#1
Moscow Times
August  5, 1999 
SEASON OF DISCONTENT: U.S. Not Up To Being Sole Superpower 
By Andrei Piontkovsky 

"Lone, lone superpower," sang the Madeleine Albright "clone" during the
musical review ending the Singapore summit. That nagging motif of the
loneliness of a global superpower is felt in works of a much more serious
genre than a remake of the old American classic "Home on the Range." In,
for example, the recent interview that the real Madeleine Albright gave to
the magazine Stern, or in Zbigniew Brzezinski's book "The Grand Chessboard."  

I have several times had the opportunity to discuss Brzezinski's book in
Russia and have often had the impression that I read a completely different
book than a majority of my colleagues. It was read in Russia as a
triumphal  hymn to the U.S. victory in the Cold War and the reinforcement
of its role  as the only world superpower. But Brzezinski is too smart and
has too much  foresight to limit himself to the statement of such banal and
already-becoming-obsolete truths.  

The book is about something else - the unclear and worrisome future. Even
now, at the height of America's economic, political and military might,
Brzezinski is thinking about the transitory nature of a period in which
there is only one superpower, about the inability of American society (by
virtue of its democratic institutions and because of its hedonistic,
consumerist precepts) to take on the burden of the only global power, not
to mention playing the role of the world's policeman.  

It seems to me that the assessments and impression of this distinguished
political scientist were confirmed during the Kosovo crisis. Outwardly, the
result of this crisis demonstrated the resolve of the U.S. and its NATO
allies to restore peace, stability and justice in regions hit by ethnic
conflicts. Such a new agenda for the North Atlantic alliance was proclaimed
in the new concept adopted during the April summit in Washington.  

But in fact the course of the Kosovo crisis revealed serious political,
psychological and cultural restrictions on the ability to project U.S.
might in regional conflicts. It turned out that the United States was
organically incapable of committing ground forces even when faced with
political humiliation and the threat of a very serious split within NATO.
All Western countries, and the United States most of all, proved to be
obsessed by a zero-casualties concept of war. And NATO turned out to be not
very well designed for waging a war. The alliance of 19 democratic
nations,  each leader of which has its own coalition and opposition, cannot
be a very  effective military instrument. It was lucky that its first
military  operation in its 50-year history came after the end of the Cold
War.  

The general feeling in the West at the end of the Kosovo operation was a
sigh of relief after a narrow escape. In mid-May, I talked to one prominent
U.S. diplomat who had served as ambassador to NATO for many years. I noted
that we had the interesting opportunity to discuss simultaneously the new
NATO strategic concept and the first test of its application. He
spontaneously interrupted me: "Not the first," he said. "The last. There
will be no other Kosovos in the foreseeable future."  

I guess this is the prevailing mood now in the United States. Kosovo may
turn out to be the last victory and triumph in an overseas operation of the
lone, lone superpower.  

#4
Defence Ministry to Receive 10 Bln Rbls More from Budget.

MOSCOW, August 5 (Itar-Tass) - The Russian Defence Ministry will receive 10 
billion roubles additionally to the approved budget this year, said a 
high-ranking official of the Russian Security Council, Colonel-General Viktor 
Yesin, speaking in an interview with the army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda 
published on Thursday. 

According to the general, Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin held a meeting of 
Security Council members on funding the Armed Forces in 1999-2000 on July 3 
in compliance with an instruction of President Boris Yeltsin. 

Yesin noted that it was found necessary to look for a possibility to 
appropriate these additional funds to the army and navy in the course of 
executing the federal budget. They will be used to pay monetary allowances as 
well as to set off expenditures to pay debts for the last year. 

It turned out at the same time that the state has no possibility to 
appropriate 3.5 percent of the GDP, envisaged by the president, for national 
defence. Therefore, it was found expedient to leave appropriations under the 
"National Defence" section of a 2000 federal budget at the level of the 
current year, taking into account inflation. 

Measures, worked out at the Security Council meeting, were reported to the 
president who agreed with them and gave an instruction to prepare appropriate 
documents. The Security Council office started fulfilling this instruction, 
the general noted.

