#1
Putin Assures US of Succession in Arms Control Policy.

WASHINGTON, August 13 (Itar-Tass) - Russian acting Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin assured the United States that his government will work to fulfil the 
arms control agreements reached by the presidents of both countries during 
their latest meeting in Cologne, Germany. 

"Mr. Putin reaffirmed Russia's desire to strengthen the overall relationship 
and cooperation and expressed that the new government intends to follow the 
Yeltsin-Clinton agenda that was put forth in Cologne earlier this year", 
National Security Council spokesman David Leavy told reporters on Thursday 
commenting on Putin's telephone talk with Samuel Berger, US National Security 
Adviser. 

Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton met in Germany on June 20 and 
agreed to promote arms control with talks on the START-3 arms reduction 
treaty which are to begin later this month. Russia also promised to push the 
START-2 ratification through parliament this autumn. 

"Mr. Berger stressed the importance of making progress on a whole range of 
issues including arms control, nonproliferation and economics", Leavy said. 

#5
BBC
August 9, 1999
The uncertain world of Boris Yeltsin 
Shifting positions: Advisers dread sudden policy pronouncements 
By News Online's Dominic Casciani 

There is perhaps only one thing now certain about Boris Nikolayevich
Yeltsin -  that the president is regarded more and more as a political joke
in his own country. 

Hot stepper: Mr Yeltsin shows off that famous Russian rhythmUnfortunately
for Russia, since his health began to deteriorate seriously, leading to a
quintuple heart bypass following his 1996 re-election, his behaviour has
been no laughing matter. 

The country entered 1999 knowing that the fall-out of the previous year's
economic crisis was far from over. 

The rouble lost 75% of its value over the year and Boris Yeltsin's response
had been to sack two prime ministers within six months - Viktor
Chernomyrdin in March and Sergei Kiriyenko in August. 

But with the additional dismissals of Yevgeny Primakov and Sergei Stepashin
- taking the total to four premiers in 18 months - many ordinary people
regard the president's actions as signs of desperation. 

The body politic is in appalling health, they concluded, and headed by a
man who had become an international embarrassment. 

Hero to villain 

The domestic and international view of Boris Yeltsin has changed
dramatically since the fall of communism. 

In August 1991 he was hailed as a hero and a defender of democracy when he
mounted a tank in Moscow, rallying the people against an attempt to
overthrow Mikhail Gorbachev's era of glasnost and perestroika. 

Today, he looks back on a second term in office which has been dominated by
financial crises, rifts with the West over Kosovo, a battle against
impeachment and a public weary with his gaffes making the news as often as
his policies. 

One of Mr Yeltsin's most recent faux-pas slipped out in May at the height
of the Kosovo conflict. 

Handing out awards at the Kremlin, the president spluttered out words to
the effect that if President Bill Clinton were to cause some sort of
accident in Yugoslavia, Russia would "send a missile". 

Mr Yeltsin's press spokesman, Dmitry Yakushkin, moved so fast that
journalists were left in no doubt that this could not be regarded as a
statement of policy. 

Russian TV journalists agreed not to use the clip, but the US network NBC
included it in a report on Mr Yeltsin's health. 

Boisterous Boris 

Mr Yeltsin's behaviour has become increasingly bizarre, and might even on
occasion be amusing if he were not ultimately responsible for a state with
a huge nuclear arsenal and an economy teetering on the brink of total
collapse. 

Make mine a small one: Drink blamed for gaffesWhile he has provided
entertainment for the world's media, critics say Mr Yeltsin's behaviour has
swung between that of a power-junkie and a quixotic figure out of touch
with reality. 

In 1994 during a visit to Germany, a band struck up a Russian folk song at
a champagne luncheon. 

The president, in rude health and enjoying the champagne, jumped onto the
stage, snatched the baton and conducted the brass band while singing,
dancing and blowing kisses to the audience. 

A month later, during a Dublin stop-over, Mr Yeltsin was due to meet the
Irish premier Albert Reynolds. 

