#1
Moscow Times
December 16, 1999 
EDITORIAL: 'And They Call This Elections?' 


When it is all over, foreign groups will almost certainly sign off on these 
elections as "free and fair." Edouard Brunner, head of the OSCE's 400-person 
elections delegation, told The Moscow Times this week his team had so far 
found no evidence that would suggest the polls are anything but that. He 
added, "One expects that at the end of the process, international observers 
will come up with a statement that the elections were conducted in a 
democratic way." 


What late-arriving observers don't seem to understand is how thoroughly these 
elections have been compromised by campaign abuses, particularly on ORT 
television. It is hard for those who have not been watching ORT for three 
months to grasp how thoroughly evil the station's behavior has been; and it 
is hard for foreigners to comprehend ORT's dominant role on the Russian 
scene. For far too many Russians, this is the only source of national news. 


Consider Gary Peach's report on front about the bezpredel in Leonid 
Gorbenko's Kaliningrad. Journalists recount losing teeth and liters of blood 
to savage beatings f and the tales are strangely reminiscent of those from 
Yevgeny Nazdratenko's Primorye, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov's Kalmykia, Vladimir 
Yakovlev's St. Petersburg and so on. 


Or consider how strong national media have been curtailed by a small Kremlin 
cabal. As Jen Tracy recounts on front today, earlier this decade Izvestia was 
the flagship of Russian journalism; but when its reporting offended the prime 
minister, a battle for control of the newsroom left LUKoil and Uneximbank in 
charge. Izvestia passed the torch to Kommersant Daily, which quickly became 
the new indispensable read; then Kommersant was bought by Boris Berezovsky. 


On Wednesday two of Russia's best-known journalistic personalities f 
Alexander Khinshtein, a reporter for Moskovsky Komsomolets, and Pavel 
Voshchanov, who is now at the newspaper Trud f held a news conference to 
discuss why a journalist would run for the Duma. 


Their answers boiled down to a blistering condemnation of the state of the 
nation. Politics? It's about manipulating and cheating and stealing f not 
public service. Journalism? There is no journalism in Russia, because society 
is too ill to support it. Free and fair elections? Already not. 


Voshchanov recounted dirty tricks f ranging from leaflets saying Voshchanov 
wants to tax all pets, including aquarium fish, to armies of telemarketers 
calling people at 3 a.m. to sing his praises. 


"And we consider these elections?" he asked rhetorically. "We consider this a 
contest of ideas? Has even one party leader spoken out against [abuses]? Not 
one."

#4
Russian Industrial Recovery Helped by Military-Industrial Complex.


YEKATERINBURG, December 15 (Itar-Tass) - The Russian government sees the 
military-industrial complex and its potential as a sort of locomotive for the 
development of Russia's industry, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said on 
Wednesday in the exclusive interview to the Oblastnaya Gazeta appearing in 
Yekaterinburg. The interview was published this Wednesday. 


The premier believes that the essential condition for the development of the 
Russian economy is the upsurge of the military-industrial complex as it 
continues to ensure Russia's leadership in trade in armaments, which brings 
considerable budget revenues. In addition, the military-industrial complex 
means high technologies of dual purpose that are already used in shipbuilding 
and aircraft construction, in electronics and new materials. 


Russia has inherited from the USSR a developed defence complex with 
contemporary technologies, skilled labour, and potential of designers and 
technicians. "It would be a waste not to use this in the interests of the 
upsurge of the Russian economy," Putin said.

#6
Rights-Russia: Market Reforms Left Children Behind
Inter Press Service


MOSCOW, (Dec. 13) IPS - While millions of Russians struggle to survive their 
nation's economic slide, their children are the ailing system's prime 
victims. 


"The state must not ignore the rights of children, a minority in the 
imperialism of adults," said activist Boris Altshuler, commenting on Unicef's 
"State of the World's Children, 2000," released today. 


Altshuler heads the Moscow-based non-governmental organization (NGO), The 
Right of a Child. 


"The country's leadership should not ignore the formula coined by (Russian 
writer Fedor) Dostoyevsky -- 'universal interests are not worth a tear of a 
child.' It's very serious," he said. 


The world is entering a new millennium with many promises to its youngest 
citizens still unfulfilled, and children continue to be killed, injured and 
exposed to abuse in violation of their rights, Unicef, the United Nations 
Children's Fund, said in the report. 