#5
Jamestown Foundation Monitor
5 August 1999

STEPASHIN COULD TAKE THE FALL FOR THE FATHERLAND-ALL RUSSIA MARRIAGE. This
week's announcement that Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov's Fatherland movement and
All Russia, the bloc led by Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev, will
merge into a coalition, is undeniably a major blow to the Kremlin. What is
more, it looks increasingly likely that Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin will
be the fall guy--or at least one of them--for the failure of the Kremlin and
the government to prevent the influential regional leaders who make up All
Russia from linking up with the Kremlin inner circle's main political enemy.
A commentary published yesterday, noting the failure of the Kremlin's
last-minute attempt to insert Stepashin into the Fatherland-All Russia
coalition as its leader, said that within the presidential administration
more and more complaints are being aired that Stepashin "has proved weaker
than he seemed to be, and that by his desire not to quarrel with any of the
current political and business figures, he demonstrates excessive
flexibility" (Russian agencies, August 4; see also the Monitor, August 4). A
similar opinion holds that Stepashin's ouster is now "practically
inevitable," though noting that his one possible salvation is the Kremlin
fear that if he is sacked, he will immediately join up with the new
Luzhkov-Shaimiev coalition, which is already heavily courting former Prime
Minister Yevgeny Primakov. "Two ex-premiers in opposition--this is already
too much" (Kommersant, August 5).

In any case, some are already naming Stepashin's possible successors--First
Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Aksenenko, who earlier this year was
reportedly the first choice of Kremlin insiders Boris Berezovsky and
Yeltsin's daughter Tatyana Dyachenko to replace Primakov as prime minister;
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, who is also said to be close to Berezovsky;
and Federal Security Service Director Vladimir Putin. According to Russian
agencies, Yeltsin likes Aksenenko (Russian agencies, August 4). Unnamed
sources have said that "close and influential" people are going all out to
convince President Boris Yeltsin to pick Putin to replace Stepashin, arguing
that Putin is more decisive and enjoys the support of the "power
structures"--meaning the Special Services, Interior Ministry and armed
forces. Putin is supported by Anatoly Chubais, who currently heads United
Energy Systems, Russia's electricity grid (Moskovskie novosti, August 3-9).
In 1996, when Chubais ran the Kremlin administration, he brought Putin from
St. Petersburg to serve on his team.

The Kremlin is--still according to unnamed sources--reportedly considering
plans of action to undermine the new Luzhkov-Shaimiev coalition and prevent
Primakov from joining it. According to the first, hardline plan, the Kremlin
would not only replace Stepashin with Putin, but dissolve the State Duma
after it refused to confirm Putin as prime minister. According to the
second, "softer" variant, the Kremlin is considering holding one or even two
referenda. One of them, being pushed by independent State Duma deputy
Nikolai Gonchar, would concern the proposed union between Russia and
Belarus. The second, being pushed by former Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko,
would be aimed at holding a constitutional assembly, which in turn would
take up amending the constitution to make the government more independent
from the president. Either of these referenda might include a question on
whether an age limit should be put on the presidency--effectively
disqualifying Primakov and even Luzhkov--and could be used to postpone the
presidential election set for next summer (Moskovskie novosti, August 3-9).

#6
UN: Transition To Free Enterprise Painful For Many
By Joe Lauria

United Nations, 3 August 1999 (RFE/RL) -- The rapid transition from a
state-run command economy to free enterprise in the former Soviet Union has
led to dramatic increases in mortality, suicide, disease, crime and
corruption, according to a report by the United Nations Development Program.

The UNDP report, released over the weekend, says in part: "At the dawn of a
new millennium, the region of Eastern Europe and the CIS reflects on the
realities of the latest experiment in social engineering." It says: "Again,
people are the objects instead of participants in shaping policies that
affect their daily lives."

Anton Kruiderink, director of the UNDP's regional bureau for Europe and the
Commonwealth of Independent States, told reporters at the United Nations on
Monday: "When it comes to the countries in transition we are still in the
midst of an extremely severe crisis."

Kruiderink says looking at the gross domestic product of the former Soviet
republics does not give the entire picture of social conditions. "One has
to look beyond the economic dimension, which is basically the focus of the
world today, and look at what happens to these societies," he says.

Looking at health, education, demography and the role of the state "you see
a rather disappointing performance, which the world did not expect when the
Berlin Wall came down," Kruiderink says.

"We all rejoiced at that time that the Iron Curtain was lifted and
therefore we declared that there was an end to the separation between
peoples," he says. "But what we have seen instead is a descent of a Glass
Curtain that separate people within countries."

