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Edited by David Johnson
| ISSUE #36 | February 19, 1998 |
The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and
analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic,
social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie
Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based
Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education
organization.
At their recent meeting in Moscow with
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, Russia's top brass, maps in
hand, told her of their concerns about
the United States' Nuclear Missile Defense,
or NDM, program. As several of our
commentators later wrote, the American
side received a "curt, well-deserved
rebuff."
I interpret this, however, as the start
of a serious professional dialogue.
The position of the United States is that
it is preparing to develop an anti-
missile system to shield the nation from
isolated terrorist missile strikes.
By having a limited capability to intercept
only 20-30 missiles the system
would not jeopardize Russia's nuclear
deterrent (its second strike capability
to launch about 1,000 missiles). Accordingly,
strategic stability between the
two nuclear powers will not be upset,
although the provisions of the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty will need
some modification.
However, the Russian military is protesting
that the creation of even a
limited anti-missile defense system entails
the development of a broad basic
infrastructure of systems both on the
ground and in space that would allow the
expansion of the system's capabilities
in the future.
In the long run, then, such a move does
jeopardize Russia's deterrence.
Moreover, the unilateral exit of the United
States from the 1972 ABM treaty
would remove the question of strategic
nuclear armament from the international
legal context.
Washington seems to have taken these arguments
seriously enough. Last week,
Pentagon spokesman Michael Doubleday said
"we want to discuss with the
Russians the ABM treaty itself as well
as our own program in order to agree on
whatever is necessary." He also rejected
assertions that Washington would move
to alter the ABM treaty irrespective of
Moscow's stance.
And so we have the Americans preparing
to develop a limited NDM system for
fear of nuclear terrorist strikes, and
the Russians worrying that this system
may undermine their nuclear deterrent.
Is it possible to reconcile these
positions? I think it is. For those familiar
with nuclear strategy there is
clearly no fundamental contradiction here,
as an explanation in terms of State
A and State B shows.
In a nuclear world, State A should be no
less interested in the reliability of
State B's nuclear deterrent than in its
own, because if State B is uncertain
of its deterrent capability, i.e. of its
second strike capacity, then in a
moment of acute military and political
crisis B may be tempted to strike
first.For this reason the United States
should do its best to disperse any
concerns that Russian strategists have
about the future of Russia's nuclear
deterrent because it corresponds to their
security interests.
The United States and Russia should approach
all the issues linked with the
ABM treaty and the NDM program not as
an ideological or political problem, but
rather as an operational research challenge:
how to design an American NMD
system that doesn't affect Russia's nuclear
deterrent.
The answer is paradoxically simple. The
dimensions of the American system
should be defined by Russians. Let Russian
military experts formulate
restrictions they consider necessary to
impose on such a system (parameters of
its infrastructure, extent of military
means, geographical zones of
deployment, etc.), and all of these restrictions
should then be accepted by
the U.S. and fixed by law in a new international
agreement complementing the
1972 treaty.
MOSCOW, February 17 (Itar-Tass) - The earliest
ratification of the
START-2 Treaty, apart from meeting the
interests of Russian national
security, makes a substantial contribution
to ensuring strategic stability in the world,
claimed here on Wednesday former secretary
of the Russian Security Council and
present acting vice-president of the Russian
Academy of Sciences Andrey Kokoshin.
Asked by Itar-Tass whether Russia
now needs costly general-purpose
troops, Kokoshin emphasised that "although
nuclear deterrence continues to
remain one of themain elements of
ensuring Russia's national security, it is necessary to
observe a balance in developing strategic
nuclear forces and general-purpose troops".
In the vice-president's opinion,
it is expedient to proceed from
possibilities of "the country's economic
potential and present-day estimates of
challenges and threats in the sphere of
the country's military security".
Kokoshin pointed to the need of
radical improvement in funding R&D as
well as armament purchases. He pointed
to the importance of urgent payments
of the state's debts to factories of the
military-industrial complex and research
institutions.
Back to the top
MOSCOW, February 18 (Itar-Tass) - A senior
Russian Defence Ministry
official said on Thursday that Russia
"holds no talks with the USA on
changing the 1972 ABM treaty," although
attempts are made to drag Russia
them.
Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, head of
the Defence Ministry's main
department for international cooperation,
confirmed that Russia "comes out
against changes in the treaty, as it sees
no necessity in that".
According to him, changing the treaty will
destroy the system of strategic
stability in the world, basing on the
START-1, START-2 treaties as well as
treaties on medium- and short-range missiles.
Ivashov told reporters that he believed
the US attempt to change the ABM
will give other countries, in particular
China, India and west-European
countries, grounds for developing missile
technologies and anti-missile
systems.
The general emphasized that the USA wants
to confront Russia with a fact by
allocating means for the development of
national air-defence systems.
Ivanov was participating in a session of
the Russian-US consultative group
on defence matters.
MOSCOW, February 18 (Itar-Tass) - The Russian
Rosvooruzhenie company offers
over 140 samples of Russian weapons and
military hardware to foreign
customers in a specially compiled catalogue,
the presentation of which will
be held at Fototsentr in the Gogolevsky
Boulevard on Friday, Itar-Tass
learnt here on Thursday at the public
relations centre of the
Rosvooruzhenie firm.