Unicef's Executive Director Carol Bellamy said that significant changes for 
children could be made within a single generation if their rights are truly 
honored. 


The agency has long urged Russia to spend more on social programs to protect 
its 37 million children from the effects of economic decline. And with a 
deepening financial crisis, the impact on families is even worse. 


Children are dropping out of school, going into the streets, and getting 
involved in crime and drugs. Russia has at least 600,000 abandoned children, 
most of them deserted by their parents, and the number is on the rise. 


Thousands of children in Russia run away from home, usually to escape 
alcoholic parents who rarely make efforts to find their offspring. The number 
of homeless street children is also rising. 


Furthermore, abandoned children often face further suffering and abuses in 
Russia's state-sponsored -- and under-funded -- orphanages. 


Thousands of Russian children in state orphanages are exposed to punishments 
verging on torture, and suffer brutal hazing by older children, thus being 
deprived of basic human rights at every stage of their lives, according to a 
recent report by Human Rights Watch (HRW). 


Beginning in infancy, many orphans classified as severely disabled are 
segregated into "lying down" rooms in the nation's 260 "dom rebenka" 
orphanages, where they are changed and fed but are bereft of stimulation or 
medical care. 


"Orphans are defenseless -- it's a universal problem, not just Russia's," 
Anatoly Severny, president of the Russian Independent Association of 
Psychiatrists and Psychologists told IPS. 


But in some Russian "special" orphanages, the children's lives are even more 
tragic, he said. 


Those who are labelled retarded, or "oligophrenic" (small- brained), face 
another grave violation of their rights around the age of four. At that time, 
a state commission diagnoses them as unable to receive education and 
warehouses them for life in institutions known as "psycho-neurological 
internments" or "special orphanages. 


Insufficient funding makes conditions there desperate. 


"Up to 75 percent of these swift judgments are simply wrong, but after the 
diagnosis, it is virtually impossible for an orphan to appeal the decision," 
Severny says. 


Even some children with very minor physical or mental handicaps are consigned 
to life in a "permanent underclass," with inadequate food and medical care, 
and no hope of any education. 


These children -- hastily diagnosed as disabled -- are condemned to lives in 
bed and kept from learning to walk or read, the report said. Many of them die 
young. 


The orphans may be restrained in cloth sacks, tethered by a limb to 
furniture, and sometimes left to lie half-naked in their own filth. In such 
orphanages, children may be administered powerful sedatives without medical 
orders. 


A decade ago, in 1989, the world recognized that children had basic rights 
and embodied them in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In October 
1999, Amnesty International voiced concern over children's rights violations 
in Russia and urged the Russian government to enforce the Convention. 


None of the recommendations of human rights activists have been carried out 
so far, notably regarding the rights of 70,000 kids in "special orphanages," 
locked and isolated institutions, which are little better than prisons, 
Altshuler argues. 


Human rights activists have called for the Russian state to reform its 
policies on abandoned children, including those with disabilities. Particular 
targets of reform are the Ministries of Health, Education and Labor, which 
administer institutions for abandoned children. 


Last September, the Russian government promised to establish the post of 
Federal Commissioner on the Rights of Children. However, with a background of 
electoral political struggles and the ongoing war in Chechnya, this new 
office is likely to take some time to function. 


About 200,000 children reside in state institutions in Russia. More than 
600,000 children are classified by the Russian authorities as being "without 
parental care," though 95 percent of them have a living parent. 


"Unicef is keen to increase our efforts to help children in concrete 
orphanages mentioned in the report," Vera Gavrilova, project coordinator of 
Moscow's Unicef office, told IPS. 


Russia's once advanced education system has suffered decline since the 
collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, and school dropout rates have 
risen. 


Cash-strapped children's institutions are increasingly incapable of providing 
proper care for children and some Russian regions, in cooperation with 
Unicef, have launched programs to move the kids into foster families away 
from the institutions. 


"Despite problems and setbacks, a universal human rights culture is 
developing in Russia, including the rights of children," said Alexander 
Gorelik, director of the U.N. Information Center in Moscow. "There is no lack 
of legal documents -- the main problem in Russia is enforcement," he said.   

#7
RFE/RL
December 16, 1999 
Russian Campaigns Military And Political 
By Paul Goble 


Political leaders throughout history have used military campaigns to draw on 
the patriotism of their people and thus boost their own political prospects. 
But frequently these leaders have discovered that it is far more difficult to 
end such politically useful military efforts than it was to launch them in 
the first place.