Kruiderink says that while education levels remain high in the region, "the
glass means the majority of people see very clearly what happens to those
parts of society they feel they no longer belong to."

The UNDP report, called "Transition 1999," points out that life expectancy
remained the same or fell in the 23 countries surveyed in the former Soviet

bloc, while it has increased in the rest of the world in the past five years.

Deaths of middle-aged Russians have increased dramatically since the
transition, due to illness, alcoholism, and psychological depression, the
report says. The ratio of men to women in the former Soviet Union has
fallen sharply. This has led to the 5.9 million so-called "missing men" in
Russia.

The transition to private enterprise has led to "a rise in self-destructive
behavior, especially among men" and to a "population crisis of
unprecedented proportions" with fewer marriages and children.

"Poverty is increasing, literacy is slipping, things that were not
characteristic of this region" before the transition, Kruiderink said.

Education has been hard hit because of the pressure to drastically cut back
government control, said Kruiderink. "By shrinking the state somehow nobody
figured out there's a vacuum and how to deal with it," he said. "At the
time there was the magic word 'civil society' as though it would suddenly
blossom up."

Teachers lack motivation in the former Soviet republics because they find
they can make better money elsewhere, he said. In Georgia, universities
have become empty shells, he said. "Teachers come and say hello, then they
go drive a cab. Because for [the equivalent of] 9 [U.S.] dollars a month,
who is going to teach?"

Kruiderink said that social services have rapidly eroded throughout the
region. In some parts of Russia, for example, teachers are teaching in
exchange for potatoes, he said. "How do you measure that in GDP? There is
still a commitment by people who believe in their society, that assume the
responsibility, but there is an enormous strain and how long can that go
before it breaks?" he asked.

The report was not prepared by the UN, but by the countries themselves,
Kruiderink said. It is a summary of five years' worth of human development
reports written by each country, he said. "They cry out, saying, 'We need
attention that goes beyond the economic measurements.'"

Such a focus on economic data alone has served the interests of both
foreign and domestic investors, but ignores the plight of the peoples of
the former Soviet Union.

"We have to focus much more on governance," Kruiderink said. "Economic
policies alone, when there is not an environment that makes them
sustainable, are prone to fail."

The report is an indictment of the "overnight miracles" or Big Bang theory
of rapid transition to capitalism. "This has been proven, particularly in
the CIS, to be failing," Kruiderink said.

He believes that even Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, who championed the
crash course for capitalism in the former socialist countries, would now
"see it differently. He is much more now interested in the right sequence
of economic policies and not in doing it all at the same time."

More attention needs to be paid to the strengthening of democratic
institutions, independent media, and human rights.

"We are not saying to stop the process of introducing new policies, but we
are saying that perhaps instead of massively introducing them -- like
privatization -- perhaps you first go for efficiency and effectiveness and
measure the introduction of new policies," said Kruiderink.

Privatization should take into account the first ten years of the ex-Soviet
experience "to make sure that the impact on societies is not as drastic and
as negative as what we have seen," Kruiderink said.

"There is a need for a review of the economic policies that with a certain
optimism we introduced ten years ago when we basically had no clue,"
Kruiderink said.

Ultimately, the report calls for a "mixed" economy with the state taking a
stronger hand to help solve the explosion of new social problems. "In
effect, neither blind trust in centralized authority, nor in the market as
the panacea, have proved capable of producing democratic instruments needed
to correct the distortions that both ideologies produced," the report says.

"A viable, dynamic and reasonably equitable market economy requires an
'activist state' to reassure investors that a predictable, rules-based
system is in place and that property ownership is protected," the report says.

The report suggested that state intervention is needed to control social
problems. Otherwise, private property could become vulnerable to theft and
abuse.

"There is too much belief that the crisis has bottomed out," Kruiderink
said. "When you look at this report, you see the societies in these
countries are under an enormous strain and the process of healing is far,
far away."

And when you link these social problems to the issue of ethnic minorities
in these countries, "we have a time-bomb ticking," he said.

