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Edited by David Johnson
| ISSUE #35 | February 12, 1999 |
The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and
analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic,
social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie
Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based
Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education
organization.
MOSCOW, February 11 (Itar-Tass) - Russian
space satellites at present number
131, which is nearly a fifth of all satellites
circling the Earth, and a half
of them is technically worn out, according
to Yuri Koptev, the Russian space
agency chief.
He told a government meeting on
Thursday that 60 satellites fulfil defense
tasks, 28 are intended for dual purpose
tasks and 43 are used for civilian
scientific research.
"75 percent of the satellites have
exhausted their guaranteed resources
and 50 per cent have worked out their
technical resources", Koptev said.
Last November Koptev told a press
conference that Russia was running 127
satellites and that the service life of
82 percent of them had expired.
Koptev said that the balance cost
of the Russian "space grouping" is 96
billion roubles (over four billion USD)
and is mostly financed from the state
budget.
"The Russian space grouping remains
an important national wealth and that
demands a rational approach to it", Koptev
said.
"Russia is very seriously represented
at the theater of space services", he
added and called "to pay attention to
the preservation of our space grouping".
Flaws in the System -- Part II
Colonel Dan Smith, U.S. Army (Ret.), Chief
of Research, Center for
Defense Information
dsmith@cdi.org
"Look Who's Sharing" (CDI Weekly Monitor
February 4, 1999) described
problems the Russians are having in maintaining
a full array of
operational anti-ballistic missile early
warning ground radars.
On February 10, the Washington Post carried
a front page story captioned
"Russia's Missile Defense Eroding" with
a sub-caption, "Gaps in
Early-Warning Satellite Coverage Raise
Risk of Launch Error." In fact, the
story is neither new nor about Russia's
missile defense system which, in
accordance with the amended 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty that limits
deployment of these systems to one site,
is confined to protecting Moscow.
An accompanying article describes how,
in September 1983, a Soviet early
warning infrared sensing satellite mistook
reflected sunlight from clouds
for the exhaust plume of incoming ballistic
missiles. Only the "gut
instinct" of the Soviet watch officer
prevented a retaliatory launch of
Soviet nuclear tipped missiles at the
U.S. But what may be most significant
about the retelling of this 1983 incident
is the observation by the Soviet
officer that "he knew the [satellite]
system had flaws. It had been rushed
into service...and was 'raw'."
Why is this significant? Because the U.S.
seems intent on launching a
multi-billion dollar array of 24 infrared-based
early warning satellites
as part of the National Missile Defense
program -- without properly testing
it to make sure it works.
In the last week three different defense-oriented
publications reported
that the Pentagon has decided to cancel
the Space Based Infrared
System (SBIRS) -Low demonstration projects
being developed by defense
contractors Boeing and TRW-Raytheon. The
reasons given are the usual ones:
very over budget -- Boeing almost double
and TRW-Raytheon a third over its
original program estimate -- and behind
schedule -- the first satellites
were originally to be in place in 2004
but will not go up before 2006
because the Pentagon determined that a
2004 launch "involved too much
technical risk."
The reports note that the whole point of
putting demonstration satellites
into orbit was to reduce risks by actually
testing the on-board infrared
systems for a year. This common sense
endeavor would ensure that the
satellites could detect and track ballistic
missiles and then pass data to
other systems that would be tied to interceptor
missile launch sites in the
U.S. But with a possible 2005 deployment
date for the National Missile
Defense interceptors, the Pentagon does
not want to risk delaying the
launch of the first SBIRS-Low satellites
beyond 2006.
The upshot? The U.S. is heading down the
path of launching and relying on
a system of untested, "raw" early-warning
satellites that are supposed to
perform a critical role in the even more
expensive and so far equally
unproven and technologically troubled
National Missile Defense program.
This isn't defense; it's a disaster waiting to happen.
MOSCOW DENIES WEAPONS PROLIFERATION CHARGE.
As might have been expected,
Russian government officials yesterday
vehemently denied a CIA report
alleging that Russian and Chinese businesses
and quasi-government agencies
pose a growing international proliferation
threat (see the Monitor, February
11). Russian First Deputy Prime Minister
Yuri Maslyukov was quoted as
insisting that the Russian government's
system of export controls ensures
that sensitive military technologies are
not leaked to foreign countries.
Maslyukov, who heads a government commission
overseeing Russia's military
and technical cooperation with foreign
countries, also said that Russia is
willing to work with other countries,
including the United States, on
proliferation issues. He added, however,
that the CIA report was politically
motivated (Russian agencies, February
10).
The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service
also denied the CIA report
yesterday. An agency spokesman reportedly
said that "according to available
data, there are no existing facts of violation
of international agreements
by Russia on a state level" in this area
(Russian agencies, February 10).
The CIA study had said that the Russian
and Chinese "entities" responsible
for leaking military technologies may
be operating outside the control of
their respective governments. That is
a charge which both the United States
and Israel have repeatedly leveled against
Russia.