Managing director of the company Grigory
Rapota will deliver a speech at
the presentation. Honorary guests will
include world-famous designer of
firearms Mikhail Kalashnikov.
An exhibition which will have on show a
catalogue of more than 120
photographs of export samples of advanced
Russian weapons and military
hardware, will open simultaneously with
the presentation of the catalogue.
It will be the first exhibition in the
history of military cooperation
between Russia and foreign countries.
Rosvooruzhenie is a firm, representing
interests of the Russian military
and industrial complex. It delivers weapons
and military hardware, spares
to them, technologies of dual designation,
provides servicing and training
of foreign specialists at Russian military
educational establishments.
The company is responsible for 90 percent
of export deliveries of Russian
weapons and military hardware. Rosvooruzhenie
cooperates with over 50
countries and has offices in 33 states.
According to estimates of military experts,
efficiency, simplicity and low
prices are the main features of Russian
weapons, determining their
competitiveness on world markets.
Washington, 17 February 1999 (RFE/RL) --
The expansion of the European
Union could divide Europe even more than
the
expansion of NATO, not only exacerbating
existing international tensions
but possibly creating new ones as well.
And to the extent that proves to be the
case, often-heard suggestions that
EU expansion could serve as a surrogate
for the
security that NATO expansion would definitively
provide may prove
ill-founded. Indeed, the expansion of
the EU could under
certain circumstances create security
problems which the Western defense
alliance might have to cope with.
This somewhat unexpected conclusion is
suggested both by the comments of a
Kaliningrad political leader and even
more by the
outcome of a Monday meeting between a
delegation from the European
Commission, the EU's executive body, and
senior Russian
officials in Moscow.
Speaking to a Western reporter recently,
Sergei Pasko, the leader of a
pro-business party in Kaliningrad, said,
"It's not NATO
expansion we're afraid of, but EU expansion."
And he gave compelling
reasons for his conclusion.
On the one hand, if as seems likely Lithuania
follows Poland into the
European Union, Pasko's region of Kaliningrad,
the
non-contiguous portion of the Russian
Federation that once was part of
Germany but is now populated largely by
ethnic Russians,
would find itself surrounded by EU states,
a situation that would make
trade across its borders far more difficult.
On the other, if Kaliningrad tries to extricate
itself from that situation,
it faces few good options. Most officials
in Moscow would
likely oppose giving Kaliningrad either
the autonomy or the free trade zone
status that might allow it to take advantage
of being a
neighbor of EU states.
At the same time, few in the Russian capital
appear likely to be willing or
able to provide Kaliningrad with the subsidies
it would
need to overcome its current economic
and social difficulties.
And that combination could convert Kaliningrad
into a security flashpoint
in Eastern Europe, either by setting the
stage for
demands by Kaliningrad residents for greater
autonomy or independence than
Moscow would accept or by creating conditions
that
might prompt Germany, Poland and Lithuania
to expand their roles in the
region.
But the potential problems created by European
Union expansion are not
limited to Kaliningrad. Indeed, the potential
for such
problems elsewhere was highlighted by
a meeting in Moscow Monday between
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir
Bulgak
and Ottokar Hahn, the head of a delegation
from the EU executive.
While both sides put the best face on the
situation, each was careful to
point out that the EU and the Russian
Federation will have
to approach one another with extreme care
if they are to avoid problems.
Bulgak stressed in his closing statement
that "the problems that exist in
relations between Russia and the EU can
be resolved
without detriment to their respective
interests" only if the two sides work
"in full compliance with the spirit and
letter" of their
cooperation agreement.
The Russian official indicated that Moscow
was especially concerned about
being frozen out in any way from the sale
of Russian
energy to European markets. But while
he did not say in public, Bulgak and
others in Moscow may also be very concerned
about
restrictions on the flow of labor and
citizens as well.
One reason for thinking that issue is very
much on Russian minds was a
statement on the same day by Germany's
Deputy Foreign
Minister Guenter Verheugen. He noted that
EU countries are prepared to
extend visa-free travel to the Baltic
countries precisely
because the latter have strong border
controls along their eastern frontiers.
The European Union has made such controls
a requirement for closer
integration, and those countries that
want to join have
willingly agreed to it. But such border
controls which allow free movement
within the EU also have the effect of
limiting
movement into the EU. And that in turn
affects EU relations with Russia and
other post-Soviet states.
In various commentaries over the last several
years, Russian officials have
generally viewed the eastern expansion
of the EU as a
positive development for Russian interests.
Indeed, they have suggested
that a Russia-EU border would work to
Moscow's
advantage even as they have argued that
a Russia-NATO border would be
destabilizing.
But these more recent developments suggest
that at least some in Moscow may
now see the EU expansion in a different
light, one
far less favorable and more likely to
spark conflict than they or others
had earlier assumed.
INTRO: RUSSIA'S FAR EAST, SOMETIMES
REFERRED TO AS THE "WILD
EAST," HAS FOR YEARS BEEN THE SCENE OF
POLITICAL INFIGHTING. BUT
OBSERVERS SAY THAT AS ITS COLORFUL POLITICIANS
BATTLE FOR POWER,
THE ECONOMY IS BEING EATEN AWAY BY CORRUPTION
AND GOVERNMENT
NEGLECT. V-O-A'S EVE CONANT REPORTS
FROM VLADIVOSTOK.