#7
Excerpt
USIA
Foreign Media Reaction
August 4, 1999

U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 'ON THE MEND' AFTER KOSOVO 

U.S.-Russian relations, "seriously breached over Kosovo," are "on the
mend"--such was the verdict of editorial writers from Russia, elsewhere in
Europe and Asia.  Chief among the indicators cited was the resumption of
high-level discussions between Russian and the U.S. officials on a range of
issues, from arms control to trade and economic cooperation.  Prime
Minister Stepashin's three-day U.S. visit in late July and talks between
Secretary of State Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov on the margins of
the last week's ASEAN meetings in Singapore, while not having "any
particularly ambitious aims," were, nevertheless, judged to be important
"markers" on the road to a "newly recovered relationship."  Several pointed
out that each of the former Cold War rivals has an interest in dispelling
the "post-Kosovo chill."  According to a Warsaw daily, the U.S. has "not
lost hope that reforms and democracy in Russia will succeed" and that it
can be "transformed into a reliable partner" on arms control and other
issues.  And "Russia, in turn, cannot cope without Western assistance and
American loans."  Indeed, many noted the IMF decision, coincident with Mr.
Stepashin's visit, "to provide another bail-out worth $4.5 billion"--the
first loan granted to Russia since it plunged into financial crisis last
August--as further evidence that Russia is pushing hard, and succeeding to
some degree, in getting back into the West's good graces.  Commentary
highlights follow:   

DOMESTIC POLITICS:  Many pundits viewed the fence-mending by U.S. and
Russian officials, and particularly the Gore-Stepashin meetings under the
rubric of the Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation,
with an eye to domestic politics in each country.  Kremlin watchers in
Britain and Belgium suggested that Mr. Stepashin's trip was "the first
phase in his international breaking-in as a future candidate for the
presidency."  Russian media underscored the benefits that "presidential
candidate Gore" derived from the confab, including the fact that he can
present himself to voters as having helped repair ties with Russia. 

ARMS CONTROL:  A handful of observers welcomed the U.S.-Russian decision to
begin talks later this month on a START III treaty and on Washington's
proposed revisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty.  Nonetheless, German writers
pointed to the "obstacles" to further disarmament, the most notable one
being a Duma, still smarting over Russia's "reduced international role,"
which has yet to ratify START II and is inclined to "reject" further arms
control efforts.    

WESTERN FINANCIAL HELP:  The IMF's decision to grant a new loan to
Russia--followed shortly by the Paris Club of country creditors' agreeing
to reschedule Russia's Soviet-era debts and a probable decision by the
London Club of commercial creditors to do the same--was depicted as
"strictly political" and "independent of economic considerations."  Said a
centrist Moscow paper, "It is just a reprieve for the Russian economy to
take a breath before the...elections."  Papers in Germany, Belgium and
Canada echoed the views of London's conservative Times, which argued:
"There are obvious political reasons...to keep the drip-feed of funds
flowing into a...potentially unstable country before elections....  Whether
Russia has made enough economic progress to justify the IMF vote of
confidence is, however, unclear."   

EDITOR:  Katherine L. Starr 

Editor's Note:  This survey is based on 38 reports from 16 countries, July
27 - August 4. 

RUSSIA:  "Purely Political Decision"  

Vladislav Kuzmichev commented on page one of centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta
(8/3): "The outcome of the four-day talks with the Paris Club is hardly a
cause for optimism.  The decision to postpone the repayment of Russia's
debts, made following similar decisions by the IMF and the World Bank, is
strictly political.  It is just a reprieve for the Russian economy to take
a breath before the general and presidential elections.  From that point of
view, the agreement with the Paris Club is a welcome thing and even a
breakthrough in easing the debt burden.  It is as good as can be--no normal
creditor will agree to forget what we owe him if our economic policy
remains uncertain after the elections."  

"White House Seeks To Avert Setbacks On Russian Front" 

Stanislav Tarasov judged in reformist weekly Vek (7/30-8/5):  "The White
House is vitally interested in avoiding any 'setbacks on the Russian front'
in the course of the present election campaign.  In that case Gore's
opponent in the elections, Bush Jr., will fiercely attack the 'limited
intellectual potential' of the Clinton administration and its associates.
Such an attempt was already made after the Russian 'surprises' in Kosovo.
That is why, despite the outwardly technocratic nature of the
Gore-Stepashin Commission's work, everything in the White House is now
being subordinated to the fulfillment of precisely this strategic task....
But let us mention only the most important points [of the premier's visit].
First of all, it can be said that our present premier has become a
full-fledged participant, not only of Russian, but also of international
politics.  It appears that we are gradually succeeding in removing the
post-Kosovo syndrome in relations between our two countries and advancing
in the search for mutually acceptable solutions in the Balkans.  As to all
the other results of the visit, however important, they still are of
secondary nature.  On the other hand, the very list of the questions that
were discussed within the framework of the Gore-Stepashin Commission is
impressive." 

