#1
Duma Official: START II 'Dead' Due to NATO's FRY Role 
 

WASHINGTON, April 21 (Itar-Tass) - Aleksey 
Arbatov, deputy head of the Duma Committee for Defence, who is staying in 
Washington at the invitation of the U.S. Atlantic Council, said in an 
exclusive interview with Tass on Tuesday [20 April], that "the NATO 
aggression against Yugoslavia has buried hopes for the ratification by 
the Russian State Duma of the START-2 treaty on the reduction of 
strategic offensive armaments." During his meetings with the American 
public, with representatives of the U.S. legislative and executive 
authorities, he told them about Russia's attitude to the developments in 
Yugoslavia and warned about most negative consequences of the bombing for 
relations between Washington and Moscow. 

"The START-2 treaty is dead," he said, adding, that it was the direct 
result of the actions, taken by the U.S. and NATO. Aleksey Arbatov 
believes that "in many respects, the damage inflicted on Russian-American 
relations by the aggression against Yugoslavia is irreparable, at least 
in the foreseeable future." "I do hope that our negotiations with the 
U.S. on the problem of strategic armaments will be resumed, but it is 
difficult for me to imagine how the Duma will get back now to the 
discussion of START-2," he said. Arbatov reminded that the next 
discussion of the problem had been scheduled for March. At about the same 
time President Boris Yeltsin had signed the law on the ratification of 
the treaty. According to Arbatov, four special committees expressed 
agreement with the draft document. It contained 20 to 30 conditions, 
connected with ratification, but all of them were acceptable. When the 
aggression against Yugoslavia was started, it immediately removed the 
item on START-2 from the agenda. "No matter in what way the Yugoslavia 
problem will be resolved (the solution is sure to be difficult and, 
perhaps, even bloody), I cannot imagine ourselves remembering about the 
treaty after all that happened all of a sudden and ratifying it at once," 
Arbatov said. 

"A dialogue with the U.S. may be continued, and we should hope for it, 
but START-2 should now be regarded as a problem, which will have to be 
tackled anyway, rather than as the document, which should be ratified 
without delay," he said. In the opinion of Arbatov, the Founding Act, 
which set the guidelines for the Russia-NATO relations, is now "nothing 
but a meaningless sheet of paper" for Moscow. [Description]

The author is director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, Moscow

UNLEASHING their aggression against Yugoslavia, the US and its allies hoped 
to crush the Serbs' resistance quickly and to dictate their terms to them. 
This, however, did not happen. Nevertheless the North Atlantic alliance 
rejected the peace initiatives proposed by Russian premier Yevgeny Primakov 
after his talks with Mr Slobodan Milosesvic. These initiatives allowed the 
start of the search for a political solution to the problem. But the fact is 
that, by accepting Mr Primakov's formulations, the alliance would have 
recognised the pointlessness of the action it began, and to NATO this is 
unacceptable. On the contrary, the leadership of the bloc decided to escalate 
its aggression. 


Tactical (attack) aviation, designed to fight against manpower and equipment, 
joined the action. It can inflict considerable damages on an enemy, but 
NATO's own losses will also increase. In spite of the cruel bombings, the 
Serbs have succeeded in preserving the fighting efficiency of their air 
defence system, which can give a rebuff to the aggressor. So that the second 
phase of the war will not allow NATO to achieve its objective. 


Two Options 


Therefore, two options are possible on the part of NATO. First, to cease 
military operations and sit down at a negotiating table. In this case, the 
conditions being discussed for settling the situation will not differ much 
from Mr Primakov's proposals. The second option is to continue the aggression 
and move into the third phase, the introduction of NATO troops into the 
territory of Yugoslavia. This is the most dangerous option. The losses of 
both sides will increase sharply. 


