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Edited by David Johnson
| ISSUE #37 | February 29,1999 |
The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and
analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic,
social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie
Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based
Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education
organization.
Last December Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov
said during a visit to India
that Russia favored the formation of a
new strategic alliance in Asia of
China, Russia and India.
"A lot depends in the region on the policies
of China, Russia and India,"
Primakov said. "A triangle, where each
corner is connected with a different
corner by bilateral relations, will lead
to more stability in the region and
on a global level."
At the time, Primakov's remarks were ridiculed
in the West as a not-very-
clever anti-American publicity stunt.
The Western media reported that the idea
of a three-way alliance met with little
enthusiasm in Beijing and New Delhi.
Primakov was quick to clarify his statement,
saying that "this is not a formal
proposal." The West believed this to be
the end of the story but two months
later Primakov's idea is apparently beginning
to materialize.
An annual high-level conference on security
policy was held in Munich this
month. German Chancellor Gerhard SchrÚder,
U.S. Secretary of Defense William
Cohen, the defense ministers of Britain,
France and other European countries,
leading Western industrialists and various
VIPs were in attendance.
During the Cold War, such Munich conferences
served as workshops in which to
hammer out joint Western security policies
to face the Soviet threat. But the
world has changed and global security
has become a political catch phrase in
Western capitals. So for the first time
the organizers invited representatives
from India, China and Japan to speak about
the prospects for stability and
security in Asia.
The organizers slated the Asia discussion
for the last session of the last day
of the conference. Naturally, almost all
the VIPs and two-thirds of all the
other participants had already left for
home. Major Asian countries are
important economic powers, but their defense
potential is small compared to
the United States and its NATO allies.
Former foes and other outsiders are
today regularly invited to attend important
transatlantic security meetings,
but it is expected that newcomers should
first of all listen to what wise
Westerners have to say and, second, fully
agree with what they are told. That
seems to be the true Western definition
of globalization.
It turned out that the Asian powers had
important security messages to
deliver. Brajesh Mishra, national security
adviser to the prime minister of
India, said on behalf of the Indian government:
"We are witnessing the erosion
of the strategic frontier on the Amu Darya
that for the last 150 years had
preserved strategic stability in a vital
part of the Eurasian landmass. In its
place, fundamentalism and extremism are
taking root and fueling terrorism.
This is a matter of extreme concern to
my country."
The subtext of Mishra's speech was that
India sees Russia's diminished
influence in Central Asia and the partial
withdrawal of Russian border guards
from Tajikistan as a serious threat.
"During this conference," he continued,
"I got the impression that the West
wants to replace the UN with NATO, that
the West believes that NATO can solve
all global security problems." Substituting
the United Nations with NATO is,
of course, anathema to India.
Mei Zhaorong, the president of Chinese
People's Institute of Foreign Affairs,
speaking on behalf of Chinese Prime Minister
Zhu Rongji, said that Beijing is
fully opposed to any loosening or rewriting
of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty and also against U.S. plans to
develop and deploy any tactical Theater
Missile Defense systems, especially in
Japan, South Korea or Taiwan.
"The TMD plan developed by the U.S. and
relevant countries in the Asia-Pacific
region runs counter to the ABM treaty,"
Zhaorong said. "Instead of improving
security for any party it can only stimulate
missile proliferation and trigger
off a new arms race."
It seems that Beijing wants to say that
U.S. attempts to bend the ABM treaty
and build anti-ballistic defenses may
"trigger" a drastic expansion of China's
nuclear rocket forces.
High-ranking Russian diplomats present
in Munich agreed that China is
defending the ABM treaty more vigorously
and that India seems to be more
concerned about Russia's diminishing influence
in Central Asia than the
Russians themselves. Beijing and Delhi
are standing up to defend Russia's
place in the world. If this is not a genuine
strategic triangle, what is?
A growing convergence of basic interest
is bringing the major Asian landmass
countries together in opposing the Western
sea nations. Maybe one day
relentless Western pressure will force
these countries to sign a formal
alliance.
#2
Russian Duma To Pass Nuclear Financing
Before START II
MOSCOW, 23 Feb (Itar-Tass) -- The Russian
State Duma will ratify the
START II treaty only after it passes the
bill "On financing Strategic Nuclear
Forces by 2010," Duma Defense Committee
Chairman Roman Popkovich told Tass on
Tuesday. "The bill is practically ready,
and will be submitted to the Duma for consideration in
March," he said.
Popkovich further explained that
the problem of START II ratification was
"directly and closely linked with the
development of the Russian strategic nuclear
forces, theirfinancing included." He pointed
out that "a financial groundwork should
be laid for the START II treaty to work."
