However, there has been a dispute - or an exchange of opinions on Chechnya, and neither of the sides has changed its position. But the regular exchange of information on Islamic terrorism, which bothers not only Moscow, seems to have played its role. Judging by some things, Ms. Albright has taken on trust, at least for the time being, Moscow's words that the large-scale military operation is nearing completion and this would remove all the questions.

What is even more important, the sides agreed to promote discussions on all the key issues of bilateral relations, including the START-3 Treaty, without waiting for the outcome of the presidential elections in Russia. They also agreed to hold consultations "from the standpoint of using the START-2 Treaty while the ABM Treaty is preserved." This is a very interesting twist, though it is a long way yet to concrete agreements.

The main result of yesterday's and the entire series of previous Russia-West talks is that the sides are "back to the norm." Boycotts, embargoes, ultimatums and so on, and so forth, the threat of which hovered during the decline of the Yeltsin era and the dawn of the new one, are now in the past. "The norm" does not mean, however, that easy times lie ahead for Russian diplomacy.

Mr. Putin has been the biggest beneficiary of the Chechen campaign. Many analysts now believe that his swift rise from obscurity to acting president was orchestrated by an alliance of military generals, Kremlin insiders, security forces and wealthy financiers who plotted the war as a key element of their strategy.

The latest revelation comes from Sergei Stepashin, a former Russian interior minister who served briefly as prime minister last year. He disclosed that the Kremlin began planning the Chechen campaign last March -- six months before the Moscow bombings that served as the pretext for the army operation.

Even if the bombings had never occurred, he said, Russia would have sent its troops into Chechnya to capture the territory north of the Terek River. Mr. Putin has soared to power on the popularity of the Chechen campaign. If the war was planned in advance, it lends credence to charges that the Kremlin launched the war in order to manipulate public opinion in favour of its preferred candidate.

Some analysts say Mr. Stepashin was sacked last August because he refused to go along with this plan, while Mr. Putin was chosen as his replacement because he had the tough image required to exploit the plan properly.

One of Russia's most famous human-rights activists, Yelena Bonner, charged last week that the Chechen campaign was staged deliberately to bring Mr. Putin to power.

Russian police have never brought anyone to trial in connection with the bombings, which killed almost 300 people in Moscow and other cities, and have never provided convincing evidence that Chechens were behind the attacks. The authorities bulldozed the bombing sites within days, preventing any independent probe.

Some Moscow newspapers are speculating that the bombings were organized by the Russian military or the former KGB, now known as the FSB. The theory gained weight last September when mysterious strangers were spotted planting explosives in the basement of an apartment building in the city of Ryazan. It took almost 24 hours before the FSB announced that the incident was merely a "training exercise" -- an explanation that some Ryazan residents still don't believe.

One Russian analyst, Boris Kagarlitsky, has charged that the Russian military intelligence service was involved in the Moscow bombings. He published his allegations last month in Novaya Gazeta, a well-respected independent Russian weekly newspaper.

Less than six months ago, Mr. Putin was an unknown bureaucrat and taciturn ex-KGB agent. Plucked from obscurity, he is now the overwhelming favourite to become president in next month's election.

Under the Russian constitution, Mr. Putin holds vast powers. His influence is bolstered by the widespread support he has mobilized among the Russian parliament and ordinary Russians.

But the question that preoccupies Russian analysts now is whether Mr. Putin himself wields those powers, or whether he is beholden to the shadowy forces that appear to have engineered his rise.

Mark Galeotti, an expert on the Russian military who is director of the Organized Russian and Eurasian Crime Research Unit at Keele University in Britain, says his intelligence sources have confirmed that Mr. Putin struck a deal with the Russian military last Sept. 20.

Under the pact, he said, Russian military chief of staff Anatoly Kvashnin promised that his troops would deliver a victorious war in Chechnya to boost Mr. Putin's political career. In return, Mr. Putin promised a big increase in the military budget and a free hand to the military to conduct the war without political interference.