It is doubtful that by carrying out land operations, the NATO grouping can 
achieve a decisive success within a short time. And this means that a 
full-scale war will be conducted in Europe. The growth of losses, and the 
scale of bloodshed, may cause shifts in the public opinion of various 
countries. Now for example, the public in the US is not very much concerned 
by the war. The internal political situation there does not hinder the 
continuation of the aggression. But, in case of considerable manpower losses 
in the NATO forces, the situation may radically change and the public of the 
US and of the other NATO members involved in hostilities will begin sharply 
protesting against the war. 


The third phase of the war is dangerous first of all in that other countries 
might also get involved in it. Even though the leadership of Russia says it 
won't allow itself to be drawn into the conflict, the sentiment of the mass 
of the people and various political forces insisting on more vigorous support 
for the Serbs could influence the stance of the president and the government. 

Most CIS residents are outraged by the NATO aggression, and sympathise with 
the people of Yugoslavia. Indicative is the change of the attitude of Ukraine 
to NATO. Whereas before the start of aggression, Ukraine pursued a course 
aimed at getting closer to this bloc, at this point Kiev is putting urgent 
and serious corrections to its policy. The Supreme Rada (parliament) of 
Ukraine has quickly and unhesitatingly ratified the agreements with Russia on 
the Black Sea fleet, which earlier caused some doubts among a part of the 
deputies, and also declared renunciation of the non-nuclear status of 
Ukraine. These steps by the Ukrainian parliament speak for themselves. 
Belarus has very firmly declared support for the struggle of the people of 
Serbia. On hand is the single position shared by the three major Slavic 
states and with this the NATO leadership will have to reckon. 


Peacekeeping Force 


If an escalation of the conflict is avoided and the two sides sit down at the 
negotiating table, the question of a peacekeeping force in Kosovo will top 
the agenda. NATO will, of course, insist on the introduction of its 
contingent in Kosovo, but Belgrade won't accept that. In my opinion, the 
stationing in Kosovo of a peacekeeping contingent under the aegis of the UN 
or OSCE will help settle the issue. And, of course, without the participation 
of Russian peacekeepers the formation of such a contingent is simply 
impossible. One can assume that Ukraine and Belarus will also want to 
participate in the peacekeeping action. This will be fully acceptable for the 
Serbs.


Thus, the big issue now is whether NATO recognises the pointlessness of the 
military action taken against Yugoslavia, and whether the North Atlantic bloc 
gives up its demand to station NATO troops in Kosovo. If common sense leads 
the US and its allies towards a reasonable solution, then the Balkan crisis 
can be settled.

#4
Moscow Times
April 23, 1999 
EDITORIAL: Envoy Will Fail to Dent Serb Resolve 

Viktor Chernomyrdin's appointment as the Kremlin's point man on Kosovo has 
rekindled some hope in the West that Russia will play a more constructive 
role in ending the war. 

Some of this enthusiasm may be justified. Chernomyrdin has close links with 
the West and he has usually been with the doves and the compromisers on 
issues such as the war in Chechnya and NATO expansion. Expect a softening of 
Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's anti-NATO line. 

Hopefully, Chernomyrdin will put an end to some of the more ridiculous 
pro-Serb, anti-NATO rhetoric, which Russia produced in the early period of 
the conflict.
 
NATO bombings have been powerless to stop the refugee exodus but it was 
disgusting to hear Russian officials claim that the 600,000 Albanians were 
fleeing U.S. warplanes when they crossed the mountains to leave Kosovo. All 
the evidence suggests that it was ethnic cleansing operations by Serbian 
paramilitary units that drove them from their homes. 

Chernomyrdin has dropped this kind of talk and his visit to Belgrade on 
Thursday will do no harm. Chernomyrdin will also do all he can to avoid 
dragging Russia into the war by supplying arms to the Serbs. 

But Chernomyrdin's appointment is unlikely to bring any diplomatic 
breakthrough. 

First, given the strength of pro-Serb sentiment here, Russia cannot throw its 
weight behind NATO's bombing campaign. Nor should it. Russia has been right 
to oppose from the very start NATO policies, which are only now, belatedly, 
being questioned in the West. 

