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Edited by David Johnson
| ISSUE #34 | February 5, 1999 |
The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and
analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic,
social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie
Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based
Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education
organization.
MOSCOW -- One third of Russians (33 percent)
said relations with the United
States over the past year took a turn
for the worse as shown in the results of
a poll carried among 1,500 urban and rural
Russians.
The Obshchestvennoye Mneniye, or
Public Opinion, fund on Jan. 23 said a
little
over one third (37 percent) feel that
U.S.-Russian relations remained
unchanged, and 12 percent believe they
became better over the year.
Closer contacts with the United
States are favored primarily by regional
urbanites (70 percent), people with higher
education and citizens under 35 (69
percent), and supporters of Moscow Mayor
Yury Luzhkov (76 percent). Those who
disapprove of better relations with the
United States are more often than not
supporters of Communist leader Gennady
Zyuganov (29 percent).
Boston, 4 February 1999 (RFE/RL) -- Azerbaijan's
attempt to involve U.S.
military forces in the Caspian Sea region
is seen as a terrible idea whose
time has unfortunately come.
The proposal advanced last month by
Azerbaijan's presidential adviser
Vafa Guluzade for an allied air base on
the Apsheron Peninsula has already
set off a wave of reactions and debates.
Russia has objected, particularly to
the idea that another power is
needed in the Caucasus to counter-balance
its influence. Iran has also
cited negative consequences of moving
NATO operations from Turkey's
Incirlik Air Base to Azerbaijan.
But interestingly, there have been
no categorical rejections of the idea
from the administration of U.S. President
Bill Clinton, NATO, Turkey or
Azerbaijan's President Heydar Aliyev.
U.S. officials have said only that
there are no plans for such a move under
consideration now.
The drawbacks of a U.S. military presence
in the region are almost too
numerous to count. But there are just
as many reasons why it appears
inevitable, if policies continue on their
current course.
On the negative side, another extension
of allied power may only succeed
in pushing Russia further into the uncooperative
posture that it has
already assumed. NATO expansion into Eastern
Europe has certainly not
improved U.S. relations with Moscow. Another
eastward step into the Caspian
would only confirm Russia's worst fears.
Russia would feel pressed to raise
defense spending at a time when its
economy demands that it be cut. Dim hopes
for arms control treaties would
disappear entirely. The old superpower
race would be recreated in the
Caucasus and Central Asia, but with one
very unstable adversary this time.
There are obvious questions about how
Caspian air space would be
managed, considering that the littoral
states have yet to agree on a legal
division of the seabed. Like Russia, Iran
would also feel encircled, given
the presence of U.S. forces in the Persian
Gulf to the south.
An eastward extension risks an outcry
in the United States that
commitments to the Gulf, Bosnia and now
Kosovo have already gone too far.
As important as the Caspian region is,
few Americans would be able to find
it on a map. U.S. forces could soon be
caught up in ethnic conflicts that
even fewer Americans understand.
For the Caspian countries themselves,
U.S. air cover is unlikely to
provide all the protection they want or
need, especially in an environment
of heightened tension that a foreign presence
could create. The result
would be spending sprees by each country
on new weapons systems, turning
the Caspian into another Persian Gulf,
where oil revenues are squandered on
defense. An officially neutral country
like Turkmenistan would be compelled
to take sides.
But for all the pitfalls, there are
temptations that may make U.S.
military involvement only a matter of
time.
Having said yes to Eastern Europe, the
U.S. and NATO may not be able to
close the door on a region that is seen
as a strategic prize. Eastern
Europe has had arguably more experience
with free markets, independence and
democracy. But it has no resources to
compare with the Caspian's oil.
Security for the planned Baku-Ceyhan
oil pipeline and the trans-Caspian
gas line may be impossible without some
U.S. role or credible support.
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova
have discussed a pipeline security
force in the group known as GUAM. Guluzade
has also proposed a formal
military alliance with Turkey, which would
try to make the region safe for
pipelines.
A side-benefit for the U.S. is that
it could still fly over northern
Iraq from Azerbaijan, if Turkey's misgivings
about patrols from Incirlik
continue to increase.
Azerbaijan's motive in seeking outside
help from both the U.S. and
Turkey is to offset Russia's bases and
weapons in Armenia. But ultimately,
if there is a settlement on Nagorno-Karabakh
and a withdrawal from
Azerbaijani territory, the call is sure
to go out again to U.S.
peacekeepers, or at least monitors, whether
under the auspices of NATO or
the OSCE.