The Chairman of the Duma Committee
for Defense said that the Russian Defense
Ministry had already prepared financial
and economic substantiation of the treaty's
implementation.
According to Popkovich, "the Russian
State Duma may start discussing the
treaty next summer," but the treaty could
be ratified only "with the perspective
development of our strategic forces taken
into account," he added.
#3
General Urges Revision of Russia's
Military Doctrine
Moscow, 24 February (Itar-Tass) -- "The
Balkan lessons are forcing
Russia to revise the main provisions of
its military doctrine," President of
the Academy of Military Sciences General
Makhmut Gareyev believes. He stated
this to ITAR-TASS on Wednesday [24 February],
commenting on the current
situation around Kosovo. In his opinion,
the interests of Russia's security
may be jeopardised not only by the presencein
other countries of nuclear weapons
aimed at our country, means for their
delivery, possible proliferation of other
types of mass destruction weapons, and
territorial claims to Russia and its allies,
but also by the US and NATO intention
to "influence the situation in any part of
the globe at their own discretion."
The eminent Russian military leader
believes that NATO's eastward
enlargement, the use of the forces of
this military-political bloc for police
functions on the alkans, and the US attempts
to withdraw from the 1972 ABM
treaty are compelling Russia to revise
he cardinal
principles of its strategy to ensure the
country's national security.
Especially, the general holds,
it is necessary to perfect the military
reform, the system of combat and mobilisational
readiness in keeping with the
present-day character of military menaces,
and also the work to promote military
cooperation within the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS).
Sergeev's February 22 remarks follow reports
disseminated recently by the
High Command that last year's autumn military
campaign--which concluded in
January of this year--had been a successful
one. The Russian General Staff's
organizational and mobilizational directorate,
which oversees military
manpower issues, said earlier this month
that the armed forces had fully met
their targets for the fall draft. Some
158,000 conscripts had been drafted,
the General Staff said, and 110,000 of
them had been sent to the army and
navy (the remainder go to the country's
various security forces).
Although military specialists continued
to bemoan health and education
problems with regard to last fall's cohort,
they nevertheless suggested that
the latest draft had provided the armed
forces with the best quality
conscripts in some years. They also suggested
that the number of those
avoiding conscription, which was said
to have totaled some 40,000 in the
spring of last year, had fallen slightly
(Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie,
February 16).
There are obvious political reasons for
the Russian government to claim
success in its efforts to halt the long
deterioration of the country's armed
forces. In his 1996 presidential election
campaign, President Boris Yeltsin
pledged to make radical military reform
a top priority of his administration
in the years to come. During the election
campaign itself, moreover, Yeltsin
dumped his longtime defense minister,
General Pavel Grachev, and brought
retired General Aleksandr Lebed into the
Kremlin, ostensibly--at least in
part--so that he could deal with military
reform issues.
Lebed's own tenure was a short one, however,
and within a year his
handpicked choice for defense minister,
General Igor Rodionov, had been
dismissed from his post as well. Rodionov's
ouster, in particular, was
related to sharp differences with the
Kremlin over military reform. With the
appointment of then Strategic Rocket Forces
commander Igor Sergeev to the
defense minister post in May of 1997,
the Kremlin began a new military
reform push which has been much criticized
by Yeltsin's political
opposition, which now includes both Lebed
and Rodionov. Military reform and
the abject state of Russia's armed forces
have been a political issue, and
are likely to become even more of one
with the approach of Russia's
parliamentary and presidential elections.
ARMY'S READINESS SAID TO BE DETERIORATING.
Sergeev's optimistic remarks on
February 22 about the state of the Russian
armed forces would be disputed by
many, however, and not merely by the Kremlin's
political opposition. The
Russian army's continuing woes were most
recently and most spectacularly
highlighted, for example, by a U.S. State
Department report delivered to
Congress on February 19. The report, which
relies heavily on classified
intelligence sources, is said to paint
a depressing picture of a demoralized
and destitute Russian army. The report
points especially to sharp and
continuing budgetary shortfalls, which
have been exacerbated by the ruble's
devaluation. These financial woes, the
report says, have forced a sharp
curtailment of combat training in the
Russian army, navy and air force, and
have also cut drastically into procurement
budgets. In addition, they have
left the Defense Ministry deeply in debt
both to its suppliers and to its
own military personnel.
For this and other reasons, the report
concludes, the Russian army's combat
readiness is in "rapid decay" and "the
average Russian soldier is only
marginally combat capable." In pointing
to the plummeting living standards
experienced by many Russian military personnel,
one U.S. defense expert
reportedly expressed surprise that the
Russian military "has not exploded."