Vienna, 10 February 1999 (RFE/RL) -- Arms
negotiators in Vienna hope to
reach basic agreement in a month on a
new treaty limiting conventional
weapons in Europe and placing restrictions
on where they can be deployed.
A senior NATO negotiator told
our correspondent that the timetable
depends on Russia. He says Russia is trying
to persuade NATO to make
concessions in return for admitting three
former communist countries --
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.
The negotiator says NATO has made
clear it will not make concessions and
it is now up to Russia to accept this.
There are also differences
between Russia and Turkey on the use of
Russian forces in the Caucasus. Russia
wants a special concession on the
number of tanks, artillery and other weapons
it can move in and out of the
region.
The NATO negotiator says Turkey
fears its security could be threatened
if Russia is allowed too much freedom
to build up its southern flank.
However, he says progress had been made
in bilateral talks between Russia
and Turkey. Turkey has offered proposals
which would allow Russia to send
more troops on a temporary basis in times
of crisis. A Turkish negotiator
confirmed this and told RFE/RL that the
Turkish government was ready to be
"helpful" so long as Turkey's own security
was not endangered.
Negotiators hope the basic
elements of the new treaty can be presented
at an upcoming NATO summit in Washington
in April. Negotiations would then
resume with the goal of having the completed
treaty signed at the end of
the year at a summit in Istanbul of the
54 members of the Organisation for
Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE).
OSCE includes all European
countries plus the United States and Canada.
The new treaty will replace
the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE), which limited the number
of tanks, artillery, armored troop
carriers, helicopters and war planes which
can be held by NATO and the
countries of the former Warsaw Pact, including
Russia and Ukraine. The 1990
treaty, updated in 1996, is widely regarded
as a cornerstone of the present
European security system, but negotiators
say it's inadequate to meet
present needs.
New treaty negotiations began
in 1997. The NATO negotiator -- who spoke
to our correspondent on condition of anonymity
-- said they had proceeded
slowly because Russia argued from the
start it wanted what it called
"compensation" for the enlargement of
NATO. Its goal was to restrict NATO's
ability to deploy forces in Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic and in
any other country which joined NATO later.
NATO says it has presented
ideas which should satisfy Russia without
offering compensation. NATO insists on
the right to deploy forces in these
new members in time of need and if they
agree. However, to ease Russian
suspicions, NATO has offered to limit
the size of the forces it deploys to
two divisions. It also will give prior
notification to all other
signatories before troops are sent --
but Russia will have no right of veto.
The NATO negotiator told RFE/RL
that this solution was similar to the
one Turkey had offered to Russia in regard
to the Caucasus.
He said NATO expects to deploy
forces in the new NATO countries "very
rarely." He said that most of the time,
the alliance would probably not
even deploy the full allowance of two
divisions.
Russia also wants to negotiate
what it calls "stability measures" in
some other countries. For example, it
wants to be allowed to deploy extra
forces on the territory of Belarus. Russia
also wants extra deployment
privileges in Kaliningrad -- the Russian
enclave wedged between Lithuania
and Poland. Russia also is seeking NATO
restraints on deploying fixed wing
aircraft and attack helicopters in new
member countries. It has proposed
numerical caps on the number of these
aircraft.
NATO negotiators in Vienna
told RFE/RL they were "reasonably confident"
a basic agreement on major issues could
be reached by the April summit.
Afterward, negotiations would continue
on issues such as verification.
With a bold new anticorruption drive and
an agreement to limit the president's
power launched last week, Prime Minister
Yevgeny Primakov has sent out the
message that he wants firm control over
an unruly Russia.
While President Boris Yeltsin recovered
from his latest bout of illness, Mr.
Primakov sent out police to raid a major
tycoon and warned that he was
emptying the jails to make room for economic
criminals who drain the country
of billions of dollars a year.
"Our government is taking all measures
to strengthen stability in the country,
both political and economic," Primakov
told reporters yesterday.
This flourish of dynamism not only strengthens
Primakov's position in case he
wants to run for president next year (sooner
if Mr. Yeltsin should die or
leave office early for health reasons),
but also further sidelines Yeltsin.
And the initiatives give Primakov a moral
authority that many Russians crave
at a time of economic crisis.
"Mr. Primakov is very slowly but clearly
strengthening his position....
Finding scapegoats is a clear tactic to
prepare for the [2000] electoral
campaign," says Sergei Kolmakov, deputy
director of the Politika Foundation,
an independent think tank in Moscow.
Primakov, a former spymaster and ex-foreign
minister, is a consummate
politician who since Soviet days has survived
several regimes in Russia's
ruthless and fickle corridors of power.
He was appointed in September as
caretaker premier, but has since broadened
his influence, culminating in an
accord Friday that blocks the capricious
Yeltsin from firing him without
consulting parliament.
Yeltsin's hallmark during his seven years
in power has been abrupt dismissals
of officials, including firings of two
Cabinets last year that drove the
country to the brink of political and
economic disaster.