Second, and more important, even if Chernomyrdin were a Western stooge, the 
hole NATO has dug for itself in Kosovo is much too deep for any quarter turn 
in Kremlin policy to make a difference. 

NATO has said it will not accept anything short of a complete Serb 
capitulation to its demands for control over the province of Kosovo. Indeed, 
if the West is to retain any credibility, it cannot accept anything less than 
a Serb withdrawal. 

But the Serbs have so far given no sign that they will surrender what they 
consider an inalienable part of their territory. Even if NATO invades with 
ground troops, Serbs could fight house to house and then for years afterward 
in the mountains. They know NATO does not have the stomach for such a war. 
They smell victory. 

Chernomyrdin will try to offer a cease-fire to cool tempers. He may offer to 
reduce NATO's dominant position in any proposed peacekeeping force for 
Kosovo. But things have gone too far for part-time diplomats from third-party 
countries to solve the Kosovo tragedy.
 

#5
Central Asia: Little Applause for Russian Military Presence
Inter Press Service
22-APR-99


MOSCOW, (Apr. 22) IPS - Russia and Tajikistan have vowed to boost a strategic 
partnership, but refrain from entering into a full military alliance because 
neighbouring countries resent Moscow's "meddling" in the affairs of fragile 
Central Asia. 

Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his Tajik counterpart Emomali Rakhmonov 
signed a treaty on alliance and partnership here on Apr 16, but fell short of 
finalising a deal to set up a Russian military base in Tajikistan. 

Yeltsin said Russia would continue its support for "fraternal" Tajik people, 
and Rakhmonov said his country prioritised ties with Russia. 

In this light the establishment of a Russian military base is designed "to 
maintain security and safeguard the territorial integrity" of Tajikistan, and 
is not aimed against other nations, Rakhmonov said. 

The two presidents were understood to reach a verbal agreement to set up the 
military base, avoiding a formal treaty due to strong opposition from 
neighbouring countries Uzbekistan and Afghanistan that view it as adding to 
instability in the region. 

Tajikistan's neighbour to the west, Uzbekistan, has already voiced fears over 
the planned Russian base. Earlier this month Uzbek President Islam Karimov 
said a Russian military build-up in Tajikistan would heighten security 
concerns in the region. 

Indicative of the region's fragility is Uzbekistan's announcement of its 
intention to leave the collective security treaty, which means only six of 
the 12 members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have so far 
agreed to renew their membership in the pact. 

Relations between Uzbekistan, Central Asia's most populous country, and 
Tajikistan are in a difficult state, owing to tensions over a rebellion by an 
ethnic Uzbek warlord in Tajikistan. 

In 1997 the Tajik government claimed victory over rebel warlord Makhmud 
Khudoberdiyev, an ethnic Uzbek, who had crossed the mountains and fled into 
neighbouring Uzbekistan. The Tajik government was upset by the Uzbek side's 
failure to hand him over. 

And when Khudoberdiyev waged another rebellion in 1998, President Rakhmonov 
accused Uzbekistan's leadership of helping plot an armed uprising in his 
country. 

Against this backdrop, it is no wonder that Uzbekistan is wary of foreign 
military presence in Tajikistan. 

One of five Central Asian republics, Tajikistan has been torn by civil war 
between former communists and Islamic fighters since shortly after 
independence in December 1991. A peace accord giving Islamists a role in 
government was signed in 1997. 

Largely, however, Rakhmonov has remained in power due to the political, 
military and financial support of Russia, which maintains some 16,000 men 
mostly on frontier guard at the Tajik- Afghan border in the south. 

Afghanistan's Taleban movement, which has frequently accused Russia and 
Tajikistan of aiding the anti-Taleban alliance, has also expressed strong 
opposition to Moscow's plan to set up a base in Tajikistan. 

A statement issued by the Taleban's foreign ministry in Kabul said Russia's 
aim in creating the military base is to continue interference in 
Afghanistan's internal affairs. 

