CDI Russia Weekly

Brought to you by the Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW * Washington, DC 20036
(202)332-0600 * Fax (202) 462-4559 * http://www.cdi.org
Edited by David Johnson
ISSUE #62 August 20, 1999


The CDI Russia Weekly is an e-mail newsletter that carries news and analysis on all aspects of today's Russia, including political, economic, social, military, and foreign policy issues. With funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, CDI Russia Weekly is a project of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information (CDI), a nonprofit research and education organization.


Contents


  1. CDI's Weekly Defense Monitor: Tomas Valasek, Trouble in North Caucasus.
  2. Moscow Times EDITORIAL: Preparing for A Disastrous New Bungle.
  3. AFP: Yeltsin keeps economic team intact in new government.
  4. Chicago Tribune editorial: A NEW POWER CENTER IN RUSSIA.
  5. RFE/RL: Florina Fossato, Analysts Believe Primakov Has Presidential Ambitions.
  6. Moscow Times: Pavel Felgenhauer, START II Will Be Hard Sell.
  7. Itar-Tass: Duma May Ratify Start-2 only in Case of Tune on Abm-Lukin.
  8. Itar-Tass: Consultations on ABM, Start-3 Get Nowhere--Ivashov. (and re Kosovo).
  9. Itar-Tass: Russia to Speed up Development of New Arms.
  10. Christian Science Monitor: Jonathan Landay, Should US aid ex-cold warriors? As US foreign aid shrinks, a battle erupts over funds for ex-Soviet weapons experts.
  11. Itar-Tass: Chemotherapy of Raisa Gorbachev Stopped for While.
  12. USIA Foreign Media Reaction: RUSSIA: ELECTION POLITICS HEAT UP; DAGESTAN 'WAR' PERSISTS; ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSED.

#1
From
The Center for Defense Information
The Weekly Defense Monitor
August 19, 1999

Trouble in North Caucasus
Will determined guerilla fighters again triumph over Russian forces. The
current fighting in Dagestan raises the specter of the Chechnya wars
-- with some very important differences.
By Tomas Valasek, Research Analyst, tvalasek@cdi.org

For the second week in a row, fighting has raged in the North Caucasus
region on Russia's southernmost edge. The war began when armed troops from
Chechnya stormed villages in Dagestan, a neighboring republic and a part
of the Russian Federation. Russian special police forces, the army and
local volunteers banded together to repel the attackers. Since August 7
the Russians have been shelling the attackers' positions, to little avail
so far. In this region, one of the most unstable and ethnically diverse in
the world, no solution is ever simple -- and neither are the predictions.

Chechnya, whence the attacking troops came, is only a nominal part of the
Russian Federation. Since the 1996 peace agreement cemented the defeat of
Russian troops, Chechnya has enjoyed a de facto independence. But instead
of replacing Russian administration with an indigenous one, the republic
sank into anarchy. Chechen residents, foreign workers, neighboring Georgia
and other Caucasus republics became targets of numerous kidnapings,
robberies and even armed excursions originating from Chechnya. So much oil
has been stolen from a pipeline through Chechnya that Russia is planning a
new route bypassing the troubled territory. Much of the crime is
economically motivated but there is a strong religious element at play as
well.

While virtually all the population of Northern Caucasus has been
historically Muslim (with most of the non-Muslim population comprised of
the Russians and Cossacks), radical offshoots calling for Islamic rule
have taken a foothold in the Caucasus in recent years. One of their most
vocal advocates is Shamil Basayev, a veteran of the Abkhazia and Chechnya
wars and the head of the Congress of the Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan,
an organization fighting for independence from Russia. Basayev is leading
the Chechen troops currently fighting in Dagestan on behalf of a
self-proclaimed Islamic state. The guerillas claim to control about a
dozen Dagestani villages on the border with Chechnya but their claims are
nearly impossible to verify.

Is there a potential for another disastrous Chechnya-like defeat for
Russian troops? And could militant Islam come to dominate Russia's south?
The answers depend on how the conflict play's out among the population of
Dagestan. For decades this poor republic essentially lived on subsidies
from Moscow. For that reason, when their Chechen neighbors rose for
independence, most Dagestanis turned their backs on them. But the flow of
money from Russia slowed down to a trickle and the bond between Moscow and
Dagestan weakened correspondingly. While this might generate greater
support for independence than five years ago, Dagestan's internal divisions
may prevent a drive for a statehood. Unlike the ethnically nearly
homogenous Chechnya, Dagestan is a patchwork of over 30 nationalities. The
republic's political scene is dominated by a handful of large and powerful
ethnic groups, such as the Avars, much to the resentment of the rest of
the population. Some (the Kumyks, for example) would prefer to secede from
Dagestan, while the Lezgins want reunification with their brethren in
Azerbaijan. Basayev's fighters may find support among the Chechen
population of Dagestan, but they only represent about 62,000 of the
republic's two million inhabitants.

The most likely scenario is a protracted conflict limited to the
Dagestani-Chechen border. Russian and official Dagestani sources report
that local resistance to the Chechen fighters is strong, which may prevent
the conflict from spreading. Much depends on Russian conduct during the
conflict. Moscow's heavy-handed treatment of the Chechens and the
indiscriminate bombing of the capital, Grozny, won more converts to the
cause of Chechnya's independence than any amount of nationalist rhetoric.
Russia's use of missiles and cluster bombs against villages in the current
conflict has already drawn furious protests from neighboring Georgia,
which has itself been hit by two misguided bombs during the past week.