After an embarrassingly long wait at the end of a red carpet on the runway
at Shannon Airport, the Irish leadership was informed by the president's
advisors that he was "unwell" and would not be leaving the plane. 

On returning to Moscow, Mr Yeltsin admonished his team for not waking him
up. The accepted version of events among journalists is that he was drunk. 

Mr Yeltsin's drink problems have been blamed for more than one indiscretion. 

Visiting Sweden in December 1997, Mr Yeltsin suddenly announced with a
flourish that he was unilaterally cutting Russia's nuclear arsenal by a
third, prompting more than a little consternation at the Kremlin. 

His long-suffering press secretary assured journalists that the president
actually meant he was not cutting back nuclear weapons at all. 

Red faces in the emerald isle: That non-appearance in EireSome of his most
extraordinary breaches in protocol came during a meeting with Pope John
Paul II in February 1998. 

Despite trying to bring the audience to an end, the Pope was forced to
retake his seat after Mr Yeltsin announced loudly: "Holy Father, we haven't
finished yet". 

At the subsequent banquet, the president used an expansive toast to declare
his "boundless love for Italian women". 


Health fears 

Months later an allegedly darker side to the president emerged when his
former head of security described him as a suicidal alcoholic who was unfit
to govern. 

Holding on: Appearances are increasingly rareAlexander Korzhakov, since
accused of seeking revenge for being ousted, claimed the president had
twice tried to kill himself, including an alleged attempt to lock himself
in a sauna. 

The Kremlin's nerves were further jangled after Mr Yeltsin stumbled during
a ceremony in Uzbekistan last autumn, a scene which was endlessly replayed
on television to show his declining health. 

His speech has been slurred and he has needed physical support at public
engagements. 

There has been a tragic edge to the decline of Boris Yeltsin as politicians
and journalists have paid less and less attention to his utterances. 

In October last year he announced he was giving up the day-to-day running
of the country and was readmitted to hospital. 

But the sackings of both Yevgeny Primakov and Sergei Stephashin have shown
Mr Yeltsin as the political pugilist of old. 

These may be only brief returns to the ring - but the consequences may be
to lead an already punch-drunk Russia further into political and economic
paralysis.

#6
Boston Globe
12 August 1999
[for personal use only]
Trail to Yeltsin succession is littered with chosen ones 
By Brian Whitmore, Globe Correspondent
  
MOSCOW - President Boris N. Yeltsin has said he wants to see the acting
prime minister, Vladimir Putin, as Russia's next leader. Ordinary Russians
are not exactly rushing out to buy ''Vote for Putin'' bumper stickers.

Yeltsin has named a lot of people his heir apparent over the years. At the
moment, none of them has a ghost of a chance to be Russia's next president.

Being ordained as Yeltsin's successor, either by the president himself or
Moscow's manic rumor machine, has turned out to be a political kiss of death. 

Speculation about who will succeed Yeltsin, who legally must leave office
in July, has heated up as the Russian president enters his final year in
office. It began, however, almost as soon as Yeltsin took up residence in
the Kremlin in 1991.

And every heir to Yeltsin's Kremlin throne, sooner or later, has been cast
into the political wilderness, usually by the mercurial president himself.
One reason: Yeltsin jealously guards the prerogatives of his office and
can't tolerate popular competitors, even when they are of his own making. 

Most observers say Yeltsin's longtime prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin,
once seen as a likely successor, was sacked last year for acting too
presidential. The same was said about former prime minister Sergei
Stepashin, who was fired Monday and replaced by Putin. Stepashin's recent
visit to the United States, where he secured badly needed credits for
Russia, was widely and favorably covered here, and the Russian media began
touting him as presidential material.

''Yeltsin does not have long-lived favorites,'' former deputy prime
minister Boris Nemtsov said Monday.

He should know. In 1994, Nemtsov was governor of the Nizhny Novgorod region
on the Volga River when Yeltsin bestowed upon him an unambiguous
presidential endorsement.

''He has grown so much that you can already tap him for president,'' said
Yeltsin of Nemtsov, then 34.