In a letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the Taleban earlier urged the 
United Nations to block what it called Russian "interference" in the war-torn 
country. 

The Taleban accused Russia of pursuing what they call "the colonialist 
policies of the former Soviet Union." The Taleban foreign ministry statement 

claimed Russia would use the base to exert pressure on those Central Asian 
countries trying to keep their distance from Russia. 

The statement also said the agreement between Russia and Tajikistan brings 
into question their position in the so-called "six plus two" group of 
countries -- made up of Afghanistan's six neighbours along with Russia and 
the United States. 

This group was set up to help find a peaceful solution to Afghanistan's civil 
war, which has persisted since the Soviet pull- out from that country. 

Some say the accusations do not seem totally groundless. The main military 
leader of anti-Taleban alliance, Ahmad Shah Massoud, met Russian Defense 
Minister Igor Sergeyev during his recent visit to the Tajik capital. 

During that April trip to Dushanbe by Sergeyev, Russia and Tajikistan agreed 
on the establishment of the base. 

The planned Russian base would include the 201th division, already stationed 
in Tajikistan. Most of the Russian troops are away from the capital, guarding 
the restive Tajik-Afghan border against incursions by rebels and drug and 
weapons smugglers. 

But for all of the concern that Russia's moves in Central Asia have 
generated, its plans for a more active military role in Central Asia lack 
economic substance, says Alexander Salitsky, senior researcher at the 
Moscow-based Institute of Oriental Studies. 

He adds that Russia's clout is different today. "These days Russia can hardly 
afford to impose its military bases abroad against the will of neighbouring 
countries," he argued. 

So though Russia reaffirmed its commitment to safeguard "stability" in 
Central Asia, domestic financial pressures and vocal protests by suspicious 
neighbours are likely to mean little change in its military presence there. 

#6
Moscow Times
April 23, 1999 
President Can Bow to Defeat or ... 
By David McHugh
Staff Writer

President Boris Yeltsin's embarrassing failure in his attempt to fire 
Prosecutor General Yury Skuratov leaves him with a stark choice. He can 
retreat to his dacha, stew over defeat in the Federation Council, and resume 
life as a figurehead. 

Or he can refuse to accept irrelevance and go on the attack, risking 
impeachment, crisis and chaos. Given his mercurial character and record of 
sudden outbursts, the political elite is bracing for escalating confrontation 
between the lame-duck president and his increasingly disrespectful rivals. 

Kommersant newspaper said Thursday that the Council, once one of his most 
slavish supports, had "spit in the president's face" by refusing to fire the 
pesky Skuratov. 

"Now he has a choice," the paper said. "To wipe it off and become a Kremlin 
pensioner, or begin a counter-attack." 

Wednesday's defeat was a sharp reality check for Yeltsin, showing the limits 
on his attempt to mount a comeback from the political disaster that followed 
Russia's Aug. 17 financial collapse. After months of illness and inactivity, 
a burst of activity had restored his status to its highest point since the 
collapse. 

But the senators weren't impressed, with only 61 members of the 178-seat 
chamber backing him. Neither was Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov. A likely 
presidential contender, Luzhkov had smiled along with Yeltsin for TV cameras 
two weeks ago, as the two apparently cemented their friendship. 

That too turned out to be mostly fiction Wednesday, as Luzhkov, who sits in 
the council, deserted Yeltsin and suggested he learn "to get along" with 
Skuratov. 

The president now has an escalating scale of options. He can try again to get 
rid of Skuratov, who with the backing of the opposition Communists has made 
himself obnoxious by investigating what he says is corruption in the Kremlin. 

Yeltsin's situation in the council is not as bad as it might seem, said 
political analyst Vladimir Prybylovsky, head of the Panorama research center. 
The 61-to-79 defeat Thursday was better than the 2-to-142 negative when 
Yeltsin asked the Federation Council to dismiss Skuratov a month ago. 