If this was so, both sides have delivered. The army has provided enough battlefield victories in northern Chechnya to solidify Mr. Putin's image as a strong and popular leader. The war has been conducted without political interference. And last week, Mr. Putin announced a 50-per-cent increase in Russia's budget for military equipment.

Mr. Putin, however, is not only indebted to military commanders and security services. He could not have gained power without the financial and organizational help of the "oligarchs," the wealthy businessmen who wield enormous political influence.

Financiers and bankers such as Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Potanin, Anatoly Chubais, Lev Chyornye and Mikhail Friedman are believed to have funded the election candidates of Unity, the pro-Kremlin party that became Mr. Putin's main vehicle in the parliamentary election in December.

In other words, the government has:

1) Detained a well-known journalist.

2) Kept him for 18 days without ever once producing any proof he is OK. The authorities did not let Babitsky's supporters, or even the Red Cross, see him; they did not release even any video footage of his condition.

3) Sold him, like chattel, to people the Russian government insists are "terrorists" and "criminals."

4) Announced that it has washed its hands of the matter - regardless of whether Babitsky turns up alive, dead or worse.

This can in no way be characterized as "a prisoner exchange." It is a slave auction.

Why do this? It could be a clumsy effort at intimidating or compromising journalism critical of the execution of the war (by associating Babitsky with "terrorists.") Or it could be that the Russians have tortured Babitsky, or killed him, and are now trying to cover it up. Either way, it is disgusting behavior on the government's part.

Yastrzhembsky says Babitsky "agreed" to this arrangement; but if that logic could stand up in courts, then none of us would be safe. People across Moscow would be disappearing, to be replaced by strangers claiming they had "agreed" to go away and leave behind their apartments, and cars, and lives ...

The authorities are within their rights if they choose to detain a journalist in a war zone, to check documents or whatever. They can of course even bring criminal charges against such a person, if they believe there is cause - provided, of course, the matter is then handed to the courts. (And provided that frivolous criminal charges are duly punished as harassment).

But the authorities had already abused their powers and Babitsky's rights by detaining Babitsky for so long; that they have now literally traded him, as a commodity in some weird barter arrangement, is a clear crime.

Yastrzhembsky's claim that the Russian authorities are no longer responsible for Babitsky is beneath contempt. If Babitsky ever emerges from Chechnya, he should respond by taking the most aggressive legal action imaginable. He should file suits against the Russian government in every court on the planet, from Moscow to The Hague.

The unexpected withdrawal from Grozny has apparently strengthened the hand of Shamil Basayev at the expense of President Aslan Maskhadov. The retreat violates Maskhadov's order to the defenders to hold the capital until February 23. Basayev, a hero of the 1994-96 war and one of the participants in the August invasion of Dagestan which triggered the current war, has emerged as the spokesman for Chechen operations on rebels' web site, kavkaz.org. The change in leadership would all but bury the already slim chances for a negotiated settlement. Although Russian officials refused to speak to Maskhadov directly, they are known to have established a lower-level contact with the Chechen president. Because of Basayev's role in the Dagestan invasion, the Chechen commander is certain to be rejected as a negotiating partner.

The rebels are now apparently retreating to the south and south-east of Chechnya to seek refuge in the mountains on the border with Georgia and Dagestan. Whether they manage to link up with the troops currently fighting there is still uncertain. The Russian forces are intent on blocking the Chechens' withdrawal. On Wednesday, Russian forces shelled the village of Alkhan-Kala where a large number of retreating fighters were regrouping. Igor Sergeev, the Russian Defense Minister, claims that 600 Chechens were killed fleeing Grozny. The Chechens claim that only 43 died while a further 2,970 escaped.

If the Chechens succeed at regrouping in the mountains, Russia will have several military options at its disposal. Moscow can decide to isolate the rebels in the mountains without engaging them. In the 1995-96 war, however, the Chechens answered Russian attempts to sideline them in the mountains with blitz raids against cities in neighboring Dagestan and Russia itself. The Chechens later managed to trickle back to the capital of Grozny with enough fighters to surround the 12,000 Russian troops in the city. Moscow, realizing the high political and economic cost of holding on to Chechnya, simply withdrew.