But any predictions about the future of Caucasus, however, are notoriously
difficult to make. Reports coming out of the region are routinely
contradicted the same day. The true strength of the Islamic radicals in
Dagestan -- who in 1998 briefly seized a government building in the capital
of Makhachkala -- is hard to assess. Russia has recently shifted the
command of the operation from the Interior Ministry to the army and sent
its highest commanders to the region, indicating that Moscow is taking the
fighting very seriously.
Back to the top

#2
Moscow Times
August 19, 1999 
EDITORIAL: Preparing for A Disastrous New Bungle 

"A mood of panic is growing among the rank and file guerrillas, as they are 
suffering heavy casualties. ... Medical institutions on Chechen territory are 
preparing to take in a significant flood of wounded." 

- An Aug. 18 Itar-Tass report. 

This is the calm before the storm. The Russians have massed several thousand 
soldiers in Dagestan, but they have not yet attacked. They will. 

Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, in Dagestan on Wednesday, was talking of a 
"short preparation" before "fulfilling our assignment in the shortest time 
possible." 

Here is what seems to pass for the plan: Over the past 12 days, the Russians 
have hit at supposed rebel positions from the air. They have also littered 
what they presume to be rebel escape and supply routes with mines. They have 
handed out AK-47s to any Dagestani "volunteer" who has asked. And they have 
airlifted tanks and armored personnel carriers to what they are calling, with 
wild optimism, "the front." 

Now let's think about this for a minute: 

The terrain being fought over is by all accounts remote, mountainous and 
dotted with caves that the rebels use to hide in. What makes the Russians 
think their aerial bombardments are accomplishing anything? 

NATO's smart bombs barely ruffled the feathers of the Yugoslav Army, and the 
alliance seems to have spent more of its time bombing cardboard tanks than 
real ones - and that was a case of the highest-tech weaponry in the world 
matched against a conventional army. Is lower tech Russian bombing really 
going to slow down Basayev? 

Five years ago the Russian army rolled into Grozny and got slaughtered. 
Generals did not escort their heavy armor with foot soldiers; military units 
at rest just a half kilometer away from those under heavy fire declined to 
come to their aid; troops were inexperienced and did not have maps. 

What has changed in the five years since? Well, the army is more sullenly 
underfunded and undertrained than ever. And Basayev's team is probably better 
trained than ever. What's the same? Well, the smug and bumbling military 
leadership remains a depressing constant; and it seems a safe bet that if the 
army couldn't dig up a map of the capital of Chechnya, it won't have one of a 
Dagestani mountain village either. 

Then there are the decisions to arm every local who asks nicely, and lay land 
mines across the republic. Who ever heard of sprinkling land mines around to 
deal with a tiny band of mobile guerrillas? These land mines will have only 
one effect: As Dagestani children step on them over the next several months 
and years, hatred of Moscow will grow.  
Back to the top

#3
Yeltsin keeps economic team intact in new government

MOSCOW, Aug 19 (AFP) - President Boris Yeltsin's economic and finance 
ministers were re-appointed Thursday to the government of new Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin, 10 days after the latest shakeup in the leadership.

Deputy Prime Ministers Nikolai Aksenenko and Viktor Kristenko who oversee 
economic policy retained their portfolios under decrees signed by Yeltsin on 
the appointment of 28 ministers, the presidential press service said.

Economics Minister Andrei Shapovalyants, Finance Minister Mikhail Kasyanov 
and Energy Minister Viktor Kalyuzhny were confirmed in their posts while 
Vladimir Shcherbak, Valentina Matvienko and Ilya Klebanov stayed on as deputy 
prime ministers.

In talks with Putin earlier at the Kremlin, Yeltsin approved the final list 
of appointments to the new government, Russia's fifth over the past year and 
half.

Under the decrees, the agriculture and natural resources portfolio were 
handed to newcomers Alexei Gordeyev and Boris Yatskevich, respectively.

Gordeyev and Yatskevich will join Justice Minister Yury Chaika, appointed 
earlier this week, as the only major new faces in the government led by 
Putin, who was appointed August 9 to head the government.

Chaika replaced Pavel Krasheninnikov who apparently failed to bow to Kremlin 
pressure and take steps to ban the Communist Party. 

Yeltsin stunned Russia's political establishment on August 9 by choosing 
Putin, 46, a former KGB spy, to head the government, replacing Sergei 
Stepashin who had been in office less than three months.

After drawing much criticism for firing Stepashin, Yeltsin may have chosen to 
keep the current team intact to ward off further barbs that he was leading 
the country to political instability. 

The current government however was only expected to remain in office until 
after the December elections of the State Duma lower house of parliament, 
which could result in a setback for communists and conservatives who now 
dominate the assembly.

Chairing his first cabinet meeting Thursday, Putin said preparations for the 
upcoming elections to the Duma and to the Russian presidency in mid-2000 were 
the government's priorities.

"The task of ensuring elections to the State Duma and to the Russian 
presidency in 2000 -- the task set by the president -- is the key task of the 
government in the political sphere," Putin said, according to news agencies.

Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov and Revenue Minister Alexander Pochinok 
also stayed on as did Privatisation Minister Farit Gazizullin, Ilya Yuzhanov 
as minister responsible for businesses, Leonid Drachevsky as minister 
responsible for CIS affairs and Mikhail Lesin as minister responsible for 
press and information.

Alexander Livshits moved from his post as a Kremlin adviser to the cabinet as 
minister without portfolio responsible for negotiations with international 
financial institutions.