The members don't want to see Yeltsin removed from office, as do the 
Communists in the more radical State Duma lower house. But the Federation 
Council wishes to guard its right to hire and fire prosecutors."They want 
calm, they don't want revolution," said Prybylovsky. "But they don't want the 
Prosecutor's Office in unfamiliar hands." 

Yeltsin might be able to swing things on a third vote by offering the 
governors an acceptable replacement, such as Moscow City prosecutor Gennady 
Ponomaryov, said Prybylovsky. That might swing Luzhkov, Ponomaryov's 
political patron, over to Yeltsin's side in the fight. 

As for Skuratov's corruption probes, Prybylovsky said, they are not a real 
threat to Yeltsin. Skuratov, even under severe political pressure, has 
refused to name names or even question anyone in the Kremlin. In 3 1/2 years 
in office, he has shown no enthusiasm for political corruption cases. 

The prosecutor remains suspended while prosecutors look into the story behind 
a sex tape broadcast on national television that supposedly shows Skuratov in 
bed with two women. Prosecutors say they are investigating whether criminal 
suspects provided the women's services in return for having their cases 
dropped. 

Yeltsin may do something more drastic and take out his frustration on Prime 
Minister Yevgeny Primakov by firing one or more of his cabinet members. Or, 
he retains the constitutional power to fire Primakov himself, though that 
would trigger a serious political crisis that might not end with Yeltsin on 
top. 

Yeltsin's already strained relationship with his prime minister, to whom he 
has grudgingly yielded much of the day-to-day responsibility for running the 
economy, is not likely to improve after Tuesday's debacle. 

Primakov went through the motions of defending Yeltsin's position in the 
Council, but reportedly spent much of his time talking about a possible 
resolution in support of him and his cabinet. "The premier's chances of being 
fired have grown significantly," wrote Natalya Kalashnikova and Svetlana 
Sukhova in the Segodnya newspaper. 

But any sudden moves with the cabinet raise the risk of a counterblow, in the 
form of accelerated impeachment proceedings in the State Duma, which has set 
a May 12 date for a vote. Yeltsin's defeat in the Federation Council, which 
must approve the impeachment charges by a two-thirds vote for Yeltsin to be 
removed, has turned impeachment, once only a nuisance, into at least an 
outside possibility. 

Or Yeltsin could reassert himself in a mostly symbolic way, by firing someone 
on his own staff. That's what he did after he lost a first vote on Skuratov 
on March 17, dumping chief of staff Nikolai Bordyuzha, who was blamed for the 
bungled effort. Next in line for the ax might be Bordyuzha's replacement, 
Alexander Voloshin, mocked by Kommersant as a "rookie" who couldn't keep the 
council members from disrespectfully chatting among themselves during his 
speech. What the unpredictable president does, in the end, depends to a great 
degree on his up-and-down health and energy level, and on his changing whims. 
"Why ask me - only a doctor can answer that question," said Prybylovsky. 

Yeltsin won't fire Primakov "if he's acting rationally," said Prybylovsky. 
"But he might act irrationally. That cannot be excluded."

#7
Russian Army's Suicide Toll 22.7% of All Casualties  

St Petersburg, 20th April, ITAR-TASS correspondent 

Nikolay Krupenik:

Thirty cases of suicide per 100,000 Russian army 
servicemen were registered in 1998, accounting for 22.7 per cent of the 
total number of servicemen who lost their lives during this period, 
Lt-Gen Ivan Chizh, head of the Defence Ministry's main military medical 
directorate told a training conference of the leading personnel of the 
Russian armed forces' medical service, held in St Petersburg today. 

Nevertheless, he stated that "the indicator of the health of servicemen 
remains stable". He pointed out that the high incidence of suicide in the army was 
due to higher stress levels in society and the resulting psychological 
problems among servicemen. Thus following each conscription 500 people 
are released from the army in the first three months of service due to 
psychological problems becoming exacerbated and this figure trebles, as a 
rule, during the following 12 to 18 months. 