His inability to come to grips with corruption
has long been a source of
frustration for Russians. But the sense
of impotence was broken last week with
an array of actions on cases that have
been under investigation for some time.
The salvos included the arrest of former
Justice Minister Valentin Kovalyov,
who is accused of embezzlement, police
raids on the businesses of oligarch
Boris Berezovsky, and revelations about
shady practices at the Russian Central
Bank.
A report by the prosecutor general's office
that the Central Bank secretly
transferred $50 billion of reserves to
an offshore account on the British
island of Jersey follows criminal proceedings
already under way against
several former bank officials. The officials
are accused of cheating on
expense accounts, money laundering, and
illegally shifting money out of the
country.
The greatest fanfare centered on moves
against Mr. Berezovsky, a political
rival of Primakov and Russia's most visible
tycoon. Once a confidant of the
Yeltsin clan, Berezovsky epitomizes for
many Russians the small group of
financiers who profited from the transition
from socialism, buying up state
firms for a song.
Police in black ski masks last week raided
his oil company, Sibneft, and firms
doing business with the Aeroflot airline,
in which he controls a large stake.
It was another blow to the fading financial
empire of Berezovsky, who also
lost a big stake in the Transaero airline
and control over the ORT television
channel, which has been placed under temporary
state administration.
While the campaign against Berezovsky is
motivated partly by politics, it also
has a strong financial component as Russia
slides toward bankruptcy.
An International Monetary Fund team left
town over the weekend with no
promises of further aid, leaving the government
desperate to mobilize other
resources to stave off complete default.
Being seen as acting decisively as a crisis
manager of the economy would win
Primakov plaudits from Western creditors,
who have demanded results on the
anti-corruption front.
"This sends the right signals at home and
abroad," says Boris Makarenko, a
political analyst at the Political Technologies
Center, a Moscow-based think
tank. "It sends a strong signal to the
political elite that this government
will no longer tolerate merciless corruption,
and it may also help win back
some foreign confidence."
Even before the recent moves, a semblance
of stability was restored with
Primakov at the helm, despite his inability
so far to rescue the economy and
win new loans.
The prime minister's popularity in public
opinion polls is rising, prompting
speculation that he could win if he decides
to enter the 2000 election.
Primakov denies presidential ambitions,
but most political observers believe
this is mere posturing.
MOSCOW - Russia's former finance minister
said yesterday that officials
profited by spiriting out billions of
dollars of government currency reserves
for management in a shadowy offshore fund.
The comments by the former minister, Boris
Fyodorov, raised new questions
about Russia's financial creditability
as it desperately seeks international
aid to climb out of debt.
Fyodorov's accusation followed detailed
charges by Russia's general
prosecutor, Yury Skuratov, just before
he resigned last week, citing health
reasons.
Fyodorov said that after taking office
in 1993, he began to notice that
Finance Ministry funds held in the Central
Bank were diminishing for reasons
he could not understand. But when he confronted
the head of the Central Bank,
Viktor Gerashchenko, he got no answers.
''I was told that ... I was meddling in
things that were not my business,''
Fyodorov said at a press conference. ''In
reality, as I understand, friends
were given a chance to make some money.
When billions of dollars are pumped
through some company - when somebody gets
a certain commission - it turns out
to be big in the long run.''
Skuratov, in a letter detailing the suspicious
practices, alleged that between
1993 and 1998, the Central Bank paid an
obscure offshore assets-management
company to handle the money, instead of
managing it itself, as central banks
usually do. Western economists here call
the practice unprecedented for a
central bank, which serves as the caretaker
of a country's national wealth.
Skuratov also accused Central Bank executives
of illegal sales of government
property and of maintaining extravagant
lifestyles at state expense.
In many places, such charges lodged by
a top law-enforcement official would
set off a political firestorm. Outside
Russia, the allegations are bound to
raise even more doubts about the wisdom
of granting Moscow's request for new
loans.
But inside Russia, where benefiting from
government funds has been a
traditional path to upward mobility, the
reaction had been rather quiet until
Fyodorov's outburst.
Gerashchenko, the Central Bank chairman,
earlier had confirmed the practice,
if not the sums involved. Gerashchenko
said Russia needed to hide its assets
to avoid seizure by creditors owed billions
of dollars of Soviet-era debt that
Russia has promised to pay.
Fyodorov responded yesterday by declaring:
''This definitely is a completely
strange system that has nothing in common
with international practice.''
Gerashchenko said that in 1994 the Central
Bank transferred $1.4 billion to
the accounts of FIMACO, a company registered
on the Island of Jersey, off
England.
''At that time, Russia was involved in
difficult negotiations with the
creditors, and there was a probability
that the country's foreign property
could be seized,'' Gerashchenko said in
comments reported by The Moscow Times.
''FIMACO was set up to avoid complications.''
According to Skuratov's letter, which was
handed out to members of the State
Duma, the lower house of parliament, the
Central Bank allowed FIMACO to handle
$37.3 billion, 9.98 billion deutsche marks,
379.9 billion yen, 11.98 billion
French francs, and 862.6 million British
pounds. This amounts to almost $50
billion at current rates of exchange and,
Skuratov said, and included funds
from multibillion-dollar loan packages
from the International Monetary Fund.
