Johnson's Russia List
#7146
17 April 2003
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
DJ: Still on vacation in Chincoteague on the Virginia eastern shore.
Its a chiller cloudy day.
1. Moscow Times editorial: A Catalog of Incompetence and Worse. (re FSB)
2. Reuters: Russian economy powers ahead 6.4 pct in Q1-PM.
3. Reuters: Top aide says Moscow plan will bring Chechen peace.
4. RFE/RL: Gregory Feifer, Chechnya: UN Declines To Censure Russia Over
Rights
Abuses.
5. Luba Schwartzman: TV1 Review.
6. Kennan Institute event announcement.
7. Moscow Tribune: Stanislav Menshikov, ELECTION GAMES. Who controls the
Duma.
8. Vremya Novostei: THE LESSONS OF WAR: A VIEW OF RUSSIAN POLITICAL
SCIENTISTS.
9. Gazeta: US MONOPOLY IS THE MAJOR THREAT TO THE UN. (inteview with
Alexei ARBATOV)
10. Moscow Times: Vladimir Pribylovsky, Election Coverage: Will There Be
Any?
11. Jamestown Foundation Russia and Eurasia Review: Alexander Kynev,
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN RUSSIA'S 2002 REGIONAL ELECTIONS
12. San Francisco Chronicle: Robert Collier and Bill Wallace, Russia now
admits
training Iraqi spies. But it says intent was to fight crime, terror.
13. WPS Monitoring Agency POLITICAL FORECASTS [press review]: THE SUDDEN
END OF
THE WAR IN IRAQ, AND NEW RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS: NOBODY LOVES A WINNER.]
*******
#1
Moscow Times
April 17, 2003
Editorial
A Catalog of Incompetence and Worse
Open Yandex on your computer. Type in "homemade bomb" in the search line.
Click. Open the link. The downloaded page describing how to make a homemade
bomb is stored in your computer. Stop. From that moment you could find
yourself facing charges of preparing terrorist acts, and risk landing in
jail for several years.
No kidding. Among the evidence used by the FSB to incriminate Eduard
Limonov in the plotting of terrorist activities was a textbook on guerrilla
warfare found in his computer.
Limonov's case and several other high-profile criminal investigations
recently conducted by the FSB cast very strong doubts on the competence of
the FSB and its "elite" corps of investigators.
In Limonov's case, all the serious terrorist charges against him and his
National Bolshevik Party colleagues, such as the creation of "illegal armed
formations" and advocating the violent overthrow of the constitutional
order, were thrown out by the court.
The only thing the FSB could pin on them was the illegal acquisition of
weapons -- something that the ordinary cops could have done in a fraction
of the time.
Limonov and five other NBP members were kept in confinement for two years
waiting for Tuesday's verdict, and were tried in the Saratov regional
court. Usually, it takes a matter of weeks for the ordinary police to put
together a case for illegal weapons purchase, which would be tried at a
lower, district level court.
Alexander Matrosov, the judge in the Limonov case, laid into the FSB
investigators and prosecutors for devoting their professional energies to
producing inconsistent and fabricated evidence. It is some indication of
their incompetence that the judge deemed it necessary to appeal to FSB
chief Nikolai Patrushev and Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov to take
disciplinary action against the remiss officers.
Indeed, this is a remarkable move for a member of Russia's court system,
which is still widely regarded as an appendage to the state's punitive
apparatus.
Adducing examples of the investigators' lack of professionalism, Matrosov
noted that despite having years and almost unlimited resources for such a
sensitive probe, there were official stamps missing from expert evaluations
and the investigators' documents making their case against Limonov
contained incorrect page references. These may seem like minor points, but
they serve to undermine the credibility of the case.
Recently, there have been two other high-profile cases in which the quality
of FSB investigators' work also proved so questionable that the suspects
got off with lighter sentences.
Moscow professor Anatoly Babkin, accused of selling state secrets to the
United States, maintained his innocence, claiming he was working with the
knowledge of his Bauman University administration, which employs an FSB
operative obliged to keep an eye on such trade. The FSB's counter-argument
in court was that the Bauman University administration department that
monitors scientific exchange was a mess. Babkin got off with an eight-year
suspended sentence. The Babkin investigation lasted two years, and Babkin
spent 34 months under house arrest.