Other experts observed that the army's
financial problems have forced the
military leadership to indefinitely postpone
plans to transform the armed
forces into a fully voluntary force by
the year 2000 (Washington Post,
February 21). That had been among the
pledges made by Yeltsin during his
1996 campaign.
BARRACKS BRUTALITY REMAINS A CONCERN. Yeltsin's
1996 pledge had been
directed not merely at improving the army's
professionalism, but also at
addressing widely held concerns among
the Russian population over the
dismal--and at times dangerous--conditions
which confront the country's
conscript soldiers. Brutality in the barracks--called
"hazing"--has been a
much publicized phenomenon in Russia since
before the Soviet Union's
dissolution, and there is little reason
to believe that the current military
leadership has made any significant progress
in this area. Indeed, a secret
General Staff study reportedly concludes
that the incidence of hazing is
rising in the armed forces as part of
a more general increase in the army's
criminalization (Moskovsky komsomolets,
February 19).
Other sources have reached similar conclusions.
The Soldiers' Mothers
Committee, a Moscow-based group which
seeks to improve life for Russia's
conscript soldiers, said recently that
conditions for the conscript army
have sunk to their lowest level since
the 1991 dissolution of the USSR. They
also say that problems in this area have
become especially severe since the
government's August financial crisis.
The Russian Military General
Prosecutor's Office, meanwhile, reports
that fifty-seven soldiers died and
nearly 3,000 were injured during the first
eleven months of 1998 as a result
of hazing (Christian Science Monitor,
February 1). But an advocate for
soldiers' rights puts the figures much
higher, claiming on February 22 that
some 2,000 Russian soldiers die each year
either directly or indirectly as a
result of hazing. Many of these deaths,
she claimed, are suicides (Russian
agencies, February 22).
Reports such as these suggest why a large
number of Russian youths are
avoiding the military draft. But, rather
than ensuring that life in the
armed forces improves for the country's
conscripts, the Defense Ministry
appears of late to be more intent on tracking
down draft dodgers and
deserters. In January of this year the
military prosecutor's office
announced that military authorities had
arrested nearly one thousand such
soldiers in a major four-day operation
aimed at locating and apprehending
deserters (see the Monitor, January 26).
This week military authorities
launched another such operation. This
one was said to have netted nearly 700
deserters (Itar-Tass, February 22). Russian
Chief Military Prosecutor Yuri
Demin vowed last month that authorities
would manage "sooner or later" to
find "everyone who has evaded military
service" (Russian TV, January 22).
http://www.russiatoday.com
Feb. 23, 1999
Russians Need the Internet
By Rod Pounsett
There are, of course, no simple solutions
for Russia's continued progress
toward a solvent market economy and truly
democratic environment -- if indeed
that is the direction it is still pointed.
Its government is unlikely to
undergo some dramatic metamorphosis whereby
it rethinks perceived imperatives
in order to balance the books and makes
its society more democratic. Neither
is the international community likely
to come up with an all embracing rescue
package to bail Russia out of its current
crisis, even if it could afford to.
So maybe it is time to focus on some key
realistic elements that, even if not
yet affordable, could put Russia back
on track to becoming a meaningful member
of the international community.
An area where one finds broad consensus
is in the development of the Internet.
Many people inside and outside the country
recognize that getting more
Russians online could have a significant
effect on the development of
democracy as well stimulating greater
understanding and utilization of a
market economy.
Despite philanthropic gestures, like international
money man George Soros'
multimillion-dollar donation to give more
Russian universities access to the
World Wide Web, less than 1 percent (1.35
million according to latest
statistics) of the population is connected
to the Internet. The numbers of
users in Moscow is slightly higher, where
an estimated 3 percent are hooked up
to the Net.
Yet, as people such as Microsoft's Bill
Gates have often pointed out, Russia
is a nation already rich in computer know-how.
And Bill Gates at least is
convinced that wider use of the Internet,
especially by the emerging business
community, would almost guarantee greater
efficiency and competitiveness.
Others concentrate on the value of the
Internet for spreading democracy and
access to the outside world's knowledge
base and opinions. There is now a
perceived threat concerning the freedom
of the press in Russia. The government
and various regional and local authorities
still own a large share of the mass
media in the country. And we have recently
witnessed Prime Minister Yevgeny
Primakov's attempts to put his people
in key positions within national TV and
other information outlets.
