnt from a source in diplomatic circles that the Russian Foreign Ministry agrees with the secretary of state on the importance of strengthening Russian-US relations in the current period. This will be "a good basis for making further progress in the bilateral dialogue after the presidential elections in Russia and the USA".

The Foreign Ministry conference drew the conclusion that "in spite of accumulated problems and the whipping-up of anti-Russian sentiment by certain US circles, there still remain quite good opportunities for further development and strengthening of cooperation between Russia and the USA".

Speaking at a regular news briefing, State Department spokesman James Rubin said after reviewing Russia's new national security doctrine, which was released last week, the administration does not believe that it makes the use of nuclear weapons more likely.

Like the last major doctrine, in 1997, it asserts the right to use available forces and nuclear weapons if all other measures of resolving a crisis have proved ineffective, Rubin said.

"Both the 1997 and 2000 national security concepts assert the right to use available forces and assets, including nuclear if all other measures of resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and have proven ineffective," Rubin told reporters.

"Russian doctrine has rejected no-first-use of nuclear weapons since the mid-1990s, so the fact that they are contemplating the first use of nuclear weapons, there's nothing new there," the spokesman said.

He also indicated that Washington and Moscow will discuss the doctrine. "We are going to discuss this with them. We try to develop better understanding of each side's nuclear doctrine," he noted.

"I think it's fair to say that we recognize that there have been some adjustments in the wording. But in terms of a major departure going from, say, 'no first use' to 'first use,' we think that isn't what happened here. They have always retained that right," the spokesman concluded.

Shortly after the Concept was published, some Western commentators described it as a "bold initiative" by the new Russian president, Vladimir Putin, who supposedly "is seeking to define a more assertive course for Russia after years of drift under Boris Yeltsin." One such commentator asserted that Putin, who took office on December 31 after Yeltsin resigned, was "staking out a name for himself as someone ready to defend Russian interests."

This speculation is misguided. Whatever Putin's intentions may be, the new Concept has nothing to do with leadership politics or the transition from Yeltsin to Putin. A draft of it was approved in early October by the Russian Security Council headed by Yeltsin, and it was published in November. The only reason the document has not taken effect until now is that it had to undergo review by the Russian legislature and bureaucracy. A few very minor changes were made in the draft, but otherwise the Concept that took effect in January 2000 is identical to the one approved last October.

The mistaken focus on Putin's role has deflected attention from the deeper significance of the new Concept and the events that shaped it. There is no question that the document is a major departure from Russia's earlier Concept of National Security, which took effect in December 1997.

The latest version essentially repudiates the earlier Concept, which spoke about a "partnership" with the West. The new Concept condemns alleged American efforts to dominate other countries through the use of force, and it dwells at length on the "increased level and scope of military threats" to Russia, as well as the "grave threats" posed by organized crime, separatism, and terrorism. It also provides somewhat looser conditions for the possible use of Russian nuclear weapons, warning that a nuclear attack by Russia might be forthcoming to repel armed aggression if all other means of resolving a crisis have failed."

Rather than being driven by leadership politics, these changes in Russia's official Concept of National Security have been spurred by internal and external events of the past year, notably the Kosovo crisis, proposals for the further expansion of NATO, disagreements about nuclear arms control, and the onset of Russia's vicious war against Chechnya.

Kosovo marked a turning point in US-Russian relations. Whether rightly or wrongly, Russian officials believed that the Clinton administration ignored Moscow's concerns in the leadup to the crisis. Russian leaders still invariably describe NATO's actions in Kosovo as "aggression" (though, curiously, the Russians have never condemned the well-documented atrocities committed by Serb paramilitary forces). The strong showing of Western air power in Yugoslavia came as a jolt to Russian military commanders, who realized how far their own forces have fallen behind.

The perceived slights on NATO's part, combined with the displays of Western air prowess, prompted a major reassessment in Moscow of the country's strategy. This was the immediate cayst for the drafting of the new Concept of National Security, which began last spring, at the height of the Kosovo crisis. The Russian government's harsh response to the crisis, replete with spurious charges of "war crimes" supposedly committed by NATO, inevitably affected the drafting of the Concept, including the statement that NATO's operation, if adopted more generally, would be "fraught with threats to the destabilization of the whole strategic situation in the world."

The start of the drafting of a new Concept also came at a time when NATO was celebrating its fiftieth anniversary. Proposals voiced then about the further expansion of the alliance were viewed with alarm in Moscow. Russian leaders have been especially vehement in opposing the possible admission of the three Baltic states--Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania--into NATO. When US officials claimed last year that the eventual entry of the Baltic states into NATO is "inevitable," this could not help but affect the drafting of the new Russian Concept.

