The financial crisis of August, 1998, was like water off a duck's back for Volodia, while for Valentina, 62, the devaluation of the ruble reduced her permanently to below the poverty line.

According to official figures, ten percent of the Russian population absorbs nearly a third of the country's riches while the poorest ten percent share just 2.4 percent of the wealth.

The richest, businessmen and politicians, live in the big cities - mainly Moscow and Saint-Petersburg - and came through the financial crisis virtually unscathed.

"After a few hesitant weeks, it was back to business," said Velodia, was vague about what his business actually is.

He said he had completed repairs in his three apartments in central Saint Petersburg, as well as work on a new house he acquired in southern France in 1998.

Indicating the high morale that persisted among the rich, Mercedes-Benz was one of the few foreign car-makers to see its sales increase in Russia in 1999, in spite of a steep rise in the price of foreign cars. Sales of its four-wheel-drive model with tinted windows, which are often seen zooming down Moscow boulevards, increased by 22 percent to 1,650 units, 294 more than 1998.

However the "new middle class" and Russia's poor were badly hit by the devaluation. Twenty-eight percent of the population lived below the poverty line at the end of 1997, but the figure today is 35 percent. Valentina, a retired teacher, survives on a pension of 560 rubles ($19). She lives in Magadan, in the far east, where the cost of living is much higher than in Moscow and the cost of the 25 food products needed to survive is nearly 950 rubles a month ($33).

"My husband, a former political prisoner, is an invalid. He gets an allowance of 250 rubles. But my daughter, who left for Alaska five years ago, helps us," said Valentina, adding that she could not afford to send her husband for treatment outside her Siberian town.

Whether they are teachers, nurses, miners or are unemployed, about 50 million Russians are living below the poverty line according to official statistics. Jobs on the side and the black economy allow many to live a little more decently than they could do on just their official salary.

But the biggest fraudsters are the rich, and the gap between rich and poor - notably pensioners who represent nearly a third of the Russian population - is wider than the official statistics say, according to analysts. A January poll carried out by the National Institute for Social and Regional Problems said that seven Russians out of ten considered themselves poor. Only 14 percent said they could pay for necessary medical treatment and only eight percent took a holiday in 1999.

Moscow, 17 February 2000 (RFE/RL) -- The revival of ties with NATO has been acting President Vladimir Putin's most resounding foreign-policy initiative since he took over from Boris Yeltsin seven weeks ago.

A warm-up in relations with the 19-nation Western alliance was signaled a few weeks ago by Russia's Foreign Ministry. But the actual agreement to re-establish NATO-Russia ties through a Moscow visit by Secretary-General Robertson was a last-minute arrangement, struck after difficult behind-the-scenes negotiations. The visit itself seemed aimed chiefly at publicizing the start of a gradual reconciliation.

In a joint statement issued after Robertson met in Moscow with Putin, the two parties said they intend to intensify their contacts. They also agreed to discuss new security concepts and other military matters in the Permanent Joint Council that brings together representatives of all NATO member-states and Russia. It was not clear, however, when Russia would return to the council, which it has boycotted since the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Both Russia and NATO also recognized that their cooperation is necessary to strengthen European and international security. But both were careful to underline that their reconciliation will be progressive and will not immediately dispel outstanding differences between them. Putin said: "The fact that you are visiting shows that NATO places great importance on the relationship with the Russian Federation. For our part, we are ready to respond, although I want to point out from the start, that for Russia, after the events in Yugoslavia, these questions are not easy to resolve."

Robertson said that both sides have moved from permafrost to softer ground. But he also made clear that he disapproves of Russia's actions in Chechnya.

"The position of NATO has been well-rehearsed and has been repeated over and over again. We understand the problems that Russia has in Chechnya, the difficulties that it has encountered and also the problems that terrorism poses to Russia as well as to many countries in the West. But we have disagreed with what Russia has been doing in Chechnya because we don't believe that it is right in principle, nor do we believe that it is right in practice, simply sowing the seeds for future conflict."

Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that Russia cannot ignore the real world, where NATO is an important strategic player. He strongly denied speculation in the Russian media that Moscow had decided on a warm-up with NATO on the basis of a cancellation of mutual grievances -- the war in Chechnya for the alliance, and the war in Yugoslavia for Moscow. Ivanov said that Russia would never have sought to resume relations with NATO if the alliance prejudiced Russia's interests or required concessions from it.

In the same spirit, State Duma Deputy Speaker Vladimir Lukin -- formerly head of the lower house's foreign-affairs committee -- said it is important for Russia to strike a balance between necessary cooperation with NATO and the need to save diplomatic face after having broken with the alliance on principle over its bombing of Yugoslavia.

"NATO exists; it's the most powerful military organization. We have to entertain a dialogue with it. So it's right to have renewed the dialogue. The other question is that this dialogue has to be resumed gradually, with dignity."

Most Russian politicians and observers supported the move as realistic. Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev said he hopes Robertson's visit will bring about new contact points to help solve world problems.

Vladimir Kosarev is a retired military officer who heads of an independent news agency that covers military affairs. He described to RFE/RL his view of the dominant mood inside the Defense Ministry:

"With time it became clear [to the military leadership] that relations between NATO and Russia could not stay [frozen] and that they had to find a balance. There are enough pretexts for reinforcing ties and mutual confidence, even in the military sphere. We are no longer in the Cold War, it's not possible to just do away with our ties and say, 'We're just not going to be friends.' [Defense and military officials especially realize this] because in the military sphere there is a constant need for cooperation -- cooperation with our peace contingent in the Balkans, for example, and possibly in other areas in the future."

Kosarev noted, too, out that Moscow's most prominent hawk, General Igor Ivashov -- who is responsible for foreign cooperation at the Defense Ministry -- was absent from yesterday's talks with Robertson. Ivashov was away on a conveniently timed mission to Switzerland.

But even from abroad, Ivashov still expressed his strongly opposed views. The Russian daily "Kommersant" quoted him as saying that NATO sees in Russia not its most likely partner, but its most likely adversary.

The director of a Russian Foreign-Ministry think-tank, Yevgeny Bazhanov, said that Putin's decision to renew ties with NATO also carried some electoral implications. Bazhanov told the daily "Vedomosti" that it would not be in Putin's interest to allow acute foreign-policy problems to intrude into the campaign for next month's presidential election.

Opinions differed even in the Defence Ministry. Some generals spoke up for resuming cooperation (if only for reason for comfortable exchange of information), while others said they would talk only if NATO repents what it did in Kosovo, recognises Russia as an equal partner (at least in terms of military might and territory), and pledges to respect Russia's stand on all European and world matters.

The battle was won by the advocates of dialogue, as proved by Robertson's visit and the wise removal of the irreconcilable anti-NATO general, Leonid Ivashov, from the talks. Ivashov, who heads the Defence Ministry's diplomatic service, left Moscow on a business trip shortly before Robertson's arrival. Such "emergency" trips are usually described as "diplomatic". On the other hand, the informal morning tea party showed that Mr. Robertson was prepared to talk even with such embarrassing partner as Mr. Ivashov. As the defence secretary of Britain, he said, he had learned to tackle the toughest of generals, and since all generals are of the same breed, he sees no problem here.

As a result, the meeting of acting President Vladimir Putin and NATO Secretary General George Robertson revealed the sides' serious intention to avoid a return of the Cold War, the possibility of which became quite real after the bombing of Yugoslavia. The important thing in this case is not the declarative joint statement, which only hinted at the Kosovo problem in a passage about indivisible Europe, but the announcement of the gradual restoration of suspended relations. Indicatively, the NATO Secretary General said even before his protocol meetings in Moscow that he was prepared to reopen the NATO office here any day.

Anyway, the Russia-NATO crisis is over -- or nearly over. It is clear that NATO does not need confrontation with Russia. Even Gennady Zyuganov pointed to a positive effect of the resumption of dialogue with NATO. The resumption of Russia-NATO relations is vital for Vladimir Putin, who no longer keeps his presidential ambitions secret, because this will add one more brush stroke to his portrait: He can be harsh (as in Chechnya), but he can also negotiate the most complicated problems.