To avoid a repeat of the 1996 events, Moscow would have to guard against Chechen moves through the republic -- a feat impossible without repressive actions against the civilian population, who the fighters use as a disguise and a source of supplies. Already, Russian forces began detaining all men of fighting age in "filtration camps," which were notorious for miserable living conditions, torture, and executions during the 1994-96 war. Short of destroying the countryside, as Tzarist troops did in the 19th century, or repatriating the entire Chechen population, as Stalin did in 1947, controlling the movement of all Chechens throughout the province may turn out to be an impossible task. The Xinhua news agency quoted Russian officials as saying that Moscow plans to station 15,000 troops in Chechnya after the war ends. This number -­ roughly the amount of Russian troops in Grozny when it was retaken by the Chechens in 1996 -­ would clearly be insufficient to prevent Chechen counterattacks. Currently Russia has some 93,000 troops in the region, according to Kremlin spokesman Sergei Yastrzembsky.

Pursuing the Chechen fighters in the mountains could prove equally difficult. The terrain makes the use of artillery and tanks almost impossible, removing the main advantage Russia has enjoyed over the lightly armed Chechen fighters.

If the Russian military wants to engage the rebels on foot, it will have to commit a substantial number of personnel and be prepared to tolerate high casualties. In the 19th century Russian campaign against contemporary North Caucasus rebel Imam Shamil some 500,000 troops were needed to put down the revolt. The technological edge the Russian enjoy over the Chechens today will remove the need for so many troops, but some of that advantage will be lost in Chechnya's mountains. In an indication that Russia may be readying to fight the rebels in their mountain holdouts, Moscow is sending 3,500 paratroopers to Chechnya, The Times of London reported. These elite units trained in close combat and survival skills could be Moscow's most effective weapon in the mountains.

The unexpected scandal in the new State Duma lower house of parliament ­ which the minority factions have called a plot hatched by the pro-Putin Unity (Yedinstvo) party and the Communists ­ has only given more scope for guessing games.

Human rights campaigner Sergei Kovalyov expressed his indignation at what he called "lowdown tactics," and he indicated that events in the Duma point to Vladimir Putin’s intentions ­ as a former member of the secret services ­ to act in the Communist Party’s interests.

This is hardly likely. More probably, the scandal resulted from a number of tactical errors made by the new "party of power." In any event, Putin, in his first public comments on the issue, hastened to say that the Communists’ program concerning review of privatization, confiscation and nationalization is unacceptable.

There’s no reason to doubt his sincerity on that count: Putin is a pragmatic man without ideological ties, and the Communists’ proposals would cause the kind of upheaval that no reasonable politician would risk.

But the bid for political consolidation and stability hides another risk ­ that of stagnation of reforms at their present, incomplete stage. Russia’s economy is in such a serious state that not taking a few decisive, radical steps today will ensure another flare-up in the near future.

The budget crisis, which began in the mid-1980s, has not been overcome and remains a headache. It makes solving all social and economic problems difficult and will therefore be the determining factor for political stability.

Coming out of the budget crisis would require seeing through market reforms to their completion. That means plucking up the courage to perform complicated "social surgery." Boris Yeltsin’s era of upheaval, made worse by the Chechen tragedy, was always throwing up new and more urgent challenges.

A "window of opportunity" for radical economic therapy opened briefly in the early days of Viktor Chernomyrdin’s tenure as prime minister. But as the previous Premier Yegor Gaidar has said, Chernomyrdin hadn’t yet completed his "economic education." Putin, on the other hand, should he win the elections, will have a "window of opportunity" right from the start.

Since reforms began, there hasn’t been such an advantageous situation for the government as in 1999-2000. During little more than a year, world oil prices have tripled, bringing Russia an extra $6 billion in export earnings in 1999 over 1998 levels.