The participants in the training conferences of military medical 
personnel will devote an expanded plenary session of the learned medical 
council to the problems of psychological health and psychological and 
physiological backup for servicemen in their profesisonal duties.

#8
Russian Missile Systems Said Immune to Millennium Bug  

Moscow, 20th April, ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail 
Shevtsov:


The Russian Ministry of Defence has "virtually resolved" the 
Year 2000 [Y2K] problem. All its computer systems have been tested or are 
nearing completion of tests. "The Russian Federation Defence Ministry 
does have some problems, and they require particular resources," 
ITAR-TASS was told today by Vladimir Bulgak, deputy prime minister and 
chairman of the Year 2000 committee. 

The millennium bug will not directly affect Russia's missile systems, he 
said, because they are not linked to astronomic time. In any country, the 
missile systems work in an autonomous environment and only those systems 
that do use astronomic time are susceptible to the millennium bug. 
"Missile systems are run with bespoke software," Bulgak said. 

He also said that NATO military bodies are constantly holding 
consultations on the millennium bug, with Russia taking part. The latest 
such consultations were held in April, and Russian military 
representatives were in attendance. 

Without wishing to underestimate the importance of the millennium bug to the 
world, Vladimir Bulgak stressed that work to deal with this computer 
issue was "proceeding according to a classic scenario". In May last year 
Russia, like the USA, issued orders for computer systems to be verified. 
After that, tests were carried out. A little later, there was an exchange 
of computer testing routines and these tests, according to the experts, 
are 80-per-cent reliable. 

Bulgak sees several elements in the Year 2000 issue. The first is that 
there are computers that will be unable to operate in the year 2000 
regardless of what software they have. This is the so-called "iron 
problem" and the only way to tackle it is to decommission and replace the 
computers in question. 

The second element is programming - computers able to accept programmes 
using the year 2000 will be upgraded and remain operational. 
Thirdly, there are ordinary computers, which will carry on working with only 
minor software adjustments. 

The deputy prime minister said that there could be computer problems 
before 1st January 2000. In particular, 9th September 1999 will show up 
as four nines and "in a number of programmes four nines means delete". 
The date format for 11th November could show up as four ones, which "to 
programmes could mean restore default settings". [omitted to end: 
generalities on financial aspect of Y2K, Russian industry is gradually 
working on the problem, federal budget contains no additional spending 
for Y2K, how China is coping] 

#10
Eastern Europe: Six Countries Seek NATO Membership Despite Balkan Conflict
By Julie Moffett

Washington, 22 April 1999 (RFE/RL) -- As leaders of more than 40 countries
descend on Washington this week for NATO's 50th anniversary summit, six
European nations aspiring to join the alliance say they remain firmly
committed to seeking membership despite the Balkan conflict. 

During RFE/RL interviews in Washington this week, envoys from Romania,
Bulgaria, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were united in their
conviction that the NATO operation in Yugoslavia was necessary to ensure
stability in Europe. 


Kalev Stoicescu, Estonia's Ambassador to the U.S., says his country is
continuing to intensify its preparations for membership. The crisis in
Yugoslavia has only increased his nation's desire to join the alliance, he
says. 


Stoicescu says it is critical that NATO remain committed to enlargement. He
says while he does not expect any countries to be officially invited to
join at this week's summit, he does expect NATO leaders to issue a
communiquÈ reiterating its commitment to an open door policy.  

"It is clear, as we see from the events in Kosovo, that the only way to
strengthen security and keep lasting peace in Europe is when NATO will
cover an entire unified Europe." 

Rolandas Kacinskas, the Second Secretary at the Lithuanian Embassy in
Washington, agrees. 

He says Lithuania hopes the NATO summit will launch a new round of
enlargement by inviting qualified candidates from the north and south of
Europe, including Lithuania. He adds he hopes NATO officials will publicly
recognize his country's progress toward membership by highlighting the
progress made in the development of Lithuania's defense establishment and
by the significant increase in its military spending. 