This is when a few delicate questions came to my mind, to which the NATO staff, who accompanied the Secretary General, listened with interest but did not reply.

Don't they fear that their visit to Moscow would be used for Putin's PR campaign and that the Kremlin would return to its uncompromising stand after the elections?

Does this visit shortly before the elections, which is not logical for diplomatic practice, show that NATO is sure of Putin's victory?

And lastly, can the Moscow visit of the NATO Secretary General at this time mean that Putin is more suitable to the world community than other candidates?

On the other hand, the answer to the last question is apparent.

TEXT:

HEINLEIN: It's the early morning hours (8 am) and there is very little sign of life on the streets of Grozny, except we now see the Emergency Situations Administration truck pulling out into the street. (It) is carrying supplies to those people who remain here -- mostly in basements, as they have during most of the war. It's a quiet city now. There's not much fighting. Overnight, we certainly heard a number of bursts of machine-gun fire and loud explosions, numerous flares and some indication there are still some (rebel) fighters left in the city. They told us yesterday that here in the camp we're staying in, in the middle of Grozny, there were two instances of snipers firing into the camps. And, just now I'm hearing the rumbling of an explosion. There's certainly some tanks rolling around. But, life is quiet. There are still several thousand civilians living here. However, there's very little in the way of provisions, other than what the Russian Government is providing them. The Emergency Situation Ministry here is operating a hospital. In just a little while, they open the doors to patients to come in. They say that they get a fairly long line each day of people coming in to ask for medication for their illnesses. Last night, we found a couple of people in the intensive care unit. Other than that, there really isn't much in the way of medical care available in Grozny.

CARPENTER: Peter, what are the Russians doing at this point to restore city services? Are any of them being restored?

H: No. "City services" is a term I'm afraid isn't going to be used in Grozny for a long time. The city has been destroyed. It's hard to imagine - although it's been done to other cities before: a city has been practically razed to the ground and has been restored. But, in this case, there is clear evidence the Russian military has systematically gunned every building and made it virtually inhabitable. It's going to be years before city services of any magnitude (are) restored here. Every tree is scorched. We didn't see a street where the destruction wasn't virtually complete. Some buildings are standing, of course, but it looked as if every floor of every building had been hit.

C: Peter, have you heard anything there from the Russian headquarters that the fighting in the south of Chechnya is now scaling up? Or, is it scaling back.

H: Certainly, we have evidence the fighting is intense. But, we don't have any first-hand information from the Russian headquarters, at this time. What we're getting is second and even third- hand information and the troop movement we could see just outside the military headquarters. It's hard to tell. Reporters are mostly being prohibited from anywhere around there. In fact, reporters - except on government tours - are being prohibited from coming to Grozny. We were very fortunate to have met with an Emergency Management team, yesterday. But, even now, our movements are being fairly restricted.

C: There's been a lot of international complaints about the human rights situation in Grozny, in Chechnya, all over. Do you see any evidence there that there are any human-rights violations?

The generals’ improvisations are proof that none of them had prepared for taking Grozny by storm. For at least 50 years now, almost no army has trained its troops to take large cities by storm. The aim of military operations, after all, is to wipe out the enemy forces. No one could imagine that the enemy would let itself be surrounded in a city solely in order to increase international pressure on the attacking side.

But no sooner had the Russian flag been hoisted over Grozny, than military operations took a turn even further back into the past with a strategy straight out of the 19th century.

Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev said now that operations in Grozny are over, troops will concentrate on concluding "the military operation in the Argun gorge." The troops are to block the rebels off from the Georgian border and cut off their supply routes. Meanwhile, the rebels will be subjected to constant bombing and heavy artillery fire.