Russia has, of course, come a long way
since the dark days of the Soviet Union
when the people's only access to the truth
was via hidden radio sets picking
up, when jamming techniques were not operating,
overseas broadcasts from such
sources as Voice of America, Radio Free
Europe, the BBC World Service and
Radio Liberty. Or clandestine dissident
publications and other printed media
smuggled in from the West. In fact, it
would now take severe oppressive action
by the authorities to stifle free speech
completely in Russia's media. But who
knows what might happen if the political
climate continues toward a more
state-controlled society.
The Internet, provided enough people can
get connected, would ensure the free
transfer of information.
In fact, last year we saw worrying signs
concerning attempts to control the
Internet within Russia. Firstly, the Communist-dominated
Duma tried to
introduce legislation that would have
severely restricted development and
access to the Internet within Russia.
Then the Federal Television and Radio
Broadcast Service began to discuss the
licensing requirements for posting
audio and video material on the Net. There
were arguments that suggested
anyone undertaking such activities in
Russia would be required to obtain a
license as a TV station. Fortunately both
attempts to impose unreasonable
regulation failed.
We even had Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov
singing the praises of the
Internet and telling us his party was
certainly going to exploit the
opportunities it presented for spreading
the word.
Indeed, many other Russian politicians
have launched themselves and their
ideological opinions on the Net. But with
so few Russians o line it is hardly
likely to have a major impact on the outcome
of the next elections.
Like most problems in Russia, the main
hurdle to the development of Internet
usage is money. Too few people have enough
cash to buy computers and pay
connection charges. And there is still
not enough investment in the basic
communications infrastructure, particularly
outside the major cities.
In smaller towns and rural areas, where
a high proportion of Russians live,
would-be surfers would confront poor-quality
telephone networks and a lack of
Internet service providers. Although the
potential for access is growing with
several major companies, such as Moscow-based
Relcom and Demos, installing
servers in more and more cities and towns
across Russia.
We have also seen a growth of the cyber
cafes, where, at a price, people can
rent workstations for Internet browsing
and sending their e-mail. But again
this is only happening in the major cities,
principally Moscow and St.
Petersburg.
Thanks to George Soros' intervention and
other similar but smaller
initiatives, progress is being made within
the education environment. But with
Internet access restricted to university
and college campuses, many students
end up frustrated once they are back home
where families are too busy finding
enough cash to feed themselves before
considering buying junior a computer and
paying for his or her Internet connection
charges.
In the West we are already hearing rumors
of major Internet service providers
considering the offer of free computers
just to increase audience sizes. They
may not yet consider Russia as a lucrative
market for e-commerce, but one has
to believe the potential is still there.
Certainly both the Russian and foreign
business communities are starting to
recognize the potential value of Internet
commerce in Russia. According to a
Moscow Times article last month, half
a million dollars was spent in Internet
advertising in Russia last year. Not much
when you consider the $1.4 billion
spent in the West. But balanced against
the mere 1.3 million internet users in
Russia that is a healthy statistic. And
Internet advertising is also still
considered one of the few industries,
apart from debt collection, that is
enjoying growth in Russia.
Maybe it is time for the IMF, World Bank
and anyone else still interested in
pushing forward reform in Russia to start
considering direct allocation of
funds for raising the numbers of Russians
with access to the Internet.
WHILE THE report, prepared
by the MITRE Corp. for the CIA, downplays
the potential for accidental nuclear war,
it states that there is a
significant risk related to the nation’s
electrical grid, including its
nuclear power plants, primarily because
of a late start in addressing or even
acknowledging the problem by the agencies
responsible.
Overall, the unclassified
report, “International Issues Associated with
the Year 2000 Problem,” contends Russia
is two to three years behind the
United States in remediation efforts.
Moreover, the report states many Russian
economic sectors — including nuclear power
— do not intend to deal with Y2K
issues until after Jan. 1, 2000.
The MITRE Corp. is one of the CIA’s most frequently used contractors.
Commenting generally before
the Senate Armed Services Committee
Wednesday, Air Force Gen. John A. Gordon,
the CIA’s deputy director, said the
fear of an accidental nuclear war is overblown.
“I want to be clear that while
local problems are foreseeable, we do
not see a problem in terms of Russian
or Chinese missiles automatically being
launched or nuclear weapons going off,
because of computer problems arising
from Y2K failures. In fact, we currently
do not see a danger of unauthorized
or inadvertent launch of ballistic missiles
from any country due to Y2K
problems.”
RISK TO ROCKETS, WARHEADS LOW
'While they anticipate no problems
with the targeting system, problems could
arise with the systems responsible for
tracking the location and alert status
of nuclear weapons.’