Yeltsin on Tuesday signed decrees confirming that the power ministries would 
remain under their current leadership with Igor Ivanov heading foreign 
affairs; Igor Sergeyev, defense; Vladimir Rushailo, interior affairs; Nikolai 
Patrushev, federal security services and Sergei Shoigu at the emergencies 
Ministry. 
Back to the top

#4
Chicago Tribune
19 August 1999
Editorial
A NEW POWER CENTER IN RUSSIA 

Imagine this. Russians will have a real political choice that is neither 
Boris Yeltsin nor the Communists in their coming elections. What a refreshing 
change for the citizens of this fledgling democracy.

Former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov has made this possible by casting his 
lot with the formidable coalition forged by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and a 
group of powerful regional governors. With the popular Primakov on board, 
overnight the Fatherland-All Russia coalition becomes the dominant political 
power as the nation gears up for parliamentary elections in December and a 
presidential race next summer.

A poll last month before Luzhkov formed his coalition revealed that his 
party, without Primakov, would capture 16 percent of the vote for the lower 
house of parliament--the State Duma--still trailing the Communists' 34 
percent. But with Primakov, it would get 28 percent to the Communists' 27 
percent.

That would represent a fundamental change in the balance of power in Russia. 
The Communist-dominated Duma has blocked key reforms at every juncture.

Primakov, 69, has elder statesman status in Russia. A foreign policy and 
intelligence adviser in the Soviet era, he was named prime minister by 
Yeltsin after the country was thrown into economic chaos last August. 
Primakov maintained stability in the shaky months after the ruble was 
devalued and the government defaulted on some debt and was generally viewed 
as a calming figure in those trying times.

He was booted in May by Yeltsin because of his growing popularity and, many 
Russians believe, because his anti-corruption campaign was getting too close 
to Yeltsin.

In any event, the Luzhkov-Primakov powerhouse seriously threatens the ability 
of Yeltsin, who is barred by the Constitution from seeking a third term, to 
control the outcome of these elections. But that won't stop him from trying. 
His latest man-of-the-moment and preferred choice for president, newly 
confirmed Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, was scrambling to put together his 
own coalition, meeting with the other three former prime ministers ousted by 
Yeltsin over the last 18 months--Viktor Chernomyrdin, Sergei Kiriyenko and 
Sergei Stepashin.

Whatever coalition emerges from that effort will face an uphill battle 
against the Luzhkov-Primakov forces. Russians wearied by the erratic intrigue 
of the Yeltsin years seem ready for a centrist party that, as Primakov said, 
promises to be "for" and not just "against."
Back to the top

#5
Russia: Analysts Believe Primakov Has Presidential Ambitions 
By Floriana Fossato

After months of silence, the politician Russians say they respect the most, 
former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, has announced his agreement to lead 
the "Fatherland-All Russia" bloc. The move gives a powerful boost to the 
bloc's future success. Now, many in Moscow are discussing the implications 
for Primakov's presidential aspirations. 

Moscow, 19 August 1999 (RFE/RL) -- Exactly one year after Russia's financial 
collapse, many of Russia's political elite have joined forces to create a new 
so-called "party of power."

Former Russian Premier Yevgeny Primakov yesterday officially announced his 
decision to join the "Fatherland-All Russia" political bloc, led by Moscow 
Mayor Yurii Luzhkov and by some regional bosses, including St. Petersburg 
Governor Vladimir Yakovlev and Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev.

Primakov, speaking at a press conference packed with reporters and regional 
dignitaries, said he will lead the bloc's candidate list in December's 
parliamentary elections. 

Primakov's long-awaited decision is expected to give a huge boost to the 
bloc's electoral chances. Besides Primakov, the bloc's leading troika will 
include Luzhkov and Yakovlev. 

However, Luzhkov said today that he, Primakov and Yakovlev will likely 
renounce their parliamentary mandates in case of their election. According to 
Luzhkov, "the first three names in the list are mainly symbols" for the 
electorate.

Luzhkov's surprising words -- immediately following Primakov's announcement 
-- underline a political culture in which voters are seen not so much as 
choosing politicians to represent them but simply as endorsing already-made 
political decisions. 

Primakov, for his part, yesterday concentrated on clarifying some of the 
bloc's priorities. Primakov said the bloc stands for the creation of what he 
called an "organic link" between the State Duma and the government. He said 
the cabinet must reflect the majority in the Duma and could include 
representatives of parties not included in the majority. He said the bloc 
stands for changes in the constitution aimed at "strengthening state power."

Primakov also said Russia's next president should keep the right to be the 
top commander of the country's military forces. Primakov said:

"[The president] should continue overseeing directly security forces and the 
security council. He should be the main leader representing Russia abroad. 
However, he should transfer part of his powers to the government and the 
Federal Assembly. It is indispensable to introduce the post of 
vice-president."

Primakov said he also advocates amending the constitution or approving a 
special bill that would guarantee a "secure and dignified life" for Russian 
presidents after their term ends. He said such a move would stabilize the 
political situation in Russia, especially ahead of elections.

Many analysts in Moscow say such a program will appeal to many Russians tired 
of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's mercurial style of rule. However, some 
say that, more than being a party platform ahead of a parliamentary vote, it 
seems to reflect a possible attempt by Primakov and Luzhkov to agree on their 
plans for the June 2000 presidential race.

Both politicians deny having presidential ambitions. However, their names are 
routinely included in opinion polls concerning presidential hopefuls, and no 
one doubts that one of them will run for the post. 

The question is, Which one of them?