Russian troops used exactly the same tactics in exactly the same places in the 19th century, when they were conquering the Caucasus. Military officials even used the archaic term "fortress." Work on building fortresses has already begun. They are to be manned by two of the five regiments that make up the 42nd Mechanized Infantry Division. This division, with its more than 15,000 soldiers and officers, will become Russia’s main force in Chechnya. Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Kosovan said fortresses would be built at Shali and Itum-Kala and in the most strategic points in the mountainous parts of Chechnya. There’s no need to be a military strategist to see what will come next. It’s enough to read classic Russian literature. Both Mikhail Lermontov and Lev Tolstoy described a wearying, decades-long war in the mountains in their works. This is the kind of war in which soldiers expect a shot from behind at any moment and can find safety only in hiding behind their fortress walls.

But today’s Russia is not the autocratic empire of the 19th century, and there is no certainty that the public would support a war that dragged on for years. The army is already looking for exit strategies. As soon as the news broke that Grozny had been taken, First Deputy Head of General Headquarters Valery Manilov announced that preparations had already begun for troop withdrawal.

The Defense Ministry would like to shift all responsibility for maintaining "constitutional order" in Chechnya to the police and Interior Ministry troops. An army general, Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, commander of the Urals military district, has been appointed commander in chief of the Interior Ministry troops. This is not the first time an army general has gone on to take command of Interior Ministry forces.

Such an appointment was made in 1996. Federal troops had taken control of all Chechnya’s towns, and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev persuaded President Boris Yeltsin that it was time to let the Interior Ministry take over operations from there.

That was done, but then it became clear that Interior Ministry generals couldn’t organize coordination between police and army units and didn’t have any experience at carrying out operations using aviation and artillery. As a result, the Interior Ministry "rented" army generals to command operations in Chechnya. Tikhomirov, for example, has commanded the united forces in the past. None of these tactics was of any use.

That seems to be the message from Russia's acting president, Vladimir V. Putin, who backed away Tuesday from his Cabinet's announcement last week of a 40 percent price increase for a bottle of vodka.

And perhaps it was not the best move for a contestant in a democratic election to announce, as Putin did last week, that he would not tell voters his plans for Russia until after the vote, so that it would not become ''an object of attack.''

On second thought, maybe such distaste for debate solidifies concerns among liberal Russians that this former KGB spy's presidency might threaten the still shaky elements of free society established under President Boris N. Yeltsin's eight-year term.

That seemed to be what Putin was saying when he announced that he would unveil his political program next week.

It is a good thing for Putin that he is so popular, that the media that back him are so powerful, and that his opponents are so weak.

Since he was propelled to acting head of state by Yeltsin's resignation on New Year's Eve, Putin has been feeling his way, committing gaffes with a frequency that would cripple a lesser candidate.

But there is another conclusion to be drawn from Putin's first month as acting head of state: He is not really sure what he wants to do.

As one Putin adviser put it: ''First he should get elected, then he will figure out what actions are needed.''

This makes sense, argued two Putin advisers, who in keeping with the campaign's clandestine style asked not to be identified. Putin has never run for election and has little experience in politics, although they say he has shown himself to be quick to recover from his mistakes.

Putin's main job, the advisers said in interviews, is not to alienate the Russians who might vote for him. That includes, his advisers and, other analysts say, pretty much anyone, except for Russia's relatively small liberal minority, whose members tend to oppose the war in Chechnya and will probably side with another candidate, Grigory Yavlinsky.

Apart from promising to keep up the military campaign in Chechnya, the largely popular war that helped bring him to power, and promising to strengthen the power of the Russian state both inside the country and internationally, themes that have been popular among Russian politicians since the mid-1990s, Putin has avoided taking definitive positions on major issues.

''Once he takes a stand,'' said an analyst at a think tank that advises Putin, ''he'll lose part of his rating.''

Putin remains purposefully vague.

''Any program should start from the revival of people's morals,'' he told reporters after his candidacy was formally approved. Denying that he has shrouded his political intentions, he pledged to present a full-issues platform next week.

So far, Putin has been vague at best. He has promised to strengthen government's role and develop a market economy.

He has spoken of the need for a free press but has praised the state-owned media for supporting the war in Chechnya while straining to limit coverage by the rest of the press.

He has promised to fulfill Yeltsin's pledge to create a professional army, but without abolishing the draft.