— REPORT ON RUSSIAN Y2K VULNERABILITIES
Dealing with the issue of
nuclear missiles, the report suggests that
the Russians claim their strategic rocket
forces “use their own computer
language,” which is simpler than COBOL,
the computer language most vulnerable
to the Y2K problem.
The report quotes Russian
defense officials as saying, “Russia’s ICBMs
cannot be triggered by Y2K-related problems
because ‘special computer
technology is used’ in these systems.”
Still, the report notes, there is
little independent corroboration for those
statements.
Moreover, the report states
that even the Russian military admits that
tracking nuclear weapons in the nation’s
inventory is one issue not yet
addressed:
“While they anticipate no
problems with the targeting system, problems
could arise with the systems responsible
for tracking the location and alert
status of nuclear weapons.” Russia has
more than 20,000 nuclear weapons of all
types. Surprisingly, the report mentions
problems with early warning systems
only in passing.
NUCLEAR STATIONS A FOCUS
The power plant problem is
a different story, the report states, in
part because the energy sector and particularly
the Ministry of Atomic Power
has not addressed the problem, while the
Ministry of Defense has. Describing
the lack of information about the Russian
energy sector in general as
“disturbing,” the report quotes a November
1997 press report of a discussion
of the Y2K issue by the top computer officials
at Unified Energy Systems, the
huge company controlling Russia’s electricity
grid:
“The main computer center
director at Unified Energy Systems claimed he
had seen a paper on the Y2K problem and
believed the problem would be solved.
One of his colleagues, however, directly
responsible for the company’s
thousands of computers, said that he had
neither heard of the bug nor of any
plans to solve it.”
Concerning the possibility
of “nuclear meltdowns” at the nuclear power
plants, the report stated the principal
risks are to “control room displays,
radiation monitoring and emergency response
mechanisms” — all essential to
controlling a nuclear accident.
WORRIED NEIGHBORS
Finnish authorities,
the report adds, had recently asked Russia for
assurances that two nuclear power plants
near Helsinki were Y2K safe, fearing
that a nuclear accident would affect much
of Finland. Russia, the report
notes, told Finland there would be no
problems but did not provide “any
supporting facts.”
It is not just the Finns.
Other neighbors of Russia, too, have
expressed concern, as have former Soviet
allies such as Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic and former Soviet states such
as Ukraine and Belarus, all of which
operate Soviet-designed nuclear plants
themselves. Given the central
government’s difficulty even paying workers
or controlling local governors in
its far-flung jurisdiction, some countries
clearly are worried.
Indeed, the Atomic Energy
Ministry said last July that it will wait
until 2000 to fix any computer glitches
arising from the Y2K problem, claiming
the plants “do not depend exclusively
on computers.... Instead, the plants are
controlled manually and automatically
for greater reliability.” Moreover, the
Ministry has said, the report notes dryly,
“the sector employs ‘the latest
hardware and software’.”
In the private sector, the
report predicts that while first-tier
companies will probably survive while
smaller and medium sized firms will do
less well. It cites a recent Coopers and
Lybrands survey which showed only one
third of Russian firms are even aware
of the problem. A sector where there is
a particular dicotomy is the banking sector,
the report claims. Larger banks,
it noted, “seem to have leap frogged stages
of technology at which Y2K is a
problem. On the other hand, most smaller
banks are using very old technology.”
On the other hand, even
those sectors where the problem has been
acknowledged are often incapable of understanding
the complexity of the issue.
The report states that MITRE was able
to obtain a copy of the Russian
Telecommunications Committee’s program
to fix the telephone system prior to
2000.
Unfortunately, the methodology
is weak and does not consider
alternatives ... which are less intrusive
and faster, an important
consideration with only one year to go.
The report does not consider
troublesome dates like September 9, 1999,
the leap year and others.
Certification criteria and validation
and verification elements of the program
are also noticeably absent."
In fact, the report
notes a spokesman for the State Committee cited a
software research company report saying
“a final resolution [of
telecommunications issues] would take
half a century.”
Finally, the report
estimates the total cost of fixing Russia’s problem
at $32 billion, roughly 10 times what
Russia has asked the West to come up
with.
Robert Windrem is an investigative
producer for NBC News based in New
York.
The report, which examines 32 countries,
is part of the State Department's
annual review of world military expenditures.
The Czech Republic, Ukraine,
Russia, and Slovakia are representatives
of Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union whose military expenditures
were studied and analyzed for 1998.
In regards to Russia, the report presented
a dismal picture of the current
state of combat readiness of the Russian
military.
According to the report, the budget for
the Russian military in 1998 was or
50.6 billion new rubles (or $7 billion).