Primakov yesterday admitted he's considering the issue:

"I can tell you frankly that I have not made up my mind on the issue. Much 
will depend on whether I feel the support of the people. This for me is very 
important."

Asked how he and Luzhkov will decide who should run, Primakov smiled and said 
that they "will agree." Luzhkov has said he would be prepared to give up any 
presidential ambitions in Primakov's favor if it came down to that.

Moscow pundits are divided on whether Primakov made the right move by joining 
"Fatherland-All Russia." Some believe he would have had a good chance of 
running successfully on his own. Others believe Luzhkov may be trying to 
"use" Primakov to enhance his own bid for the presidency. 

Political analyst Sergei Karaganov -- who is close to Primakov -- told our 
Moscow correspondent that "this is the spin that those who are afraid of us 
would like to give to the latest developments."

Andrei Piantkovsky is director of the Moscow Center for Strategic Studies. He 
told RFE/RL that Primakov is certainly doing a great favor for Luzhkov:

"Primakov is simply saving the 'Fatherland' venture. I think that Luzhkov, as 
a presidential candidate, had made a mistake taking the burden of the party. 
Primakov's official support enhances now the bloc's hope to obtain a good 
result [in December] and therefore save the presidential election."

Piantkovsky believes Primakov is clearly aiming at the Russian presidency and 
sees two reasons that could have motivated Primakov to join the bloc. 
Piantkovsky says: "He may have obtained the firmest guarantees from Luzhkov 
that they will be in tandem for the presidential election. [This scenario 
would see] Primakov running for president, while Luzhkov would become prime 
minister and enjoy new broad powers. I do not think it is by chance that 
Primakov in his press conference talked about constitutional changes in this 
direction."

According to Piantkovsky, Primakov could also have decided that pre-empting 
efforts by the Kremlin to stop the creation of the new powerful bloc was of 
paramount importance.
Back to the top

#6
Moscow Times
August 19, 1999 
DEFENSE DOSSIER: START II Will Be Hard Sell 
By Pavel Felgenhauer 

This week Russia and the United States began to discuss amendments to the 
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and, at the same time, the terms of the 
START III strategic arms reduction treaty. START III is a follow-up treaty to 
START II that was signed by President Boris Yeltsin and then U.S. President 
George Bush in 1993. The outline of START III was agreed to by President Bill 
Clinton and Yeltsin in 1997 at a summit in Finland's capital, Helsinki. START 
II required Russia and the U.S. to reduce their present arsenal of about 
6,000 strategic warheads each to 3,000-3,500. The follow-up START III 
proposed a lower ceiling of 2,000-2,500 warheads. START II has not been 
ratified and so START III is also in limbo. 

Significant nuclear arms reductions are broadly supported by Russian and 
American military chiefs. Nuclear deterrence prevented major military 
conflicts in Europe during the early years of the Cold War when nuclear 
arsenals were much smaller than they are today. There is no reason why 
deterrence should not work at greatly reduced levels of deployed strategic 
warheads now that the Cold War is over. Military planners in Moscow and 
Washington want to spend less on upholding present strategic weapon systems. 
Russian and American generals want instead to use more resources on new arms. 

In the early 1990s the Russian Defense Ministry was planning a grand overhaul 
of its strategic nuclear forces that envisaged deployment of a new mobile 
land-based intercontinental ballistic missile - the SS-27. The SS-27 was 
developed in the 1980s as a response to the "Star Wars" Strategic Defense 
Initiative. The SS-27 has special features that could help it to avoid ABM 
defense systems. The Russian military deliberately negotiated the terms of 
START II in the early 1990s to ensure a major deployment of SS-27 ICBMs. 

Most likely the Russian generals believed that a major international arms 
agreement would guarantee government funding for new ICBMs. In Soviet times 
such Defense Ministry devices to suck money from the budget worked 
handsomely. The present Russian defense minister, Igor Sergeyev, who was 
before that a Strategic Rocket Forces chief, is still today an enthusiast of 
START II ratification. For the last two years Sergeyev has siphoned money out 
of all other military procurement programs to make and deploy new SS-27 
ICBMs. 

However, if START II is good for the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, it is 
bad for Russia's overall national and defense interests. Yeltsin did sign 
START II, but did not release any significant sums of money for SS-27 
deployment. In fact, Yeltsin never seriously pressed for START II 
ratification. From 1993 to 1999 there were many times when a concerted effort 
by the Kremlin could have easily ensured ratification of START II. However, 
this never happened. Most likely START II is one of those grand documents 
Yeltsin likes to sign with no intention of ever doing anything. 

Meanwhile, the disadvantages of START II for Russia have become so obvious 
that opposition to ratification in the Duma grew, engulfing not only 
Communists and nationalists, but also many liberals. To overcome this 
opposition the follow-up START III treaty was proposed. Lower START III 
warhead levels will reduce the need for Russia to deploy lots of new ICBMs. 
If put together in one package, START II and START III can possibly pass 
ratification and be implemented. 

However, there are still major hurdles ahead in arms reduction. It is in 
Russia's interest to have a much lower level of strategic nuclear armaments 
than is envisaged in the START III outline: not 2,000-2,500, but 1,000-1,500 
warheads or maybe even less. However, the Pentagon is adamant that the U.S. 
should not go under the 2,500 limit. 

The U.S. is also against a package ratification of START II and START III. 
Washington insists that START II be ratified first. Many in Russia believe 
this may be a trick to get Russia to ratify a treaty it does not want and 
then stall on the follow-up. 

