#1
Russia: Duma Deputies Prepared To Ratify START-Two Nuclear Treaty
By Jan de Weydenthal

Prague, 10 December 1998 (RFE/RL) -- After years of delay, there is a real
prospect that Russia will ratify a major nuclear arms reduction treaty this
month. There is a good chance as well that a treaty setting ceilings on
conventional weapons will soon be amended to further reduce the danger of
armed conflict.

   The nuclear arms treaty, known as START-Two (Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty-Two) was signed in January 1993 by then U.S. President George Bush
and Russia's President Boris Yeltsin. It was ratified by the U. S. Senate in
January 1996 but, having attracted determined opposition in Russia's State
Duma from nationalists and communists, has been stalled there for almost six
years.

   START Two sets limits of 3,000 to 3,500 nuclear warheads for each side,
down from the 6,000 set in the earlier START-One treaty.

   It is generally accepted that a reduction in the number of nuclear
weapons is likely to reduce the danger of world war.

   Many Russian politicians and military officials have long insisted that
preserving a large number of nuclear weapons helps Russia maintain the
status of a global superpower. They have been concerned that a reduction in
the number of these weapons would affect Russia's international standing.

   But this view has been slowly changing, largely owing to Russia's
economic decline. It has become increasingly clear that economic
difficulties have greatly undermined Russia's ability to maintain a large
strategic nuclear arsenal, including major weapon systems which are now
close to the end of their serviceable life. This is particularly the case
for "heavy," land-based multiple-warhead missiles, which have long
constituted the mainstay of Russia's nuclear force.

   According to intelligence reports published in the West (New York Times,
Dec. 1997), Russian military experts have been advocating a shift away from
expensive "heavy" strategic nuclear weapons toward cheaper "light" tactical
nuclear arms. This move has been linked with the current Russian military
doctrine and planned reforms of its armed forces.

   During recent weeks there have been recurring press reports that many
State Duma deputies, who had been opposed to the ratification of START-Two,
were changing their minds.

   Yesterday, Russia's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told U.S. Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright during their meeting in Brussels that the State
Duma will "almost certainly" approve the terms of START-Two by the end of
the month. 

   Albright promptly said she would travel to Moscow early next month to
begin a new round of talks seeking further reductions in both the American
and Russian nuclear arsenals. It is expected that a START-Three treaty would
limit each side to fewer than 2,500 warheads.

   During the same meeting yesterday Albright and Ivanov agreed to speed up
negotiations on updating the eight-year old Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) treaty, setting national ceilings for tanks, troops and artillery
across Europe.

   The CFE treaty was signed in November 1990 between NATO and the now
defunct Warsaw Pact. Since then, of course, the political and military map
of Europe has changed. The updating is to account for this change.

   The original treaty was based on a "bloc-to-bloc" concept. Two years ago,
NATO moved to replace this with a treaty "between the states" and made a
series of proposals for the "flank" zones stretching from Norway to Turkey
and Saint Petersburg to the Caucasus and on "verification" procedures.

   Moscow has sought adjustments to the distribution of weapons and troops
in particular zones, insisting on the right to bolster its military strength
in both the north (in the Leningrad military district) and in the Caucasus.
In addition, Moscow has sought limitations on the level of armaments in the
prospective "eastern" NATO members (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland).
It also has argued for the establishment of a special "security zone" in
Central Europe (including the three new NATO members and Belarus, Ukraine
and the region of Kaliningrad) in which in addition to arms restrictions
there would also be a ban on large scale military exercises.

   NATO has been opposed to these demands. According to a report in the
Polish newspaper "Rzeczpospolita," Albright yesterday told Polish Foreign
Minister Bronislaw Geremek that the U.S. would insist that the new CFE
treaty give Poland --and presumably the other new NATO members-- an equal
standing to all current NATO states.

   After the talks with Ivanov, Albright yesterday said that NATO would seek
in the negotiations on the CFE to reach "a balanced treaty that benefits us
all."

   Talks on updating the CFE treaty are due to begin early next year in
Vienna and are to end by next November.

#2
Irish Times
December 8, 1998 
[for personal use only]
Former KGB men in control as heads roll 
The new appointments at the Kremlin herald a dramatic change of direction and
put former KGB agents in the driving seat. Seamus Martin reports 

   President Yeltsin's three-hour storm through the Kremlin in which a dozen
officials were sacked for questioning his health ended with his immediate
return to hospital. 

  The strange turn of events raised many eyebrows and more than a few laughs but
the main results of that bizarre episode have been far more serious. The key
roles in post-communist Russia now lie firmly in the hands of the former KGB.

  Mr Yeltsin's frequent illnesses have in the past allowed members of his
entourage to take control of vital aspects of Russia's administration without
having been elected to do so. Previously politicians such as former prime
minister Mr Viktor Chernomyrdin and the former deputy prime minister, Mr
Anatoly Chubais, have used their influence behind the scenes as the ailing
President's concentration failed.