Yeltsin brought Nemtsov into his Cabinet in March 1997, saying that Russia
needed ''young energetic leaders.'' Nemtsov's poll numbers immediately
soared and pundits proclaimed him the country's next president. Just 17
months later, Nemtsov was a private citizen, fired by Yeltsin after
Russia's debt default and ruble devaluation last August. Today Nemtsov's
popularity is, like Yeltsin's, in single digits, and nobody considers him a
serious presidential contender.

Nemtsov can take comfort in the fact that he is not alone.

In June 1996, Yeltsin appointed retired general Alexander Lebed, who was
then widely popular, as his national security adviser.  Asked at a Kremlin
ceremony whether Lebed was his chosen successor, Yeltsin replied: ''Yes.''

Lebed won praise for negotiating a cease-fire in Russia's 20-month war with
the breakaway republic of Chechnya. But he also made the mistake of taking
Yeltsin's presidential endorsement too seriously. Asked by reporters
whether he wanted to be president in 2000, Lebed smiled and said, ''Maybe
earlier.''

After four months in office, Lebed was sacked by Yeltsin. And despite his
election last year as governor of the Siberian region of Krasnoyarsk, talk
of ''President Lebed'' has all but ceased.

''All those whom Yeltsin once called his successor have no political future
now,'' said Gennady Seleznyov, speaker of the State Duma, the lower house
of Russia's parliament. Seleznyov added that by anointing Putin, Yeltsin
had ''put a hex'' on him.

Seleznyov has a point. Over the years, Yeltsin's heirs apparent have
included a bunch of people Russians have long forgotten and most of the
rest of the world has never known: Sergei Shakhrai, Vladimir Shumeiko, Oleg
Soskovets.

At times, the succession speculation has bordered on the absurd.

Shakhrai, who in the early 1990s served as deputy prime minister, was once
the media's favorite president in waiting. But Yeltsin put an end to the
diminutive Shakhrai's hopes when he announced that his successor had to be
''a tall person.''

That's a requirement that does not bode well for Putin, who is a full head
shorter than Yeltsin.

#7
Russia:  Dagestan Rebels' Aims, Moscow's Plans Remain Unclear 
By Liz Fuller

Prague, 12 August 1999 (RFE/RL) -- Islamic militants under the command of
former acting Chechen premier Shamil Basayev and maverick field commander
Khottab last Sunday crossed the border between Chechnya and Dagestan and
occupied several villages in the mountainous Botlikh Rayon. 

Three days later, the self-styled Islamic Shura (Council) of Dagestan
issued a statement in Grozny declaring an independent Islamic state in
Dagestan. Both those developments had been predicted months earlier by
Dagestani leaders and Russian intelligence. Depending on Moscow's response,
they could develop into a serious threat both to political stability in
Dagestan and to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. 

Some politicians in both Moscow and Makhachkala are clearly aware of that
danger. Leaving the capital of Dagestan on last Sunday after emergency
consultations with the republic's leadership, then Russian Prime Minister
Sergei Stepashin warned that "We could lose Dagestan." 	The following day,
Dagestan State Council speaker Magomedali Magomedov admitted that the
republic's authorities had failed to respond in good time to the threat of
attack from Chechnya, calling for the swift creation of volunteer
self-defense units. Whether such units, which are reportedly being armed
mostly with hunting rifles, will prove able to repel highly trained and
motivated guerrillas armed with grenade-launchers and anti-tank weapons is
questionable. 

The apparent reluctance of the Russian defense establishment to make
serious contingency plans for a crisis in Dagestan is both alarming and
puzzling.

Rumors of a planned attack on Dagestan by armed forces subordinate to the
Congress of Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan have been circulating at least
since late 1998. The Congress was formed in April 1998 with the proclaimed
aim of creating an independent Islamic state comprising Chechnya and Dagestan.