Russian diplomats and generals also oppose any changes in the ABM treaty. 
During the coming negotiations Russian officials will stall as long as 
possible, hoping that Yeltsin and his pro-Western regime will be ousted 
before any "treacherous" agreement is reached. 

To obtain any significant progress in the new arms talks, Washington will 
have to appeal to the Kremlin over the heads of the Russian negotiators. But 
any agreements that are pressed through in such a way will never enjoy broad 
support in Russia, so ratification and implementation will be as impossible 
as with START II. 
Back to the top

#7
Duma May Ratify Start-2 only in Case of Tune on Abm-Lukin.
By Ivan Novikov 

MOSCOW, August 19 (Itar-Tass) - Russia's State Duma lower house of parliament 
can ratify the Russo-US START-2 Treaty only if a mutually-acceptable stand is 
found regarding the adaptation of the ABM Treaty, holds Vladimir Lukin, the 
chairman of the Duma Committee for International Affairs. 

Commenting on the negotiations in Moscow with the US delegation lead by 
Undersecretary of State John Holum, Lukin told Tass that the negotiations 
centered on disarmament issues. The negotiations are concluding this 
Thursday. Lukin said the main theme of the negotiations was debating the 
problem of drafting the START-3 treaty and the possibility of ratifying the 
START-2 Treaty. 

"The Russian side made it plain that the treaty can be ratified only if there 
is a mutually-acceptable stand on the adjustment of the 1972 ABM treaty, 
Lukin said, adding that "this adjustment should in no case infringe Russia's 
interests". 

In addition, Lukin said there must be a clear notion of the main parameters 
of the START-3 treaty, particularly as regards the ceiling for warheads. "Any 
unilateral actions on ABM undermine chances for the continuation of strategic 
disarmament," Lukin said. He said the sides agreed to continue debating 
questions connected with the START-2 Treaty and the Treaty on Antiballistic 
Missile Systems.
Back to the top

#8
Consultations on ABM, Start-3 Get Nowhere--Ivashov.

MOSCOW, August 20 (Itar-Tass) - The situation in Kosovo harbours danger, the 
Russian Defense Ministry's international military cooperation department 
chief Leonid Ivashov said at a press conference on Friday. 

He said Kosovo's situation is describable as "having dangerous prospects". 

One of causes of exacerbation is the "development of the peacekeeping 
operation according to NATO's scenario," and "ignoring the sovereignty and 
participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in solving the problems 
of the Kosovo province". 

"We reject the attempts of revising the accords that were earlier reached in 
Helsinki, we are conducting consultations with the command of the KFOR and 
NATO forces," Ivashov said. 

He said the Russian peacekeeping contingent "is closely and constructively 
cooperating with contingents of other states, especially at the tactical 
level, in platoons and companies". 

Ivashov said the Russian force had started the peacekeeping mission in 
Kosovo. 

The Russian peacekeepers have been fully deployed in the East sector and 
partially in the South sector. 

They hold the Centre sector and so far have not entered the North sector, 
Ivashov said. 

He said Kosovo's situation would be one of key subjects of talks that the 
Russian and American defense ministers are expecteto hold soon. Their 
"meeting will be held in the nearest time, somewhere in September", Ivashov 
said. 

"We have said to our American partners that the situation in the Balkans, the 
situation with the implementation of Resolutuion 1244 of the United Nations 
Security Council on Kosovo should become a subject for serious discusssion by 
the heads of defense ministries of the two countries," Ivashov said. 

"We are worried by the circumstance that the USA and NATO are trying to 
impose order in the Balkans excluding from this process the very entities of 
the Balkan region - the states of the Balkan region," Ivashov said. 

"That is, (they) are imposing a stereotyope, their vision of the situation in 
the Balkans. This is, in our view, a very dangerous tendency," he said. 

Ivashov said Russian -American consultations on the strategic arm reduction 
treaty, Start-3, and the anti-ballistic missile treaty, ABM, were held in 
Moscow on August 17-19. 

"There are no results," Ivashov said, adding that diplomats were likely to 
have a different view of the consultations' outcome. 

The US' approach to deployment of the regional anti-ballistic missile defense 
system is apparently "in the spirit of the American policy", Ivashov said. 

"First the decision is made, the financing of the work is done, companies get 
research and development orders. All this is done in violation of the 
agreements on the ABM treaty of 1972. Then Russia is put before an 
accomplished fact: now let come to agreement," he said. 

Russia's stance is that the ABM treaty of 1972 is a guideline for all 
processes in the field of strategic nuclear forces, and violating it means 
wrecking the whole process of nuclear deterrence, Ivashov said. 

He said the Russian delegation to the consultations was sharply critical of 
the US' plans about the vital treaty. The consultations were in fact limited 
to statement of Russia's and the US' approaches to the problem. 

"As concerns the Start-3 treaty, we were put on guard by the attempt in the 
position of the American side to tie the future of Start-3 to modification of 
the ABM treaty. This is not anything other than pressure on the Russian 
delegation, Ivashov said. 
Back to the top

#9
Russia to Speed up Development of New Arms.

ZHUKOVSKY (Moscow region), August 20 (Itar-Tass) - Russia will speed up its 
programme of the development of arm systems based on new physical principles, 
the Defense Ministry's armament chief Colonel-General Anatoly Sitnov said. 
Sitnov, who attends the international air show in Zhukovsky on Friday, said 
in an interview with Itar-Tass that the Defense Ministry had passed the 
decision to hasten the development of new arms after NATO's assault of 
Yugoslavia. 