Commentaries in both the Moscow and Western media suggest that Russian Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin is currently learning this ancient but often 
forgotten lesson about the ways in which military and political campaigns 
interact.


No one has gained more politically from the Russian military campaign against 
Chechnya than Putin. From a virtual unknown at the time of his appointment 
last summer, the former security officer has seen his stock rise to the point 
where he is now favored to win election as president next June.


If the presidential vote were taken this week, all Russian polls suggest, 
Putin almost certainly would win. But because that vote is still seven months 
away, the Russian Prime Minister must navigate a parliamentary election this 
Sunday and decide how to end the Chechen conflict in a way that will not 
deprive him of the popularity he has achieved.


As the events of the last few days suggest, that is not going to be easy, not 
least of all because Putin does not have complete control of his own destiny 
on either the military or the political battlefields.


Many in Moscow are pressing for quick action against Grozny, a strategy that 
could backfire in any one of at least three ways.


First, it could lead to a Russian victory rather too early for Putin's 
purposes, opening the way to the kind of second guessing by his political 
opponents that might cost him support before he has to face the voters. As 
long as the popular military campaign continues, most of Putin's political 
opponents are likely to avoid criticizing him or it in ways that might cost 
them their own popularity. But once the war is declared over, that will 
quickly change. Putin has not yet provided evidence that he can maintain his 
political popularity except by military means.


That fact indeed has led some in Russia and even more in some of its 
neighbors to speculate that the Russian prime minister might decide to launch 
some action against them after declaring victory in Chechnya.


Second, such a strategy could lead to the kind of humanitarian disaster which 
might cause the West to adopt a tougher line toward Moscow. In the short 
term, Putin would likely win support for appearing to stand up to the West. 
But in the longer term, a cutback in Western assistance and cooperation could 
lead some Russians to question what he has done. At present, as one Russian 
observer noted this week, "the tougher Moscow's policy in Chechnya gets, the 
more it is welcomed by most Russians and the more it is criticized in the 
international arena"


So far, most Western powers have avoided imposing sanctions to back up their 
critical words. But that may now be changing: In the last week alone, the 
International Monetary Fund has delayed the disbursement of a $640 million 
loan installment, the Council of Europe has threatened to suspend Russia's 
membership in that organization, and there have been calls to drop Russia 
from participation in future G-7 meetings.


If Russian forces commit atrocities in their campaign to achieve what some 
Russian analysts quoted in the Moscow press have called "the final solution 
of the Chechen problem" and if the international community focuses on these 
atrocities, Western governments are likely to face ever greater popular 
pressure to take a stand.


And third, the Russian military campaign could trigger terrorist actions by 
Chechens against civilian and military targets far from the North Caucasus. 
Again, Putin might win support for a short time with a harsh response, but 
over time, ever more Russians would likely begin to ask why he could not have 
avoided precisely this disaster. For all these reasons, many analysts are now 
suggesting that Moscow may suspend its Chechen campaign over the winter after 
Russian forces occupy Grozny. But even if these suggestions prove to be the 
case, such a decision would not necessarily solve Putin's political problem.


Indeed, it would only highlight the ways in which leaders like Putin who seek 
political gains through military action often find themselves trapped by 
their own strategy, forced to do things which may in the end deprive them of 
victory on either field of battle.

#8
Nezavisimaya Gazeta
December 11, 1999
[translation for personal use only from RIA Novosti]
RUSSIA VS. EVERYBODY ELSE
Will Russia Dictate to the Rest of the World?
By Sergei ROGOV, Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences' 
Institute of the USA and Canada
     
     The phantasmagoria of the current election campaign in
Russia defies all rational assessments. Two weeks before the
election which will define the country's fate in the next
century, the wave of incriminating materials has swept all feeble
attempts to launch a discussion of ways to lead Russia out of an
unprecedented crisis. Crowds of candidates are using the same
words to promise instant prosperity and greatness of Russia as
soon as they are elected. The nation is drowning in demagoguery
at all levels.

     It looks like a battle royal. It is not surprising therefore
that there is no serious attempt to ponder the problems Russia's
society is facing, the main one being ways to lead the country
out of the crisis. 