However, actual military
expenditures from January to September
1998 were only two-thirds of what
had been budgeted, says the report. The
causes behind the low rate of
expenditures, says the report, were numerous
budget corrections and
*sequestering throughout the year, caused
primarily by revenue shortfalls.
The ruble's threefold devaluation and
the high inflation rate further
reduced the military's purchasing power.
The report says all of this
contributed to a 60 billion-ruble debt
for the Ministry of Defense.
For the first three quarters of 1998, Russia's
actual military expenditures
were 1.8 percent of the nation's gross
domestic product (GDP) or about 15.1
percent of the overall Russian budget.
The report says the authorized peacetime
strength of the Russian armed
forces, as of January 1, 1999, is about
1.2 million people. Those numbers
are likely to decline, says the report,
due to the Ministry of Defense's
orders to continue downsizing, chronic
conscription shortfalls, and cadre
resignations.
The report adds that the Russian armed
forces' standard of living remains
"at the low end of the country's socioeconomic
scale." The Russian
government remained three to four months
delinquent in paying wages
throughout 1998. This decline in the standard
of living for military
personnel has contributed to an increase
in crime, particularly theft, as
well as suicides among service members,
and widespread evasion of military
service.
In fact, economic problems have caused
Russian combat training to become
"virtually non-financed," says the report,
with the military receiving a
mere six percent of the resources it needed
for training in 1998. According
to the report, only 35 percent of planned
regimental-level and 73 percent
of battalion-level tactical exercises
of the ground forces were conducted
in 1998. Sea duty for Russian fleet submarines
was reduced by 25 percent
and 33 percent for surface vessels. The
Russian air force conducted only 15
to 40 percent of their standard training.
The report determines: "This is contributing
to rapid decay of combat
readiness....the average Russian soldier
is only marginally combat capable."
The report goes on to say that as a result
of the military's financial
difficulties, plans to modernize Russia's
military, including the
acquisition and procurement of new equipment,
and plans to transition from
a conscript to an all-contract military
force has been deferred "well into
the next decade."
Bruce Blair, a defense expert at the Brookings
Institution in Washington,
told RFE/RL that all of these factors
are signs the Russian military is
slowly and dangerously deteriorating.
"It is clear that the Russian military
is now almost totally alienated.
Alienated from the State, which is not
supporting it by even providing
minimal benefits, and alienated from society,
which is not bestowing any
respect or honor on it, and is withholding
its sons from recruitment."
In regards to Ukraine, the report says
that country spent about 1,500
million hryvnya (equal to about $600 million)
or approximately six percent
of its national budget on defense in 1998.
This is down 0.12 percent from
1997.
The reports says the manpower strength
of the Ukrainian armed forces in
1998 was estimated at about 350,000, a
five percent reduction from 1997.
Because of the nation's serious economic
difficulties, the report says that
in recent years, the funds disbursed to
the Ministry of Defense fell well
short of the actual budget figures. In
order to survive, some military
units adopted various strategies to keep
operating.
The report explains: "For example, construction
units may sell their
services, units that control natural resources
(such as rock quarries) may
sell them off, and naval vessels may seek
sponsors among cities or
businesses that would provide uniforms,
food supplements, and so forth."
Military spending in Ukraine shares the
"two-sided character of the
Ukrainian economy as a whole," states
the report. There is an official
side, which is reflected in statistics,
and a "shadow side" which is not,
it says. While the report recognizes that
the "shadow side" is largely a
survival mechanism for many units, it
warns that such creative funding
"opens up possibilities for corruption
and abuse."
In Slovakia, the report says the nation
spent 14,628 million crowns (or
more than $406 million) on its defense
budget in 1998 -- about eight
percent of the federal budget. In real
terms, defense spending decreased in
1998, because while military expenditures
rose five percent, inflation
increased even faster at seven percent.
In fact, the report states that
because of financial concerns, the Slovak
parliament has annually reduced
the military budget in real terms since
1995.
The report says that under the Conventional
Forces in Europe treaty,
Slovakia has a ceiling of 46,667 military
personnel. The Slovak parliament
has authorized the army to have 45,483
peacetime personnel, but due to
budgetary difficulties, the current number
of service members in Slovakia's
armed forces is just over 39,000.
The report says that Slovakia's budget
"barely meets minimum requirements
to maintain subsistence." It adds that
the budget also does not allow for
military upgrades or modernization. However,
the report says that
Slovakia's plans to reduce its size to
35,000 by the year 2000 will help
considerably.