Because of Russia's role in the region,
there may be no power other than
the United States, or U.S.-backed organizations,
that can serve as a
guarantor of peace. For better or for
worse, countries from Georgia to
Uzbekistan hope for U.S. solutions to
their security problems.
Officials have stepped carefully around
questions about how deeply the
United States would become involved. But
most discussions have focused on
the obstacles to a U.S. presence rather
than denials that military access
is a goal that would be desirable to achieve.
Washington has also worked tirelessly
to promote its interests in the
region, bending pipeline routes away from
Russia and Iran, despite the high
costs. Temptation to support that strategy
militarily is bound to grow,
just as debates over economic interest
have gradually blossomed into
arguments over U.S. national security.
Despite all the reasons to avoid it,
the U.S. will probably be drawn
into defending the interests which it
has created in the region. The
alternative is to step back and craft
a new policy that gives all nations
an economic interest in Caspian development.
So far, there is no sign of
that.
(Michael Lelyveld is chief correspondent
at the Journal of Commerce.
This analysis was written for RFE/RL)
Look Who's Sharing
Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, Center
for Defense Information
tvalasek@cdi.org
Even as the United States is planning
to build a national missile defense
system, Russia is fighting to keep its
existing anti-ballistic missile
complex together -- with assistance from
the United States.
Earlier this week, deputies of the parliament
in Azerbaijan suggested
shutting down the Russian radar station
in the Azeri city of Gabala
(also referred to as Lyaki in arms control
documents). The move came in
response to Moscow's deliveries of arms
to the Russian base in Armenia,
which Azerbaijan vehemently opposes. The
Gabala station does not appear
in danger of being shut down in the near
term, but its fate hangs in
balance. Its future will impact not only
Azerbaijan and Russia but has
direct bearing on U.S. security.
The collapse of the Soviet Union left
a number of radar stations,
indispensable to the ABM system, outside
of the territory of Russia.
Their radar beams detect and track oncoming
missiles and other air
traffic. To increase warning time, most
stations were built as far out as
possible on the periphery of the former
Soviet Union. But this translated
into political trouble after 1991 -- four
out of the five major radar
stations suddenly fell in the hands of
independent governments. Moscow was
left scrambling to negotiate with the
new governments in Ukraine, Latvia,
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to allow Russia
to continue operating the sites.
Azeri officials contend that the Gabala
station is illegal -- the
ABM treaty prohibits stationing ABM technology
outside the territory of
the United States and the then-Soviet
Union. A 1997 Memorandum of
Understanding expanded the list of ABM
Treaty signatories to include four
USSR-successor states: Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Two
countries with ABM radar stations did
not sign: Latvia and Azerbaijan.
Latvia reached a bilateral agreement with
Moscow in 1994 that allowed the
station in Skrunde to operate for four
more years. Its radars were turned
off in August 1998, and the entire station
is slated for dismantling by
2000. A new station in Baranovichi, Belarus
is being built to replace
Skrunde.
Russia and Azerbaijan have been talking
on and off since 1995 but failed
to reach a final agreement. Originally,
Russia asked for a 25 years lease,
which Azeri authorities rejected. They
offered a shorter term agreement
which would give Russia enough time to
relocate the station or build a new
one elsewhere. Azeris allege that the
use of freon and dumping of
contaminated coolants into the soil is
destroying the environment around
the station. Also, in case of a war, Azerbaijani
officials say, they don't
want their country to be targeted because
of the Russian radar station.
Then there is the politically sensitive
issue of the Russian military
personnel working at the station -- Azerbaijan
is wary of Russian
involvement in the region. The Baku government
has resisted Moscow's
attempts to build a military base there,
similar to the ones in
neighboring Armenia and Georgia.
The Gabala station is not strictly a
bilateral problem -- a false nuclear
alarm could send Russian intercontinental
missile flying out of their
silos and cause a global disaster. A 1995
flight of a Norwegian
scientific missile almost caused a launch
of nuclear missiles from
Russia. Only in the last moments did Moscow
determine that the missile
was not hostile.