Western economists have been scratching
their heads in amazement. Eric Kraus,
head of the fixed-incomes desk at Dresdner
Bank's Moscow office, called the
allegations and Gerashchenko's partial
confirmation ''astonishing.''
Kraus said he thought the $50 billion figure
was ''doubtless exaggerated,''
because the Central Bank ''never had that
much to manage.'' But he was left
with more questions than answers.
''Who actually managed this money, and
how was it invested, what were the
results, how much was charged for this
service, to whom did the profits go,
and where is the money now?'' he asked.
No one knows. Nor will they ever, if some Russian politicians have their way.
''It would be wrong to launch a criminal
proceeding only on the basis of the
transfer of money to this firm,'' remarked
lawmaker Georgy Luntovsky, who is
chairman of the Duma committee that oversees
the Central Bank.
Analysts say that nothing in Russian law
prevents the Central Bank from acting
as it did.
''There is nothing illegal about commercial
activities by the Central Bank
that do not always coincide with the interests
of the state,'' said Georgy
Bovt, political commentator for the liberal
daily Segodnya.
However, Bovt said the government should
investigate whether anyone profited
personally from the offshore investing
of government funds.
Bovt and other analysts suggested that
Skuratov's charges stemmed from an
investigation into the causes of Russia's
financial collapse last August, when
the government devalued the ruble and
defaulted on $40 billion of domestic
debt.
Anastasia Saschikhin of the Moscow bureau contributed to this report.
MOSCOW, February 12 (Itar-Tass) - If Russia
finds itself in the range of
the new Japan-US security treaty, Moscow
will have to reconsider its
defense policy, a high-ranking official
at the Russian Foreign Ministry
told Itar-Tass on Friday.
The Japanese parliament this week opened
debate of a package of draft
laws to enact a new edition of the Japanese-US
defense cooperation accord
which was passed in September of 1997
and which calls for consolidation of
bilateral military ties in case of an
"emergency" in Japan-adjacent regions.
The vague wording causes dismay of
several countries, including Russia
and China.
Moscow wonders what adjacent spells,
the Russian Foreign Ministry's
senior spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin said
at a news briefing on Thursday.
"Russia's question arises how far the
'regions adjacent to Japan'
stretch and whether they can apply to
territories of third countries,
including Russia," Rakhmanin said.
He said a "possibility of inclusion
of the territory of Russia in the
sphere of effect of the new Japanese-American
military agreement is
unacceptable for Moscow".
"It is desirable that Japan and the
US more precisely define the area of
effect of their new agreement. If Russia's
territory is included in it, we
shall have to take certain measures in
the field of ensuring security," the
ministry official said on Wednesday.
As it has become known, the financial-economic
basis of START II, which
has been drawn up by the experts of Prime
Minister Yevgeny Primakov's
Cabinet, has gone to the lower house of
parliament. This was announced
by Roman Popkovich, the chairman of the
State Duma Committee on Defense
and one of the most open lobbyists for
the signing of this act. The FEO
was prepared, as per the instructions
of first vice-speaker Yuri
Maslyukov, who has likewise come out in
favor of its ratification by the
Russian parliament. Popkovich noted
that a law on financing the
strategic nuclear forces up to 2010 has
been prepared by his committee.
The leader of NDR [Our Home is Russia
political factiontrns.] believes
that this law, which he proposes sending
to the lower house for debate
at the end of February-beginning of March,
will help the "sacred" matter
of ratification.
At the same time, it can be said that Yuri
Maslyukov (the negotiations
of whom with the IMF are proceeding intricately
enough and are necessary
from some sacred cows that are sacrificed)
will manage to convince a
parliamentary majority of the necessity
of ratifying START II. Thus,
the most influential political forces
in Russia are uniting for the
ratification of such an important document
for the US. From our
archives: read here the article by Hero
of the Soviet Union, Army
General Valentin Varennikov, on the possibility
of ratifying START II...
Interfaks-AiF, No. 5
29 Jan-4 Feb 99
[translation for personal use only]
Interview with unidentified admiral
of the Navy Main Staff; place and date
not given: "Having
Naval Nuclear Forces Reinforces Stability
in the World. Opinion of Navy
Main Staff Admiral"
Swords continue to be crossed over START
II even five years
after it was signed. The Russian parliament
does not want to ratify
it. The treaty's fate was complicated
even more after the armed
forces of the United States and Great
Britain attacked Iraq.
Certain aspects of START II related to
the problem of the changing
balance of nuclear forces based on the
Navy were discussed with our
newspaper by an admiral of the Main Staff
of the Navy of Russia who
wishes not to be identified.
[Interfaks-AiF] To begin with, let us
remind our readers of
the essence of this treaty.
[Admiral] The Treaty on Further Reduction
and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms signed by the
presidents of the Russian
Federation and the United States on 3
January 1993, known by the
acronym START II, may be said to have
two fundamental
aspects.