TEXT: PERHAPS ONE OF THE MOST VIVID
RESULTS OF THE POLITICAL
INFIGHTING IN VLADIVOSTOK IS A HALF FINISHED
FREEWAY OVERPASS.
THE BRIDGE HAD BEEN A DREAM OF THE CITY'S
FORMER MAYOR, VICTOR
CHEREPHKOV. BUT NOW HE HAS BEEN
OUSTED, AND HIS GIANT THREE-LANE
PROJECT IS BEING USED BY PEDESTRIANS TO
WALK THEIR DOGS.
THE BRIDGE IS JUST ONE OF MANY CASUALTIES
OF A FIVE-YEAR
POLITICAL BATTLE BETWEEN THE REGION'S
AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNOR,
YEVGENY NAZDRATENKO, AND THE ECCENTRIC
MR. CHEREPHKOV.
THE POLITICAL SOAP OPERA HAS RAGED AS THE
REGION SUFFERED
CONTINUAL ENERGY BLACKOUTS, MONTHS OF
OVERDUE WAGES, AND A
GROWING REPUTATION AS ONE OF RUSSIA'S
MOST CORRUPT CITIES. BUT
THE FIGHTING HAS ALSO TURNED INTO SOMETHING
AKIN TO A POLITICAL
FARCE. LOCAL ELECTIONS HAVE BEEN
INVALIDATED 15 TIMES, THE
FORMER MAYOR CLAIMS TO HAVE EXTRASENSORY
POWERS, AND LOCAL
BILLBOARDS HAVE COMMENTARIES SUCH AS "VLADIVOSTOK
IS NOT A
PSYCHIATRIC WARD."
GOVERNOR NAZDRATENKO CALLS THE FORMER MAYOR
THE TOWN "CRAZY," BUT
THE EX-MAYOR IS STILL ONE OF HIS FAVORITE
TOPICS OF CONVERSATION.
/// NAZDATENKO ACT - IN RUSSIAN - FADE UNDER ///
THE GOVERNOR SAYS, "AH! ASK
ME ANYTHING ABOUT CHEREPHKOV, HE'S
MY FAVORITE THING TO RIP APART.
EVERYTHING IS MUCH BETTER NOW
THAT HE'S GONE."
BUT MR. CHEREPHKOV, WHO IS NOW SUING RUSSIAN
AUTHORITIES TO GET
HIS JOB BACK, SAYS THE ONLY REASON THE
CITY HAS ELECTRICITY IS
BECAUSE OF A PLOT TO MAKE HIM LOOK BAD.
HE SAYS THE ELECTRICITY
WILL SOON RUN OUT.
BUT DESPITE HIS PROBLEMS, MR. CHEREPKHOV,
WHO STILL ENJOYS WIDE
SUPPORT IN VLADIVOSTOK, SAYS THE POLITICAL
FIGHT IS A GOOD THING.
/// CHEREPKHOV ACT - IN RUSSIAN - FADE UNDER ///
MR. CHEREPKHOV SAYS THE POLITICAL TEMPERATURE
IN VLADIVOSTOK
SHOULD BE HIGH. IF THERE IS
NO STRUGGLE, HE SAYS, SOCIETY ROTS
AND CORRUPTION FLOURISHES.
BUT LOCAL RESIDENTS, SUCH AS TAXI DRIVER
VIKTOR KARCHAT, ARE NOT
AMUSED BY THE POLITICAL STRIFE.
/// KARCHAT ACT - IN RUSSIAN - FADE UNDER ///
HE COMPLAINS THAT EVERY OTHER DAY THE POLITICIANS
FLY TO MOSCOW
TO SUE EACH OTHER. AND THE MONEY
FOR THEIR PLANE TICKETS, HE
SAYS, COMES OUT OF MY TAXES.
THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS HAS
BEEN SO HOT THAT RUSSIAN
PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN APPOINTED THE
LOCAL SECURITY SERVICE
CHIEF, VICKTOR KONDRATOV, TO ACT AS HIS
PRESIDENTIAL
REPRESENTATIVE TO KEEP TABS ON THE POLITICAL
CHAOS.
CONTRADICTING LOCAL OBSERVERS, MR. KONDRATOV
SAYS HE BELIEVES THE
POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE AND CORRUPTION IS
NOW UNDER CONTROL.
/// KONTRATOV ACT - IN RUSSIAN - FADE UNDER ///
HE SAYS ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS IN RUSSIA
GROUPS ARE NOW MORE
INTERESTED IN OTHER COUNTRIES.
WE ARE NOW POOR AS RATS, HE
SAYS, ASKING, WHAT IS LEFT FOR THEM HERE?
(SIGNED)
"Ukraine in 1999: Objectives for U.S. Policy"
(January 11, 1999) Seminar at
the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for
Scholars, Washington, D.C.