John Pike, a space and missile expert
at the Federation of American
Scientists, said that a loss of the accurate,
Darya class radar at the
Azeri site cannot be fully replaced by
other means. Russian early-warning
satellites can only provide general information
about the ballistic
missile launches and their status is uncertain
anyway. Lower class
Dniestr radars in Kazakhstan are not accurate
enough to predict the impact
point of missiles. This is important --
Russia could resort to an all-out
launch of nuclear missiles if it suspects
that its command centers are
being targeted. Without the powerful radar
at Gabala, Russia would have
considerably less accurate information
on missiles coming from Iran,
Iraq, or U.S. Trident submarines in the
Indian Ocean. "Opening a gap in
Russian radar coverage," Pike said, "
would make Russian strategic forces
more accident-prone."
Holes in the radar coverage of the Russian
skies are being plugged by the
United States itself. Washington and Moscow
signed an agreement in 1998
on sharing information on ballistic missiles
and space launch vehicles.
Under the agreement, information derived
by Russia and the United States
from their space and ground-based stations
is processed by the countries
at their command centers, such as the
one at the Buckley Air Force base
in Denver, Colorado. The United States
and Russia would then send the
information to its counterpart on a virtual
real-time basis. The agreement
is intended to lower the risks of a false
alarm, such as the 1995
Norwegian missile scare, and to offset
any losses in radar coverages.
But any such agreements are only half-steps.
Only a significant reduction
or elimination of U.S. and Russian nuclear
arsenals can prevent an
accidental nuclear holocaust. The United
States and Russia have been
negotiating cuts in their missile and
bomb arsenals, but the talks appear
to have stalled. The Russian parliament
refuses to ratify the START II
Treaty and the United States seems bent
on constructing of a national
missile defense system, which Moscow contends
violates the ABM Treaty.
But until the tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons are taken off alert and
destroyed, any U.S.-Russian agreement
on information sharing can only hope
to slightly diminish the dangers the missiles
pose.
MOSCOW, Feb 2 (Interfax) -- Russia is unlikely
to attend the NATO
anniversary summit in Washington on April
23-25.
Well-informed sources told Interfax
that Moscow is considering the
possibility of timing a session of the
Russia-NATO Joint Permanent Council
during the summit and not attending the
meeting directly.
Council sessions are held at different
levels: ambassador, defense
minister, foreign minister.
The final decision depends "on the need
to clarify a number of
things."
It is important for the Russian side
to know what the new NATO
strategic concept to be approved by the
summit is like.
Moscow has expressed grave concern about
attempts to include in the
concept provisions that give NATO the
right to carry out military
operations without a mandate from the
U.N. Security Council and outside the
zone of its responsibility.
Sources say Moscow's decision will also
depend on whether fundamental
understandings are reached by April on
the adaptation of the CFE treaty and
on how the subject of alliance enlargement
will be handled in Washington.
Russia's official invitation was handed
to Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov during the ministerial meeting
of the Joint Permanent Council in
December.
Ivanov told the Russian journalists
accompanying him that the NATO
session in Washington would be held at
top level and Russia had been
invited.
He said the Russian side would closely
study the proposal and will
take into account all the circumstances,
including the decisions made in
Washington.
At the previous summit in Madrid in
July 1997, Russia was represented
by the then Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy
Serov and Deputy Foreign Minister
Nikolay Afanasyevskiy.
MOSCOW, Feb 3 (Interfax) -- Russia received
$84 million over the past
five years toward ensuring nuclear safety
under the Nunn-Lugar program,
head of the 12th department of the Defense
Ministry Igor Valynkin said at a
press conference in Moscow Wednesday [3
February].
These funds financed an increase in
the safety of the transportation
of nuclear weapons, their stockpiling
and accountability, Col. Gen.
Valynkin said. Over 100 railroad
cars and 250 containers for
transportation of nuclear weapons were
paid for from these funds, he said.
They also financed new engineering structures
and power cables to boost the
protection of nuclear installations, he
said.
A training base was established in Sergiyev
Posad outside Moscow to
"verify the staff's reliability," he said.
Around 5% of officers fail the
aptitude tests to work with nuclear arms.
Valynkin categorically denied Western
mass media reports on
misappropriation of the U.S. funds.
"Misappropriation or inappropriate use
of the equipment are out of the question,"
he said.
He expressed the hope that Russia and
the United States would agree on
financing the transportation of weapons
to dismantlement facilities. A
preliminary agreement on allocating a
further $80 million to Russia was
reached, he said.
Chief of General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin
is in charge of dealing with
the millennium bug problem in the computer
systems of the Armed Forces, he
said.
CHALLENGE: RUSSIA AND CHINA
Daunting as these challenges are, Mr.