The report notes that the U.S. and other
countries continue to urge
Slovakia to spend more on its defense
budget to improve its chances of
joining the NATO alliance. It also adds
that the Slovak military continues
to play an important and stabilizing role
in the nation, citing recent
opinion polls that show the army is the
country's most trusted institution
with 74 percent of the public's support.
The Czech Republic clearly fares the best
of the four nations reviewed in
the report. Czech military spending for
1998 was 30,200 million Czech
crowns (or $1.1 billion) -- nearly seven
percent of the budget. Military
spending increased by 0.1 percent of the
nation's GDP, a sign the report
says is the "Czech Republic's commitment
to its imminent NATO membership."
The report says the U.S. and other NATO
allies continue to urge the Czech
Republic to increase defense spending,
and notes that the current Czech
government has emphasized its commitment
to increase military spending to
at least 2 percent of its GDP by the year
2000.
The Czech armed forces personnel strength
held steady at roughly 55,000
members, says the report. The report noted
that the military is apolitical
and has established rules that bar officers
from elected office and
membership in political parties.
"We welcome any help [that] ... can help
us to boost the neutralization of
this threat," said Yury Bespalko, spokesman
for the Nuclear Power Ministry.
Rose Gottemoeller, an assistant U.S. energy
secretary, said earlier this week
at a Moscow news conference that Washington
plans to contribute to the
disposal of Russia's decommissioned attack
submarines. The work could begin
next year, she said.
Gottemoeller did not reveal how much money
the United States would allocate. A
U.S. official in Moscow, who asked not
to be identified, said President Bill
Clinton's administration is to decide
on a figure by October. The program then
has to be approved by the U.S. Congress.
It costs an average of $8 million to safely
dispose of one submarine, Bespalko
said.
The Nuclear Power Ministry said there is
a total of about 30 decommissioned
Charlie and Victor class atomic-powered
attack submarines in both the Pacific
and Northern fleets.
But according to Norway's environmental
watchdog Bellona, there are 26 of the
decommissioned attack submarines floating
at bases of the Northern Fleet
alone. Most of these submarines, which
carry cruise missiles, were withdrawn
from service in the early 1990s, Bellona's
Northern Fleet expert Thomas
Nielsen said.
Overall there are more than 150 decommissioned
atomic submarines in the
Pacific and Northern fleets and several
dozen of them "urgently" need to be
decommissioned, the Nuclear Power Ministry
spokesman said.
As financing of scrapping programs has
dwindled in Russia, these submarines
have become nothing less than a "threat
to national security," said one of the
ministry's submarine disposal specialists,
who asked not to be identified.
It would cost a total of $2.6 billion to
dispose of the 150 submarines, he
said.
Bellona and other environmental groups
have repeatedly alleged that some
rusted submarines and aged waste storage
facilities have already started to
pollute the seas.
Two navy captains, Alexander Nikitin -
who supplied materials to Bellona - and
Grigory Pasko, are on trial on charges
of treason for exposing the fleets'
nuclear waste disposal practices.
The Nuclear Power Ministry, which took
over the scrapping of submarines from
the navy last May, acknowledges that it
depends on foreign help, which
Bespalko said currently covers 25 percent
of all disposal costs.
Most of the foreign assistance comes from
the United States, Norway and the
European Union.
Bellona's Nielsen said his organization
welcomes any efforts to help Russia
dispose of atomic submarines.
However, both Nielsen and Bespalko noted
that it is not the second-generation
Victor and Charlie attack submarines,
but the first-generation November, Hotel
and Echo class submarines that pose the
greatest threat.
These first-generation vessels were built
between 1955 and 1964. All of them
have been decommissioned, with some floating
at Northern Fleet bases for more
than 15 years, Bellona says.
But the United States has chosen to help
scrap later-generation submarines
because some of them could still be returned
to service to counter the U.S.
Navy, said Greenpeace's Igor Forofontov,
an expert on Russian nuclear waste.
Forofontov said the United States offers
help only when it affects Russia's
nuclear strike capabilities.
http://www.intellectualcapital.com
February 25, 1999
Clinton's Strategic Failure
by Melvin Goodman (goodmanm@ndu.edu)
Melvin A. Goodman is senior fellow
at the Center for International Policy
and co-author of The Wars of Eduard
Shevardnadze.
President Clinton has managed to dominate
the
domestic agenda over the past several
years but has made no progress in
developing a strategic approach to foreign
policy. His administration has
allowed relations with Russia to worsen
dangerously since 1993, and a
president who was initially tentative
in resorting to force has relied too
heavily on the Pentagon for the resolution
of regional problems.
As a lame-duck president for the next year
and a half, Clinton will leave
to his successor the task of resolving
the problems he has either created
or ignored during his watch.