He has suggested a referendum on lifting Soviet-era restrictions on private ownership of land, without staking a firm position on whether he supports the idea or not.

He has talked about political stability and the need for foreign investment but has offered few clues on how he plans to provide the first to attract the second.

And, critically for the business ''oligarchs,'' as they are called, who control Russia's most lucrative assets, Putin has talked about guaranteeing ''equal privileges for all'' - but has promised not to probe the dubious privatization deals that empowered them.

Some analysts say this last promise is the main reason Putin was plucked from among Yeltsin's cabinet to lead Russia. They say Putin's main task is to preserve the oligarchs' power, and their access to the state budget, two features of Yeltsin's Russia often blamed for the economic stagnation of recent years.

''It is naive to expect that Putin will start dismantling the robber capitalism system when its most symbolic figures are key shadow players in Putin's game,'' a political analyst, Andrei Piontkowski, wrote in The Russia Journal on Monday.

Putin is said to be affiliated with several well-connected financial groups, especially the oil and financial conglomerate Alfa Group and the oil major Sibneft, and the talk in Moscow is that negotiations are underway with groups that backed Putin's opponents in last December's parliamentary elections. ''For top-level politicians in today's Russia, affiliation with oligarchs is like being in the Communist Party was under the Soviet Union,'' the political adviser said. ''You can't get there without it. Of course Putin will be thinking about the interests of oligarchs. Right now, there is a battle among the oligarchs for Putin's allegiance.''

An administration adviser to Putin characterized the leader as a novice politician in an unfamiliar position, likely to make mistakes that occasionally alienate voters.

''This is natural, since he does not have a team of his own in place, but instead is using a hybrid - Yeltsin's old administration, people he brought into government from Alfa Group, his own confidants'' from his previous job as head of Russia's Federal Security Service (the successor to the KGB), the adviser said. ''The good news is that Putin seems to realize his mistakes quickly and make the right response.''

Recognizing that a 40 percent increase in vodka prices was a blunder, Putin said Tuesday that ''the government has taken no decisions on this issue. ''Most people in our country, unfortunately, cannot afford to drink cognac or whiskey,'' he told reporters. ''Whether or not they are celebrating a holiday, when it comes to hard liquor, Russians drink vodka. That's why any issue concerning vodka cannot be considered a joke.''

Among Putin's other ''mistakes'' and recoveries, according to the adviser: A surprise move to fire two senior military commanders in Chechnya last month, at a time when Russia was bogged down and needing a victory. (Putin fixed that a few days later by awarding the commanders with medals.) He hesitated before opposing a rule proposed by Russia's Central Bank last month to require exporters to exchange all of their hard currency earnings for rubles, instead of 75 percent; not only did the business leaders oppose the idea, so did many ordinary Russians, who keep their money in dollars to hedge against years of sharp drops in the value of the ruble.

He decided to form an alliance with the Communists in parliament, which gave him control over the lower house but which came off as a heavy-handed power play.

''It could have been done much more subtly, by getting liberal factions involved in a power-sharing deal, which would have been much less disturbing to people,'' said the political researcher who works for Putin. ''This move made people fear that in Putin's Russia, power will act without concern for procedures and traditions.''

Yesterday, after heated debate, parliament loosened its stance, appointing two liberal politicians as deputy speakers. But a Moscow political scientist, Sergei Markov, argued that Putin's Communist courtship made a point with voters.

''Forming a union with the Communists and snubbing the liberals was a good way of showing most Russians that Putin is not a tool of the liberals, but his own man, and someone closer to the way most people feel,'' Markov said. A similar case is the story of Andrei Babitsky, a reporter for the US-funded Radio Liberty, who disappeared in Chechnya after Russians detained him, then said they had handed him over to rebels in return for Russian soldiers, then denied doing anything to him.

Rights groups and journalists have protested that the authorities decided to get rid of Babitsky for his coverage of the setbacks and brutality of the campaign.

Rather than explain the situation, Putin has casually brushed off questions. His advisers do not see this as a mistake.