  These men are now out of favour. Both have, incidentally, been fingered by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States as involved in serious
personal corruption. The Clinton administration chose to ignore the CIA's
warnings in this respect.

  Mr Yeltsin's sweep through the Kremlin yesterday claimed as his chief victim
the head of the Kremlin administration, Mr Valentin Yumashev, a former family
friend. Mr Yumashev's crime, and that of the others involved in the purge,
appears to have been that they believed the President's health to be so weak
that his credibility had been seriously diminished. The President's return to
hospital immediately after the sackings may or may not have borne out these
views.

  But more important than the sackings have been the replacements to the jobs of
those who have been dismissed. Mr Yumashev's job as head of the Presidential
Administration has gone to Gen Nikolai Bordyuzha, a former Colonel-General in
the KGB, who, until now, has been secretary of the Russian Security Council.

  The conflation of these two extra-constitutional posts gives Gen Bordyuzha a
complex of powers which had previously been divided amongst a number of
Kremlin officials.

  The main power structures in Russia have developed constitutionally and extra-
constitutionally since the Soviet Union was dismantled in 1991.
Constitutionally the main power structures have been that of the president of
the Russian Federation and of the prime minister.

  Outside the constitution the main posts have been those of the secretary of
the Security Council and those of head of the presidential administration.
These have now been put in the hands of Gen Bordyuzha. This concentration of
powers, almost it appears by accident, would have been unthinkable until now.

  On the constitutional side of the equation the President's health puts his
powers very much in question. This structure indicates that Gen Bordyuzha has,
at least until the next purge, the ability to act on the President's behalf.
The other constitutional leader, apart from the President, is the Prime
Minister, Mr Yevgeny Primakov. By coincidence Mr Primakov is Gen Bordyuzha's
former boss.

  Mr Primakov is a former head of the KGB and before that acted as a
"journalist" in the Middle East where he was given the onerous task of writing
one article per month. To his credit, however, his intervention in Iraq has
allowed UN Secretary General Mr Kofi Annan prevent a second Gulf war. Now,
however, whether Mr Yeltsin realises it or not, former KGB agents hold almost
all the reins of power in Russia. There is even evidence that the head of the
Russian Orthodox Church, His Holiness Alexei II, Patriarch of Moscow and all
the Russias, was once a KGB operative known as "Agent Drozdov" - "The Thrush."

  In an odd coincidence, the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian
Parliament, has voted in the past week to reinstate the massive statue of
Feliks Dzerzhinsky in the centre of Lyubanskaya Square in Moscow.

  Dzerzhinsky, a Polish aristocratcum-communist, founded the KGB's predecessor,
the Cheka. Duma deputies in their speeches indicated their belief that the
return of the statue would convey a strong message to the Moscow underworld
that its time is up. Perhaps it is.

#3
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
10 December 1998

LEADERS APPLAUD RUSSIA-NATO COOPERATION... In what reports suggested was an
unusually warm meeting of NATO's Permanent Joint Council (PJC), Russia and
the Western military alliance yesterday celebrated eighteen months of
cooperation and hailed their joint peacemaking efforts in the Balkans. NATO
Secretary General Javier Solana and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright also used yesterday's meeting in Belgium to invite Russia to take
part in NATO's fiftieth anniversary summit in Washington next April. Russian
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, who represented Moscow at yesterday's talks,
reportedly offered no immediate response.

  Western officials participating in yesterday's meeting suggested that
Ivanov--who was attending his first PJC gathering--had been a considerably
more engaging partner than his predecessor, current Russian Prime Minister
Yevgeny Primakov. Ivanov, for his part, was quoted as saying that Russia and
NATO had "come a long way from mistrust to understanding" since the two
sides signed the Russia-NATO Founding Act in Paris in May of last year. The
creation of the PJC, which serves as a consultative mechanism for Russia and
NATO, was set out in the Founding Act (Reuters, AP, Russian agencies,
December 9).

  For all the warm words uttered yesterday, however, Ivanov's silence on the
question of Russia's participation in NATO's fiftieth anniversary summit was
perhaps a more telling reflection of the uneasy state of affairs which
persists between Moscow and the Western alliance. Russian leaders have
objected strongly and often to NATO's enlargement plans, and are undoubtedly
loathe to take part in a summit at which three Eastern European
countries--Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary--are to be welcomed into
the alliance.

  Russian-NATO cooperation, moreover, has been anything but trouble-free. Even
in the area of their greatest success--the peacekeeping effort in the
Balkans--the two sides have clashed repeatedly over NATO threats to launch
air strikes against Yugoslavia. Disagreement on that issue has reflected a
broader division between Russia and NATO: namely, Moscow's unyielding
support for Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic at a time when most
Western nations have held him primarily responsible for the bloodshed in
Kosovo. Moscow's sympathy for the Serbs has also been evident in Bosnia,
where Russia's peacekeeping contingent recently protested the arrest by U.S.
NATO troops of Bosnian Serb General Radislav Krstic and his dispatch to the
war crimes tribunal in The Hague.