Metals magnate Anatoly Bykov spent 21 months in detention and got off with
a 6 1/2-year suspended sentence in another compromise settlement the court
had with the FSB. The FSB accused Bykov of ordering the murder of his
business associate -- an offense that under criminal law is regarded as
threatening to the public and therefore not qualifying for a suspended
sentence. The murder was in fact staged by the FSB to frame the magnate.
Moscow's Meschansky district court found evidence collected by the FSB in
the two-year investigation very poor, and after reading the verdict the
judge also publicly castigated the investigators for their lack of
professionalism.
These verdicts may indicate that the courts are gradually gaining
independence from the executive branch and offer hope that justice will
prevail in politically charged cases -- at least in those cases that are
closely monitored by the media.
But it is also becoming alarmingly clear that the country lacks effective
law enforcement. After all, the very same listless and incompetent
investigators must be investigating genuine spy and terrorism cases as well.
******
#2
Russian economy powers ahead 6.4 pct in Q1-PM
MOSCOW, April 17 (Reuters) - Russia's economy grew 6.4 percent in the first
quarter of this year, compared to 3.7 percent in the same period of 2002,
Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov said on Thursday.
"I believe that this figure is quite an encouraging factor," Kasyanov told
the weekly cabinet meeting. "If we do not remain consistent, we could lose
this."
Kasyanov also said that Russia's industrial output rose by six percent in
the first three months, the fastest quarterly in increase in the past three
years.
"Growth was achieved through a continued improvement in the oil and metal
sectors as well as in the engineering and processing industries," Kasyanov
said.
He noted, however, that light industry had lagged under intense pressure
from foreign competition.
"During the past year, profitability in this sector fell to three percent
and the number of loss-making companies increased," he said.
Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) grew 4.3 percent in 2002.
Russia, the world's second largest crude exporter, had been aiming for
3.5-4.4 percent growth in 2003 depending on global crude prices but after a
strong performance in the first two months of the year, officials raised
forecasts to 4.5 percent.
Economists have said that Russia's economy looks set for a stronger than
expected 2003 on the back of soaring exports, rising investment and robust
domestic demand propelled by high oil and commodities prices.
They warned, however, that volatility in the price of oil, Russia's main
export, and a strong rouble may dent what looked like an optimistic picture
at the start of the year.
********
#3
INTERVIEW-Top aide says Moscow plan will bring Chechen peace
By Clara Ferreira-Marques
MOSCOW, April 16 (Reuters) - The Kremlin's top Chechnya aide said on
Wednesday Moscow's plan to amnesty separatists and pay compensation for
lost homes would bring lasting peace to the violence-torn region, despite a
fresh outbreak of bloodshed.
Sergei Yastrzhembsky, who was spokesman to ex-President Boris Yeltsin
before taking charge of Russia's thorniest problem, said Moscow could not
bow to fears of violence as it planned elections later this year for the
Chechen presidency.
"We cannot count our chickens before they hatch, but one thing is certain
-- we cannot be afraid," he told Reuters.
A referendum last month, the main plank of a Kremlin plan to end a decade
of war, gave overwhelming approval to a new constitution anchoring the
mountainous region within Russia.
Since then, separatists have attacked dozens of servicemen and local
police, viewed by the rebels as collaborators. Eight civilians working at a
military base were killed this month when a mine ripped their bus apart in
the Chechen capital, Grozny.
On Wednesday, news agencies reported three children were injured in a mine
blast outside the same base.
"Every amnesty, every compensation payment will have an echo in Chechnya,
letting people know there are new rules. The rumour mill can also work in
our favour," Yastrzhembsky said in his well-appointed office overlooking
the Kremlin.
"If we carry out promises made by Moscow on the recovery of the region, on
compensation and on amnesties, I am sure everything will be fine."
Residents have welcomed proposed compensation payments to some 300,000
people, but these will do little to revive the region's maimed economy,
once dependent on oil revenues.
"GREEN LIGHT FOR THE KREMLIN"
Yastrzhembsky said the referendum outcome amounted to a green light for
Moscow's determination to proceed with its settlement for Chechnya, despite
Western scepticism.
Western rights groups criticised the plan to introduce a constitution and
hold presidential and local assembly elections, while refusing to talk to
the rebels. Activists said Chechnya, crippled by war, was not ready for polls.
But the 96 percent "yes" vote, monitored by a handful of international
observers, exceeded even Moscow's expectations.
"I consider it first and foremost a victory for Chechen people themselves.
A victory over fear, over the doubts in which the region has lived over the
past decade," Yastrzhembsky said. "Of course, it is also a victory for the
Kremlin."