Chairman, we cannot, in focusing
on them, overlook some more traditional
concerns in two nations of critical
importance to the United States: Russia
and China.
Russia
Let me start with Russia. Last year
I reported to you my view that
Russia's future direction—whether it develops
as a stable democracy,
reverts to the autocratic and expansionist
impulses of its past, or
degenerates into instability—remained
an open question. My concerns about
Russia's direction are greater today than
they were a year ago—largely
because Russia's deteriorating economy
elevates the ''uncertainty
quotient'' in a number of key areas.
Just one year ago, Russia had its problems,
but it had a basic sense of
direction and seemed to be moving forward,
however fitfully. Now, however,
Prime Minister Primakov is struggling
with mammoth problems. To his credit,
he has built a good relationship with
the legislature and gained passage of
some long overdue legislation. But the
nation is heading into a political
transition, facing difficult economic
choices, and possibly entering a
period in which it debates its future
political direction. This is playing
out against continuing instances of lawlessness
and growing public
sentiment for a stronger hand at the helm.
This could be a dangerous path
for a country with Russia's authoritarian
history, even though Russia has
now held successful elections and adopted
a constitution.
The sense of drift is accentuated by
the focus most political leaders
already have on the December 1999 Duma
elections and the June 2000
Presidential election. Very few are disposed
to take bold steps or new
initiatives that might risk additional
public ''pain'' right now.
Meanwhile, President Yeltsin's health
problems limit his involvement in
decisionmaking and place on Prime Minister
Primakov much of the
responsibility for the day-to-day management
of the country.
As the government ponders how to proceed,
the economic indicators grow more
worrisome. Russian consumers have been
hit hard by inflation—prices have
shot up 90 percent since late July—imports
of consumer goods have now
fallen sharply, unemployment has inched
up to nearly 12 percent and is
spreading to the emerging middle class,
and the economy will probably
contract by 6 to 8 percent this year.
This changed political dynamic and
the economic slide highlights the
foundation of my increased concern: Politically,
Russia is increasingly
unpredictable, and the worsening economic
situation affects all aspects of
the Russian scene, as the desperate search
for revenue streams is
exacerbating a number of serious problems:
For example, it has magnified the proliferation
threat across the board,
as growing financial pressures raise incentives
to transfer sensitive
technologies—especially to Iran.
It has also highlighted the patchwork,
inconsistent nature of Moscow's
relations with Russia's 89 regions—particularly
in the delineation of
fiscal powers and responsibilities. Alarm
bells rang in Moscow as dozens of
regions initially responded to the economic
crisis by imposing price
controls and limiting the flow of foodstuffs
and other goods outside their
regions....
Semipalatinsk's devastation was
only one of a series of man-made ecological
disasters in Kazakhstan, which was was
damaged more than perhaps any other
former Soviet state. In the eyes of authorities,
the territory's remoteness
- it is 44 percent desert and 33 percent
semidesert - and sparse
population, made it a prime place to test
bombs, dump dissidents, and
situate a space center. (The Baikonur
facility is jointly controlled with
Russia.)
Soviet planners also imposed the Virgin
Lands policy, which destroyed more
than 96,000 square miles of pasture lands
traditionally used by Kazakh
herders to grow wheat on the steppes.
They also ruined the Aral Sea. Once
the world's fourth-largest lake, its
volume has decreased by 75 percent since
the early 1960s as tributary
waters were siphoned off to irrigate cotton
fields.
At Semipalatinsk, as elsewhere in Kazakhstan,
the damage was done with
little concern for the local population.
But in this case, the danger was
easy to anticipate. Soviet scientists
even used people as subjects in their
nuclear research, just as they tested
the effects of bombs on vehicles,
bridges, and buildings.
Left to fend
"It was much worse than Hiroshima, Nagasaki,
or Chernobyl," says Herbert
Behrstock, the UN resident coordinator
in Kazakhstan. "There was no massive
effort to treat what was an extraordinary
man-made problem. People have
been left with the consequences and little
resources to deal with it."
Because the situation at Semipalatinsk
was shrouded in secrecy, military
workers on the site often didn't understand
the danger of their work.
Among them was Malguis Metov, now chairman
of the Semipalatinsk Veterans
Association, who employed at the site
as a soldier in 1961 and '62. At
work, he was outfitted with limited protective
gear: rubber boots and
gloves, a thin cotton outfit, plastic
goggles, and a respirator. But he
lived in buildings and drove vehicles
that had been contaminated by
radiation.