"Many people in the U.S. who have been
working on Ukraine over the
past several years have felt they were
swimming upstream," remarked John
Tedstrom, Research Leader for Russian,
Ukrainian, and Eurasian Affairs at
RAND Corporation in Washington, D.C.,
at a Kennan Institute lecture on 11
January 1999. He posited that they have
been swimming not upstream, but in
the wrong river.
Tedstrom suggested that the U.S. make a
strategic adjustment in its policy
toward Ukraine in order to shift to "the
right river." In essence, the U.S.
should stop focusing on Ukraine as a former
Soviet Republic and begin to
look at it as an emerging European country.
Tedstrom noted that 1999 is the
year for this strategic adjustment to take
place, as both the geopolitical
conditions and the course of Ukraine's
own "European choice strategy" have
created ample opportunities for the shift.
The geopolitical environment that Ukraine
finds itself in today has three
parts, said Tedstrom. First, there is
Western Europe, which is
characterized by an increasing openness
to enlargement. Second, there is
Central Europe, where one can point to
a number of outstanding success
stories in terms of post-Soviet transformations
that may serve as examples
for Ukraine. The third dimension, said
Tedstrom, is Ukraine itself. He
explained that over the past several years
Ukraine has distinguished itself
internationally through successful regional
cooperation and its
relationship with NATO.
Tedstrom went on to describe the non-security
dimension of Ukraine's
present position. Ukraine has thus far
been able to avoid the full
financial meltdown that plagued Russia
in the second half of 1998. While he
lamented that Ukraine's internal reform
has gone very slowly, he predicted
that the ability of Ukraine to keep a
steady hand on the macroeconomic
tiller will serve the country well.
Moreover, the Ukrainian government has
recently stepped up its commitment
to a "European choice strategy," said
Tedstrom. In March 1998 Ukraine
ratified the partnership cooperation agreement
with the European Union.
Recently, high-level government and parliamentary
committees have been
formed to deal with issues of European
integration.
All of these factors, according to Tedstrom,
provide the U.S. with a unique
opportunity to make a strategic adjustment
in its policy in 1999. Tedstrom
claimed that the NIS context, which is
what informs U.S. policy today, does
not have much to offer Ukraine. Ukraine
increasingly rejects closer
relations with the NIS or CIS. Moreover,
there is no successful example of
reform or state-building for Ukraine to
follow in the NIS context, nor are
there resources that can be mobilized
within the NIS that would support
Ukraine's reform efforts.
In addition, keeping U.S. policy toward
Ukraine within an NIS context sends
the wrong message to Moscow, Tedstrom
explained. It illustrates that no
matter what a former Soviet state does
as far as cooperation with NATO and
financial stabilization, it will never
be considered an emerging European
state.
A strategic adjustment in U.S. policy would
move Ukraine forward on reform,
would address concerns of Central European
countries that will soon be
members of important European and transatlantic
institutions, and would
send a positive message to Moscow about
the benefits of transformation,
said Tedstrom. Most importantly, it would
acknowledge trends independently
underway in the region.
According to Tedstrom, this strategic adjustment
would entail several
policies. The first is largely bureaucratic:
in order to change the context
that informs U.S. policy making on Ukraine,
the Ukraine desks in U.S.
agencies should eventually be moved from
the NIS to the European
department. Secondly, Tedstrom suggested
that the U.S. heighten engagement
with Western and Central European countries
bilaterally and multilaterally
on Ukraine.
Finally, the U.S. should support high-profile
projects that have broad
support within the Ukrainian government,
include a Central European
dimension, and encourage Ukraine to undertake
reform measures. One example
is the Eurasian Transportation Corridor
from Odessa to Gdansk, which is
highly supported in Ukraine and would
create jobs for Polish refineries and
encourage Ukraine to move forward with
liberalizing its investment laws.
Tedstrom warned that there are two near-term
issues that must be resolved
before U.S. policy can be adjusted. The
first is Ukraine's relationship
with the IMF. He noted that IMF disbursements
had been cut off in the fall
of 1998; negotiations over their resumption
are critical. The second issue
is certification. On 18 February 1999
Secretary of State Albright must
certify to Congress that Ukraine has made
significant progress in the areas
of economic reform and resolution of certain
commercial cases raised by
U.S. investors. Without certification,
further assistance to Ukraine will
be curtailed. Tedstrom suggested that
a favorable IMF agreement would go
far to help certify the issue of economic
reform, but the resolution of
commercial disputes is likely to be difficult.
However, should the IMF agreement and the
Secretary of State's
certification be successfully resolved,
1999 presents unique opportunities
for the U.S. in its relationship with
Ukraine. Taking advantage of those
opportunities to adjust U.S. policy, concluded
Tedstrom, will have
tremendous payoffs over the short and
medium term.
Nancy Popson is senior program associate
at the Kennan Institute of
Advanced Russian Studies.
If they succeed, more
power to them. They would not be the first to
profit from another's real, embellished
or imagined fears.
The fear is not that
nuclear missiles will launch of their own accord,
but that computer snags could sabotage
radar and telecommunications
networks used to detect foreign launches.
Radar screens could go blank and
some nuclear systems could be thrown into
test patterns.
Darkly hinted in all
this is that without expert assistance and money
-- the Russians estimate they will need
$3 billion -- there is no telling
what kind of Y2K problems could emerge.