"Lithuania wants to join NATO as a strong alliance which would be capable
of increasing stability and security in the region." 

Peteris Vinkelis, Counselor at the Embassy of Latvia in Washington, says
the summit will be a chance for his country to reaffirm its desire to
participate in a collective security alliance for all of Europe, and also
to show its solidarity with the NATO operation in Yugoslavia. 

"The situation has proven that the only reliable organization that could
stop the violence, the massive human rights violations, and the worst
humanitarian tragedy in Europe since World War Two, is NATO." 

Bulgaria's Ambassador to the U.S., Philip Dimitrov, says the delegates at
the summit will have to face a number of very important issues regarding
the future of the alliance. 	He says his country will be closely watching
how NATO defines its new strategic mission for the 21st century.  

Of particular importance, he says, is that Bulgaria expects to see a "clear
message" emerge from the summit in terms of future enlargement and a
confirmation that integration is "but a matter of time." Dimitrov says the
crisis in Yugoslavia has not deterred Bulgaria from wanting to join NATO.
But he says he hopes the delegates will use the summit as an opportunity to
discuss concretely what should be done in the Balkans. 

"I very much hope that a vision will be expressed concerning the future
stabilization of the Balkans in the form of some kind of idea or general
scheme or plan -- and for the participation of all the countries in the
region." 

Martin Butora, Slovakia's Ambassador to the U.S. calls the NATO summit a
"very important milestone both in the general history of mankind as well as
in the history of NATO." 

Butora says the general strategy of the Slovak delegation at the summit
will be to act as if  Slovakia is already a de facto ally of NATO. He says
this strategy is already underway as shown by Slovakia's rapid response to
allow NATO airplanes to fly over Slovak airspace for its operation against
Yugoslavia. 

Butora says Slovakia hopes NATO leaders will issue a "credible enlargement
policy" at the summit and not let the issue of Yugoslavia completely
dictate the alliance's agenda. 

"I think that current catastrophe in Kosovo shouldn't overshadow the
importance of what the NATO summit will in fact confirm -- the importance
of the performance of NATO in the previous decades as a keeper of stability
and peace in Europe and the world." 

Butora says that Slovakia is prepared to be involved and incorporated into
a long-term stabilization plan for the Balkan region. He says that Slovakia
can be shown as a success story in the region since it "understands the
connection between ethnic issues and democracy." 

Butora explains: "We are convinced that without having a democratic regime,
without a firm democratic rule, and without democratic rules of the game,
it is very complicated to solve ethnic and national issues in a proper
manner." 

Romania's Ambassador to the U.S., Mircea Geoana, says the most important
aspect of the summit will be the opportunity to showcase the solidarity
between NATO and its partner and aspiring members in face of the crisis in
Yugoslavia. 

"Romania felt the need to join NATO, not only because we want to take care
of our security, but also because we felt, and feel, that we can contribute
to the security of that region in Europe...We do hope that the ultimate
result is a democratic Serbia." 

Geoana also says Romania hopes NATO leaders will "thoroughly and in a
lasting way" revise the strategic concept of the alliance. That, he says,
includes keeping the door open for further enlargement and a commitment
that the next NATO summit will be one that includes new members.

#11
IntellectualCapital.com
April 22, 1999
How to Destroy NATO
By Melvin Goodman   						

NATO's 50th-anniversary summit begins tomorrow in Washington; it is the
largest meeting of heads of state and government ever held in the nation's
capital. The confused and confusing policies of the Clinton administration,
however, should assure that the events resemble an inquest more than a
celebration.

Every aspect of the NATO alliance, including membership, strategic concepts
and war fighting, will come under the microscope.

Underestimating Milosevic

The current war in Kosovo will prevent any real celebration for NATO.
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and Secretary of Defense William
Cohen overruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff and naively believed NATO could
repeat in Kosovo what was accomplished in Bosnia three years ago.