"U.S. Investors Won't Be Beating Path To Russia" 

Sergei Gulyi concluded in reformist Novye Izvestia (7/29):  "The interest
of private American investors in the Russian economy, which could
theoretically overshadow political differences and propel bilateral
relations, is still not in evidence....  The Stepashin government obviously
is not counting on speculators, and serious players will not invest in
Russia on the eve of an election whose outcome is unpredictable.  He won't
come until Russia puts its own house in order and provides a minimum of
transparency and maximum confidence for internal and external investors."  

"New Cold War Over?"  

Marina Volkova asserted in centrist Nezavisimaya Gazeta (7/29):  "One
shouldn't expect much from Sergei Stepashin's visit.  After the conflict in
Yugoslavia, achieving a thaw in relations between Russia and the United
States, a debtor and a world dictator respectively, is no mean feat.  This
task has been fulfilled, at least as far as the Russian side is
concerned....  According to the Russian premier, his trip to the United
States was a 'serious step forward in the relations between Russia and the
United States.'"  

"A Responsible Politician" 

Vera Kuznetsova held in reformist Vremya-MN (7/29): "All the signs are that
Mr. Stepashin during his Washington visit managed to confirm his image of a
responsible Russian politician 'with a human face.'  Some experts did note,
however, that the Russian premier looked 'somewhat plain' next to the sleek
Mr. Gore.  And that may be just as well because, as the same experts point
out, 'He will be elected in Russia, and not in the United States'." 

"Meeting Mr. Gore"  

Konstantin Levin commented in reformist, business Kommersant Daily (7/29):
"In spite of all Stepashin's gaffes Gore may be pleased with making a
personal acquaintance with the premier.  For the first time since the start
of the Kosovo crisis the head of the Russian Cabinet sided with Washington,
even though with reservations.  Stepashin said he did not back Milosevic
('We might as well have befriended Kim Il Sung') while warning the
Americans that too much pressure on the Yugoslav president may strengthen
his position.  It was important for Gore that Stepashin promised to raise
the question of START II ratification at the Duma next fall and was
prepared to start negotiations on START III and the ABM Treaty.  In
general, the presidential candidate [Gore] will be able to tell his voters
to what extent he controlled the political situation in Russia.  It remains
for Gore to watch with interest how Stepashin's political manners are
assessed by the Kremlin.  He welcomes Stepashin, but on the other hand, he
has become used to replacements of his counterpart in the Russian-American
Commission."  

"Why The Premier Went To The U.S."  

Mikhail Tretyakov remarked in neo-communist Pravda (7/29):  "It is hard to
speak about the success of Stepashin's visit to Washington, no matter how
much the servile Russian media try to drive this message home to us.  True,
he can boast one 'success.' Washington announced that the next round of
nuclear arms reduction talks will begin in Moscow in August.  Russia and
the United States will resume the preparation of the START III Treaty,
which would cut the number of nuclear warheads on each side to 2,000.  In
addition, Moscow has decided to revise the ABM Treaty, thus meeting
Washington's constant request over the past few years.  The message is that
we are again making concessions to Capitol Hill."  

"Not A Flop" 

Mikhail Stoyanov judged in centrist Moskovskaya Pravda (7/29):  "So,
Stepashin had to do a bit of tightrope walking.  And he did so amid the
clamor in the local press which was building up another spy scandal
alleging that America was full of Russian James Bonds...and that Moscow was
widely resorting to computer technologies to steal American military
secrets.  If the diplomatic optimism both sides expressed after the Russian
premier's meeting with Bill Clinton and Al Gore is to be construed as a
success, then Stepashin's first foreign venture was not a flop." 

"Stepashin Gets A Taste Of Big League Diplomacy"  

Vladimir Abarinov remarked from Washington for reformist Izvestia (7/28):
"The visit did not have any particularly ambitious aims:  The sides claimed
in unison that they did not set themselves any concrete aims, that they
intended only to overcome the damage that was inflicted to their bilateral
relations and tactfully to refrain from mutual accusations in the process." 