The prospect of further NATO enlargement is especially controversial for Moscow as a result of the Kosovo crisis. In 1997, when NATO took in three new members (Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic), Russian leaders grudgingly accepted what they said were NATO's assurances that thealliance would be used only in self-defense. From Moscow's perspective, the more assertive stance by NATO in Yugoslavia without the approval of the UN Security Council (in which Russia has a veto) reneged on those earlier alleged assurances. Military officers and some political leaders in Russia have claimed that if NATO expands further, it would "create a base to intervene in Russia itself."

In addition to opposing NATO expansion, Russia has been at odds with the United States about strategic arms control. The Clinton administration has sought Russia's consent for amendments to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that would permit the deployment of a limited system in the United States to defend against possible strikes in the future by rogue states that might acquire nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. Russian military officers, who fear that a limited defensive system could someday be expanded to a level that would erode the deterrent value of Russia's nuclear missiles, have been adamantly opposed to a modification of the ABM Treaty.

Some Russian political leaders have occasionally hinted at a willingness to strike a compromise on this issue, allowing modest revisions of the treaty in return for concessions on Russia's nuclear missile deployments. Putin's proclaimed desire to have the Russian parliament endorse the pending strategic arms reduction treaty, Start 2, suggests that he may eventually seek some sort of bargain on the ABM issue. At the moment, however, the disagreement between the two sides about the treaty remains as acute as ever. The more alarmist view of US intentions is reflected in the new Concept, and it undoubtedly played a role in the modified provision about the possible use of nuclear weapons.

The fourth major development shaping the new Concept was Russia's latest war against Chechnya, which commenced at the end of last summer. All evidence suggests that the Russian army had begun preparing in the spring of 1999 to reassert control over Chechnya, a republic that had been largely independent since a truce was signed in 1996. The incursions by Chechen guerrillas into neighboring Dagestan in August 1999, combined with the unsolved bombings of apartment buildings in Moscow in September, which were blamed (without any convincing evidence) on Chechen terrorists, came along at a convenient time. They gave a pretext for the Russian army to embark on a full-scale campaign in Chechnya, which continues at full force to this day.

US criticism of Russia's actions in Chechnya has been very mild, but West European governments have lodged much stronger complaints about Russia's indiscriminate bombing and shelling of civilian areas in Chechnya. These protests have been angrily brushed aside by Russian political and military leaders, who insist that the conflict is a purely "internal affair." Suspicion of Western motives in the Chechen conflict is amply reflected in the new Concept of National Security. The language about "threats to the existence of the Russian Federation as a sovereign state" takes full account of this combination of internal separatism and external diplomatic pressures.

The significance of Kosovo, NATO expansion, strategic arms control, and Chechnya was already evident in October, when the draft of the new Concept was adopted. The tone and the content of the document had nothing to do with leadership politics or Yeltsin's resignation; they had everything to do with the threats perceived--at least for the time being--by Russian political and military elites.

This is doubly necessary now because the international community is heatedly discussing the world's possible development ways in the 21st century. The "millennium summit," to be held in the UN framework in the second half of 2000, will be a symbolic event in this sense. Naturally enough, Russia cannot remain aloof of this debate. It is not the same to it how the world will develop.

Russia is a direct participant in the deep transformation processes underway in the world. These changes concern not only the system of international relations, but also the entire structure of human civilisation. The potential of the economic and research-technical progress, which accumulated in the 20th century, resulted in qualitative changes in the past few years in virtually all spheres of life of society and Man.

From the viewpoint of world politics, the essence of these changes concerns above all globalisation. There is a growing rapprochement of countries and regions and of their interdependence. The problems, which until recently were regarded as local or regional, now more frequently concern, directly or indirectly, the interests of all.

It is apparent that the importance of predictability and controllability of international processes is growing dramatically in this situation. But in fact this is not always the case. Quite often, events escape our control, developing more quickly than the ability of the world community to promptly and effectively react to arising risks and challenges.

The threat of global annihilation, which was a factor of the Cold War period, has been replaced by such abhorrent phenomena as international terrorism and organised crime, militant separatism and ethnic differences, illegal weapons and drug trafficking and other problems. We must admit that the international community and individual states were not ready to effectively resist these challenges.

Moreover, there is such highly dangerous thing as the attempts of some countries to exploit the problems arising in other countries, which leads to extremely negative consequences for the global and regional stability. Solidarity and impartiality have not yet become the norm of international life. As a result, we still have tensions and crisis situations in different parts of the world. Neither have we found optimal ways of resolving such global problems as the growing socio-economic gap between different groups of countries, and the disruption of the ecological balance in the world.