At the same time, the ruble devalued more than fourfold after Aug. 17, 1998, decreasing the social burden on the budget while not giving rise to increased social tension. The domestic political situation is calmer than ever before.

There are two clear reasons for this. First, devaluation of the ruble led to increased industrial output and thus increased employment, and second, the government took advantage of devaluation to pay off its wage and pension debts, which had previously been constantly on the increase.

Experts think that these positive 1999 factors could have a greater effect in 2000 and, to a greater or lesser extent, over the following two years. The new president will have three years in which to work more or less undisturbed in the interests of reform.

So far, Putin’s promises have been fairly general, signaling equally either future radical liberal reform or future stagnation. Only a return to the Communist past has been rejected.

"There can be no market if the state is weak," Putin told an annual convention of judicial officials. He said the state should not meddle in the economy but must lay down "clear rules" that would apply to all market participants.

The Chechen dilemma

Secondly, Yeltsin and his protégé counted on the Chechen campaign to be won well before the election, establishing Putin's image as the man who has restored Russia's international prestige. Although Moscow seized as an excuse on several terrorist bombings, which, without providing the evidence, it attributed to Chechens, and the ill-advised attempt of Chechen fundamentalists to raise the flag of rebellion in neighboring Dagestan, it is know known that the campaign against Chechnya had been planned months before these events took place -- perhaps as early as February-March 1999. Originally intended as a limited operation, it was expanded into an all-out war by Putin to reestablish Russia as a power to be reckoned with and to avenge the humiliation suffered as Chechen hands in the previous conflict. Putin subsequently defined Chechnya as "the place where Russia's future is being decided."

The full-scale assault on Chechnya may have been a miscalculation. After quickly seizing the undefensible and undefended flat northern half of the country and in this manner raising enormously Putin's prestige, the Russian army, moving south ran into stiff resistance. The demoralized and undisciplined Russians, made up partly of raw recruits and partly of mercenaries more interested in looting and raping than winning the war, have been bogged down in Groznyi, unable, despite relentless bombing, to seize the center of the city. Repeated promises of quick victory notwithstanding, it is nowhere in sight. As casualties mount, Putin's popularity is dropping: recent polls indicate that it has declined from nearly 60% to 48%.

Return to the old?

Putin's views and intentions are far from clear. In some remarks, he extols reform and democracy; in others, he insists that Russia is ready neither for democracy nor free-market economy. What Russia wants, he has declared recently, is "the restoration of a guiding and regulatory role of the state." One suspects that the former statements are meant for the ears of western powers whose credits and investments Russia desperately needs, while the latter are addressed to the large segment of the electorate which is tired of turmoil and yearns for a return to the security of the Soviet era.

What bolsters this interpretation is the deal Putin struck with the Communists after the parliamentary elections. Calling for the sharing of the most important committee assignments between the pro-Putin party, Unity, and the Communists, the deal shut out rival parties. This alliance displays a disturbing lack of principle on Putin's part in that it cold-shoulders parties which stand for reform, his avowed objective, and makes common front with the leading opponents of reform.

-------------------------------------------------- 
Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Dec 31- 
Jan 4 
-------------------------------------------------- 
I'm confident that 
I shall not vote 3 15 12 12 10 9 
I doubt that I 
shall vote 7 9 8 10 7 8 
I don't know whether 
I shall vote at all 15 14 13 16 13 14 
Most likely I shall 
vote 21 20 20 16 16 19 
I know for sure that 
I shall vote (unless 
something happens to 
me prior to this) 39 38 44 44 52 46 
Hesitant 5 4 3 2 2 4 
-------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------- 
Jan Jan Jan 
6-10 14-17 21-24 
-------------------------------------- 
I'm confident that 11 8 11 
I shall not vote 
I doubt that I 8 6 7 
shall vote 
I don't know whether 12 18 17 
I shall vote at all 
Most likely I shall 20 20 20 
vote 
I know for sure that 
I shall vote (unless 
something happens to 48 46 43 
me prior to this) 1 2 2 
Hesitant 
---------------------------------------

Comparing the data of the poll with the real participation during the previous elections, it may be presumed that this time about 53% of electors would participate. Whom of the following politicians you would most likely vote for at the elections of the Russian President, if they were held next Sunday? (Only the answers of those who intend to participate are given).