"Ivanov-Albright Talks: Differences Persist" 

Alexander Chudodeyev stressed in reformist Segodnya (7/27):  "In the series
of informal meetings at ASEAN...the numerous observers were most interested
in the meetings within the U.S.-China-Russia triangle.  Russian Foreign
Minister Igor Ivanov had lunch with U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright yesterday and is going to meet with her again.  Observers say with
one voice that the current Russian-American talks are the first between the
two ministers after the end of the Kosovo conflict.  Yet there is a long
way to go to full mutual understanding.  Yesterday's talks have shown that
differences between Moscow and Washington over the Balkans persist....
Another strong irritant for Moscow in its complex relations with Washington
is the U.S. plan to build an ABM system in the Far East (mainly in Japan
and Taiwan) which Russia opposes jointly with China."  

#9
Raisa Gorbachev: feted in West, viewed with suspicion at home

MOSCOW, Aug 5 (AFP) - Raisa Gorbachev, wife of the former Soviet leader 
undergoing treatment for leukaemia in a German hospital, was feted in the 
West for her elegance and style but viewed with suspicion in a Soviet Union 
of poverty and shortages.

Barely a year after Mikhail Gorbachev became master of the Kremlin in 1985, 
Raisa, smiling and spontaneous, was stealing the scene on the international 
stage from her powerful husband.

Raisa broke the mould of Soviet wives, dumpy "babushkas" who pundits 
maliciously noted confined their main public appearance to walking behind 
their husband's funeral cortege on Red Square.

Sweeping aside Soviet conventions, Raisa's grace and intelligence contributed 
to the success of her husband's charm offensive with western audiences.

"First lady" in the country of state enterprises and collective farms, 
Raisa's tastes were far from proletarian. She became notorious for huge 
credit card shopping sprees abroad and a love of jewellery and haute couture 
fashion.

The mistress of the Kremlin had a fondness for the biggest names in fashion, 
from Pierre Cardin to Yves Saint-Laurent, whose "Opium" fragrance was a 
particular favourite with Raisa.

She also helped boost the development of fashion in the Soviet Union with the 
launch of a Russian-language version of the German magazine Burga, and the 
organisation of a YSL exhibition in Moscow in 1986.

But the "Red Tsarina" who courted the West was viewed with suspicion and even 
hostility in her native land.

Her habit of changing her outfit four times a day and evident taste for the 
good life went down badly in a country brought up on hardship and which took 
a dim view of personal wealth.

And when the general secretary of the Communist Party admitted that "I 
discuss everything with my wife, including Soviet affairs at the highest 
level," conservative circles in the Soviet Union went into shock.

Censors cut the admission from the version of the NBC interview broadcast in 
the Soviet Union, but the cat was out of the bag.

Raisa exercised huge influence over her powerful husband. She successfully 
opposed the launch of a massive Stalinist project to divert the waters of 
Siberian rivers to parched lands in the south.

Under her influence, 40 percent of funds earmarked for health were reserved 
for maternal and child care. Sections of Gorbachev's speech to the 27th 
Communist Party Congress in 1987 on women clearly bore her stamp.

The Party leadership, little used to having to cope with a high-profile wife 
of the party chief, always regarded Raisa with mistrust.

However, she did win sympathy with the Russian public in the wake of the 
aborted coup against Gorbachev in August 1991 by Communist hardliners, which 
the former Kremlin chief has blamed for his wife's health woes.

Stricken by apoplexy after returning to Moscow from Crimea where the couple 
had been detained for three days by coup plotters, she remained in hospital 
for the next 18 months with high blood pressure.

Raisa Maximovna Titarenko was born in Rubzovsk, in Siberia, on January 5, 
1932, daughter of a railway worker. She went on to study philosophy and 
sociology in Moscow, where she married Mikhail Gorbachev in 1952.

The pair set up home in the southern Russian town of Stavropol, where she 
continued her studies and gave birth to the couple's only child, Irina.

The Gorbachevs moved to Moscow in 1978, Raisa giving up her teaching post and 
securing election to the leadership of the Soviet Culture Fund in 1986.

In 1992 she was awarded the Donna-Citta di Roma prize for her book "I Hope," 
chosen "for the author's personality, role in perestroika launched by Mikhail 
Gorbachev, and her contribution to the search for freedom and a better 
future."

#10
Izvestia
August 4, 1999
Moscow Will Keep An Eye On American Missiles After All 
By Yury Golotyuk 

  This year - for the first time since the disintegration of the USSR and
the end of the Cold War - Russia will add another radar station to its
national Missile Warning System [MWS], IZVESTIA writes in its story.
 