     It was announced in 1991 that Russia was going to join the
'civilised world'. To do this, it had let the Soviet Union fall
apart. Eight years after the Belovezhskaya Pushcha accords,
nobody can say where Russia is going, or whether it has economic,
military or foreign-policy strategies. 

     The 'honeymoon' in Russia's relations with the West is long
a thing of the past. The USA and its allies have been surprised
and relieved to have won an unexpected victory in the cold war
with Moscow. But the emotional shock has soon passed and the
victors have begun to diligently work on consolidating their
victory, i.e. building a new rigid hierarchy of international
relations dominated by the West with the US, the only remaining
superpower, in the lead. 

     Russia indeed presents no threat to the West any more--and
not without a good reason. Russia is no competitor for the US. As
distinct from the late USSR, today's Russia is not a superpower
whose interests and influence are global. Russia is entering the
year 2000 having 1.5% of the world GDP, while the United States
accounts for 21%, and NATO, for nearly 50%, of it. 

     The weakened Russia has found itself in an unprecedented
economic dependence on the West in the '90s. Its foreign debt
approximates its annual GDP at the current rouble/dollar exchange
rate and is 6 times its federal budget.

     The countries of the West are shaping the rules of the
global economic game while dictating, via the IMF and the World
Bank, the conditions of integration into the global market to
Russia. Throughout the past few years Moscow has been presented
very tough conditions which effectively set limitations on the
Russian sovereignty in the budgetary and financial sphere and
some other fields. Can one really be so naive as to expect that
the economic demands would not be dovetailed to political
conditions?

     Russia's military might is fast withering away without a
proper economic backing. Washington and its allies account for
60% of the global military expenditures (including 80% for the
purchases of arms and defense-related research), while Russia is
spending no more than 3-4% for the purpose. 

     The US is keeping mighty army units in Europe and the Far
East and wages, not without its allies' help, wars in the Persian
Gulf and Yugoslavia--not without success and with minimal losses.
Russia, meanwhile, has suffered a defeat in the sanguinary war it
waged in its own territory in 1994-96 and is now involved in a
new war whose outcome and duration are hard to forecast. 

     It goes without saying that the West has no moral or legal
right to interfere in Russia's domestic affairs. But the war in
Kosovo has proved that the US and its allies are not above
applying double standards. Yet it is the West Europeans, not the
Americans, who are fanning the current anti-Russia campaign.

     On the other hand, one can hardly overlook our own mistakes
and miscalculations which the West has grabbed at to seize the
propaganda initiative and accuse Russia of human rights
violations and even war crimes. These days, the Western media are
picturing a repugnant Russia which treats barbarously both its
own citizens and the rest of the world. 

     Economic sanctions applied against the Russian Federation
under the pretext of the war in Chechnya are of a clearly
geopolitical nature. The tough pressure Russia is being subjected
to aims to force it to accept the Western rules of the game and
to agree to playing a secondary role, or otherwise it will be
subjected to isolation, be made an outcast country to which the
civilised norms are not applicable. 

     Evidently, Russia cannot give up its state sovereignty. If
the war stops on the conditions proposed by the insurgents,
Russia's territorial integrity will be at stake. Russia therefore
cannot afford to be talked to in the language of diktat. Russia
can and must defend its national interests. 

     To do this, there is no need to return to the rhetorics of
the cold war times. Nuclear weapons are a means of containing
aggressors, not an instrument of diplomatic bluffing. Nuclear
weapons are a means of last resort, an argument to be used in a
conflict when there is no other choice. Does not Russia have
arguments other than the threat to 'zap' all?

     Russia should not react to the attempts to humiliate it by
parroting those methods which Russia decisively condemns. If
NATO's planes bombed peaceful Belgrade, it is no reason for us to
bomb our own towns and villages. If we reject America's diktat
only to promise that we ourselves will dictate to the rest of the
world, this country's prestige will hardly grow. 

     The war in Chechnya cannot be won by military means alone.
There is the need to seek political solutions both on the level
of private agreements (i.e. separate towns and villages), and in
the interests of deriving long-term dividends from the victory in
the battlefield. Not can Russia be indefinitely late in dealing
with the humanitarian matters on which the lives of hundreds of
thousands of women, children and old folks hinge.

     On the diplomatic front, stronger relations with China
should not lead to a rupture of dialogue with the West. Whatever
its disagreements with Washington, Beijing prefers to come to an
agreement with the Americans on its membership in the World Trade
Organisation, rather than engage in confrontation with it. 