--------------------------------------------------- 
Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Dec 31- 
Jan 4 
--------------------------------------------------- 
1. V. Putin 2 4 21 42 50 56 
2. G. Zyuganov 26 27 20 18 15 14 
3. Ye. Primakov 19 19 16 11 9 10 
4. G. Yavlinsky 9 9 7 5 4 3 
5. V. Zhirinovsky 7 3 3 2 2 2 
6. A. Tuleyev -*/ - - - - - 
7-12. Yu. Skuratov, 
K. Titov, A.Barkashov, 
U. Dzhabrailov, 
A. Podberezkin, less than 1 
L. Ubozhko 
Other 29 25 21 11 9 7 
Against all 1 2 1 2 2 1 
Hesitant 7 11 11 9 9 7 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
*/ - were not included in the list of offered candidates 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------- 
Jan Jan Jan 
6-10 14-17 21-24 
-------------------------------------------- 
1. V. Putin 56 62 58 
2. G. Zyuganov 18 15 16 
3. Ye. Primakov 8 5 6 
4. G. Yavlinsky 3 2 4 
5. V. Zhirinovsky 2 2 3 
6. A. Tuleyev - 2 1 
7-12. Yu. Skuratov, 
K. Titov, A.Barkashov, 
U. Dzhabrailov, 
A. Podberezkin, less than 1 
L. Ubozhko 
Other 6 4 1 
Against all 1 1 2 
Hesitant 6 7 8 
--------------------------------------------

With regard for this issue, the data can be compared conditionally, taking into account the fact that until January 14, 2000 the polls used a different list of potential candidates. Changes in the data within the limits of measurement accuracy (4%) are insignificant. Who, in your opinion, will become the next President of Russia?

--------------------------------------------------- 
Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Dec 31- 
Jan 4 
--------------------------------------------------- 
1. Vladimir Putin 5 7 17 33 52 65 
2. Gennady Zyuganov 11 9 7 7 5 4 
3. Yevgeny Primakov 14 11 12 5 5 2 
Other (less than 1%) 23 17 13 7 6 2 
Hesitant 47 56 51 48 32 27 
---------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------- 
Jan Jan Jan 
6-10 14-17 21-24 
--------------------------------------- 
1. Vladimir Putin 63 67 69 
2. Gennady Zyuganov 5 4 4 
3. Yevgeny Primakov 2 1 1 
Other (less than 1%) 4 4 2 
Hesitant 26 24 24 
---------------------------------------

The above data are not a forecast of the voting results. The list of candidates will most likely differ significantly from the preliminary one which was used in the poll. Apart from this, a considerable part of voters have not yet decided as regards their participation in the elections and their preferences. What personal qualities, in your opinion, should the President of Russia have, first of all? (Here and in the next question it is possible to choose up to five offered options of the answers, which are given together with the data of the similar poll of VTsIOM carried out in January 1996.)

------------------------------------------------------- 
1996 2000 
------------------------------------------------------- 
1. Intellect 60 66 
2. Honesty, decency 57 63 
3. The experience of a politician 49 48 
4. Strong will 34 38 
5. The experience of a manager 38 37 
6. The ability to listen to others and 
seek compromise 30 31 
7. Qualities of a leader 30 29 
8. Cultural and educational background 23 20 
9. Unselfishness 18 19 
10. Composure and good temper 20 17 
11. Ideological conviction 13 8 
12. Personal charm 7 5 
Other 1 1 
Hesitant 5 2 
-------------------------------------------------------- 