The first is the agreement that was
reached for the complete
elimination of intercontinental ballistic
missiles with multiple and
independently targeted warheads.
The second is that a concrete maximum
level was established
for warheads placed on ballistic missiles
mounted on submarines: no
more than 1,750 units of the overall level
of 3,000-3,500 strategic
nuclear weapons for each of the parties
to the treaty.
[Interfaks-AiF] How are these agreements
advantageous to
Moscow?
[Admiral] For Russia these were forced
political decisions
were related primarily to the impossibility
of maintaining and
developing the groups of missiles that
were subject to being
reduced, since the main industrial potential
for their production--
the NPO [scientific production association]
Yuzhnoye--is located in
Dnepropetrovsk in Ukraine. To make our
nuclear potential dependent
on a foreign state would be highly irrational.
Clearly, whether Russia's high military-political
leaders like
it or not, after it is implemented this
decision will lead to
radical changes in the structure of the
country's strategic nuclear
forces. While traditionally their structure
in the USSR has been
oriented toward the unconditional priority
of intercontinental
ballistic missiles (at the time of the
signing of START I, up to 65
percent of all the strategic nuclear weapons
were placed on them),
after START II up to 59 percent of these
weapons could be placed on
carriers of the naval nuclear forces.
After fulfillment of obligations under
START II, the
structures of nuclear forces in Russia
and the United States should
be practically identical.
[Interfaks-AiF] And is this good or
bad?
[Admiral] It is our firm conviction
that the transfer of most
of our strategic missile potential to
Navy carriers on the whole
corresponds to Russia's national interests
and the preservation of
strategic parity between the Russian Federation
and the United
States in the area of nuclear weapons,
taking into account the
political, economic, and purely military
aspects of the
problem.
In relations with the international
community, having powerful
naval strategic nuclear forces gives the
country's leaders
undeniable advantages over strategic missile
forces. This is
explained primarily by the fact that nuclear
weapons are regarded by
all nuclear powers not as battlefield
weapons but as a powerful
deterrent against any type of aggression.
Intercontinental
ballistic missiles with multiple and independently
targeted warheads
will provoke the leadership of any nuclear
country to adopt a
decision to launch them at the earliest
possible stage in any
military conflict in order to avoid an
attack by the enemy. This
led to the development of fixed theoretical
ideas about their use in
the first strike or, in the extreme case,
in a responsive
counterstrike.
In order to provide for this application
of these missiles,
the corresponding systems for combat control
and antimissile
observation were created.
The single-warhead ground-launched ballistic
missiles may be
regarded in the same way. From the standpoint
of political
relations among nuclear powers, having
them increases instability,
the more so if these states do not trust
one another or are in a
state of confrontation.
But having a system of sea-launched
nuclear forces contributes
to strengthening strategic stability in
relations among nuclear
countries. For no government in the world
can be certain that it is
possible as a preventive measure to discover
and simultaneously
destroy all the probable enemy's submarine
missile carriers.
[Interfaks-AiF] You mentioned that relying
on sea-launched
nuclear forces is advantageous economically
as well...
[Admiral] The number of Navy personnel
involved in servicing
sea-launched nuclear forces is about 7,500,
and RVSN [strategic
missile forces]--about 170,000. It takes
less than three people to
service one strategic warhead in the Navy
(with the Tayfun missile
system--less than one person), while in
the Missile Forces it takes
57.
The Navy has 17 facilities for strategic
offensive weapons,
and the RVSN--about 40. The cost of maintaining
RVSN during 1990-
1994 reached no less than 6 percent of
the country's military budget
annually. And the cost of maintaining
naval nuclear forces during
this same period was no more than 15 percent
of the annual
expenditures on the entire Navy, that
is, no more than 3.3 percent
of the military budget. Thus if we say
that during this time, twice
as many warheads were deployed on land
as on submarine cruisers, it
is possible to draw the conclusion that
the cost of maintaining one
combat unit is the same in the RVSN and
sea-launched nuclear
forces.
After the implementation of START II,
when up to 1,750
warheads are deployed on multiple-warhead
missiles and the RVSN
keeps only 700-900 single-warhead missiles,
the cost of maintaining
one combat unit in the Navy will be less
than in the RVSN by a
factor of 2-2.5 (if the current ratio
of the levels of financing the
RVSN and the Navy are maintained).
On the whole, military-economic calculations
done by
scientific research institutions of the
Ministry of Defense, the
Navy, and the General Staff show that
solving problems of
maintaining the combat readiness of naval
nuclear forces, further
developing them, and implementing START
I and START II for the
period up to 2003 will take about R20
trillion, that is, an average
of about R3 trillion annually. These costs
cannot be considered
excessive.
[Interfaks-AiF] What are the purely
military advantages of
sea-based nuclear forces?