The Russian government,
like its Chinese counterpart, has not taken the
Y2K threat as seriously as has the U.S.
government and some others, which
have been working on it for years.
"They don't seem to
have the same level of urgency that we have had
over it," U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary
John Hamre said of the Russians.
His comment understates U.S. Y2K paranoia.
Many Americans are stockpiling
supplies in the event computer failures
cause a breakdown in the transportation
and distribution of food, energy
and other necessaries of life. Leaders
have warned of these possible
eventualities. Recently, fear was expressed
that people dependent on
medical prescriptions need to be able
to stockpile their medications.
Given American fears
about Y2K, $3 billion to help the Russians solve
their potential problems may be reasonable.
If getting some of these
dollars is part of Russia's motivation,
who can blame her. With her economy
in tatters, Russia needs every dollar
she can get.
Warsaw
Surrounded by his library of 5,000 Russian
books, Sergei Stankevich watches
Russian television programs in his Warsaw
apartment and dreams of the day
when he can return to his homeland.
A decade ago, he was a comrade of Boris
Yeltsin in the fledgling Soviet
democracy movement. When democracy triumphed,
he rose to become a Kremlin
aide and a deputy mayor of Moscow.
Today, he is a lonely exile in Poland,
a refugee from the ruthless backroom
intrigues of Russia's new elite. He cannot
return home without facing
arrest on corruption charges that many
observers believe are politically
motivated.
Russia has demanded his extradition, but
Poland has refused to hand him
over. Last month, a Polish court ruled
that Mr. Stankevich should be given
refugee status because he has a legitimate
fear of political persecution in
his homeland.
The ruling symbolizes the deepening alienation
of the two Slavic neighbours
and former Communist allies.
For most of the past two centuries, Poland
was dominated by Russian czars
and Soviet dictators. Today, as it moves
into the West's leading military
and economic alliances, it is increasingly
willing to defy Moscow's pressure.
This month, Poland celebrated the 10th
anniversary of the negotiations that
led to the collapse of its Communist regime
-- an event that helped trigger
the toppling of communism in the rest
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
Yet, while capitalism and democracy take
root and flourish in Poland's
booming market economy, Russia is slipping
back toward stagnation and
authoritarianism.
"They are going in two different directions,"
Mr. Stankevich said in an
interview.
"There's a post-imperial syndrome in Russia,
and maybe an excessive
pro-Western optimism in Poland. In Russia,
reform is an empty slogan.
Russia is becoming less democratic and
more autocratic, and the dark forces
of KGB professionals and Communist functionaries
are getting closer and
closer to power."
Poland took another step to safeguard its
independence yesterday when its
parliament approved the protocols of entry
to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Next month, it will officially
become a member of NATO,
despite Moscow's strenuous objections.
For most Poles, their long-awaited entry
to the Western military alliance
is a guarantee of freedom from Russian
domination. They want NATO to keep
its doors open to potential new members
in the Baltic states and other
former Soviet republics.
Russia has vowed to draw a "red line" against
NATO's expansion into the
territory of the former Soviet Union.
One senior Russian defence official
has warned Poland that it would be "committing
a historic mistake" if it
supports the Baltic states in their bid
for NATO membership. Poland has
flatly rejected this pressure.
Russia also lodged a protest when a Polish-German-Danish
army corps was
recently deployed in northwestern Poland.
Again, Poland refused to back down.
"It's increasingly obvious that the West
is using Poland as its eastern
outpost," Mr. Stankevich said. "This new
role is provoking a Russian
reaction. Russia has had to accept Eastern
Europe's integration into the
West, but psychologically the Russian
elite cannot accept it. There's an
anti-Polish mood among them."
On the economic front, Poland has shifted
most of its trade to the West.
Only about 7 per cent of its exports go
to Russia, while more than 60 per
cent are sent to the European Union.
Poland has also imposed tight restrictions
on traders from Russia and other
former Soviet republics who buy and sell
goods in Poland. The new border
controls were introduced last year as
Poland prepared to join the European
Union.
Officially, however, Poland's diplomatic
policy is to develop friendly
relations with Russia -- especially since
Russia supplies 60 per cent of
Poland's oil and 90 per cent of its natural
gas.
"Russia is our neighbour, our historical
and modern neighbour, and an
extremely important partner to us," Polish
President Alexander Kwasniewski
said in an interview. "We wish for relations
between democratic Russia and
democratic Poland to be the best they
can be. We'd like the policy dialogue
to be active and very open."
But Mr. Kwasniewski insisted that Russia
cannot weaken Poland's links to
NATO. "Russians are very aware that this
is an irreversible process," he
said. "We expect Russia to understand
and accept that Poland is going to
join NATO through our own sovereign decision."
Many ordinary Poles are still resentful
of Moscow's traditional dominance
over them.
When Chechen separatist rebels were fighting
Russian troops a few years
ago, most Poles were sympathetic to the
Chechens, and Polish
parliamentarians criticized Moscow for
inflicting "genocide" on Chechnya.
More recently, when they saw Russia's plans
for a political merger with
neighbouring Belarus, many Poles worried
that Russia might try to revive
its empire.