  Cooperation between the sides has been minimal in other areas as well.
Although Russia has established a presence at NATO headquarters in Brussels,
there have been repeated delays in the creation of analogous NATO
representation in Moscow. Russia has also participated only sporadically in
Partnership for Peace activities, despite having committed itself earlier to
do more in this area.

  For all of that, the two sides yesterday did endorse an action program for
1999 which, if implemented, could promote greater transparency and
confidence between Russia and NATO. The two sides are to conduct studies on
peacekeeping and crisis management, work on the nonproliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, consult on the safety of nuclear weapons and the
Millennium computer bug, and seek to make progress on conventional
disarmament and other areas of military cooperation (Reuters, Russian
agencies, December 9).

POINTS OF FRICTION EVIDENT IN RUSSIAN-U.S. TALKS. Countervailing tendencies
and continuing tensions in Russian-U.S. relations were reflected similarly
in yesterday's talks between Ivanov and Albright. On the positive side,
Ivanov reportedly offered assurances that Russia's parliament would ratify
the START II strategic arms reduction treaty by the end of December.
Albright, who accepted an invitation to visit Moscow next month, expressed
her hope that ratification might open the door for the two sides to launch
talks on a follow-up START III accord which would reduce the nuclear
arsenals of the two countries still further.

  But signs of dissonance between the two were equally evident. Ivanov
reportedly emphasized Moscow's continuing opposition to proposals aimed at
broadening NATO's mandate to include missions outside member state
territory. He also restated Moscow's insistence that any proposed NATO
military actions in such instances must first be approved by the UN Security
Council. His remarks came a day after Albright called for NATO to broaden
its role by undertaking to fight global threats such as terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. NATO is currently debating a
new post-Cold War "strategic concept." Many alliance members are
uncomfortable with Washington's calls both for an enhanced role for NATO and
for a flexibility which could allow the alliance to act without UN Security
Council approval. Moscow's undoubtedly hopes to exploit these differences
within the alliance.

  Albright and Ivanov also spent time discussing what has now become a staple
of Russian-U.S. talks: Washington's concerns over Moscow's cooperation with
Iran in the fields of missile development, nuclear energy and, more
recently, biological warfare research. Albright reportedly warned yesterday
that Moscow could lose millions of dollars in U.S. aid to Russian scientists
if Russian authorities fail to curb such cooperation with Tehran. The issue
will reportedly top the agenda of talks between Russian and U.S. delegations
in Moscow this week. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott arrived
in Russia yesterday at the head of a U.S. delegation that also includes
Treasury Undersecretary Lawrence Summers (Reuters, Russian agencies,
December 9).

  As it has in the past, however, Moscow answered the U.S. warnings with a
reiteration of its intention to follow through on nuclear dealings with
Iran. Speaking to reporters in Moscow, Russian Atomic Energy Minister
Yevgeny Adamov criticized Washington for trying to halt Russia's US$800
million deal to build a nuclear reactor at the Bushehr site in Iran. He
called Washington's policies in this area biased and overly politicized. He
also repeated Moscow's claim that the reactor deal is purely commercial,
saying that it will not advance any possible Iranian ambitions to develop
nuclear weapons (AP, Russian agencies, December 9).

  During a visit by Adamov to Iran last month the two sides signed a new
nuclear energy accord which calls for Moscow to speed up its construction
work at Bushehr. Perhaps of greater import, the memorandum of understanding
also created a joint Russian-Iranian committee tasked with studying the
feasibility of additional nuclear projects for Russia in Iran, including the
construction of other reactors at the Bushehr site (see the Monitor,
November 25). Washington, having been frustrated in its efforts to stop the
current Russian project in Iran, had urged Moscow at least to forego any
additional nuclear deals with Tehran.

  During his remarks to reporters yesterday, Adamov spoke enthusiastically of
Russian nuclear projects in China and India as well. The Russian energy
minister said that Moscow and New Delhi could reach a final decision on the
construction of a nuclear plant at Kudankulam--located in southern
India--sometime in the first half of next year. The United States has
earlier objected to that project on the grounds that it undermined efforts
to isolate India for nuclear tests conducted by New Delhi this past May.
Moscow, which has cultivated friendly relations with India, has ignored
those warnings. Russia is expected to build two light-water VVER-1000
reactors at the Kudankulam site in India. The deal is estimated at US$2.6
billion (AP, Russian agencies, December 9).

 #4
Russia: Vast Funds Needed To Dispose Of Russian Subs
By Ben Partridge

London, 9 December 1998 (RFE/RL) -- A top-level seminar on nuclear hazards in
Russia has been told that it will cost nearly $100 billion over several
decades to scrap decommissioned, Soviet-era nuclear-powered submarines.

  The estimate, described by one British official as "horrendous," was presented
last week to a closed-door nuclear clean-up seminar attended by Russian,
Scandinavian, U.S. and British officials at London's Foreign Office.