[Admiral] In the first place, the huge
nuclear striking power
concentrated on each missile submarine
cruiser makes it possible for
the high military-political leadership
of the Russian Federation to
confidently pursue an independent national
policy. One Tayfun
submarine missile carrier alone can strike
200 objects at distances
of up to 10,000 kilometers in four minutes.
Having two or three
such missile carriers guarantees the population
that unacceptable
harm can be done to any probable enemy
of Russia in any
situation.
In the second place, naval nuclear forces
are more viable.
This thesis is the most unpleasant for
their enemies. Our submarine
missile carriers of project 941 Tayfun
and 667 BDRM have 100 times
less noise than the first generations
of the Navy's nuclear
submarines did. Various devices from foreign
submarine research are
installed on them and they are close (and
in some cases surpass) in
their capabilities to those that are found
on Western
submarines.
Armed with missiles with intercontinental
firing range, our
Navy's submarine missile carriers can
solve combat problems from
regions directly adjacent to Russia's
coastline and in extreme cases
right from the points where they are based.
There is no need for
them to get past the lines of antisubmarine
forces and be in regions
monitored by the submarine observation
system.
At the same time, one must admit that
during 1997-1998 the
resource of the basic equipment of combat-ready
nuclear submarine
cruisers and the reserve of active zone
of their reactors where to a
considerable degree expended. I fear that
in the future naval
nuclear forces will not be able to effectively
carry out the tasks
assigned to them in the system of national
security of the Russian
Federation.
We must understand that the relative
expenditures on the
country's strategic nuclear forces are
many times less than the
expenditures Russia would have to make
to provide for security with
nonnuclear means alone.
Next week the upper chamber
of the Russian parliament, the Federation
Council, will either ratify or reject
the Russian-Ukrainian Treaty. The
outcome of this vote will have far greater
consequences for Russia's future
than talks with the IMF or the titanic
battle now unfolding between Prime
Minister Yevgeny Primakov and financier
Boris Berezovsky.
But our political consciousness
still has not adapted to the idea that
the most crucial direction of Russian
foreign policy in the coming decades
is no longer our relations with the United
States but our relations with
Ukraine.
Refusal to ratify the treaty
is tantamount to a declaration that Russia
does not recognize the Ukrainian state
and makes territorial claims on its
neighbor. The most passionate opponent
of the treaty in the Federation
Council clearly understands this. "Let's
make territorial claims on
Ukraine, and then no one will accept it
into NATO," said Moscow Mayor Yury
Luzhkov, jumping up and down on the tribune
with excitement as he
elaborated on this preposterous argument
during the recent debate on the
treaty.
So why not develop Luzhkov's
train of thought? There are two months left
before the formal acceptance into NATO
of Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic - quite long enough to make serious
territorial claims on them
too, thus derailing the process of NATO
enlargement once and for all.
For Russia, refusal to ratify
the treaty will signify not only the
geopolitical catastrophe of long years
of confrontation with our southern
neighbor, but a moral catastrophe too.
If we are incapable of establishing
normal relations with the nation closest
to us in terms of blood-ties,
language and culture, then just what use
are we to anyone else in this world?
For several years now the
Russian political class has been heading
steadily toward just such a catastrophe
in its relations not only with
Ukraine but other CIS states as well.
It seems that Moscow itself doesn't
know what it wants from its "younger brothers,"
and its behavior is rather
like that of a hysterical, aging spinster
trying to win back the sympathies
of former admirers first by way of generous
gifts (cheap energy supplies,
cancellation of debts) and then by using
threats and tantrums.
Much can be gleaned from a
recent discussion on the television program
"Postscriptum" featuring two deputies
from the State Duma, one in favor of
ratifying the treaty and the other against.
Under no circumstances should
Ukrainian independence be recognized by
ratifying the treaty, insisted the
opponent. "On the contrary," objected
his more geopolitically advanced
colleague, "their independence should
be recognized, but they should be
placed in such circumstances that they
come crawling back to us on their
knees of their own accord."
As it presides over a country
ruined by its own incompetence and
unprecedented thieving, our "political
elite" still waits with foolish
conceit for someone to "come crawling
back on their knees."
It is just such inability
on the part of Russia's political class to
take the independence of CIS states seriously
- not formally on paper, but
psychologically - its staggering obliviousness
to any possible reaction
from partners and neighbors, and the spiritual
torpidity that prevents it
from seeing itself through their eyes,
that combines to produce a
self-perpetuat ing cycle of alienation
and enmity across the entire
post-Soviet expanse.
Argumenty i Fakty, No. 955
February 1999 (signed to press 9 Feb
99)
[translation for personal use only]
Unattributed report from the "Details"
column: "The President's Surprises;"
passages
within slantlines published in boldface.
subheads as published
The activity the president showed
throughout last week astonished
even his tried and tested entourage. Some
people say that as early as 1
February Boris Nikolayevich felt so well
that allowed himself to drink
seven glasses ofbrandy to mark his birthday.
Yet another outburst of
energy took place on 5 February, when
Yeltsin all of a sudden
descended on the Kremlin, called for Prime
Minister Yevgeniy Primakov,
anddiscussed the situation in the country
with him till late hours. Rumors
have it that this conversation, too, was
held in a typically Russian way, that
is, helped by liquor.