These challenges weigh down heavily on international relations, undermining the base for stable development, which is vital in conditions of global economy. There is a dire need to find common solutions to the problems facing humankind. The main task is to make the positive elements of globalisation work to full capacity, and to neutralise or minimise its negative consequences.

It is more important than ever in conditions of an open and interdependent world to jointly determine the guidelines and the structure of the future world order, and to elaborate coordinated mechanisms of governing international processes. For it is apparent that discord, not to mention rivalry or attempts to serve one's interests at the expense of others during the globalisation of problems are counter-productive, and doomed to failure in the long run.

Regrettably, the international community has not reach conceptual accord on this issue. Two fundamentally different attitudes to the creation of a new world order have clashed. One of them provides for creating a unipolar model of the world, where a group of the most developed countries would dominate the world by relying on the military and economic might of the USA and NATO. And the rest of the world would have to live by the rules that suit this "club of the elect." The unavoidable consequence of this would be the enforcement of the "might is right" principle in international relations, the policy of diktat and double standards.

It is especially alarming that attempts are made to overhaul the fundamental norms of international law to suit this scheme, to replace them with the doctrines of "limited sovereignty" and "humanitarian interference." The NATO military action in Kosovo clearly showed where this policy can lead. It leads into a dead-end, or rather back to a world of confrontations.

Like many other countries which share its opinion, Russia suggests a different model. It is based on the sincere belief that the objective road of civilisation leads to multipolarity, and there is no reasonable alternative to this.

Our idea of a multipolar world is not an ideological slogan; it is a philosophy of international life resting on the realities of the epoch of globalism. Only having based a new world order on the principles of interdependence and sovereign equality of the international community's members, can one pool the resources of all states and regions to face the challenges of today and to build working instruments of combining national and international efforts.

This is the only basis on which we can maximally heed, within the framework of a single international process, the national interests and uniqueness of separate states, and ensure their equal safety and worthy place in the global community. This would help preserve and add to the realistic fruit of peace and security resultant from the end of the two blocs' confrontation-- an open society, a single information and cultural space, major agreements to cut back on arms and secure strategic stability. The idea of multipolarity is designed to tally with a new architecture of international security. The central place in it should, without doubt, belong to the UN, a unique and largely alternative-free mechanism of regulating the system of international relations.

Today's agenda includes the urgent tasks of adding to the authority of the UN and its Security Council, adapting its mechanisms to the new conditions, and of further developing its partner relations with other international and regional structures.

A lot will have to be done in Europe, too. The formation of a really pan-European architecture of security and cooperation has not been finalised. Russia's objective is to see the process become on-going and expand, rather than contract, all European states' capacity to actively participate in the continent's political and economic life.

As we see it, European integration is Europe's unification on the principles of democracy and mutual respect, rather than the formation of narrow oases of well-being.

This is why the Russian Federation has tried so hard to develop the potentialities of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe and has joined the Council of Europe.

We are prepared for most constructive cooperation with the European Union with which we have built the necessary legal, political and economic basis for interaction in the past few years. Our approach to relations with the EU and the processes in it is free of time-serving, opportunistic considerations. We expect that our European partners will be acting likewise while building ties with the Russian Federation.

The door is still open for a resumption of contacts between Russia and NATO, but we need to have a clear understanding of the degree to which the alliance intends to heed our interests and concerns, and to honour the provisions of the Founding Act. The developments around Yugoslavia have raised quite a few questions in this respect.

But NATO is a reality of the European arena, and ignoring this fact would be myopic, in the very least.

We are open for close, substantial interaction with the US, which has on more than one occasion helped find mutually acceptable solutions to most complex international problems. We are in for serious work to further deepen the disarmament processes and build up bilateral trade and economic ties.

Many analysts predict that the 21st century will be Asia's epoch. Well, we have nothing against it. Russia has been, is and will be an Asiatic power. We are presently developing our involvement in the integration efforts in Asia and the Pacific.We are consistently building up our ties with the continent's leading states--China, India, Japan, Iran, etc.

We are counting on a dynamic development of interaction with the countries of Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.

It goes without saying that a priority area of Russia's foreign policy will be our relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States. I am positive that the first decade of the 21st century will be decisive in forming a modern edifice of the CIS which is capable of becoming an influential regional organisation stimulating prosperity and cooperation throughout the post-Soviet space.