It is also of interest to compare the answers received in the poll with the data on how the respondents who gave their answers had voted on party lists at the elections to the State Duma in December 1999. Thus, intellect, and also honesty and decency and, apart from that, cultural and educational background stand high, above the average level, in the esteem of the supporters of the Union of Right Forces and least of all in the esteem of the supporters of the Zhirinovsky bloc. The experience of a politician is most of all attractive for the supporters of Yabloko and least of all for the supporters of the Union of Right Forces. Strong will most frequently is required by the supporters of the Zhirinovsky bloc and least of all by the supporters of the OVR. The requirement for the experience of a manager is most of all typical of those who voted for the OVR and least of all of those who cast their votes for the Zhirinovsky bloc. The ability to listen to others and seek compromise is attractive for the supporters of the Union of Right Forces and least of all for those who voted for the OVR. The qualities of a leader are most frequently needed by those who gave their votes for the Zhirinovsky bloc and least of all by those who voted for the KPRF. Unselfishness is attractive most of all for the supporters of the KPRF and least of all for the supporters of the Union of Right Forces. Composure and good temper are most of all valued by those who voted for Yabloko and least of all by the supporters of the KPRF and the Zhirinovsky bloc. Ideological conviction as the quality of the future President stands high in the esteem of the electorate of the Zhirinovsky bloc and the KPRF and is least of all valued by Yabloko. And vice versa, personal charm was noted, first of all, by the supporters of Yabloko and least of all by the supporters of the Zhirinovsky bloc and the KPRF. What, in the first place, do you expect from the President whom you could vote for?

-------------------------------------------------------- 
1996 2000 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
1. To do away with the war in Chechnya 59 56 
2. To return to Russia the status of 
a great and respected power 54 55 
3. To strengthen law and order 58 54 
4. To ensure fair distribution of 
incomes in the interests of 
ordinary people 37 43 
5. To return to ordinary people 
the means they lost during reform 38 38 
6. To strengthen the role of the state 
in the economy 37 37 
7. To continue reform but with greater 
emphasis on social protection of 
the population 35 35 
8. To keep Russia on the way of reform 13 12 
9. To carry out policy towards 
re-unification of former Soviet 
republics 13 10 
10. To continue the course towards 
closer relations with Western nations 6 8 
Other 1 2 
Hesitant 5 3 
----------------------------------------------------------- 

Measures to do away with the war in Chechnya are most of all awaited by the supporters of the Union of Right Forces and Yabloko and least of all by the KPRF and the Zhirinovsky bloc. Most frequently, those who voted for the KPRF and the Zhirinovsky bloc want the return of the status of a great power and least of all this is desired by the Yabloko electorate. The supporters of the Union of Right Forces want most of all the strengthening of law and order, while least of all this is desired by the supporters of the OVR. Those who voted for the Zhirinovsky bloc and the KPRF hope strongly for the fair distribution of incomes and the return of lost money and least of all this is desired by the supporters of the Union of Right Forces. The strengthening of the role of the state in the economy would be most of all desired by the KPRF electorate and least of all by the supporters of the Union of Right Forces. The continuation of reform with greater emphasis on social security is expected most of all from the future President by those who voted for Yabloko and least of all by those who voted for the Zhirinovsky bloc. The keeping of Russian on the way of reform is desired most of all by the supporters of the Union of Right forces and least of all by the KPRF electorate.

While the scene appears little different from that of decades past, there is a change afoot, heralded by the huge yellow sign hanging over the entrance. It advertises a web site - (www.yarmarka.com ) - where the babushkas can order their groceries at the click of a mouse.

The dotcom revolution that has so changed American life is remolding Russia too, if more slowly. The number of Net users has doubled over the past 12 months to 2 million - about 1.4 percent of the population. And just like wired societies in the West, Russians can now check their bank accounts, reserve plane tickets, and book opera seats online.

Even Russia's acting president, Vladimir Putin, is getting into the act. Although widely considered a throwback to the old days of a sterner state, Mr. Putin chose to publish his political manifesto on a new government Web site launched Dec. 27 (www.pravitelstvo.gov.ru ). In an introductory statement, the site declares, "The significance of this development is well beyond another official public information channel taking off in the Internet. In fact that means a fundamental turnabout in government information policies. From now on, the latest first-hand government news will be immediately available to all Internet users."