Dagestan's Interior Minister Adilgirey Magomedtagirov said in May that the
republic's leadership takes seriously rumors of a planned attack by Chechen
militants. Concern mounted in recent months as raids from Chechen territory
on Interior Ministry and border posts along the Chechen-Dagestan border
became increasingly frequent. But Stepashin and Russian Interior Minister
Vladimir Rushailo downplayed the threat posed by those incursions,
ascribing them to "bandits" whom they pledged to eradicate.

Both men ruled out a new war in the North Caucasus. Russian Federal
Security Service Director Vladimir Putin in early July ruled out preemptive
strikes against the militants' bases in Chechnya. The reasons for Moscow's
reluctance to launch such preemptive strikes  -- whether because of
disagreements within the top leadership, excessive caution, underestimating
the danger,  or lack of strategic thinking -- is unclear.

Russian commentators have advanced varying explanations for the
intensifying hostilities along the Chechen-Dagestan border. Some observers
believe Moscow is behind those clashes, suggesting that some Russian ruling
circles are deliberately promoting instability in the North Caucasus to
create a pretext for imposing a state of emergency and postponing the State
Duma elections scheduled for 19 December. But President Yeltsin said on
Tuesday that one of the main reasons for his replacement of Stepashin as
prime minister by Putin was to prevent destabilization in the runup to that
poll. 

A second theory is that the fighting is aimed at thwarting the long-planned
meeting between Yeltsin and Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov, at which the
latter may make serious concessions to Moscow over the renegade republic's
future status vis-a-vis the federal center. 

Such an agreement, if it were accompanied by measures to strengthen
Maskhadov's authority, could lead to a resumption of exports of Caspian oil
via Chechnya. Some Russian observers say that such exports are not in the
interests of "some influential circles in a number of Near and Middle
Eastern states" who are believed to support the Islamic insurgents in
Chechnya and Dagestan. 

A third possibility is that the fighting does indeed mark the beginning of
a serious attempt by the Chechen opposition to Maskhadov and a handful of
Islamic radicals from Dagestan to seize power. Interfax last week (5
August) quoted an unidentified Russian intelligence source as predicting
that the radicals will take hostages in Makhachkala to pressure the
republic's leaders to resign. 	It's worth noting that Basayev first
achieved notoriety as a result of his masterminding of the June 1995
hostage-taking in the south Russian town of Budennovsk. If such a move is
in the militants' approved scenario, then the current skirmishes on the
border with Chechnya could merely be a stratagem to tie down Russian forces
as far as possible from the capital. And last year's occupation by
Nadirshakh Khachilaev's forces of the government building in Makhachkala
may have been a practice round for a more serious move.

What remains unclear is precisely how strong the armed forces of the
Congress of the Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan are, and what support they
can count on from the Dagestani population. Basayev can count on the
100,000 so-called Akkin Chechens, whose traditional homeland was part of
Chechnya until 1921 when it was transferred to Dagestan. And most of the
population of Botlikh Rayon, the scene of the present fighting, belong to
an ethnic group closely related to the Chechens.

Calculating the number of potential sympathizers on religious grounds is
equally problematic. Some 10 percent of Dagestan's 2.2 million population
are estimated by Russian observers to be "Wahhabists," but this term fails
to differentiate between militant radicals and the tens of thousands of
other Muslims who simply prefer a truly godly, righteous, and sober life to
the occasional pro forma observance of Muslim rites. 

Profound dissatisfaction with the current Dagestani leadership certainly
exists. But that resentment derives primarily from the leadership's virtual
monopoly on economic activity and its efforts to exclude the smaller of the
republic's 34 ethnic groups from leading positions to the benefit of the
Avars, Dargins and Kumyks. Those ethnic groups account for 27 percent, 15.5
percent and 12.9 percent of the total population. 

If observers' prognoses of the militants' plans are accurate, calculations
of the probable degree of support within Dagestan for a coup orchestrated
from Chechnya are irrelevant. In that case, Moscow's success in retaining
control of Dagestan is likely to depend on the ability of the Russian
military and interior ministry forces to preempt guerrilla strikes in
Makhachkala. "Nezavisimaya gazeta" reported today that 1,000 Russian
Interior Ministry troops had been sent to Makhachkala yesterday "to conduct
special operations."    