  A British report said a serious accident with a submarine reactor could
release as much as 10 percent of the radioactive particles and gasses that
escaped in the 1986 Chornobyl disaster.

  The seminar focused on the serious threat posed by nuclear waste to the
environment of northwest Russia, the site of hundreds of nuclear reactors and
thousands of spent nuclear fuel elements.

  Along with government officials, the meeting was also attended by nuclear
clean-up experts and industrialists. The Russian delegation was headed by
Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Nicolai Egorov and Murmansk Regional Governor
Yuri Yevdokimov.

  The seminar focused on radioactive contamination in northwest Russia first
highlighted by former navy captain Aleksandr Nikitin. He was arrested in 1996
and charged with treason, a capital offense, because of research for a
Norwegian environmental group, Bellona. 

  (The trial of Nikitin began on October 20 this year but the judge dismissed
all evidence presented in the indictment and referred the case back to the
prosecution for further investigation.)

  The London seminar, which received little media attention, was one of the most
comprehensive examinations of the problem to date. One diplomatic source said:
"We are having all these meetings now because of Nikitin. He really got things
going in a big way."

  A Foreign Office briefing paper said the area surrounding Murmansk, the Kola
Peninsula, Severodvinsk and the island of Novaya Zemlya contains 300 nuclear
reactors (20 percent of the world's total) and tens of thousands of spent
nuclear fuel elements.

  Scientists are worried by the lack of plans for dealing with the nuclear
reactors of the decommissioned submarines, a lack of reprocessing facilities,
and the lack of safe storage facilities for spent fuel and radioactive wastes
from their reactors. The condition of nuclear power plants in the region is
also causing concern.

  Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia inherited a
large fleet of nuclear-powered vessels. The fleet included warships and
submarines belonging to the navy's Northern and Pacific Fleets as well as
civilian icebreakers. Combined, they contained some 449 nuclear reactors.

  According to a report by Itar-Tass last May, 95 nuclear submarines of the
Northern Fleet have been taken out of operation, but reactor cores have been
removed from only 26 of them. At least nine submarine reactor compartments,
each with two reactors, are stored afloat at submarine bases in the Kola
Peninsula.

  Large numbers of the submarines no longer in use are now laid up around
Russia's northern coastline. The British report says: "Many are in a poor
state of repair, and concern has been expressed about the risk of radioactive
release into the atmosphere or seas."

  Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Egorov told ITAR-TASS in May that Russia will
need 5 to 10 years to solve the problem of radioactive waste from serving and
decommissioned subs in the Northern Fleet.

  But the British report quotes experts as saying that even if the Russian
authorities were prepared and able to foot the astronomic cost, the "work
would take 30-40 years to complete." It adds: "The costs are enormous: the
cost of decommissioning one submarine can amount to $4 million; and it is
estimated to cost up to $100 million every year to keep submarines afloat."

  The report estimates the total cost of scrapping all the submarines now out of
service at nearly $100 billion. Scrapping includes cleaning up the mostly low-
level radioactive contamination from the submarines and building and improving
storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel.

  The experts say that in the event of an explosion or meltdown on board one of
the decommissioned submarines, there would likely be a large release of
radioactivity. Such a release would cause local contamination, and pose a
serious health risk to the people living near the scene.

  The international community is cooperating by providing funds for the clean-up
of nuclear hazards across Russia. In one example, Russia, Norway and the U.S.
signed the Arctic Military Environment Cooperation agreement in September
1996, to upgrade nuclear waste treatment in Murmansk. The U.S. and Norway are
contributing millions of dollars toward the cost of scrapping old submarines.

  The London seminar identified two problems: Russian reluctance to give
Westerners access to military facilities, although that situation is
improving, and the need for Western agencies to be given exemption from
liability in the event of clean-up accidents. The seminar also discussed the
need for Western agencies to be given tax exemptions.

  But the priority was clear: more outside assistance is needed to help Moscow
tackle nuclear waste disposal and contamination, particularly since it lacks
the cash to deal with the problem itself.  

#5
BBC
December 8, 1998
Tensions of the future Nato-Russian border 
By Janet Barrie in Kaliningrad 

 As Poland joins Nato next year in the first wave of new members, the
organisation will for the first time have a common border with Russia. 

  Poland shares part of its northern frontier with the Russian region of
Kaliningrad. Home to the Russian Baltic fleet, it remains strategically vital
for Moscow. 

  But observers are warning that Russia's economic crisis left its Baltic
outpost exposed - and a potential destabilising influence on Nato's doorstep. 

  For years the Baltiysk naval base was strictly off-limits to all but the elite
of the Soviet military. It was the launch pad for a possible invasion of
western Europe. 

  But with the end of Communism, it acquired a whole new significance. Ousted
from its bases in the Baltic states and the Soviet satellites, the Baltic
fleet concentrated its efforts and its firepower in Kaliningrad. 