"There's a phobia that the East is bad
and the West is good," said
Stanislaw Filipczak, a Warsaw businessman.
"People are fascinated with the
West and there's a hostility to the East.
It's mainly because of our past."
Polish foreign minister Bronislaw Geremek
visited Moscow last month and
promised that Poland had "no intention
of building a wall with Russia."
For more than two years, however, the prime
ministers and presidents of the
two countries have not exchanged any official
visits. "There are no
high-level visits, and no dialogue on
security issues," said Longin
Pastusiak, vice-chairman of the foreign
affairs committee of the Polish
parliament.
On military issues, there is a frosty tension
between the defence
ministries of the two countries.
"The Poles want the best possible relations
with Russia, but Russia doesn't
reciprocate because it has a psychological
problem with Poland entering
NATO," said a Western diplomat in Warsaw.
After Poland gave refugee status to Mr.
Stankevich last month, the Russian
Foreign Ministry issued a blistering protest.
"The attempts of certain circles in Poland
to impart to this criminal case
a political colour, and the lack of legal
rationale for the decision of the
Polish authorities, makes one seriously
doubtful of their readiness to
conscientiously co-operate," the Russian
ministry said.
However, Polish politicians are skeptical
of Russia's claim that Mr.
Stankevich accepted a $10,000 (U.S.) bribe
from a British company in 1992.
They believe his declaration that the
money was payment for a series of
lectures he gave in London.
Mr. Stankevich still hopes to return home
some day. But he doesn't think it
will be possible as long as former KGB
officers and Soviet apparatchiks
remain influential in Moscow.
"I feel a great potential that's not being
used," he said. "I'm angry at
those people who changed my life so drastically."
As the new millennium moves closer, there
is increasing alarm about possible
year 2000, or Y2K, related computer problems
in Russia. The Defense Ministry
continually states that the Y2K problem
is really not a problem at all. But
Alexander Krupnov, chairman of the Central
Telecommunications Commission, said
recently that because of Y2K "we're in
a critical situation in several areas,
including the Defense Ministry." Krupnov
also said that Russia needs $3
billion to solve Y2K-related problems
in the coming several months.
If the money is not forthcoming, terrible
things might happen. U.S. officials
have said that Y2K could blank out command
computers and panic Russian
officers into suspecting an enemy first
strike, thus, in the most extreme
scenario, causing an unintended nuclear
launch. Russian nuclear reactors may
explode in a string of new Chernobyls.
New Year's Day may turn out to be
doomsday.
Of course, Krupnov is not a military officer
and so he may not know in detail
precisely which modifications Russia's
top-secret nuclear command and control
and early ballistic-missile attack warning
systems need. It's hard to know how
Krupnov calculated the vast sum of $3
billion. Maybe he did not calculate at
all. General Vladimir Yakovlev, the chief
of the Strategic Rocket Forces and
its early warning system, said at a news
conference last December that the
Defense Ministry will need 10 million
rubles (less than $500,000) to solve Y2K
problems. The Defense Ministry price tag
on Y2K fixing is 6,000 times less
than Krupnov's. Maybe the $3 billion sum
is inflated out of all proportion.
Recently a three-star Russian general told
me: "We need to reprogram only 12
to 16 computers in the Defense Ministry's
early warning system network. These
computers are essential and also use times
and dates in their programs. All
other military computers are either not
networked, or not essential, or do not
use dates." The general said that the
Russian armed forces have been for
months trying in vain to convince their
U.S. counterparts that Russia's Y2K
problems are trivial in comparison with
those of the Pentagon.
"We have been telling our American friends
that they have over-computerized
their armed forces. If their computers
go bust, they will be lost, they will
not be able to fight and defend themselves.
We Russians never fully
transferred to computers anything essential
in our Defense Ministry."
I personally have never seen a Russian
general use a modern computer. Many
Russian generals have desktops in their
offices, but they are always switched
off. To give orders Russian generals use
telephones, pens and paper. I have
seen Russian majors and colonels use Defense
Ministry computers, but usually
they were playing computer games or preparing
to print out papers for their
superiors to sign.
Russian military officers neglect their
computers because the several thousand
desktops at the Defense Ministry are not
networked. These computers can only
be used as intelligent typewriters or
play stations. And since all the
generals' typing is done by subordinates,
if these desktops go blank next New
Year's, Russian military lines of command
and control will hardly be affected.
Last month, U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary
John Hamre acknowledged "some
nervousness" in Washington about potential
computer problems in Russia. "They
don't seem to have the same level of urgency
that we have had over it," he
said. A U.S. delegation has just come
to Russia to share information about Y2K
problems. U.S. defense agencies want to
place American officers in Russian
nuclear control rooms and Russian officers
in American control rooms to
monitor the Y2K changeover.
However, Russian military chiefs say that
the Americans have bullied them into
accepting the Y2K mission. "The United
States has no information or expertise
to share," one Russian general told me.
"In our nuclear command networks we
use old mainframes that our American counterparts
scrapped more than 15 years
ago. This Y2K mission is essentially an
intelligence gathering operation."
The Russian military will receive the U.S.
delegation cordially, but try to
"share" as little true information as
possible. Exposing Russia's military
computer backwardness to Americans could
undermine the threat potential of
Russia's nuclear deterrent. Instead of
improving an already wobbly
partnership, attempts at Russian-U.S.