''Polls show that people want order; the Kremlin has been able to characterize Babitsky as someone who was working against the Russian army in its effort to bring order to Chechnya,'' the Kremlin official said.

Putin has regularly received "support" from 50 percent or more of opinion poll respondents, leaving all other potential rivals far behind. The one potential rival to Putin who might have represented a threat, former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, announced on February 4 that he would not run. Primakov, who had said on December 17 that he would, changed his mind after realizing how far Russia was from "true democracy" (Russian agencies, February 4).

Putin, of course, is also strongly supported inside Russia's military and "power ministries," and has received verbal endorsements from a number of regional leaders, despite his harsh words about some regions violating federal laws and rumors that he may attempt to take power away from Russia's eighty-nine regions if he wins on March 26. For example, Oleg Korolev, deputy speaker of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of Russia's parliament (all regional leaders), said that the March 26 vote should be seen as a vote on which "path" Russia should take and that the country should "unite around Putin" (Russian agencies, February 15). Yesterday Putin addressed the Federation of Independent Trade Unions. Afterward its general council switched allegiance, abandoning Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov (the two leaders of the Fatherland-All Russia coalition), and voting in favor of a declaration of support for Putin (Russian agencies, February 16).

AFTER 'VICTORY' IN GROZNY: A handful of Russian papers looked beyond the "military phase of the Chechen operation" to the task of bringing stability to the "liberated territory." Reformist Noviye Izvestiya held that "restoring constitutional order is the goal, the only one, which, if only in a small way, justifies the loss of human lives and the inhumane destruction." Neo-communist Slovo concluded that any defeat of Chechen "bandits" will ultimately depend on "destroying their social base," and "that takes winning over...the Chechen population and creating social and economic conditions to preclude the return of a criminal free-for-all" there. 'WEST'S LENIENCY' TOWARD MOSCOW: Paris's left-of-center Le Monde found common cause with other leading publications in Paris, Berlin and Rome in contending that in the face of the "annihilation" of Grozny, "the U.S. is totally complacent and Europe is almost as bad." In contrast to the "indignant" reaction to events in Austria, the paper further charged that "such a double standard treatment...between Vienna and Grozny turns the West's talk of human rights into a...manifestation of hypocrisy." A Warsaw paper demurred, arguing that Russia's military heft requires that a "different standard" be applied there. Muslim voices resumed their screeds against "Western abandonment of Chechnya," while a few Asian and Latin American pundits suggested that NATO had "abandoned" Chechnya as a "quid pro quo.... Kosovo for Grozny.".....

RUSSIA: "Good Guy Putin"

Sergei Chugayev of reformist, youth-oriented Komsomolskaya Pravda (2/16) commented on President Clinton's on-line interview with CNN television yesterday: "The statement by Bill Clinton that the United States can 'do business' with Russia's acting president could well be called a major political breakthrough for Vladimir Putin. After all, it is the president of the leading country of the Western world...who said that. This means that in the eyes of the world public, Putin is no longer Stasi or a 'black box' or a 'blank sheet.' He is now a 'good guy.'" "U.S. Comes Around On Russia" Dmitry Gornostayev said in centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2/16): "It must be the first time that the U.S. administration clearly demonstrated a change of heart on what is going on in Russia. Clinton's statement [on CNN] attests that Washington will bear (for how long?) with the Chechnya operation and is even ready to work with Vladimir Putin, notwithstanding his being branded a 'blank sheet.' Remarkably, the Russian foreign ministry has reacted promptly to the 'constructive statements by the U.S. president,' emphasizing that the Russian leadership shares his desire to step up the dialogue."

"Clinton Nominates Putin"

Leonid Gankin said in reformist, business-oriented Kommersant (2/16): "Since Madeleine Albright met with Russia's acting president recently, she has more than once made it clear that she thinks he is ready to make concessions and is capable of resolving differences that have accumulated between Russia and the United States. It is hard to tell whether Washington really feels optimistic about its relations with Russia under Putin, but it surely is clear on who is going to win the elections in this country."...