Taking a page from the Cold War
Instead of developing new conceptual approaches
for the millennium, Clinton
has relied on strategic concepts inherited
from the Cold War era. Clinton
correctly observed that the states of
Eastern Europe had to be anchored to
the West, but the appropriate vehicle
for such an arrangement should have
been the European Union, not an expanded
NATO, a Cold War creation.
The expansion of NATO will weaken the alliance
over the long term, weaken
the fragile Eastern European states that
will be forced to modernize their
armed forces, and antagonize a Russian
Federation that wants to align
itself with the United States on a broad
range of security issues. Indeed,
the greatest strategic failure of the
Clinton administration has been its
apparent effort to marginalize Russia
rather than seeking to anchor Russia
to the West in the global arena.
"Dual containment," a phrase used by Clinton
to justify non-recognition of
both Iran and Iraq, is another example
of a Cold War concept. Iran will be
the major strategic power in the Persian
Gulf over the long term, but we
have failed to respond aggressively to
Iran's signals that it seeks
improved bilateral relations.
In Iraq, we have resorted to outmoded "covert"
actions such as the recent
Iraq Liberation Act in order to replace
Saddam Hussein. The international
consensus favors diplomacy in dealing
with Iraq, but Clinton has remained
stubbornly tied to the military instrument.
Our European allies are particularly concerned
with Clinton's efforts to
use NATO outside its members' territory
without the endorsement of the
United Nations.
Finally, Clinton should have sponsored
a strategic debate to examine ways
to reduce Washington's objectives and
forces abroad. Secretary of State
Madeleine K. Albright's constant references
to the United States as the
"indispensable nation" and her view that
"our work is never done" are
self-fulfilling prophecies.
We are expanding ineluctably into the Persian
Gulf and the Balkans without
any strategic notion of our overall objectives.
Our expanded military
presence in the gulf is contributing to
the kind of instability Washington
says it abhors.
Charting a new defense course
Are we contributing to the instability that FDR tried to prevent?
Clinton shuns the very institutions that
President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt conceived to prevent such instability.
Instead of sponsoring new
roles for the United Nations in Third
World arenas, Clinton -- like his
immediate predecessors -- has been highly
critical of the leadership in the
United Nations and not supportive of the
need for multilateral actions in
flash-point situations.
Our failure to respond to the genocide
in Rwanda was nothing short of
immoral. The Clinton administration initially
endorsed "aggressive
multi-lateralism" but quickly abandoned
that strategy when it encountered
criticism.
What is to be done? If Clinton is serious
about countering the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, he should
be willing to reduce our
nuclear inventory that currently exceeds
the lethality we had during the
height of the Cold War.
In signing the nuclear nonproliferation
treaty in 1969, the United States
pledged to reduce its nuclear inventory
in order to convince such states as
India and Pakistan to renounce any nuclear
ambitions. We have failed to
follow through.
Clinton should have used his State of the
Union address to announce that
the United States would continue to observe
the limits of the START II
nuclear arms treaty with a proposed ceiling
of 3,500 nuclear warheads for
each side, and would reduce our inventory
to 1,500 warheads. Instead, we
have stopped the destruction of nuclear
warheads because of the failure of
the Russian Duma to ratify START II.
Russia, meanwhile, continues to destroy
its nuclear inventory and already
has reached levels that the treaty demands
for the year 2002. If Russia
cannot afford to destroy additional nuclear
weapons, then we should fund it
ourselves.
Moreover, we should defuse another 1,000
missiles in order to get Russia to
take similar steps. Adm. Stansfield Turner,
former director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, believes the creation
of such a strategic escrow would
re-energize the disarmament process.
An unstable future for the next president
The United States also should abandon its
launch-on-warning doctrine and
its doctrine that we would be the first
to employ nuclear weapons under
some circumstances. Several of our NATO
allies want to renounce any first
use of nuclear weapons, but we refuse
to consider such a step despite the
overwhelming superiority of both our conventional
and strategic deterrents.
Such conciliatory steps could be used
as leverage against the nuclear
ambitions of China, India and Pakistan.
Instead, Clinton has announced the first
significant increases in the
defense budget in more than 10 years,
as well as the first appropriation
for deployment of a nationwide anti-ballistic
missile system. We already
have wasted more than $50 billion in research
and development of a nuclear
defense that still has not been tested
successfully.
The next tranche of spending probably will
require us to withdraw from the
ABM Treaty of 1972. If the ABM treaty
collapses, then the collapse of the
non-proliferation treaty would not be
far behind. The strategic
consequences for Clinton's successor would
be destabilizing.
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