  In general, Moscow has started to modernize the MWS which was built in
the dismal years of the Cold War. The MWS was to inform the Kremlin ahead
of time about nuclear warheads that had been launched by a treacherous
enemy and to crush the aggressor with a retaliatory strike. 

  The Commander of Russia's Strategic Missile Force, General Vladimir
Yakovlev, has just inspected a mothballed radar station not far from the
Belorussian city of Baranovichi. He has given the go- ahead to complete the
radar station by the end of the year, and in 2000 it will already hooked up
to the national MWS for combat patrol duty. 

  However, the author points out, there is a hitch. The station was
designed back in the 1980's when Ukraine was still part of the former USSR.
Ukraine was to supply the antenna modules for the station, but construction
work was put "on hold" when Michael Gorbachev came to power as it seemed
there would be eternal peace in the world. Today Ukrainian contractors have
upped the price tag for their wares from 7.2 million rubles to 30.5
million. Yakovlev has refused to pay such a sum. The needed modules, he
said, will be built in Russia, and he emphasized that the station would be
commissioned on time. 

  The fact that the Russian military attach so much importance to the
speediest commissioning of the radar station, the author points out, says a
great deal. It was only in March of this year (when NATO started bombing
Yugoslavia - an interesting coincidence?) that Moscow gave the order to
resume work on completing the station. The reason for getting the station
out of mothballs was, of course, not only due to the general cooling of the
international climate. 

  The MWS which Russia inherited from the USSR really fell into neglect
over the past several years. After all, without an efficient MWS, the
country's huge nuclear arsenals became a kind of huge atomic club in the
hands of a blind man. The MWS became seriously crippled when Latvia shut
down the Russian radar station in Skrunde last year. This made a yawning
gap in the northwest direction of the national MWS - precisely in the main
regions patrolled by American submarines in the North Atlantic and the Sea
of Norway. And it is precisely the radar station in Baranovichi that is to
patch up this hole in Russia's Missile Warning System. 

  Such military and political processes in the world as the expansion of
NATO, the war against Yugoslavia, preparations to build a national ABM
system in the United States have compelled Russia to seriously tackle the
problem of upgrading its nuclear deterrent force, writes another newspaper,
NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA [08/04/99, p. 2]. 

  A second missile regiment with ten "Topol-M" missiles is to be deployed
by the end of this year. Another two or three such regiments may be placed
on patrol duty in 2000. 

  However, nuclear containment is ensured not only by strike weaponry. A
country's strategic clout may prove to be useless if a missile attack is
not detected in time. This is where the Missile Warning System steps into
the picture, the author writes. 

  Of course, the completion of the radar station in Baranovichi will
require a hefty sum of money, all the more so since Ukrainian contractors
are demanding more than four times the original price for their antenna
modules. Although Yakovlev has given the order to produce the required
modules in Russia, the author thinks this question [of price tags] could be
thrashed out at intergovernmental level so that the required parts will be
dispatched to Baranovichi as partial payment of Kiev's debts for Russian
natural gas. 

#11
Russian Think Tank 'Critical' of Baltic Unity  

TALLINN, Aug 02, BNS - Russian politologists' 
recent foreign and defense policy report to the government is critical of 
the unity of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, making particular mention of 
territorial disagreements and ethnic intolerance. One of the obstacles to 
Baltic unity is territorial disagreements between the three republics, 
says the report "Russia and the Baltic states" compiled by the Foreign 
and Defense Policy Council, a non-governmental think-tank. The document, 
one of whose authors is the well-known politologist Sergei Karaganov, 
states that the Baltic countries have much bigger territorial demands on 
each other than on their eastern neighbor. As an example, 
Russian politologists cite a sea border dispute between Latvia and Lithuania 
and Estonian-Latvian differences over fishing rights in the Gulf of Riga. 
"The differences also influence public opinion," the report reads. 
"According to sociopolitical studies, the Estonians regard Latvia and 
Lithuania as their chief enemies after Russia. The Lithuanian television 
meanwhile criticizes the `arrogant and ambitious' Estonians." Other 
problems named in the report include growing red tape on the three 
countries' borders, their competition on the path toward the European 
Union, and scant cooperation in building the international road link Via 
Baltica.