#8
Moscow Times
August 12, 1999 
DEFENSE DOSSIER: Chechen Rebels Set To Win 
By Pavel Felgenhauer 

Three years ago the war in Chechnya ended in total humiliation for the 
Russian armed forces. Almost two years of continuous air and gun bombardments 
did not break the Chechen rebellion. On the contrary, in August 1996 the 
Chechens launched a daring and well-organized assault to recapture Chechnya's 
capital, Grozny, which was occupied by thousands of heavily armed Russian 
troops. 

Armed mostly with light infantry weapons, the Chechen fighters split the 
Russian garrison into pockets of resistance and then beat back Russian 
armored counterattacks, inflicting heavy losses. Russian generals had no 
viable military option left, except to accept defeat and evacuate their 
troops from Chechnya. 

The defeat in Grozny marked the formal end of fighting, but in essence the 
war was lost much earlier. From the beginning the Russian military had the 
superior firepower and were pounding any sector of Chechnya believed to house 
rebels. These bombardments, of course, inflicted a toll on civilians and 
combatants, but did not break the Chechen fighter's morale or bring victory. 
Moscow lacked well-trained infantry units capable of moving in swiftly and 
cohesively to flush out the lightly armed, mobile rebels after the air and 
artillery attacks. 

Russian forces did not even learn to be coherent the hard way - through 
battle experience. Russian officers and men were constantly rotated in and 
out of Chechnya. A high-ranking Russian general told me in 1995 that the 
Defense Ministry wanted to move as much military personnel through Chechnya 
as possible "for them to gain some battle experience, since we have no money 
for regular military exercises." At the end of the Chechen war, most Russian 
forces in the combat zone were still an undisciplined armed rabble of 
makeshift units, whereas the rebels had matured to become crack storm troops, 
men who had been fighting in the same formations and under the same 
commanders for 20 months against a better-armed enemy. 

Today in Dagestan they meet again: The well-trained, highly mobile fighters 
trained in Chechnya, and a Russian-led armed rabble. Even the leaders are the 
same: The notorious Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev heads the guerrillas while 
Russian military activities are coordinated by the chief of the General 
Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, who was the overall commander of Russian troops in 
the North Caucasus during the Chechen war. Kvashnin personally planned the 
ill-fated New Year's attack on Grozny on Dec. 31, 1994; his complete 
incompetence as military leader and senseless bravado cost the Russian army 
thousands of men. 

The front line against the rebels in Dagestan is held today by makeshift 
formations of local Dagestani police and other Interior Ministry forces. 
Dagestani reservists and volunteers are being hurriedly called up and sent to 
the war zone. 

Today, as was almost commonplace during the Chechen war, competent signal 
officers, who should coordinate air and heavy gun bombardments, are absent at 
the front. The Russian-led forces command total firepower superiority, but 
cannot use this advantage efficiently. 

According to Interior Ministry sources, Dagestani police units were 
mistakenly attacked recently by Russian bombers and suffered casualties. 

Air force chief Anatoly Kornukov announced later that an investigation had 
proven that his planes had not hit the Dagestani police. It was a "rebel 
mortar attack," he said, and the Interior Ministry staff in Moscow had 
accepted this explanation. 

Kornukov may be right, but the fact that it took several days to convince the 
Interior Ministry that the air force did not bomb their men illustrates the 
total absence of coordination between branches of the armed forces. Also, if 
Dagestani police cannot tell an aerial attack from a mortar bombardment, they 
are totally unready for modern combat and should not be at the front. 

In any event, the Interior Ministry had its revenge soon: The frontline 
patrols allowed the rebels to infiltrate the perimeter of the Russian air 
base near Botlikh in the Dagestan mountains and execute a successful mortar 
attack. Two Russian helicopter gunships were destroyed and a distinguished 
air commander - Colonel Yury Naumov - was killed together with other Russian 
pilots. 