But it was for the weekend that
the head of state reserved real
surprises. First, to his doctors' dismay,
he went to sweat in the sauna, and
then, having learned about the death of
King Husayn of Jordan on Sunday
evening, he ordered an aircraft to fly
to the funeral. Those doctors
who dared to protest were sternly told
"to mind their own business." The
argument that a 30-degree temperature
change is dangerous for someone
still recovering froma stomach ulcer was
ignored.
On the plane, the president was
accompanied by a team of doctors. Another
team remained at the airport ready to
fly to Amman if need be. Luckily,
everything passed without a hitch. True,
the meeting with Bill Clinton, on which
Boris Nikolayevich had counted somuch,
lasted only six minutes: the flight and
climate change had had their effect. The
worried entourage had only one
consolation: alcohol is banned in Muslim
Jordan.
What is Yeltsin's illness, after all?
We seem to know everything about
the president's health: what diseases he
had in his childhood; what traumas he
had; how the heart bypass operation
was carried out.
But it is, in essence, not important
what Boris Nikolayevich is down
with. It is when he recovers that alert
should be sounded. Each time Yeltsin
returns to his office, the bureaucrats
get a good bashing.
Evil tongues contend that //half
of Yeltsin's stays in hospital is simply
a way of checking his subordinates' loyalty.//
From the hospital bed, the
president is watching keenly who of his
officials doubts his ability to work.
In 1993 it was the then Security
Council Secretary Yuriy Skokov who got
caught in the president's trap, in 1996
- Aleksandr Korzhakov, Mikhail Barsukov,
and Oleg Soskovets.
Later former Security Council Secretary
Aleksandr Lebed made the same
mistake. He was followed by Prime Minister
Viktor Chernomyrdin. As for ordinary
deputy prime ministers and ministers sacked
after the president emerged from Barvikha,
they are counted by dozens.
Psychologists are saying that Boris
Nikolayevich uses his ailments to
screen off his indecisiveness and that
stability simply drives the head of state to
political depression.Not surprisingly,
Yevgeniy Primakov, with his peace and accord,
has a badeffect on the president's health.
Does he not see that the best medicine for Boris
Nikolayevich is to be "above the fray"
and to hold the steering wheel in a crisis situation?
Did Skuratov know too much?
According to our information, the
presidential administration had been
planning Prosecutor General Yuriy Skuratov's
dismissal for a long time. The prosecutor
had come across documents which implicated
the country's leadership directly or indirectly.
For instance, there is information about
//the Central Bank transferring billions of dollars//
abroad, something that could hardly have
been done without approval from above. Or
information about certain real estate
abroad in the name of Tatyana Dyachenko. One of
Skuratov's closest allies told us that
it was the danger of "family secrets" being leaked to
the opposition that sealed his chief's
fate.
However, it is not inevitable that
the situation should take the turn
that the Kremlin desires. The Federation
Council which, under the Constitution, has to
endorse thedismissal, is bound to seek
explanations. People are saying that Moscow mayor
Yuriy Luzhkov is going to insist that
Skuratov report on the work he has done and offers his
view of his sacking.
WASHINGTON, February 12 (Itar-Tass) - U.S.
President Bill Clinton and
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who
paid a one-day working visit to
the United States, discussed on Thursday
the situation in Russia, ways of
rendering economic assistance to it, the
Kosovo problem and the forthcoming
NATO summit.
After the end of the meeting,
which lasted for about two hours at the
White House, Chancellor Schroeder said
that both the United States and
Germany were very much interested in the
stabilisation of the situation in
Russia.
The two leaders focused their
attention on economic problems. They
discussed the forthcoming meeting of the
"big eight," stressing the
importance of the "development of global
financial architecture, which will
help us wage the struggle against machinations
all over the world." They
both pointed to the identity of their
stands on the items, included in the
agenda of the forthcoming NATO summit.
According to Schroeder, the exchange
of views on the Kosovo problem also revealed
the similarity of their views.
Speaking about Russia, Schroeder
stressed that both the United States
and Germany were interested in the stabilisation
of the situation there,
and that they are ready to support the
reform, which is being implemented
in Russia. He stressed, at the same time,
that support should by no means
be a one-way traffic, and on this point
the U.S. and Germany also reached
agreement. They believe that, responding
to their support for its
stabilisation, Russia will exert efforts
aimed at speeding up the reform.
Schroeder said it was very
important now to stabilise the situation of
Primakov, because this will help stabilise
the situation in Russia. White
House spokesman Antony Blinken, who is
a senior official of the National
Security Council, said, in his turn, that
the United State was paying
special attention to the rendering of
assistance to the reform process in
Russia.