Strategic importance 

  It is the most westerly point of Russia. The naval base at Baltiysk was and is
of vital strategic importance. That is set to grow, as Nato expands eastwards.

  The commander of the Baltic fleet, Vladimir Yegorov, says no-one should fear
Russia's response if Nato expands to its borders. 

  But he says Kaliningrad is a special place that should be treated with
respect. 

  "Kaliningrad is in a state of transition. You could say it is the military
training ground for a new life," he said. 

  "Our region was always very important for Russia because of where it is and
because of the ports and the infrastructure. 

  "Kaliningrad will always mean a lot to Russia." 

Growing isolation 

  But Kaliningrad's isolation is growing. On the Lithuanian border, the main
through-route to Moscow, the traffic is drying up. 

  The Lithuanian authorities impose high tariffs on transits from the Russian
heartland. And the Russian financial crisis has drained Kaliningrad's
resources. 

  It is dependent on its neighbours for food and fuel. Western advisers say it
must loosen some ties to Moscow if it is ever to flourish. 

  "The only chance for the Kaliningrad region is to be open towards the European
Union, to have a special status inside Russia but towards the EU," said German
Economic Consul Stefan Stein. 

  "But I don't know if everybody in Moscow will understand this opinion." 

Hong Kong of the Baltic 

  Russia's biggest car market is in Kaliningrad. Despite the general Russian
financial crisis, trade is still lively. 

  Kaliningrad is already treated as a special economic area. It has been freed
of customs duties and it was once touted as a Hong Kong of the Baltic. 

  But its status is dictated and limited by Moscow. And Kaliningrad's pro-Moscow
lobby believes it must stay that way. 

  "Kaliningrad is like a special fortress in the west of Russia," says Communist
deputy Yuri Dovzhenko. 

  "The population is here to protect Russian interests. 

  "We have to strengthen local Russian business, we don't want Kaliningrad to be
used as a resource by the west." 
  
Craving for stability 

  There are already joint Russian-European companies and observers say it is
vital more foreign partnerships come to Kaliningrad and thrive. 

  They say Moscow is worried that wealth will encourage secession. But as the EU
expands to surround it, they say Kaliningrad must look to the west to remain
stable. 

  "The worst case scenario is a total economic and social collapse in this
region, which will be a major destabilising influence within the entire Baltic
rim," says Stephen Dewar of the EU support programme. 

  "It would have very threatening implications for the immediate neighbours
Poland and Lithuania. 

  "It would also be extremely worrying and disturbing to the other Baltic rim
countries, as well as to Nato," he says. "We are not talking about war, but a
very unstable situation." 

  Kaliningrad has been a Russian region for only 50 years, but the Soviet
planners have stamped their mark. 

  As the EU looks east, Russia's westernmost outpost could prove a blessing - or
a curse - for the rest of the Baltic.

#6
Moscow Tribune
December 9, 1998
Russia Risks Sanctions over Death Penalty
By Lyuba Pronina 

  Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's sudden threat to "physically eliminate"
violent criminals and murderers in an effort to clamp down on violent crimes
-- despite the current moratorium on the death sentence -- may provoke a harsh
reaction from the European Council, jeopardizing not only Russia's reputation,
but also its membership, analysts say. 

  The Duma's failure to pass a law putting an end to the death penalty has
clashed with the presidential promise to ratify the International Convention. 

  The term to eliminate the death penalty, one of the 25 conditions placed by
the European Council before Russia when it sought membership in 1996, is due
to expire next April. 

  The 831 people whose sentences were changed from the death penalty to life
imprisonment may find themselves back on death row. 

  Despite being given three years to ratify protocol No. 6 of the International
Convention on the Protection of Basic Human Rights and Freedoms -- the first
article of which pronounces a no death penalty policy in peace time -- the
State Duma has failed to come to terms with the international demand. 

  At the beginning of 1997 it rejected the governmental draft which called for
adherence to the protocol -- two further drafts have been sitting with the
Duma legislative committee since last summer, but there is still no progress. 

  "The Duma's attitude to the law is extremely negative," Sergei Nikulin, head
of the Department for Legislation on State Security at the Justice Ministry
told the Moscow Tribune. 

  "Deputies say the Duma's beliefs are representative of society and as most of
the population believes the death penalty should be preserved, they say they
cannot go against their electorate." 

  When contacted on Thursday, one of the deputies at the legislative committee
sounded perplexed when asked about the moratorium. 

  "What moratorium are you talking about, when contract killings thrive?" he
said.

  Analysts say there have been many similar comments since the murder of
prominent democrat Galina Starovoitova. 

  "The murder of Galina Starovoitova is being used to justify the measures the
government is calling for, to toughen the regime. This may well result in the
European Council severing its relationship with Russia," Sergei Grigoryants,
head of the Glasnost Foundation said on Thursday. 

  "For the European Council, it's getting more difficult to deal with Russia, as
its levers of influence have weakened since Russia became a member." 