During the Chechen war there was a lot of mistrust, even hatred, between 
Interior and Defense Ministry forces. This incoherence was one of the sources 
of many defeats. If today Basayev seriously presses forward in Dagestan, the 
Russian military may be in for another major disaster.

#9
Russia Hopes To Keep World Naval Presence  

MOSCOW, August 10 (Itar-Tass) -- Russia is 
interested in the presence of its naval ships in the world ocean, 
Vice-Admiral Viktor Patrushev said in an interview with Itar-Tass. 
"Russia's weight is based not only on its geographic expanses but also on the 
strength of its navy. Russia must reinforce its political statements with 
real actions," said the chief of the operational division of the General 
Staff of the Russian navy. 

"The Russian navy is prepared to send its ships into the Mediterranean 
and the Indian Ocean, but it needs resources and it needs bases for its 
permanent presence there," the admiral said. He noted that "Russia has 
only two naval bases left abroad -- Kamrai in Vietnam and Tartus in Syria." 

"Even with underfinancing and shortage of food and fuel supplies, the 
Russian seamen are always ready to depart for the assigned area and 
accomplish the set tasks. This readiness is not something on the paper 
only. During the Yugoslav crisis, the naval ships were ready to sail to 
the Mediterranean but no order came," he said. 

The admiral noted that "most of the countries in the Mediterranean area, 
even NATO members, want to see the Russian flag there." He said, "The 
seamen of many NATO countries have a negative attitude to the U.S. 
domineering role in the North Atlantic Alliance." 

"Many in NATO are against eastward expansion," Viktor Patrushev said. 
"They keep in mind the economic difficulties which their countries will 
have to face in the course of rearmament of the army of our former 
allies. But the bulk of the cost in NATO is covered by the United States, 
which has even cut its contributions to the United Nations as Washington 
believes that the North Atlantic Alliance can replace the United Nations." 

#10
Russia Notes Increased Western Intelligence Activity  

Moscow, 9th August, (ITAR-TASS) -- Western 
countries have strengthened their intelligence activity in the Pacific 
and Northern fleets, chief of the operational directorate of the Main 
Headquarters of the Russian Federation Navy, Vice-Adm Viktor Patrushev, 
said in an interview with an ITAR-TASS correspondent today. 

He said that "since the collapse of the USSR the intelligence activity 
of the West in the Pacific and Northern fleets has been strengthened. 
Space intelligence is being carried out actively. In view of climatic 
conditions the stress on reconnaissance aircraft has been somewhat 
reduced." 

"Submarines of the USA and Great Britain are on constant combat duty in the 
northern seas. The strengthening of the intelligence activity of NATO 
countries is also observed in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean. 
This is connected with the emerge of conflict situations between the 
North and South Korea, rocket launches, which have been carried out by 
China, and the start of planned exercises in Malaysia," the rear-admiral 
said. 

"We observe a constant presence of Western submarines, aircraft and 
hydroacoustic reconnaissance vessels in the Okhotsk Sea and near the 
Kamchatka coast. The stepping up of NATO reconnaissance activity in the 
Baltic is causing concern. Operational formations of the NATO 
minesweeping forces are there all the time," Patrushev said. [Passage 
omitted: NATO concentrates huge forces on hot spots, namely the Persian 
Gulf and in the Mediterranean Sea]