Putin is just one in a growing tide of Russians who have practically overnight discovered the Net's powerful potential. And he confirmed that the virtual is now a reality here.

"It is impossible to stop the progress," says Irena Fadeyeva, a spokeswoman for Golden Telecom, an Internet service provider (ISP) in Moscow whose business recently was extended to 60 cities.

The cyber explosion is all the more dramatic considering that technologically backward Russia is not a computer-driven society and has far less disposable income than the West. Phone lines tend to be lousy, and imported computers costly.

But the lure of the Net is such that users were not greatly hampered even by an economic crash that began in August 1998 and lasted for most of last year. The crisis especially hit the sort of people who use computers: well-educated, middle-class, young, urban professionals. Now, the quantity of Web sites has topped 20,000. Search engines number more than a dozen in Moscow alone. Russians can stay on top of trends with various new magazines, one television and three radio programs devoted solely to information about the Internet.

Perhaps the biggest sign that the Internet's day has dawned in Russia is its harnessing by politicians and security services. The Federal Security Service (FSB), successor to the KGB, has devised a system called SORM by which it can potentially spy on Internet traffic.

Meanwhile, the Internet made its debut as a major campaign tool in Dec. 19 parliamentary elections. Most major parties and candidates set up Web sites to try to attract voters.

One such site, operated by the Kremlin-linked Effective Politics Foundation, was particularly active, publishing online smears against Moscow's Mayor Yuri Luzhkov.

Then the group released early election results before balloting was over. Although illegal under Russian law, the practice went unhindered because the Web site (www.elections99.com ), was registered abroad and thus could not be closed by authorities here. "A whole new trend began - the role of the Internet in politics. Next time, it is bound to be even more widely used," says Mikhail Akopov, a partner of DM Studio, an Internet company based in Moscow. Foreseeing the growth of the Net as a business tool, the huge MediaMost information-financial group recently bought a local search engine, Netskate.ru, for $450,000 - a massive sum by Russian Web standards. Founded just two months ago, Molok.ru, a Russian version of the eBay online auction house, offers everything from cars to chipped, old teacups. But for now, the biggest Internet business seems to be trading in Web-site names themselves, rather than goods offered electronically. In a practice known as cybersquatting in the West, small-time users register the names of big companies, people, or other titles that they believe someone one day will be willing to pay a hefty fee to acquire.

For instance, the domain www.Putin.ru has already been snapped up by SiteShop.ru, a small company that specializes in buying and selling sites.

Industry sources are curious to see who the next owner will be.

Another downside of the Net is hacking and electronic scams. Criminals who have penetrated every other level of Russian society are committing cyber-fraud, breaking into sites or using the Web for theft. "Maxim," for example, claims he is a teenager from Russia. He claims responsibility for the theft of thousands of credit-card numbers from Internet music retailer CD Universe over the holidays, and for publishing them on the Web.

Industry sources agree, however, that honest Russian e-commerce has a long way to go before it completely alters how business is done. Russians do not shop online in large numbers due to a lack of buying power. Unlike Americans, Russians do not widely use credit cards or make many purchases from catalogs, which would facilitate the switch to electronic shopping. There are also legal obstacles - such as no digital equivalent of the rubber stamp and paper required to formalize a trade transaction here. This can be frustrating for pioneers of online shopping such as Sedmoi Kontinent, an upscale food-store chain in Moscow. It uses the Internet to take orders from customers - and then has to trust them to come up with the cash upon delivery.

Some 75 percent of Russian Internet users surf the Net for fun, not work, according to Andrei Plushev, who hosts the daily Internet radio program EkhoNet.

Rogozin said that the Duma deputies would discuss the document, assuming that Russia would have the right to cancel its obligations under the START-2 treaty should the US side violate the ABM treaty. The committee took the decision to consider the START-2 problem "in package with ABM treaty related problems" last Tuesday.