Responding to questions of
journalists at the press conference, held at
the Willard Hotel of Washington, Schroeder
said, that both the U.S.
president and himself would like to see
progress in Russia in the sphere of
the reforming of the banking and tax systems,
in the struggle against the
mafia and terrorism. The U.S. and Germany
are ready to support Russia, even
if its advance in those directions is
slow. According to Schroeder, no one
thinks that Russia can make a transition
form the centralised planned
economy to the socially oriented market
economy overnight.
Speaking about his visit to
Russia, planned for the next week, Schroeder
said he intended to explain in Moscow
that Germany and the U.S. would lay
emphasis on financing specific programmes,
for instance, those connected
with the development of infrastructure
in the power sector. If Russia makes
a certain degree of progress, Germany
and the U.S. will not only use their
influence in the IMF, but will also render
material assistance to it by
themselves.
MOSCOW (AP) -- At the height of Russia's
financial meltdown, the minister
named to save the economy outlined an
overriding priority: build a new
generation of nuclear missiles.
The warning from First Deputy
Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov, first made
in October, that Russia could lose its
nuclear capability, has produced
rare unanimity among the country's bitterly
divided political factions.
Communists, nationalists and
liberals alike agree that Russia must stake
everything on its nuclear forces if it
wants any claim to be a world power
and have any kind of credible military.
Yet, the huge arsenal of rockets,
planes and submarines that once
terrified the world is falling apart and
there is no money to maintain it
or build large numbers of replacements.
"The only thing for which
Russia is respected in the world and which
makes us worthy partners ... is our strategic
rocket forces," said
Alexander Lebed, a former general and
a leading presidential candidate.
Russia's nuclear arsenal of
6,000 warheads could soon shrink to just a
few hundred, analysts say. Early-warning
radar and satellites vital to
protect against pre-emptive attacks and
prevent premature missile
launchings are also falling apart, they
add.
"By the year 2010, the number
of Russia's nuclear warheads will fall
10-fold to 600 to 800," predicted Alexander
Pikayev, a top expert in arms
control with Moscow's branch of the Carnegie
Endowment for Peace.
Russia could be eclipsed as
a nuclear power by China, which once lagged
far behind Moscow, he said.
Analysts paint a gloomy picture of Russia's crumbling nuclear triad:
-- The navy's nuclear missile
submarines are in the worst state. During
the Soviet-era, dozens of submarines were
on patrol, lurking under the
waves with batteries of nuclear missiles
ready for instant firing. Scores
of submarines have been decommissioned
and no more than three are thought
to be on patrol at any one time now. Even
the working boats rarely leave
harbor.
And if a nuclear war starts,
the submarines wouldn't be able to sail out
immediately because they don't have food
supplies on board.
-- The air force's mainstay
Bear bombers are more than 40 years old.
Pilots only get a few hours flying time
each year, far below the level at
which they can operate effectively, analysts
said. Lebed said the air force
has only 20 modern nuclear bombers.
-- The land-based rocket forces,
always the strongest part of the Soviet
nuclear triad, are in better shape. But
many of the most powerful missiles
are well past their operational lifetime,
officials admit.
Nuclear weapons have a limited
lifespan because of their atomic warheads
and corrosive fuel. Beyond that lifespan
they often are incapable of
working or function defectively.
"The strategic nuclear forces'
command systems are also expiring, and
that may result in loss of control over
them," Lebed wrote in a Jan. 21
article in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper.
It would cost $3 billion a
year to maintain existing missiles, according
to Roman Popkovich, head of the defense
committee of the Duma, the lower
chamber of parliament. Russia's full budget
for 1999 is $25 billion, and
officials concede much of the money exists
only on paper.
With the economy in a nose
dive and conventional forces collapsing,
Russia's military has become increasingly
dependent on its still massive
Soviet-era nuclear forces.
Whatever money the government
can scrape together for the military is
being funneled into nuclear forces, but
analysts say it's too little, too
late.
The navy designed a new nuclear
missile submarine -- the Yuri Dolgoruky
-- but only one is under construction.
"It's really difficult to say how
many nuclear submarines Russia will have
on duty by 2010 -- two, four, five
or seven," said Pavel Felgenhauer, a leading
analyst.
The air force does not have
any plans for a new long-range nuclear
bomber or cruise missiles, analysts said.
The land forces alone have
a new weapon -- the Topol-M -- a
single-warhead missile, 10 of which were
deployed for the first time in
January.
But even if Russia meets its
goal of building between 35 and 40 Topol-Ms
a year, analysts say the nuclear forces
will still drop drastically. Some
officials advocate building multi-warhead
missiles, but this would break
the proposed START-2 agreement with the
United States.
The Communist-dominated Duma
repeatedly has refused to ratify the
treaty, which was approved by the U.S.
Senate in 1996 and would reduce each
side's nuclear arsenals to between 3,000
and 3,500 warheads by 2007.
Government officials say Moscow
must accept START-2 and seek a START-3
treaty to cut both sides to about 1,500
nuclear warheads as the only way to
give Russia some kind of parity.
Such drastic cuts are "dozens
of times more important for our country
than for the United States," said Popkovich,
warning that Russia cannot
afford any kind of arms race with Washington.
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