#11
Excerpt
USIA 
Foreign Media Reaction
August 11, 1999

RUSSIA: YELTSIN'S LATEST 'SACKING SPREE' CRITICIZED

The vast majority of commentators in Europe, Asia and Latin
America--including those in Russia--reacted with profound dismay to Russian
President Yeltsin's "abrupt" dismissal Monday of his entire cabinet. This
fourth political reshuffling in 17 months by Mr. Yeltsin was viewed by many
opinionmakers as an "unexpected"--but not necessarily "surprising"--move,
taken by a Kremlin leader who is increasingly "unpredictable,"
"irresponsible" and "sick." Editorialists contended that Mr. Yeltsin's
action was "opportunistic," designed to help him retain political power in
the run-up to next year's presidential elections and to install a successor
who would protect the interests of his immediate family and political
allies. Analysts believed that Mr. Yeltsin's action does not bode well for
Russia's internal political stability, democratic development, or
international credibility. They also stressed that it could not have come
at a worse time for Russia, when "war is in the making" in the southern
region of Dagestan, parliamentary and presidential elections are "just
around the corner," and economic woes continue. Analysts agreed with the
observation that the magnitude of the "electoral battle" about to take
place in the former superpower is enormous. "The stakes are clear:
democracy in Russia, and Russia's place in the world," warned a Belgian
paper. Several dailies contended that real reform and progress in Russia
will only take place after Boris Yeltsin has left the Kremlin, and some
urged him to "step down" now, even before the June presidential elections
are held. A few analysts called on the West to be vigilant, urging it "not
to support individual personalities" in Moscow, but, in the future, to
"help with structural changes." Themes follow:

WHY DID HE DO IT?: The overwhelming consensus in the press was that the
Russian president fired his government in a desperate attempt to hold on to
power and to ensure that an acceptable candidate would be in position to
"protect" the interests of his "clan." A majority in the media considered
Vladimir Putin--the new prime minister-designate--to be an "unpromising"
candidate and a "weak puppet," who, with his KGB background, is a throwback
to "old Soviet recipes" for Kremlin politicians. But others demurred,
arguing that he will at least have some staying power because Mr. Putin is
the first to be publicly designated by Mr. Yeltsin to be his successor. A
few writers focused on former Prime Minister Stepashin, suggesting a
"jealous" Mr. Yeltsin fired him because he had become too independent,
popular and powerful. Others editorialists maintained that Mr. Yeltsin was
moved to act because Mr. Stepashin was unable to impede a political
alliance between Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov's Fatherland Party and All
Russia, an influential group of regional governors. This coalition was seen
by some as posing a real threat to Mr. Yeltsin and his "inner circle,"
primarily because Mr. Luzhkov is "one of the most serious candidates for
Boris Yeltsin's succession." But others dismissed the new political bloc,
declaring that such alliances are not a political force because they are
not "real parties." 

DAGESTAN: Pundits expressed growing alarm at the unfolding events in
Dagestan, where Islamic militants have proclaimed independence. Analysts
held that Moscow--in the grips of political turmoil--faces an increasingly
difficult situation, where the Kremlin will have to choose "between giving
up Dagestan or engaging the army, as it did in Chechnya five years ago."
EDITOR: Diana McCaffrey

Editor's Note: This survey is based on 65 reports from 25 countries, August
5-11. The following editorial excerpts are grouped by region; editorials
from each country are listed in reverse chronological order....


RUSSIA: "Yeltsin Bets On Crude Force" 

Reformist Izvestiya front-paged this commentary (8/11) by Aleksei Nikolsky
and Semyon Novoprudsky: "Weak as never before, President Boris Yeltsin, it
seems, has decided to bet on crude force. With Putin in the premier's
office and Supreme Commander-in-Chief Yeltsin urging stability in the
country, the influence of the 'force ministries' will grow infinitely. And
so will the influence of the government's staff." 

"Yeltsin Violates Voters' Right" 

Reformist, youth-oriented Moskovskii Komsomolets (8/11) featured this open
letter to Boris Yeltsin: "No doubt, under the constitution, the president
can sack the premier and government. But by sacking Mr. Stepashin without
explaining your reasons, you violated a voters' right which, while not
being written in the Basic Law, is natural in a democracy. It is the right
to know." 

"Self-Defense Groups Biggest Threat" 

Neo-communist Slovo (8/11-12) had this front-page editorial: "Forming
self-defense groups and arming the local population, which does not trust
the local authorities to protect it from bandits, is the biggest threat to
federalism in Russia. We may end up with a civil war in the Caucasus. This
is exactly what the separatists are after." 

"Specter Of Islamic Revolution" 

Pavel Anokhin warned in reformist Noviye Izvestiya (8/11): "Those behind
the idea of distributing and legalizing arms among the population in
Dagestan should know that these weapons can easily be used to stage an
'Islamic revolution' in the North Caucasus. The federal forces, indecisive
and incompetent, are poor protection for the corruption-weakened Russia." 