In Bosnia, however, NATO's air attacks were accompanied by pressure from
Croatian and Bosnian ground forces. In Kosovo, there are no ground forces
to exploit the judicious, if not timid, air operations. A majority of NATO
members already believe that, in the future, NATO must seek the approval of
the U.N. Security Council before taking military operations beyond its zone
of membership.

Albright and Cohen underestimated the will of Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milosevic and advised the president that the Serbs would cave in with the
mere threat of force. The initial NATO attacks on remote air-defense
targets in northern Serbia were irrelevant to Milosevic's goals in Kosovo.
NATO's highly scripted, risk-averse air attacks against Serbia have had no
impact on Milosevic's ruthless killing squads in Kosovo.

NATO members now differ over their capabilities against ethnic instability
throughout Europe's southeastern rim, and they overwhelmingly oppose
Albright's "strategic concept" for preserving stability in and beyond the
European continent.

Even before the anniversary celebrations, Albright's radical views on a new
strategic concept to expand NATO's mission from territorial self-defense to
crisis management in non-contiguous areas assured an acrimonious weekend in
Washington. Albright sees the Balkans as the gateway to resolving
confrontations in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and even the
Transcaucasus.

But if peacemaking becomes the new core function of NATO in the "wider
European continent and beyond," in Albright's words, then the United States
will have to pick up the tab for every flash-point situation in Eurasia.
The Europeans reluctantly agreed to Albright's efforts to expand NATO's
membership; they will never agree to her efforts to expand its mission.

The flaws of NATO expansion

The war in Kosovo has exposed the flaws of NATO expansion. The three new
members -- Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic -- have little enthusiasm
for the military operation and have provided only minimal support.

The ill-conceived campaign of expansion has turned a successful military
alliance into an ungainly political-military consortium with no clear enemy
and no clear mission. Expansion also has expanded NATO's geographical
commitments while diminishing its military capabilities.

The expansion of NATO, moreover, threatens the most important elements of
the post-Cold War security order in Europe. These include the end of the
division between East and West; the moderation of Russian national security
policy; and the reduction and limitation of strategic and conventional
weapons in Europe.

NATO expansion has even blocked the most important U.S. security objective
in Europe -- the formation of a long-term strategic relationship with
Russia. Ironically, Russia offers one of the few chances for ending the
crisis without a wider war, but the Clinton administration has only
belatedly begun to play the Russian card.

The president and his secretary of state have one additional card to play
in order to interest both Russia and the European members of NATO in a new
security architecture for the post-Cold War era. Until now, the Clinton
administration has had a knee-jerk negative reaction to Canadian and
European interest in a "no first-use" policy for nuclear weapons.

But such a policy, as well as U.S. withdrawal of its nuclear bombs from
Europe, would give some credibility to U.S. interest in
counter-proliferation within NATO. The unwise U.S. sanctioning of a CIA
presence in U.N. inspection efforts in Iraq, which has ended inspection
efforts there and compromised international monitoring elsewhere, has
undermined U.S. efforts to attract a greater European role in
counter-proliferation generally.

Celebrating a big blunder

NATO would like to use its birthday party to celebrate its role in ending
the Cold War, but now its credibility as an alliance is tied to its ability
to deal with the powder keg in the Balkans.

The U.S. campaign to expand NATO has undermined the cohesion of the
alliance and complicated NATO's ability to deal with Russia in the Balkans.
The use of NATO's conventional military power has strained the strategic
arms-control dialogue with Russia and has persuaded Moscow to rely more
heavily on its relatively inexpensive nuclear arsenal.

The war in Serbia has turned an anniversary celebration into a council of
war and has exposed the expansion of NATO as the worst mistake in U.S.
policy toward Europe since World War II. 

Melvin A. Goodman is senior fellow at the Center for International Policy
and co-author of The Wars of Eduard Shevardnadze. He is a regular
commentator for IntellectualCapital.com.