"We have not seen anything principally new in terms of armaments of the NATO 
countries and of the tactic of their use in the Yugoslav conflict. On our 
part, we have made the decision to speed up the creation of the newest arm 
systems based on new physical principles," Sitnov said. 

He said Russian arms specialists had exhausted the scientific-technological 
groundwork of the past decade. 

Russia was never inferior to any country in aerodynamic research, he said. 

As for avionics, a number of important decisions have been made over the 
recent years on improvement of navigation and sighting onboard systems, 
radioelectronic equipment and other components of aircraft. 

Sitnov said a manifold-module principle of assembly of aircraft arms would be 
employed under a decision passed four years ago. 

This principles is used at present in designing new aircraft on the basis of 
tested aerodynamic schemes. 

Asked why federal troops are not using the newest arms in fighting Islamic 
militants in Daghestan, Sitnov said the fighting was not a war, but stopping 
the bandit activity, which does not warrant sending the newest arms to the 
region.   
Back to the top

#10
Christian Science Monitor
20 August 1999
Should US aid ex-cold warriors?
As US foreign aid shrinks, a battle erupts over funds for ex-Soviet weapons 
experts. 
By Jonathan S. Landay, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

They were once a pampered elite, scientists and technicians who designed and 
built the weapons of the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. 

But like millions of Russians, they have fallen on hard times, earning on 
average under $100 a month. Some of these former cold warriors may be selling 
their deadly skills to foes like Iraq, North Korea, or terrorist groups. 

To avert this threat, President Clinton wants the United States to underwrite 
peaceful research that would keep 40,000 Russian weapons experts working. Yet 
this proposal faces opposition from the GOP-run Congress. 

This new political and ideological tussle over foreign aid comes amid a 
15-year decline in the assistance the world's richest country provides the 
poorest. In fact, as a percentage of gross national product, the US gives 
less foreign aid than any of the world's 20 most developed nations. 

"The general trend is that foreign aid is becoming a lower and lower priority 
for US policymakers," says Phyllis Bennis of the Institute of Policy 
Analysis. She believes the gap between wealth and poverty can lead to 
conflict that threatens American interests. 

"Yet there is no effort to do any preemptive spending, which is always less 
than the cleanup costs or the costs of war," Ms. Bennis says. 

As Republican congressional leaders cut Mr. Clinton's proposed funding to 
keep former Soviet scientists working, the issue of preemptive spending is 
becoming the heart of the ideological battle over foreign aid. 

Clinton is threatening to veto the House and Senate versions of his fiscal 
2000 foreign-aid budget because of $1.9 billion in cuts from his proposed 
$14.6 billion aid plan. The cuts, he charges, will hurt programs designed to 
bolster international stability and keep the US out of wars. 

"Underfunding our arsenal of peace is as risky as underfunding our arsenal of 
war," Clinton told a Veterans of Foreign Wars group this week in Kansas City. 

Foreign aid is less than 1 percent of the US budget, he noted, and less than 
one-fifteenth of Pentagon spending, "If we end up underfunding our diplomacy, 
we end up overusing our military." 

Nonsense, conservatives retort. They assert that US assistance has never 
helped avert crises and disasters that threaten American interests. To the 
contrary, they say, US aid has helped keep dictators in power and failed to 
prevent the collapse into chaos of countries like Somalia and Haiti. 

Other priorities closer to home, such as the Congress-approved $792 billion 
tax cut, are more important, they say. 

A senior administration official says funding the tax reduction while keeping 
the federal budget balanced is a major reason for the GOP foreign aid cuts. 
"[Republicans] are in an impossible budget situation right now, and 
traditionally one of the budgets with the smallest domestic constituency is 
the most convenient to take hits from." 

Foreign-aid spending hit its zenith in 1947, the height of the Marshall Plan 
for the post-World War II reconstruction of Europe. It then declined steadily 
until President Reagan boosted it as part of his strategy to undermine Soviet 
power by advancing American influence through largess to anticommunist 
regimes. 

The decline resumed with the end of the US-Soviet rivalry, tight federal 
budgets, and a post-cold-war belief that free trade and private investment 
are better ways of reducing global poverty and instability. Aid supporters, 
however, point out that the expansion in global markets has failed to halt 
the gap between rich and poor nations. 

Foreign aid is now half of what it was 15 years ago. About 50 percent is 
military assistance - most of which goes to Israel and Egypt - or aid 
designed to bolster US security, according to the Council for a Livable 
World, a Washington-based arms-control group. 

While Clinton's proposed fiscal 2000 budget would not increase assistance, 
the House and Senate both would slash Clinton's requests. He is threatening a 
veto unless House and Senate negotiators restore the cuts when they meet next 
month to reconcile their bills. 

The two houses slashed more than $200 million in aid to the former Soviet 
union, leaving it up to the administration to decide how to distribute the 
rest. But Clinton says the total is insufficient to fund economic-reform 
projects and expanded arms-control cooperation, including the program to fund 
peaceful research by the Russian weapons experts. 

Republican lawmakers also slashed spending on aid to Africa designed to 
promote development, democratization, and conflict resolution on a continent 
mired in poverty and strife. 

Clinton seeks $500 million in aid to Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians 
under the Wye River accord he brokered earlier this year. The Senate withheld 
the funds for Israel and the Palestinians pending implementation of the 
agreement. The House slashed the entire amount.
Back to the top

#11
Chemotherapy of Raisa Gorbachev Stopped for While.