     A new cold war where Russia is bound to be the losing side,
is not in its interests. Next year will witness hard struggle for
the preservation of the ABM Treaty whose derailing may threaten
the containing potentiality of the Russian nuclear arsenal.
Russia will need allies in the West to come on top in the effort.

     Lastly, it is high time the war of everybody against
everybody else be stopped. The election rhetorics should cede to
a realistic programme of Russia's economic recovery. Only then
will Russia be a great power in deed, rather than in word, whose
interests the others will have to heed.

#9
Moscow Times
December 16, 1999 
DEFENSE DOSSIER: Is Chechnya Legally a War? 
By Pavel Felgenhauer 


Since the end of the Cold War it has been stressed many times that 
establishing an effective framework of dialogue between East and West on 
security in Europe is of paramount importance. In 1997, after the Founding 
Act between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization established a 
permanent NATO-Russia council, it seemed the framework was at last there. 
Today, with NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia and Russia's savage military 
offensive in Chechnya, the dialogue idea is in tatters. The permanent 
NATO-Russia council never seriously got down to business and today it's no 
more than an empty shell. 


During NATO's recent war, all serious negotiations between East and West f 
even the essential problem of the deployment of Russian peacekeepers as part 
of the NATO-lead KFOR security force in Kosovo f were held on a bilateral 
basis between Russia and the U.S. on behalf of NATO. 


Since the illegal bombardment of Iraq by the British and U.S. air forces a 
year ago, East and West are not talking. Instead, they are exchanging abuse 
as during the Cold War. But there is a difference: During the Cold War the 
confrontation in Europe was maintained "cold" by both sides of the divide by 
adhering to certain rules. 


Today all rules seem to have collapsed and international law seems to have 
flown out the window. Last March NATO committed anact of aggression by 
attacking Yugoslavia. NATO forces also committed war crimes during the war by 
attacking civilian targets like the TV center in Belgrade and bridges over 
the Danube as far away from the war zone as Novi Sad. The new NATO official 
doctrine states that such "humanitarian" aggressions may be committed anytime 
in the future. Russia deplored the attack against Yugoslavia, but today 
Russia is tampering with international law by perpetrating massive war crimes 
in Chechnya. It has often been said that Russia has been trying to copycat 
NATO in its latest war in the Caucasus by using bombardments instead of 
ground troops, by displaying footage of aerial attacks at press conferences 
and so on. But it seems that the main lesson Moscow learned from the West 
during the war in the Balkans was that it's OK to violate the most 
fundamental principals of international law and that naked military force is 
the only true argument. 


Western diplomats in Moscow, including the Swiss, who consider themselves the 
custodians of the Geneva conventions, have been approaching the Russian 
authorities since the conflict in the Caucasus began to ensure that Russians 
comply with internationally agreed-upon rules and customs of war. It soon 
turned out the Russian authorities simply do not recognize that international 
agreements f signed and ratified by Russia f apply to Chechnya, including the 
Geneva II protocol of 1977, which specifically deals with internal conflicts 
between a sovereign government and armed rebels. A deputy foreign minister 
told me lest week: "We do not recognize the antiterrorist operation in 
Chechnya to be an armed conflict. So we accept the Geneva II protocol in 
Chechnya 'partially.' Those parts of the protocol we like will act on and 
those we do not f will not. We certainly do not recognize Chechen fighters to 
be legitimate combatants protected by the rules and customs of war." Surely, 
Russia's position is legally ridiculous. The Geneva II protocol stipulates 
that there is an "armed conflict" when antigovernment rebels are organized 
and control territory. All combatants can then be expected to abide by the 
rules and customs of war. Last week Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said 
publicly that Chechen forces "still control parts of Chechnya." Does such a 
statement actually recognize that there is an armed conflict? 


"No," said the deputy foreign minister. "I am a tired man and you, Pavel, 
seem to be full of energy. If you want to argue, I'll send you a lawyer from 
our ministry and he'll say 'No' to anything you say until you are blue in the 
face. Now get off my back, please." 


If Russia does not recognize the jurisdiction of international law in 
Chechnya, no war crimes can be technically committed at all. Before and 
during the war in the Balkans, Western leaders often claimed that, in 
principle, they were upholding international law, but that "Kosovo is an 
exception." Today the West may see the results of its opportunism: an endless 
morass in Kosovo, a dirty war in Chechnya and a world without any universally 
recognized legal framework, where anyone any time may claim to be an 
"exception." 