Y2K cooperation have up to now only
enhanced mutual mistrust.
Pavel Felgenhauer is the chief defense correspondent for Segodnya
BRUSSELS February 18 [date as received]
(Itar-Tass) - The Joint
Permanent Russia-NATO Council on Wednesday
[17 February] opened its meeting
over the military doctrine of Russia and
the strategic concept of NATO.
Russian General Staff first deputy
chief Colonel-General Valeriy Manilov,
who attended the meeting, said at a news
briefing that the meeting was not over
reconciliation of two documents but reciprocal
information on their substance.
In other words, Russia and NATO
will not discuss changes to the draft
documents, although coordination of stances
and major provisions is feasible.
This is crucially important, given
that we live in the era of partnership
and have the Founding Russia-NATO Act
which formally stipulates information
exchange in the field of doctrines, Manilov
said.
He said he had laid out at the Council's
meeting Russia's major concerns
which he said could be alleviated at the
stage of the drafting of the conceptual
documents.
The concerns in particular relate
to NATO's developing the military
infrastructure in Central and Eastern
Europe, admissions of new members, NATO's
meeting its deployment commitments and
exchange of information on the military
activity near borders and in oceans.
These provisions could be laid down
in the conceptual documents, which
would make military policies more predictable
and reciprocal security higher, Manilov
said.
He said the Russian delegation sounded
rigid enough telling the NATO
partners that Russia retains its stance
that any military actions of NATO outside
its area of responsibility must get the
UN Security Council's sanctions and
be conducted in conformity with international
law.
NIZHNI-NOVGOROD, Russia, Feb 18 (AFP) -
The Sokol factory in
Nizhni-Novgorod makes one of the best
jet fighters in the world, the
MiG-31, but in today's dismal economic
climate, survival means also doing
repairs to the city's fleet of trolley
buses.
"We take any orders which provide
work to our personnel. We repair
trolleybuses for the city and we are even
contemplating producing them,"
said Vassily Pankov, the director of Sokol,
a mainstay of the Russian
aeronautical industry.
For the past five years, because of a massive
cut in the Russian military
budget, Sokol has received no orders from
the state which in Soviet times
assured the prosperity of the country's
huge defence industrial complex.
"Neither have we received the least financial
aid to fund our conversion to
civilian production after military orders
were slashed," Pankov said.
In the Soviet era up to 1991, about 100
scientific institutes and as many
companies - 30 percent of the region's
industry - worked for the defence
sector.
Today, Sokol's salvation comes mainly in
the form of orders from abroad.
This year, Sokol is counting on a contract
worth 300 million dollars signed
with India to modernise 125 MiG jets and
on opportunities to export the MiG-31
As part of its conversion to civilian production,
Sokol has begun making
amphibious engines, aircraft for fire-fighting
and a plane designed for
businessmen, freight transport or emergency
evacuations, called the Gzhel.
However mass production of the Gzhel will
depend on support from investors
who have yet to materialise.
"We had started to produce the Gzhel with
15 million dollars invested by a
Russian bank. But the bank collapsed during
the crisis of last August. To
continue production, we need nine million
dollars which the bank was
supposed to provide us with," Pankov said.
The Sokol director said he hoped this year
to sign a 200 million dollar
contract with the Italian firm Aermacchi
based near Milan, to build the
fuselage and wings of about 15 aircraft.
He is also looking at offers from outside
the aeronautical sector and is
hoping to sign a contract this year worth
70 million dollars with a western
firm which would sub-contract to Sokol
the production of household appliances.
In a move marking the final break with
the hush-hush world of military
secrecy which defined Sokol for decades,
the firm is now offering
thrill-seekers the opportunity to fly
in a MiG-29, a two-seeter jet used to
train Russian fighter pilots. The planes
piloted by an experienced test
pilot,take off from an airfield inside
the Sokol complex.
For amateurs of such sensations, flying
at twice the speed of sound will
cost them 6,000 for an hour. But for the
12 or so wealthy westerners who
have already gone up, the experience was
apparently worth it.
This kind of luxury is not for Sokol workers
however whose average wage of
580 rubles (26 dollars) was paid, generally
four months late last year.
Last year, 1,800 people left the factory;
600 were sacked and part of the
6,000 others were left redundant for several
months for lack of work. The
management today says it may have to fire
between 1,000 and 1,500 people.
"The worst is over but it is obvious that
all the problems are not yet
behind us," Pankov said.
Some vestiges of Soviet times survive at
the Sokol factory. Portraits of
Lenin, communist slogans, hammers and
sickles still adorn the walls of the
buildings - forlorn reminders of a time
when Nizhni Novgorod, then known as
Gorky, was a pillar of the Soviet arms
industry.
WEEKLY REPORTS THAT BEREZOVSKY'S ARREST
IS IMMINENT. The anonymous
investigator from the Prosecutor General's
Office, who spoke with
"Moskovskie vedomosti" about Yuri Skuratov's
resignation as chief of that
office, also said that financier Boris
Berezovsky's arrest is imminent.