FRANKFURT-AM-MAIN, August 20 (Itar-Tass) - Doctors have withdrawn 
chemotherapy of Raisa Gorbachev who is treated for acute leukemia in the 
Muenster University clinic, Germany. Her attending physician Thomas Buechner 
told reporters that chemotherapy was stopped on Friday for an interval, as 
doctors "need time and the patient a rest". 

Raisa Gorbachev, the wife of first Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, has 
been treated since July 25. 

Buechner said therapy had not yielded a remission, but "we are on the way to 
it". 

As for the prospect of bone marrrow transplantation, which is an alternative 
treatment of acute leukemia, Buechner said "not now". 

However, the operation reportedly could be carried out within days. Raisa 
Gorbachev's younger sister Lyudmila Titarenko, who lives in Ufa in Bashkiria, 
has been selected as marrow donor. 

German media said Mikhail Gorbachev had asked Russian Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin to assist Titarenko's rapid arrival in Muenster. She is expected to 
come on Saturday. 

Observers noted the fact that two weeks back, doctors described marrow 
trasplantation as a rather far-off prospect. 
Back to the top

#12
Excerpt
USIA
Foreign Media Reaction
August 18, 1999
RUSSIA: ELECTION POLITICS HEAT UP; DAGESTAN 'WAR' PERSISTS; ARMS CONTROL
DISCUSSED 

Events in Russia continued to garner extensive media coverage as overseas
analysts mulled over the political scene in Russia, with the run-up to
December's parliamentary elections and the 2000 presidential elections
foremost in the minds of most observers. "The battle for the succession is
on," declared one paper, and most foresaw a fight that would not be "clean,
fair or reassuring to the outside world." While the latest round of
government reshuffling and unrest in the southern region of Dagestan
remained staples of editorial pages in Moscow and elsewhere, yesterday's
announcement by ex-Prime Minister Primakov that he would join forces with
Moscow Mayor Luzhkov and regional governors in a centrist electoral
bloc--the so-called "Fatherland-All Russia" coalition--and this week's
resumption of high-level U.S.-Russian arms control talks also drew the
attention of Russia watchers. Highlights follow:

ELECTION BATTLE LINES BEING DRAWN: The latest change of government--which
left Vladimir Putin as the new premier and Mr. Yeltsin's heir-apparent--was
viewed by a strong majority as evidence that the president was less
interested in strengthening democratic institutions than in protecting the
interests of his family and associates as they position themselves for the
upcoming election year. London's independent weekly Economist found it
"unfortunate" that Mr. Yeltsin did not seem to "understand the importance
of continuity of government, of building parties, of fighting corruption,
of enforcing the law and of generally establishing the institutional
framework that democracy demands." Indeed, concern about the state of
Russian democracy," as its politics appear to be sinking more and more
deeply into a morass of intrigues and mistrust," was widespread. A few held
the U.S. somewhat accountable, since it was due to "Washington's advocacy
[that] much of the world has put its faith in Yeltsin to carry the torch
for democracy in Russia." Meanwhile, several saw Mr. Primakov's agreeing to
head "Fatherland-All Russia" as posing a formidable challenge to the
Kremlin leadership, perhaps eventually "dominating the political landscape."

THE DANGERS OF DAGESTAN: Opinion diverged on whether "Russia's new war" in
the Caucasus might escalate to another Chechnya. One Moscow writer
maintained that Dagestan is "an exact copy of Chechnya;" another demurred,
arguing that it is "no Chechnya" since "99 percent of Dagestanis want to
fight the invading bandits." A number of analysts worried that the real
"danger is that the conflict will be used by Yeltsin to bolster his own
fragile position in Moscow" by perhaps "imposing a state of emergency,
which could then justify postponing both the parliamentary and presidential
polls." German papers urged the West to send a clear message to the Kremlin
that such action would be unacceptable. 

U.S.-RUSSIAN ARMS CONTROL: With U.S.-Russian arms control talks on START
III and possible modifications to the ABM Treaty underway, papers in
Britain and Germany--referring to the proliferation of missile know-how to
"some 30 countries of varying reliability"--judged that there are "good
reasons for a missile defense system." Noting that "the next arms race
could be anti-missile protection," one analyst insisted that "this week's
talks...are critically important."....


RUSSIA: "Dagestan Is No Chechnya" 

Centrist, trade union Trud (8/18), reporting about fighting in Dagestan,
cited a member of the former Stepashin cabinet, Ramazan Abdulatipov: "This
is a war against Russia and its integrity. An international group of
bandits, finding refuge in Chechnya, staged this war. Terrorists spent
several years preparing for it, financed by international centers. Dagestan
is not what Chechnya was before the war there. The Russian troops' mission
in Dagestan is entirely different from what they did in Chechnya.
Ninety-nine percent of Dagestanis want to fight against the invading
bandits." 

"Yeltsin Wins One Of His Last Battles" 

Natalia Konstantinova noted on page one of centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta
(8/18): "The confirmation of Vladimir Putin as prime minister must make
Yeltsin feel better. He has won an important battle, possibly one of his
last, before he leaves as president. The Duma can sit back and relax until
December, and the new government, led by Kremlin protege Putin, will most
likely act as a branch of the administration, closely supervised by Yeltsin
himself." 

"No Reform Is Expected" 

Natalia Neimysheva concluded on page one of reformist Izvestiya (8/18):
"Along with a new government, we have to accept its 'continuity' policy.
All it will do is try to help those in need of national budget money. The
previous cabinet did the same. With elections around the corner, there is
going to be no reform." 