  Nikulin says that in most European countries where the death penalty has long
been abolished, legislators have managed to ignore the general public's
prejudice, but not here. 

  In Russia, everything is dependent on the will of just one person -- President
Boris Yeltsin -- Nikulin explained. A number of changes to the criminal
executive legislation introduced earlier this year put the president in charge
of signing death orders. 

  "Following his promise to the European council, he is just not regarding them
(death-penalty cases) and without his resolution, the death penalty cannot be
executed. Should legislators pull out these amendments, the procedure will
return back to 'normal.' " 

  According to Nikulin, the Justice Ministry has already prepared a draft
federal law which would eliminate the death penalty. 

  "It is now sitting on the minister's desk but, however, the draft cannot go
ahead without the convention being ratified." 

  It is now for the Duma to act. If the protocol is not ratified in due time,
Russia will be seen as the country which does not hold to its liabilities and
sanctions may follow, he added. 

#7
PERSPECTIVE 
Volume IX, Number 2 (November - December 1998)
To access back issues of Perspective, the Database, the Editorial Digest,
and information about the Institute and its work, please see our web site at

http://www.bu.edu/iscip/
Published by
The Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy at Boston
University,
141 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215

Russia's Military: Corruption in the Higher Ranks    
With Appendix
By RICHARD F. STAAR (rstaar@bu.edu)
Hoover Institution and Boston University

   The official government news agency ITAR-TASS earlier this year quoted
Defense Minister Igor D. Sergeev as having told senior military personnel
that about 18,000 of their officers had been charged with criminal activity
during 1997.  He warned that organized crime sought to penetrate armed
forces construction projects, access to weapons, and to use the military as
a medium for the growing drug trade.  Last year, an official announcement
had mentioned that 26 generals and 100 colonels were under investigation for
corrupt activities.

   Colonel General Yuri G. Demin, chief military prosecutor, recently gave
an interview on the same subject.  He stated that during the first half of
1998, crime had increased by 12 percent in the army and navy, with
drug-related cases up 70 percent.  These figures suggest a dramatic growth
in corruption throughout the Russian military establishment.  Demin also
mentioned the former chief of the General Staff, Army General Mikhail P.
Kolesnikov, and a former commander of Russian forces in the Transcaucasus,
General Fedor M. Reut, as being under investigation.

   One of the difficulties in reversing these trends is that the government
in Moscow includes about ten different law enforcement structures which lack
coordination as well as professional expertise.  The other problem is
funding.  Of the estimated 23 trillion rubles required to implement an
effective anti-crime program, only four trillion had been appropriated
during the preceding three years. Yet another obstacle is represented by the
State Duma which provided amnesties to 13 of the 14 generals who had been
convicted of various crimes between 1996 and July 1998.  The justification?
They had fought in Afghanistan or Chechnya or one of the lesser "hot spots"
on Russia's periphery....

Conclusions

   It has been stated that the prevalence of corruption within Russia's
armed forces is directly related to the penetration of the central
government by criminal structures.  The State Duma, however, refuses to
adopt anti-corruption legislation.  Organized crime is sometimes called the
"fifth estate" in Russia, perhaps soon to become more powerful than the
other four: the executive, parliament, judiciary, and mass media. 

   Unfortunately, the future does not suggest that the foregoing problems
will be solved.  To the contrary, the state property agency has announced
commencement of a sale that will include "military aircraft, naval ships,
fuel in storage, non-ferrous metals, and part of the real estate belonging
to the Defense Ministry." It is anticipated that the government will bring
in R400 million during the last several months of 1998. 

   As Russia careens toward chaos, the jackals with shoulder boards will
continue to steal from what is left in the above inventories.

#8
Moscow Times
December 11, 1998 
Rightist Democrats Form Coalition 
By Melissa Akin
Staff Writer

   Russia's fractious right-of-center democrats on Thursday unveiled plans
to run candidates for next year's State Duma elections in a single bloc,
which they say is "doomed to get into the Duma." 

   The group, which includes two former prime ministers f Sergei Kiriyenko
and Yegor Gaidar f along with former deputy prime ministers Boris Nemtsov,
Boris Fyodorov and Anatoly Chubais, announced their strategy at a news
conference after a founding session of a new "coalition of right-centrist
forces" at the President Hotel. 

   The coalition has a plan but so far no name, an issue the democrats will
have to resolve to register the organization as a bloc before Duma
elections, which are due in December 1999. 

   The founding of the coalition comes three weeks after the murder of their
colleague, Duma Deputy Galina Starovoitova, a tragedy that led to calls for
unity among all pro-democratic forces. 

   The coalition expects to gather 8 percent of the popular vote in the Duma
elections, enough to pass the 5-percent threshold needed to win seats in the
State Duma under the party list system. 

   "We're just doomed to get into the Duma," Nemtsov said. 

   Half of the deputies to the State Duma, parliament's lower house, are
elected on a proportional system where voters choose a party list. The other
half are elected in first-past-the post contests in individual constituencies. 