"Tug Of War Over Foreign Policy"

Gennady Sysoyev contended in reformist, business-oriented Kommersant (2/16): "The Robertson visit is not only the beginning of normalization between Russia and NATO. It is also a victory for the foreign ministry in its tug of war with the defense ministry over who will define Russia's foreign policy.

"It is just that Igor Ivanov knows that no matter how we feel about NATO, ignoring it, as a reality in European politics, would be myopic, to say the least."

"Turning Point"

According to Viktor Sokolov in centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2/16): "The visit may well become a turning point. Neither Moscow nor Brussels seem happy about how things have been going since the tragedy in the Balkans. Obviously, the West, more than Russia, has been attempting to renew the dialogue."

"Who Cares About Chechens?"

Valery Yakov stated in reformist Noviye Izvestiya (2/15): "There is only one official agency which is trying to assess the extent of the tragedy that has befallen the peaceful residents of Chechnya. But even that organization, Human Rights Watch, is not Russian--it is international and has been acting in the conflict area at its own risk, with little support from Moscow, gathering information bit by bit.... Based on the latest statements by Yastrzhembsky [Kremlin aide on war information], Manilov [a Defense Ministry spokesman] and Koshman [the federal government's envoy in Chechnya], it is clear that the authorities don't care how many civilians died in the 'liberation' of Grozny and what will become of those who survived.... After all, the price of victory in this kind of war is not only the lives of men and officers, but primarily those of peaceful citizens, fellow countrymen."

"Big Victory"

Nikolai Aleksandrov, reacting to Moscow's agreement with the London Club to restructure the ex-USSR's debt, exulted in reformist youth-oriented Komsomolskaya Pravda (2/15): "Kasyanov has saved Russia. The government and personally First Deputy Premier Mikhail Kasyanov have won a big victory.... For the first time, a country that is not one of the world's poor gets significant relief on its debt."

"Success"

Aleksei Nikolsky commented in reformist Izvestiya (2/15): "It is a success and a big one at that. Only recently, the very idea of such a deal caused skeptical remarks. We could have done without this agreement if we had wanted to live in isolation and go bankrupt every three years. The price for giving up isolation is a great need for economic growth in the next few years, which is a lot of work."

"Disgrace"

Boris Fyodorov lamented in reformist Segodnya (2/15): "For a country with the ambition of a G-8 member, it is an outright disgrace to beg that its debt be written off. I am not at all sure that in a few years, we won't see another victory for our economic diplomacy, as our new Eurobonds are written off as well. No doubt, Russia will be able to service its foreign debt in full measure and have a decent budget if it cuts down on stealing, corruption and the flight of capital. Otherwise, the so-called breakthrough on the Main is just a cover up for our outrages at home.... Putin has made this deal and he is going to be responsible for seeing it through. In any event, the West has nothing to lose."

"Liberty Stages Political Show"

Reformist Izvestiya (2/15) said editorially on page one: "Part of the hysterics in the past couple of weeks is Radio Liberty, which instead of quietly working for the release of its staff member, has staged a political show. "With Andrei Babitsky in bandits' hands, Italian sports showman Savik Shuster would do well to engage in talks and raise money, rather than sorting out Russian journalists by their being or not being 'true' on the basis of their loyalty to Radio Liberty."

"Russia-West: Back To Pre-Chechnya Days?"

According to Yulia Petrovskaya and Igor Maksimov on page one of reformist Vremya MN (2/15): "Relations between Russia and the West seem to be coming back to what they were before Chechnya, with the subject of the rebel republic receding into the background. That, however, does not mean that the United States and Europe have changed their opposition to the Kremlin's Chechnya policy. Even so, with Moscow winning the war, it is hard to see how outside pressure can make the Russian leadership stop fighting."

"What Is Yastrzhembsky's Job?"

Valery Yakov charged in reformist Noviye Izvestiya (2/12): "Interpreting events in a specific way and juggling with facts is what constitutes the job of our new war ideologue, which is why his comments on the fighting are easy to guess without referring to the source. Yastrzhembsky really cares little about Babitsky; his concern is far more important: using every means to justify the war and the enormous losses it incurs."

"War To End In Court Of Law"