Russia's relations with the CIS states should be genuinely friendly and mutually beneficial. We are prepared for this and will work actively toward this objective.

On the whole, Russia will continue to make a weighty contribution to the formation of a fair and equal system of international relations. This fully accords with our national interests--the interests of building a single, strong, democratic and prosperous Russia.

The output hike was fueled mainly by the August 1998 ruble devaluation that priced expensive imports out of the market and lowered costs for domestic producers. Production now stands about 2.5 percent higher than 1997 levels and is back on par with 1995.

But economists warned Thursday the industrial output hike was based on weak economic foundations and that in some sectors growth had already begun to sputter into stagnation and decline.

"In seasonally adjusted terms the level of production overall is already 4 percent lower than the peak reached in July," said Peter Westin, an economist at the Russian European Center for Economic Policy.

While output for most industries stabilized in the last few months of 1999, textile and food-processing industries began to produce less, he said.

Economists say the industrial boomlet is running out of steam as consumer spending fails to keep step with output and investment remains dismally low.

In a rare statement on the economy Thursday, acting President Vladimir Putin conceded that despite last year's record economic growth, living standards were dropping and Russia had lost much of its influence over world economic processes.

"We cannot tolerate this and it must be acknowledged," Interfax quoted him as saying at a Cabinet meeting.

"We need to take energetic action on carrying out reform," he said. "Above all we need to strengthen state institutions."

Economists agreed Putin would have difficulty finding a quick fix for Russia's economic woes.

"The only way to seriously tackle the slowdown in industrial growth is to improve the investment climate through institutional reform and ensuring the implementation of law," Westin said.

Otherwise, investors will continue to stay away, he said.

Investment so far has mainly been in the oil and gas sector, leaving production in consumer goods industries, like the already declining food processing and textiles sectors, with little fuel for growth.

More important, though, is the sense among the international business community that Putin might really have the strength to ensure that laws in Russia are actually enforced.

"I think enforcement is the real issue now. There are hundreds of thousands of laws, and the key thing is to implement them, and implement them fairly," said Mark Cooke, chief investment officer of Brunswick Capital Management, a London-based firm managing fund investment in Russian equity.

"The law has to apply to the rich as well as the poor and regardless of which clan you belong to. It clearly needs massive change, and this will take time. But the state has to be strong enough to impose its will, to uphold the law and be able to punish, to crack down on white-collar crime."

Though Yeltsin impressed many with his courage, few Western businesspeople felt the same way about his management skills in contrast to the decisiveness and discipline displayed by Putin to date.

"Putin has demonstrated clear effectiveness in waging war in Chechnya," said Bill Browder, managing director of Hermitage Capital Management, a fund management firm. "If he could apply the same effectiveness to the economy, life would improve in Russia."

Like Cooke, Browder believes enforcement of laws will be a key indication of Putin's ability to encourage investment in Russia.

"The single most important theme for investors is the rule of law, the enforcement of laws," he said. "At the moment, no one can really believe a contract will remain valid or that securities laws can be enforced, and that needs to be addressed."

Browder said the general view among investors is that the most important catalyst for change in Russia was replacing Yeltsin.

"He was a very credible revolutionary but turned out to be a bad manager. The fact he has now been replaced can be viewed as positive," he said.

And Putin's call for a stronger state, much derided in the Western press, is not anathema to everyone. Cooke said that when he reads what Putin says about need for the stronger state, he absolutely agrees.

"The major problem for Russia is probably not that the state is too strong and that it interferes," Cooke said. "The problem is the opposite — the state is too weak. It's vulnerable to pressure from different interest groups, while its role should be as referee between those groups."

He said that since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Russian state has not had much legitimacy. It has done very little for its people, whether in terms of physical or medical protection, or education. To achieve legitimacy, the state must be seen to be doing this, to be treating people well.

Meanwhile, those working in business in Russia were cautious in their reaction to Putin taking over the reins, saying they do not anticipate the situation worsening.

"The effect on us is not going to be great, I would say neutral to slightly better," said Thomas Garman, general manager of Kodak in Russia. "I think most people, myself included, had essentially given up on Yeltsin."

The ARPI regional polling organization said 62 percent of Russians would cast their ballot for Putin, enough to win the election outright in the first round.

His closest rival, Communist Party chief Gennady Zyuganov, was credited with 19 percent in the poll.

Former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, who has not confirmed he will contest early elections prompted by Boris Yeltsin's shock December 31 resignation, was third with seven percent.

Bringing up the rear were Grigory Yavlinsky, head of the liberal Yabloko party on five percent, and flamboyant ultranationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky on three percent.