Pavel Felgenhaur is an independent, Moscow-based defence analyst. 

#10
New 'Cold War' With United States Examined  


Obshchaya Gazeta 
9 December 1999
[translation for personal use only]
Article by Mikhail Delyagin: "Quiet American Ultimatum; Washington 
Slipping Toward 'Cold War,' With Help of Kremlin" 


   The attack by the USA and its NATO partners against Yugoslavia marked 
the end of the post-war era, when the opposition of the two world powers 
created a global "system of checks and balances" in which there 
was room for treaties and diplomacy.  The disappearance of one of these 
powers not only gave rise to a "unipolar world"--it made 
diplomacy superfluous and removed all limitations on the application of 
brute force. 

   According to certain indicators, the mechanism which was successfully 
developed in Yugoslavia is now being applied in regard to Russia.    * * * 

   In recent times, various representatives of the USA have, in covert 
form, presented four demands to Russia. 

   The first and most well known is Moscow's acceptance of the 
dissolution of the ABM Treaty, which is the basis of the world system of 
security.  The leaders of the USA are directly stating that they are not 
interested in Russia's position on this question and that America thus 
believes it has the right to fulfill or not fulfill the agreements which 
it has signed, at its own discretion. 

   The dissolution of this treaty is a no less serious indicator of the 
change in the USA's attitude than was the attack on Yugoslavia.  
Previously, in opposing the USSR, they at least indirectly and at least 
for the sake of maintaining their image admitted responsibility for the 
state of affairs in the sphere of their influence.  The dissolution of 
the ABM Treaty is legal proof of the rejection of this responsibility. 

   The second demand to Russia is that it undertake a large-scale 
struggle against corruption.  Unfortunately, the "aloofness" of 
President Yeltsin's closest encirclement leaves no hope for success in 
this direction before the presidential elections. 

   But even possible successes would not have been perceived by the USA 
leaders.  They are using the struggle against corruption as one of the 
instruments in the competitive struggle with Russian business (which has 
become particularly acute after Russia's rejection of the high exchange 
rate of the ruble which was imposed upon it by the West, and which 
undermined its economy).  It is no wonder that all the corruption 
scandals overlook the caprices of American companies, which are 
participating, for example, in the organization of fictitious import into 
Russia and are focusing attention only on their Russian partners. 

   In essence, the campaign in the struggle against Russian corruption 
largely serves as a justification for the growth of protectionism on the 
part of the developed countries. 

   The third group of demands presented to Russia is aimed at ending the 
war in Chechnya.  The need for concern about 210,000 people cast out into 
the open field is obvious--as well as the need for concern about the 
60,000 military servicemen who are spending the winter there.  Just as 
obvious is the desirability of open negotiations with the Chechen side, 
although these must in no way impede the anti-terrorist operation as a whole. 

   Unfortunately, Russia's correction of its tragic mistakes in the North 
Caucasus bears a rather remote relation to the position of the USA--it 
may in fact be reduced to a demand for capitulation of Moscow.  And here, 
as "small change," the fourth group of demands is presented: To 
leave the resolution of the problem of Nagornyy Karabakh to the USA, up 
to the introduction of troops to that region; To withdraw troops from 
Georgia and to ensure transfer of Abkhazia to its sovereignty. 

   In fact, the USA is asking Russia to reject its influence in the 
Transcaucasus region in exchange for the world community "closing 
its eyes" to Chechnya.  Moreover, this is done in such a skillful 
manner, that in case of deceit (as has often been in the past), Russia 
would not be able to protest, since it is not being given any specific 
promises. 

   For the present time, it is unclear whether the "four demands to 
Russia" are a foreign manifestation of the domestic political 
struggle within the USA, or whether they are the result of a supra-party 
consensus of the elite.  Another, more probable, variant conceals a 
strategic threat to Russia, since it would lead to the unilateral 
restoration of the "Cold War" on the part of the USA.    * * * 

   The main irritant, of course, is Chechnya.  The leadership of Russia 
either does not understand that the world is expecting 
fictitious-demonstrative negotiations with the Chechens and effective aid 
to refugees, or does not know how to supplement the military actions 
which are distracting the Americans and the entire West with 
negotiations.  This lack of understanding may be aggravated by a 
successful counterattack by the Chechen formations, which is probable in 
accordance with the logic of the war's development. 