He describes an incident in August 1962
when a nuclear bomb exploded at the
surface - a mistake he later found out
"happened all the time."
"The black nuclear cloud moved toward
us and we fled in cars, driving
through the night to get away," Mr. Metov
says, "The next morning we
settled down in the steppes, but the wind
changed direction and the cloud
moved toward us."
He was demobilized the following year
due to health problems. Metov now
lives on a pension worth $84 a month and
cannot afford treatment.
The UN is appealing for $40 million
to deal with the aftermath of the
tests, from providing health care to finding
work for the 400,000 who lost
jobs with the shutdown of the Polygon
site.
"We hope this makes a difference," says
Maiden Abishev, vice president of
Nevada-Semipalatinsk, another advocacy
group. "We're angry our government
is doing nothing but welcome the interest
of the rest of the world."
According to a Bellona lawyer, Jon
Gauslaa, the easiest way to get
Nikitin out of the cycle of reinvestigations
now would be to appeal to the European
Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg,
France. But even if the Strasbourg court
accepts the appeal, it would take 1 1/2
years to be heard, Gauslaa said.
Since May, Russian citizens have had
the formal right to appeal to the
Strasbourg court after all domestic opportunities
have been exhausted.
However, at the moment, the Strasbourg
court does not have a Russian
representative, and therefore cannot hear
suits filed by Russian citizens.
Since Nikitin was first charged, he
has received seven awards from U.S. and
European environmental and human rights
organizations and while in jail was
named a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty
International - the first Russian to
be so distinguished since Andrei Sakharov.
MOSCOW DRAMATICALLY UPS ESTIMATE OF COSTS
TO FIGHT COMPUTER BUG. A top
Russian government official warned yesterday
that his country will need up
to US$3 billion to deal with the Year
2000 computer glitch. Russia had
previously downplayed the likely impact
of the Y2K problem, and the
government last year had estimated the
costs to counteract it at about
US$500 million. Yesterday, however, Aleksandr
Krupnov, chairman of the
Russian Central Telecommunications Commission,
said Russia had thoroughly
reviewed the problem and arrived at the
new, and significantly higher,
estimate.
What Krupnov did not say was how Russia's
cash-starved government was going
to pay that high a bill. With only 330
days left to resolve the problem,
Krupnov said only that each Russian government
agency would be responsible
for finding the necessary funding to solve
its own computer problems. He
also appealed to the United States and
NATO for help in fixing the computers
which control Russia's nuclear weapons.
Russia wants all sides to "speak the
same language" in addressing the Y2K problem,
Krupnov reportedly said.
"We're in a critical situation in several
areas"--including the Defense
Ministry. Krupnov also identified--in
addition to military facilities--oil
pipelines and airports as being particularly
vulnerable areas (AP, February
3; International Herald Tribune, February
4).
Western officials--both civilian and military--have
long expressed concern
over Russia's tardiness in tackling the
Y2K problem. Reacting to this
concern, Moscow appeared at last to get
in gear on January 14, when Prime
Minister Yevgeny Primakov reportedly ordered
the country's Defense and
Atomic Energy Ministries to prepare themselves
for any possible Y2K
problems. Then, on January 22, Primakov
ordered that a government
commission--headed by Deputy Prime Minister
Vladimir Bulgak--be created to
oversee efforts at counteracting the computer
glitch. Tellingly, however, he
did not indicate how much funding was
being allocated for the commission or
resolving the problem (see the Monitor,
January 27).
Krupnov's remarks yesterday came as the
director of the CIA, George Tenet,
told U.S. lawmakers that the Y2K bug could
interrupt energy flows "in
certain countries." Tenet suggested that
Europe was a potential victim of
this sort of mishap because it receives
more than one-third of its natural
gas from Russia. The Russian gas giant
Gazprom has apparently not yet dealt
in full with the Y2K problem. A Western
defense analyst, meanwhile, warned
that nuclear power plants in Russia--and
elsewhere in the world--could also
be among the facilities affected by the
computer bug. Paul Beaver, an
analyst with Jane's Information Group
in London, was quoted as saying that
"nuclear plants won't be able to get accurate
temperature information, and
you could have another Chernobyl" (AP,
February 3; International Herald
Tribune, February 4).
Western military specialists are reported
to be primarily concerned not with
a possible accidental launch of a nuclear
missile, but with the impact that
the Y2K bug could have on Russia's command
and control systems. A failure
there could cause Moscow to mistakenly
perceive a threat (AP, January 14).