   In elections in 1995, right-of-center candidates were fragmented with
Gaidar, Starovoitova and Fyodorov each heading their own parties. Although
combined they collected about 8 percent of the vote, none of the parties
crossed the 5-percent threshold. 

   At Thursday's meeting, the man who heads the one democratic party to make
it into the current Duma was conspicuous by his absence. Grigory Yavlinsky
has pointedly stayed aloof when calls have been raised for democratic unity,
determined to lead his Yabloko party himself without interference from
politicians tainted by service in the government. 

   "We don't disagree with Yabloko on fundamental issues," Nemtsov said. "I
think our movement has real possibilities for close contacts. But there are
also obstacles. They are as follows: some leaders' political ambitions." 

   But the delegates at Thursday's conference acknowledged they had an image
problem: Gaidar is blamed for inflation in the early 1990s, Chubais is
blamed for turning privatization into a free lunch for a lucky few, and the
Kiriyenko government took the politically fatal decision to devalue the
ruble and default on government debt last summer. 

   Fyodorov said the coalition's strategy will be to keep the unpopular
members of their movement out of the limelight. "People who have less chance
of attracting voters should be less visible," Fyodorov told reporters after
the news conference. "I wouldn't want to be in a party headed by Gaidar or
Chubais." But Nemtsov and Kiriyenko, whose images are less damaged, are
another matter, he said. 

   Kiriyenko was fired and Nemtsov resigned in the wake of the devaluation
and default, which hit the nation's financial elite hard. 

   Nemtsov was a popular governor of Nizhny Novgorod. President Boris
Yeltsin brought him into the Cabinet in early 1997, and Nemtsov brought with
him Kiriyenko, a regional bank executive who went on to head the Fuel and
Energy Ministry and chair the Cabinet. 

   The coalition is apparently hoping for big support from Russia's
provinces. The mayors of Abakan, Tolyatti, Tambov and Tver were in
attendance, and Nemtsov spoke of reaching out to the grass roots. 

   "We discussed the necessity of attracting nonpolitical organizations,
primarily organizations like the Soldier's Mothers, groups involved in local
self-government, women's groups and workers' groups," Nemtsov said. "We
don't want to concentrate exclusively on regional leaders." 

   The only groups the coalition absolutely will not cooperate with, they
said, are fascists. Nemtsov added, "We're not really in any condition to
align with communists." 

   Speakers savagely attacked the economic policy of the government of
Yevgeny Primakov, especially tax cuts, which they condemned as short-term. 

   "If tax cuts are made up for by printing money, which was what they did
in November, when 10 billion rubles were printed, then you can understand
where it all would lead þ This is not an economic policy. This is something
strange," Fyodorov said. 

   Gaidar said that plans to eliminate value-added tax and introduce a sales
tax would raise Moscow's tax take and decrease tax revenues in the regions. 

   Nemtsov claimed the issue of financing was not discussed at the meeting
except to agree that money would not come from "oligarch structures."
Instead, they would seek their funding from Russia's entrepreneurs, "who now
number not in the thousands but in the millions," Nemtsov said. He also said
they were hoping the movement's grass-roots appeal might let the movement
live on donations and dues. 

   Also present at the meeting were Alexander Yakovlev, a liberal adviser to
former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, Sergei Filatov, former Kremlin
chief of staff, Sergei Yushenkov, a liberal Duma deputy, Oleg Sysuyev,
current deputy Kremlin chief of staff, plus a gaggle of cultural figures
such as comedian Mikhail Zhvanetsky. 

#9
Russia to Reprocess Spent Nuclear Submarine Fuel 

MOSCOW, Dec. 10, 1998 -- (Agence France Presse) Russia will begin in January a
program to reprocess spent nuclear fuel from abandoned submarines, Atomic
Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov said Wednesday. 

  "Preparation work is finished and we can now begin reprocessing the submarine
fuel," Itar-Tass news agency quoted him as saying. 

  The ministry plans to use funds earned by reprocessing nuclear waste from
other countries, as its own budget is not sufficient, Adamov added. 

  He said it was a "very advantageous deal" for Russia. 

  "Money could be earned by selling recycled first run fuel and separated
products which retain over 50 percent of unused uranium," Interfax news agency
reported him saying. 

   The money paid by foreign governments will cover employees' salaries and
finance efforts regarding nuclear technology, and the environment, Adamov
said. 

  Russia has 157 abandoned nuclear submarines, of which 95 belong to the
Northern Fleet, according to Itar-Tass. 

  Spent nuclear fuel has been removed from 65 of those, it added. 

  In all, the ships are expected to produce nearly 100,000 tonnes of spent fuel,
which experts cited by the agency said would cost one to $1.5 billion to
reprocess. 

#10
The Independent (UK)
11 November 1998
[for personal use only]
Desperate protest in Russia's Arctic
By Phil Reeves in Pevek (reevesp@glasnet.ru) 

 
   The complaint by Valentina Velichko is no routine industrial gripe. It is
not as if she has not been paid for a mere six months - common enough across
Russia - or even a full year. No, the last time she received hard cash for
her labours as a crane operator in the Arctic was three and a half years ago. 