   The behavior of Yeltsin's inner circle, which has fully discredited 
itself, is also prompting the USA toward the "Cold War."  Aside 
from the effective part of the propaganda apparatus (something akin to a 
"collective Goebbels"), it almost entirely controls the General 
Procuracy and other agencies which ensure law and order. 

   The connection of the power structures with the President's 
encirclement and the mass media creates the threat of emergence of a 
corrupt state which relies on brute force, following the worst world 
examples.  Thus, the ever more frequent cases of persons being seized 
directly in the court chambers immediately after their 
acquittal--regardless of who these personages might be--forces one to 
think about the possibility of creation of "death squads" in 
Russia, following the example of a number of Latin American countries. 

   The USA's choice in favor of a "cold war" may also be 
accelerated by global factors which bear no relation to Russia.  Thus, a 
key strategic threat to the USA is the transfer of world dollar assets to 
"euros."  Opposition to it is one of the main motives of 
American policy. 

   After the conclusion of the world financial crisis, the USA exhausted 
the possibility of such opposition by financial means.  The aggression 
against Yugoslavia shows that, by utilizing its global advantage in 
technologies (including in technologies for formulation of 
consciousness), the USA has begun to act with the aid of customary 
military-political instruments. 

   Thus, the USA may be interested in a unilateral return to the 
"Cold War" and in creation of a "controlled crisis" 
in relations with Russia as an element of overall strategy of 
"global controlled destabilization" and weakening of Europe. 

   Aside from the global interests which it recognizes, the USA is also 
evidently motivated by an unrecognized "containment complex," 
which lives at the expense of providing its "junior partners" 
military-political protection in exchange for weakened economic competition. 

   A consequence of this--and this has been confirmed by history--is the 
organic need of the super-power to have an enemy.  Moreover, the ideal 
enemy must be, on one hand, vulnerable and not posing a real threat, and 
on the other--sufficiently authoritative. 

   After Russia is deprived of its intercontinental missiles with nuclear 
warheads (which, because of degradation of the guidance systems may occur 
sooner than the expiration of their service life), if the other 
tendencies and motivations are retained, it will become the "ideal 
enemy" of the super-power.  And, regardless of its interests and 
behavior, it may expect the same fate as that of present-day Yugoslavia. 

   * * * 

   Russia must use the crisis in relations with America to fight crime, 
to revitalize the state, to bring together honest and responsible forces. 
 We should concede to pressure from the USA not where it is beneficial to 
them, but where it is beneficial to us.  We should not capitulate to 
international terrorism and its "fifth column" in Russia's 
leadership, but on the contrary, we should eradicate them in the course 
of a true struggle against corruption. 

   Aside from this, Russia must thoroughly analyze all the factors of 
stability of the USA.  We must understand that the American markets, no 
matter how unstable they might be, will not collapse by themselves.  At 
the necessary moment, they must be given a push--moreover, in such a way 
as to most effectively utilize the opportunities which will be created. 

   Editorial comment: 
   In the opinion of M. Delyagin, the current crisis in relations between 
Russia and the West conceals a threat of a total confrontation called the 
"Cold War," which has already been somewhat forgotten.  And 
this leads to the need for a correction in Russian foreign and domestic 
policy. 

   While abstracting ourselves from the specifics of the solutions 
proposed by the author, we nevertheless cannot overlook the emotional 
manner in which Russia reacts to the West's challenge.  And at the same 
time, this "new course" is entirely regular.  Who if not we 
ourselves convinced our Western partners of our inconsistency and lack of 
principle by flirting with the most offensive regimes in the world?  And 
were we not the ones who, with our own inept policy, facilitated the 
increased influence of the USA in the Caucasus?  Why, for example, did we 
have to open the border with Abkhazia, when in principle there is the 
problem of relations with Georgia?  Even such obvious questions testify 
to the non-synonymous nature of the situation, which would most 
expediently be resolved by relying on new approaches, and not those which 
have exhausted themselves.  And this means there is serious reason for 
discussion. 

  The editors propose that all who are not indifferent to the threat of 
revival of the "Cold War" take part in a discussion of this 
topic--perhaps under the following heading: "The Second 'Cold 
War'--Pro and Con."