With this concern in mind, the United
States has proposed putting Russian
officers in American control rooms and
American officers in Russian ones to
monitor the millennial changeover. According
to earlier reports, Pentagon
experts are also scheduled to visit Russia
on February 10-12 to share
information on the Y2K problem (Reuters,
January 26).
MOSCOW, February 3 (Itar-Tass) - Russian
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said
that the U.N. Charter's principle rejecting
the use of force or threat of
using force is "binding on all states."
"Any attempt to circumvent the U.N.
Security Council is fraught with
undermining the existing mechanism of
peace maintenance and with creating
chaos in international relations," Ivanov
said in an interview given to the
Peruvian newspaper El Comercio on Wednesday
in connection with the 30th
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic
relations between Moscow and
Lima.
Russia carries out an "active international
policy" and "will not backtrack
from the path it has chosen, whether it
is assistance in creating a multi-
polar world or a turn towards Latin America,"
the minister said.
He believes that "Russia's political
weight is too big to be ignored."
Ivanov recalled that Russia, as a permanent
member of the U.N. Security
Council, bears special responsibility
for global peace and security.
"This is an objective reality. It determines
the eighty role that our
country traditionally plays on the world
arena," he added.
Among Russia's foreign policy priorities,
Ivanov named strengthening global
stability, increasing the efficiency of
the United Nations as an universal
tool for achieving this goal, settling
regional conflict, ensuring an adequate
response to modern threats and challenges
that have been facing humankind
since the end of the Cold War.
"I think all these topics concern Latin
America too. By the way this is
quite natural because we live in an interdependent
world. The most important thing
now is to 'inoculate' democratic principles
of behavior to the international
community and ensure the force of law,
not right of force," Ivanov said.
Regional conflicts are a matter of concern
for the modern world, he noted.
"Our fundamental approach towards all
crises is the same -- conflicts
must be settled by political methods and
should not increase international tension or
confrontation," the minister said.
On Iraq, Ivanov said "we are firmly
committed to the implementation of UN
Security Council resolutions on Iraq,
primarily those concerning the
elimination of its potential weapons of
mass destruction.
In response to a question about Russia's
non-acceptance of US and British
air bombing strikes against Iraq, Ivanov
emphasised that "the matter is by no
means in some rivalry, still less over
the so-called spheres of influence".
"Our negative reaction to the use of force
against Iraq was accounted for by
the fact that that was unjustified and
counterproductive in every respect,"
the Russian Foreign Minister pointed out.
He believes that the unilateral
actions by the United States and Britain
only made it still more difficult to
find solutions to the "Iraq problem".
It is now essential to work out adequate
solutions within the UN framework,
solutions which would make it possible,
on the one hand, fully to implement
the above-mentioned UN Security Council
resolutions on Iraq, and, on the other
hand, to keep the settlement process within
the political field, Ivanov pointed out.
Accepting food aid in the form of
loans from the U.S. government was
always a stupid idea. These loans aren't
about helping poor Russians, but about
furthering the career interests of a handful
of U.S. and Russian bureaucrats.
The Americans with the Clinton administration's
U.S. Department of
Agriculture get to brag about prying open
Russian grain and poultry markets, which
will help line up the Midwest farm vote.
The Russians with Yevgeny Primakov's
Cabinet get to strike collusive insider
deals involving millions of dollars of
Western money, and to do so with a USDA
seal of moral approval.
When talk of this ill-considered deal
first surfaced in October, there
was so much to criticize it was hard to
know where to start: Without any public
participation, and in response to a phantom
threat of mass hunger (where's
that mass hunger now?), Russian bureaucrats
took on hundreds of millions of
dollars in new sovereign debts (!) so
as to buy American wheat, which is three
times more expensive than Russian wheat
(!!). The Russian delegation was led
by Deputy Prime Minister Gennady Kulik,
a man under a cloud of corruption
allegations (!!!), who announced that
the impending famine situation was too
critical to waste time on "lots of blah
blah" about bidding and tenders (!!!!)
- clearing the way for the government
to chose scandal-tarred companies like
Roskhleboprodukt to distribute the aid.
The Americans responded by announcing
they would task an entire two people (!!!!!)
to monitor food aid distribution.
If American bureaucrats really want
to help Russians, they could practice
the free-market ideology they have peddled
so ardently here, and not block Russian
steel from the American market.