President Vladimir Putin has urged Chechnya's pro-Moscow authorities to
push on with peace efforts, setting the year-end as a target for half the
compensation payments.
Yastrzhembsky said the amnesties had yet to be worked out in detail, though
a proposal could reach parliament this week.
"The issue is not the number of people. It is to make the amnesties as
attractive as possible for people who want to stop fighting," he said.
After Chechnya's first bout of war in 1994-1996, parliament approved
several amnesties to win the release of Russian prisoners-of-war in
exchange for detained Chechens. The amnesties did not cover fighters
convicted of serious crimes.
Yastrzhembsky said Moscow had no plans for reconciliation commissions,
suggested by rights activists as a way of smoothing over recurring
allegations of house-to-house disappearances carried out by the army. Human
Rights Watch says 3,000 bodies have been buried in mass graves since war
flared again in 1999.
*******
#4
Chechnya: UN Declines To Censure Russia Over Rights Abuses
By Gregory Feifer
The top United Nations rights body today rejected a resolution that would
have censured Russia for violations in Chechnya. Rights defenders in
Moscow, meanwhile, criticize the international community for failing to
pressure Moscow over its brutal conflict in the breakaway region. As RFE/RL
Moscow correspondent Gregory Feifer reports, a group of them met today to
present a case to the country's Supreme Court on the unlawfulness of a
referendum carried out in the region last month.
Moscow, 16 April 2003 (RFE/RL) -- For the second year in a row, the United
Nations Human Rights Commission has refused to pass a resolution condemning
Russia for its actions in Chechnya.
Today's move seemingly boosts Moscow's argument that a referendum it
carried out in the breakaway North Caucasus region last month signaled the
start of a political solution leading to peace.
Liberal Duma Deputy Sergei Kovalev told reporters ahead of the vote today
that Western democracy has "fallen asleep" over its response to Moscow's
intractable, three-and-a-half-year conflict in the troubled region. He said
Western democracy "is well-nourished by its own prosperity. It feels
comfortable. It is lazy and shortsighted."
Kovalev and other rights defenders met today to discuss a case filed at the
country's Supreme Court that calls last month's referendum unlawful.
The plebiscite overwhelmingly approved a new, Kremlin-drafted constitution
for Chechnya.
Lev Ponomarev, whose For Human Rights group filed the case on 1 April, says
that in carrying out the referendum, the government violated Russian law by
attempting to change regional legislation.
"The president says nothing extraordinary is going on in Chechnya, that
there's only a counterterrorist operation going on there. There's no need
to introduce martial law, and the war is essentially over. If that's the
case, Chechnya is a normal subject of the Russian Federation. According to
Russian legislation, in that case, Chechnya's new constitution has to be
drafted by the Chechen parliament."
Ponomarev also says it is illegal to conduct voting in what is essentially
a war zone, despite Russian government claims that its campaign is over. He
says the presence of Russian soldiers, roadblocks, and other conditions
influenced voting.
"If you ask any lawyer in Russia who knows at least something about
constitutional law and our legislation, almost every one would say right
away that carrying out the referendum in Chechnya in the manner it was
passed is illegal. So we're essentially walking through an open door" by
filing a case whose legitimacy is obvious.
But Ponomarev adds that practically any lawyer in Russia would also say the
case has almost no chance of success.
Duma Deputy Kovalev says that even if the case has virtually no prospects
it still represents an important step.
"Every one of our steps showing that we are not a herd of sheep -- that we
are not, excuse me, the State Duma of the Russian Federation, ready to
support every initiative [of the president] -- is an event that carries
public significance."
Despite his criticism, Kovalev says the international community does, at
times, "wake up." He praises a resolution passed this month by the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe -- the continent's main
human rights watchdog -- calling for the creation of a war crimes tribunal
if the situation in Chechnya does not improve.
Moscow angrily denounced the suggestion as "politically harmful."
Chechnya's new constitution subordinates the breakaway region as an
"inseparable and integral" part of Russia.
Around 96 percent of those taking part in the referendum supported its
passage. In response to two additional questions on elections, some 95
percent voted for holding presidential elections in six months; 96 percent
approved parliamentary elections later in the year.
The government reported a total turnout of more than 80 percent of eligible
voters.
President Vladimir Putin said after the voting that Chechens had "made
their choice for peace and development together with Russia."