   And nor is her protest a routine industrial action. The fact that she and
10 others are on hunger strike is almost academic, since they barely had any
food in the first place. A fortnight ago, after they ceased to receive
bread, they stopped eating, huddling up in bed against the incredibly severe
temperatures outside. 

   They will, they say, remain there until the authorities take notice. If
that means death then so be it, says Ms Velichko, who has weighing scales
next to her bed. Her records reveal that the strikers have lost an average
of almost a stone each. One has already been dispatched to hospital. 

   Ms Velichko belongs to a village outside Pevek, a dying port and
restricted border zone rarely visited by Western correspondents. Although it
sits on Russia's extreme north-eastern edge on the Arctic Sea, it lies at
the very heart of the country's economic crisis. 

   The strikers' job is to service the airport but now, like 28 villages
before it in the huge Chukotka region, their community is being closed down.
Although rich in minerals - it has the second largest gold reserves in
Russia - Chukotka is fast shedding population. 

   For the last three years, Ms Velichko, 45, and her colleagues has
subsisted on food distributed under otovarka, a chit system in which they
receive groceries in lieu of pay. They got the bare minimum: 1kg of rice a
month, a similar amount of peas, sugar and flour, plus a couple of kilos of
meat. 

   "What would our mothers think if they knew how hungry we were?" she asks,
tearfully quoting from a poem she has written about their plight. It
continues: "Spare us from advertising. Our children can't bear watching
Snickers ads on TV any more." 

   Here, her story is an all too familiar one. She was lured to the Arctic
16 years ago, full of hope and idealism, by the high rates of pay offered to
those willing to work in extreme conditions. Somehow, she never left -
condemning herself to incarceration in one of the most remote societies on
earth. 

   In winter, the sun does not rise above the horizon of snow-covered tundra
and frozen Arctic sea. An iron-grey twilight hovers reluctantly over the
town for a few hours around lunchtime, before fading to black. This week,
temperatures were minus 33C. It took 20 seconds for a ballpoint pen to freeze. 

   Women wander around the town - a lifeless collection of utilitarian
Soviet housing blocks, a near-dead sea port, and a few moribund plants -
swathed in fur coats reaching to their feet. Windows are a waste of wall
space - for nine months of the year they are encrusted with an impenetrable
white frost. This is no place for human beings, and many of them know that
all too well. 

   Which is one reason so many are either getting out, or trying to. When
they were paid it was tolerable, but now almost everyone seems to go unpaid
for months. There is food in the shops, but prices are twice that of Moscow,
the world's third most expensive city. The hospital is seriously short of
medicine and doctors. Shortages of fuel are commonplace. Mys Schmidta, a
town 300 miles to the west, is still waiting for a delivery of fuel. It
arrived by ship in Pevek days ago, and there it remained: no one can agree
on who will pay for it. 

   For such reasons, the population of the Pevek area has dropped by
two-thirds in seven years, from 34,500 to 12,500, a migration repeated
across the Russia north. Chukotka's population has shrunk from 180,000 to
90,000 in the same period, a process encouraged by the anti-Communist
governor, Alexander Nazarov. 

   Mr Nazarov recognises that, after limping on for six decades, the Soviet
experiment in social engineering - the arrogant Stalinist belief that man
could conquer by colonisation any corner of the world, no matter how harsh -
has collapsed, changing the geopolitical map in this vast territory, whose
eastern edge is less than a hundred miles from Alaska. 

   Plenty more would like to leave, but cannot afford the air ticket, let
alone a flat somewhere else. Larisa Kozar, 40, head of the municipal welfare
office, has a list of almost 700 families who applied for government
assistance to return to the "mainland". Of these, 69 are special category
cases - pensioners, veterans, invalids. 

   But Ms Kozar's organisation, like every other arm of government, is
hopelessly under-funded: last year, only eight special cases were helped to
relocate. She wants out herself. "If you gave me the choice, and housing on
the mainland, I would leave too," she said. 

   The choice is a rare luxury. Most are stranded in what amounts to a
prison. The conditions may not be as hellish as those which once prevailed
within Pevek's four Gulag camps, set up under Stalin to hold thousands of
labouring prisoners. But many of the remaining residents are no less trapped. 

   What, then, does the future hold? Mr Nazarov is campaigning hard for
international investment, especially in the gold industry which, hampered by
a low price and inefficient production, makes a loss. He envisages a new
society with a smaller population in which towns become industrial outposts,
like North Sea platforms, whose workers come and go. 

   He claims to have $600m (£364m) of potential investment waiting for
parliament to pass production-sharing laws. He talks of creating a thriving
fishing industry, sea-weed farms. But he admits the inescapable truth: the
north is "in a terrible situation". As Ms Velichko and her friends know only
too well.