If Russian bureaucrats really want to help
their countrymen, they could buy
three times as much wheat domestically
for the same price - and supported
Russian agriculture instead of undercutting
it with U.S.-Russian-government
subsidized competition. There is plenty
of Russian wheat around - Russia has
been exporting tons, to the discomfort
of the aid deal brokers.
As to those exports, it turns out the
apparatchiki in Moscow and Washington
are on the verge of a breakthrough. Reality
is not conforming to their
bureaucratic expectations - so they are
preparing to alter reality: a top
Russian official says Primakov may soon
outlaw grain exports.
If this final stupidity is carried out,
Russia's sickly domestic agriculture
sector will wilt further - but at least
no one will be able to criticize the
aid deal over those inconvenient exports.
Now, if only the population could be
made to look a bit more deservedly hungry
and desperate ...
Rossiyskaya Gazeta
29 January 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Vladimir Kuznechevskiy,
under the rubric
"Politics in Persons": "How Would You
Like Us To Live/Die? Western,
and in Their Wake, Some Domestic Experts
Are Seriously Discussing
the Imminent and Inevitable Disintegration
of Russia. While Public
Opinion Polls Show That Russians Support
a Completely Opposite
View"
"The New World Order"
It appears 17 August 1998 is gradually
moving up to the rank
of another date--25 October (old-style)
1917, that is, it is
becoming an epoch-marking watershed in
the history of new
Russia.
Three days ago, the BBC published a
conclusion typical for the
modern West: Lately, a rather serious
change has been taking place
in the mindset of US ruling circles. "While
in the past they said
that a tougher policy towards Russia would
lead to negative changes
in the domestic political situation in
Russia, and therefore a
policy of compromise and search for some
accord with Moscow was in
order, a different viewpoint has come
to dominate the field now. Its
substance is that more attention ought
to be paid to what is
happening in Russia, since Russia is weak,
unconsolidated, and is
incapable of being an active player in
the foreign policy
arena."
This position, both inside and outside
of our country, is
linked with a word previously unknown
to the Russian language, short
like a pistol shot: default. Inside the
country, the default marks
the end of the liberal revolution in Russia
that began on 23 August
1991, and outside--the complete write-off
of Russia as an equal
international partner for the strong powers,
first and foremost the
United States.
To put it briefly, half a year after
17 August of last year
Western public opinion came to the conclusion
that the Kiriyenko
government pushed the country into bankruptcy
and opened up the way
to Russia's final disintegration into
separate territories. Leading
Western weeklies and monthlies spat out
en masse various
commentaries sharing a common conclusion:
that of the imminent and
inevitable disintegration of Russia. In
a fatherly tone, specialists
are suggesting to Russians the most acceptable
disintegration
formulae and models. These publications
are being happily reprinted
by the Russian press and accompanied by
Russian experts'
commentaries.
What is surprising is not these publications
appearing in our
country per se, but the servility with
which Russian ideologists
listen to them. Here are two typical examples
in this
respect.
In the summer of last year, Zbigniew
Brzezinski published the
book "The Great Chess Board: America's
Pre-Eminence and Its
Geostrategic Imperatives." The book was
immediately translated into
Russian under the neutral title "The Great
Chess Board." Talking to
a Russian journalist about his research,
the author ingenuously
says: "I wanted to show how to make American
hegemony stable, but at
the same time create the conditions for
it to be transformed into a
broad system of international cooperation,"
since "America's
domination in the world helps in the establishment
of democratic
systems." The author proposes to establish
a "new world order" in
international relations under the auspices
of the United
States.
The mind-boggling simplicity in formulating
the goal: Let the
whole world surrender to America, because
it (the world) will only
be better off for that.
Happiness--Forcibly and At Any Cost
And there are no illusions regarding
the fact that such
aspirations already have been known in
the history of humanity. And
failed. I am not talking about Hitler's
Germany, which also wanted
to bless the world with a "new order."
And not even about the author
of Ecclesiastes, who said in times immemorial:
"There is nothing new
under the Sun. Sometimes, something happens
that causes people to
say: 'Look, this is new;' but it has already
happened in times
before us." I am talking about a much
more amazing thing.
In 1920, Russian writer Yevgeniy Zamyatin
wrote the novel
"We," which started with these words:
"I am simply copying--verbatim--what
was printed today in
Gosydarstvennaya Gazeta: 'In 120 days,
the construction of the
Integral will be completed. A great moment
in history is nearing.