"Provocation"

Official parliamentary Parlamentskaya Gazeta had this commentary by Andrei
Papushin (8/10): "It looks like a provocation. Should the opposition
respond rashly, the Kremlin would declare a state of emergency. The
president's love for weird situations is common knowledge, so his
administration produces them every six months. Emerging victorious from a
crisis makes him feel better morally and physically. Not so about the
country, which has to endure the oddities of its leader's policy."

"Everybody Disapproves Of The Decision"

Aleksandr Privalov said in reformist Izvestiya (8/10): "The president is as
good as his word--he has named the man he wants to see as his successor.
But his method of doing so, sacking a loyal cabinet, is confusing. It does
not look like a reasonable move. Yeltsin has shown that he can consolidate
this nation with a stroke of his pen--everybody has condemned his decision.
It is not Stepashin's popularity. It is the hatred of backstage politics." 

"War Assumes Alarming Proportion" 

Yevgeny Krutikov asserted in reformist Izvestiya (8/10): "A full-scale war
in the Caucasus is going to result in a state of emergency and the
cancellation of federal presidential elections. It seems that certain
forces in Chechnya want to see that happen. The situation in Dagestan is
disastrous. A lot depends on the military as well as the politicians."

"Yeltsin Jealous" 

Konstantin Levin commented on page one of reformist, business-oriented
Kommersant Daily (8/7): "The president has been discontented with the
premier. This is not so much because of the premier's setbacks in the
election campaign as the welcome he was accorded during his recent trips to
Germany and the United States. Yeltsin is known to be jealous of his
premiers' successes." 

"Moscow Caught Unawares Again" 

Reformist daily Vremya-MN (8/9) front-paged a report by Mikhail Chernyak
and Aleksandr Raskin on Muslim radicals fighting to break away part of
Russia's Dagestan: "Surprisingly, the Feds have been caught unawares, even
though the radicals have been active since last spring, according to the
sources of the Interior Ministry and the Federal Security Service. On July
11 local religious leaders, in an open letter to the Dagestan government,
made it clear that they had resolved to set up an independent Islamic
republic and were determined to 'fight consistently to achieve their goal.'" 

"Bringing Forth A Mouse With New Coalition In Duma" 

Reformist Noviye Izvestiya (8/6) front-paged a comment by Sergei Agafonov
on Otechestvo (Fatherland) and Vsya Rossiya (All Russia) forming a new bloc
for the upcoming parliamentary elections: "Presented as a great
accomplishment, the marriage of two 'political adolescents,' in effect,
attests to them each feeling defective and unsure of themselves.... Pundits
may talk their heads off, discussing consolidation among local elites and
centripetal tendencies, but they can't hide that what is going on is an
attempt to privatize big politics through joint effort. Instead of seeing a
serious political force, we watch a show a la retro. This is another case
of the mountain bringing forth a mouse." 

"Hoping For The Best" 

Official parliamentary daily Parlamentskaya Gazeta (8/5) remarked in a
report by Andrei Papushin on the forming of a new election coalition of
Otechestvo and Vsya Rossiya: "Hopefully, with it, there will be less
confusion and uncertainty in our socio-political life." 

"New Political Vector" 

Yevgeny Krutikov commented on page one of reformist Izvestiya (8/5): "The
merger indicates a new political vector which points away from the Kremlin.
It may seriously change Russia's political make-up in the years ahead....
Now, in the runup to the presidential campaign, the only reasonable choice
is between Primakov and Stepashin." 

"Coalition Formation Defeat For Kremlin" 

Yelena Yegorova stated on page one of reformist, youth-oriented Moskovskii
Komsomolets (8/5): "The Kremlin has suffered its worst defeat in months. By
getting together with Otechestvo, the governors [Vsya Rossiya] have changed
colors, leaving Yeltsin in the position of the British queen who reigns
without ruling. 

"The new opposition is going to be stronger than the Communists."