According to the official's account, the
search earlier this month of the
offices of Sibneft--the giant oil company
reportedly controlled by
Berezovsky--yielded evidence of close
links between Roman Abramovich,
Sibneft's general director, and the Yeltsin
family, and included "a
photograph of Abramovich openly kissing
the president's daughter, Tatyana
Dyachenko." Last year, Aleksandr Korzhakov,
who once headed Yeltsin's
presidential security service, claimed
that Abramovich was the Yeltsin
family's "cashier." Investigators reportedly
also found US$8 million in
Abramovich's safe, "along with several
files of compromising material,"
aimed at, among others, Moscow Mayor Yuri
Luzhkov.
"Moskovskie vedomosti" quoted the investigator
as saying: "Berezovsky will
not be at liberty much longer. A warrant
for his arrest has already been
drawn up. Moreover, at least five other
major operations against corrupt
officials are in the pipeline for the
very near future. Even all these
things put together, however, represent
just a tiny proportion of what could
be done in principle. We have too many
highly placed people in this country
who are, to put it bluntly, 'dirty'. When
relevant documentation came into
my hands and those of other former Prosecutor-General's
Office members of
staff a while ago, we were shocked--it
was simply horrendous. If the
documents were to be believed, there was
hardly a single 'clean' person left
in the top echelons of power. Virtually
the only exception is Prime Minister
Yevgeny Primakov." The weekly said that
the "purges" currently under way are
the work of Deputy Prosecutor-General
Mikhail Katyshev, who is known to be
an ally of Viktor Ilyukhin (Moskovskie
vedomosti, February 16-22).
The Prosecutor General's Office denied
that an order for Berezovsky's arrest
had been signed, calling the report a
"provocation" (Center TV, February 16).
Moskovskiy Komsomolets
17 February 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Aleksey Borisov and Nina Moskvina:
"Debts in Our Socks; Russia
Again Trying To
Seduce IMF, Forgetting Its Own Reserves"
There is a crisis in Russia.
Only three years ago Western experts were
seriously discussing whether the Russian
economy would be able to "digest"
$300 billion in investments or not. Now
more than ever the financial system
needs an influx of "new blood." But there
is none. Finding donors is increasingly
difficult. The volume of infusions has
been almost halved -- from the estimated
$9.3 billion to the real $5.9 billion.
Russian banks do not feel
charitable now. They themselves would like to
be able to make ends meet. Private investors
are ignoring the banks. They are
knowledgeable now. Theybelieve only in
their own socks. Over the fall the banks
lost a pile of money. According to the
figures of the Association of Russian Banks
the total reserve capitals were the smallest
in the past five years -- 50 billion rubles [R].
I remember the government
once intend to give material aid to
enterprises from the budget's pocket.
Within the framework of the large budget a
small budget was created -- the development
budget. But it turned out to be small
indeed.
For next year the development
budget will probably be about R22 billion
(slightly over $1 billion). Knowing our
deputies' appetites we may suppose that nothing
will be left of these billions. Nevertheless
Economy Minister Andrey Shapovalyants
stated in all seriousness that the volume
of government guarantees for investments this
year will be R50 billion.
According to the minister
these will not simply be papers with a fine
stamp. They "will be backed up by payments
from the federal budget." Aleksandr Zhukov,
chairman of the State Duma Budget Committee,
believes that the likelihood that the draft
budget for 1999 submitted to the State
Duma by the government can be assessed at about
10 percent. In other words all the above
can be divided by 10. Thus we should not count on
our own resources. Russia is not Munchausen.
It cannot drag itself out of the swamp by its
own hair.
Two very large economic forums
were held in January: in Davos in
Switzerland and Harvard in the United
States. Of these two gatherings of world financial
experts the more important one for Russia
was the less publicized Harvard meeting. The
largest wallets were gathered there: 600
of the world's largest companies, investment funds,
and banks, and leaders from the World
Bank, the European Ban, and the IMF. While in Davos
the Russian delegation was merely listened
to politely, in Harvard they promised money. But only
after a brush-off from the IMF, which
has adopted a wait and see position. One can understand
the IMF: Russia owes it about $9 billion.
Moreover, the IMF has just felt a blow below the belt --
the Brazilian crisis and the collapse
of the South Asian stock markets, which cast doubt on the
correctness of reforms according to the
IMF formula.
Meanwhile the IMF is silent.
But this silence is becoming menacing.Counting on boosting Russian
production without investments is like
waiting for the second coming. Russia's state budget is of no
help here. The crisis has thrown the Russian
economy back to its 1994 positions. Our Gross Domestic
Product has never been large. That is
true now more than ever. Here only one third of what is produced
is up to contemporary standards. It is
shameful even to count the rest.
The forthcoming year will
show what the final solution of the investment issue will be.
Perhaps we will get help from abroad.
But it is nonetheless better to pin our hopes on
ourselves. Aleksandr Livshits has told
Moskovskiy Komsomolets that citizens have about $40
billion in their possession. To avoid
any current financial problems in 1999 it would be
enough to have $5-6 billion. Or one seventh
of the reserves "kept in socks." Or one third of that
amount to be able to forget the financial
crisis entirely. Consequently it is merely a
question of regaining people's faith in
the state. But that is in fact
hardest of all.