Thousands of years ago our forebears subjugated
the entire planet to
the authority of the Unified State. You
will be accomplishing an
even greater heroic deed: ...You will
subjugate to the benevolent
yoke of reason unknown creatures living
on other planets, perhaps
still in the savage state of freedom.
If they do not understand that
we are bringing them mathematically flawless
happiness, it is our
duty to force them to be happy." Did the
American political
scientist perchance borrow his idea of
hegemony from the Russian
writer?
And here is another example. A whole
page in a newspaper under
the huge banner "Russia will disintegrate..."--a
reprint of an
article from the American magazine New
Republic.
The problem, of course, is not the reprint
itself but that in
an accompanying commentary two Russian
authors dutifully, in the key
of the methodology suggested by the American
magazine, pontificate
at length that in a hundred years there
may indeed be a population
of only 50 million, or maybe even less,
left in Russia, that the
Russian language may turn into Americanized
slang, that culture and
the arts will lose their national character,
and so on. It is hard
to explain such obedience, but this is
a rather widespread
phenomenon here these days. In the same
interview with Brzezinski,
the Russian journalist says that "there
is much that is interesting
and educational even in what sounds unpleasant.
And some things we
should simply take as sound advice" in
the American political
scientist's revelations.
That is, what strikes one here is not
so much the absence of
will to resist the funeral marches proposed
for us as the fact that
all Western recommendations are accepted
as something inarguable,
something that must come true. But this
is not necessarily
so.
Take the same Brzezinski. His almost
biological hatred for all
things Russian is legendary. What should
be acknowledged is that he
does have the will to fight the Soviet
Union, and later Russia. Just
as the Roman consul Marcus Cato (234-149
B.C.), who remained in the
memory of civilized humanity as an irreconcilable
enemy of Carthage,
since at every senate meeting he dully
repeated the same phrase,
which went down in history: "Carthage
must be destroyed." When it
comes to arguments, though, Brzezinski
does not always get it right.
I remember how in the middle of 1991
I happened to come across a CIA
report on the fate of the USSR. The report
predicted the imminent
(imminent!) departure of the CPSU from
the political arena and the
disintegration of the USSR along ethnic
borders--after the year
2020. The report was dated March 1991.
Four months later (rather
than two decades) the CPSU no longer existed,
and in three more
months the Soviet Union followed it. I
heard that the author of "The
Great Chess Board" participated in the
report's preparation.
Horrible Forecasts Instead of CalculationsIt
should be mentioned in
general that 20th century humanitarian
sciences found themselves unprepared
for the cataclysms of the departing century
and are now demonstrating their
unpreparedness to predict the 21st century's
events and problems as
well.
Both in the West and in Russia. The
recipes for reforming the
economy, which the West in the persona
of its most authoritative
organizations (the IMF, the World Bank,
and so forth) proposed to
Russia, have led our country into a dead
end. But neither were our
domestic economists able to offer anything
sensible, except
lamentations that their recommendations
are not being listened to.
All the economic maitres did was criticize
the actions of every
single Russian government. To this day,
none was able to come up
with a rational forecast of the country's
development--long- or
short-range. In reality, it was precisely
the helplessness of
science that vacated the forecasting field
for charlatans
(astrologists and such), who today are
edifying us with colorful
descriptions of what will (will not) happen
to our country.
One can understand the current prime
minister when after
several months on the job he sadly remarked,
addressing the old-
guard economic wisemen: "Guys, would you
please come closer to
earth..."
Where then can we find a source of optimism
and confidence in
today's reality? Fortunately, there is
such an address--in our own
people. They are much more perspicacious
and confident of the
future. Both their own and Russia's.
Numerous public opinion surveys in Russia,
conducted after 17
August of last year, including those in
January 1999, show that
there is, of course, pessimism regarding
Russia's near future, and
the prospect of the country's disintegration
is not fully denied by
any age group of Russian citizens. But
these pessimists are in the
absolute minority. For instance, among
officials--that is, the
people on whom the course of integration
and disintegration
processes actually depends--the ratio
of those who believe
disintegration to be possible or impossible
is 32:65. Among the
military: 36:54. One can agree with the
conclusion of the VTsIOM
[All-Russian Center for Public Opinion
Studies] that the hypotheses
of expectations regarding the "country's
disintegration" can be
considered checked out and proven unfounded.
[Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Government daily
newspaper.]
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