"Indifference" 

Neo-communist Slovo (8/18-19) remarked editorially on page one:
"Indifference reigned supreme in the Russian parliament as it discussed the
appointment of a new prime minister. You can't blame the deputies. It is
the fourth premier they had to approve in a year. The political elite's
only concern is surviving. The president wants more time to enjoy his
position. The premier is eager to assert himself. And the deputies would
like to return to their seats in the Duma after the December poll."

"Reformers Fail" 

Official parliamentary Parlamentskaya Gazeta (8/17) ran a commentary by
Andrei Papushin: "The choice of Putin, the chief of the FSB (the Federal
Security Service) and the Security Council, shows that things are getting
serious. There is no way back, and to protect the 'democratic values,' the
powers that be think they can only rely on people from the 'power
structures' [and] those who are close to the president.... This is evidence
that 'reformers' have failed. That the Kremlin has picked the FSB's chief
as a successor and bodyguard (in the broadest sense of the word) makes this
evident." 

"Crisis Senseless, Boring" 

Vyacheslav Nikonov judged in reformist Izvestiya (8/17): "The current
(political) crisis is the most predictable, senseless, boring and
short-lived in the last few years. After giving the boot to two popular
premiers, the Kremlin has decided to gamble by betting on a dark horse." 

"Duma Doesn't Care About Premiers" 

According to Natalia Kalashnikova and Yevgeny Yuryev on page one of
reformist Segodnya (8/17): "The Duma does not care a hoot about who will be
the premier in the period before the elections. The Kremlin has missed a
chance to solve the continuity problem--the Duma would have accepted
anyone, be it Chubais, Gaidar or even Tatyana Dyachenko." 

"Duma Pragmatic" 

Irina Granik reported on page one of reformist, business-oriented
Kommersant Daily (8/17): "Yesterday the Duma quickly approved Vladimir
Putin. Seeing no difference between him and his predecessor, the deputies
showed a pragmatic approach to the approving procedure." 

"Putin To Be Approved" 

Marina Kalmykova predicted on page one of reformist Vremya-MN (8/16):
"Yeltsin's new figurehead will leave the Duma as a premier.... Theirs is a
vote not for Putin but a chance to hold an election campaign quietly,
without problems. All they want is fair and timely elections, so they will
vote him in. Another change of the cabinet has left them so cold that they
would not mind temporarily giving up their right to approve a new premier.
With a procedure so routine, they might as well approve a list of
prospective premiers for a year ahead, along with a federal budget." 

"Putin--End Of Liberal Era" 

Centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta (8/14) front-paged this commentary by
Aleksandr Tsipko: "If the 'family' makes its choice definitive and has
Putin elected as president, the 'liberal' era will end. For Russia to have
the leader with the face and mentality of a KGB investigator is no
blessing. Putin will not change to become a goody-goody czar. The opposite
is more likely. In Russia, authority has never helped anyone become more
ethical. Yeltsin has done a great thing by anointing Putin--there is no
other way to unmask our so-called democracy and our so-called liberals and
show the world what we really are. 'Yeltsin and family' can do to Russia
anything they want. We have no political force to resist this authoritarian
regime. Our selfish and wily political elite will not rise from its knees.
The Yeltsin era will continue for a long time after Yeltsin. As long as our
democracy has the face of Colonel Putin."

"Family Vs. Rest Of Russia" 

Natalia Kalashnikova asserted in reformist Segodnya (8/14): "The latest
(evidently, not the last) government crisis has conclusively split the
Russian elite, with the family (the Kremlin) up against the rest of Russia.
It seems that the non-family stands to win and, more so, take over control.
Practically all, speaking with one voice, want 'the Yeltsin Constitution'
revised. So we may be in for surprises concerning the 2000 elections." 

"It Sounds Like Chechnya" 

Official government Rossiiskaya Gazeta (8/13) ran this piece by Boris
Yamshanov: "Reports from Dagestan make the whole thing sound like the early
period of the Chechnya drama. It's all talk and no action. In the meantime,
bandits feel free to do what they want in Russia, smiling arrogantly on TV
screens. When will we ever learn? Thousands of our soldiers died in
Chechnya. This is too high a price for a lack of will or politicians'
double game?" 

"Self-Defense Justified" 

Aleksandr Bykov, reporting on fighting in Dagestan, demanded in official
parliamentary Parlamentskaya Gazeta (8/12): "Why is it possible in Russia
at all? Obviously, the federal center and 'force structures' are helpless
to the point of conniving with what is going on. It is equally obvious that
the local population can't stand the outrages of extremists anymore. The
idea of a resistance movement and self-defense groups seems justified under
the circumstances. The popular volunteer corps is graphic testimony to the
feds' impotence and failure in the North Caucasus. Dagestan will never be
the same, no matter what happens next. That is true also of Russia." 

"A Copy Of Chechnya 5 Years Ago" 

Valery Yakov said on page one of reformist Noviye Izvestiya (8/12): "The
current events in Dagestan are an exact copy of the Chechnya story of five
years ago. The government, for all the multitude of troops, special
services and means available to it, is helpless. It has started to arm
volunteers. Armed, the volunteers may soon turn against the local
administration. To arm Dagestan is to create a new potential danger of war
in Russia. The fighting in the mountains is just a prelude. Alarmingly, it
shows that the past five years have been wasted on the president, the
premier and the 'force ministries.'"   
Back to the top


Back to the Center for Defense Infomation Site
Back to The CDI Russia Weekly Site