But groups monitoring the referendum disputed the figures. Kovalev says
they smack of falsified Soviet-era statistics, showing the Kremlin does not
respect the public enough to make them seem plausible.
The government's hopes that the referendum would silence international
criticism over its actions in Chechnya have meanwhile seen mixed results.
The European Union supported the resolution rejected today. It voiced "deep
concern" over the alleged abuses in Chechnya.
But the EU also told Russia yesterday that it does see signs of progress in
Moscow's policy toward Chechnya, even while asking for more action to
improve human rights, Reuters reported.
Human Rights Watch, citing a leaked government document, said this week
that disappearances, killings, and torture continue unabated in Chechnya.
HRW quotes the report as saying more than 1,100 civilians were killed in
the region last year.
Russian officials deny the report's existence. Putin's envoy for human
rights in Chechnya, Abdul-Khakim Sultygov, denounced the New York-based
rights group as "an extremist organization spreading totalitarian notions
about Europe's democratic values," Interfax reported.
Ahead of the UN vote today, Chechen advocates said the war in Iraq has made
it more difficult to pressure Russia over Chechnya, with France especially
muting its criticism of Moscow, which is a Paris ally in opposition to the
U.S.-led campaign.
Kremlin critics say the only way forward to a political solution is talks
with separatist rebels headed by Aslan Maskhadov. But the government
resolutely refuses to negotiate with Maskhadov, elected Chechen president
in 1997 in voting recognized by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. Moscow often calls Maskhadov and his followers
"bandits" and "terrorists."
Critics have opposed Chechnya's constitution for trying to legitimize the
war and giving the federal government much more sway over Chechnya than
other regions.
The details of Moscow's plans for Chechnya's future are as yet unclear. In
addition to setting the date for presidential elections -- which the
Central Elections Commission says could take place in December or in March
2004 -- Putin must now move forward with plans to negotiate a federal
treaty with Chechnya that will hammer out the specifics of its status and
establish the structure of its administration.
Meanwhile, as a counter to possible moves toward an international
commission, presidential rights envoy Sultygov promised yesterday that the
government would set up its own commission to investigate abuses by both
rebels and Russian soldiers.
*******
#5
TV1 Review
www.1tv.ru
Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba_sch@hotmail.com)
Research Analyst, Center for Defense Information, Moscow office
HEADLINES,
Wednesday, April 16, 2003
- The deputy prime ministers of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan met at the Kremlin to present to Russian President
Vladimir Putin plans for the creation of a new economic model for
the Commonwealth of Independent States. Experts are working to
bring all laws and regulations to a single standard. The group will
meet again in Minsk on May 15th.
- An unidentified man killed the deputy director of Norilsk Nickel,
Dmitry Trifonov, as he was entering his home in Krasnogorsk, in
the suburbs of Moscow. Investigators believe the assassin stole
Trifohov's briefcase, which contained documents and money. The
man attacked Trifonov in the elevator and stabbed him several
times in the neck. Trifonov managed to get to a neighbor's door
and rang the doorbell. An ambulance was summoned, but
Trifonov's life could not be saved.
- President Putin met with Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov.
Kasyanov reported that industrial production this quarter is 6
percent higher than in the same quarter last year.
- At the ceremony of the presentation of credentials for new
ambassadors to Russia, President Putin advocated strengthening the
role of the UN.
- Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin and his deputy, Aleksei
Ulyukaev, were invited to today's State Duma meeting. They were
asked to speak about the payment of compensations to soldiers who
served -- and to the relatives of those who died -- in Chechnya.
- State Duma deputies also discussed the draft law "On Civil
Service." One of the innovations is a special employment contract
for government officials.
- The Migration Service is building deportation centers near Sochi.
Illegal immigration has been a serious problem in the Krasnodar
Krai.
- The Russian General Prosecutor's Office has submitted a second
request to the Turkish Ministry of Justice for the extradition of
Chechen separatist Movladi Udugov. The first request was made
in the summer of 2002.
- A four-alarm fire broke out at a paint factory in St. Petersburg.
130 firemen took 2 hours to localize the fire. There were no
casualties.
- The Chechen National Youth Dance Ensemble will perform at the
Pierre Cardin Hall in Paris.
- The Moscow Obast Court has began hearings on one of the
biggest narcotics cases in recent history. The four accused –
Vadim Lavrenov, Mikhail Svanidze, Natik Babaev and Vladislav
Dolgii -- made deliveries of cocaine throughout the world. The
dealers had acquired hundreds of millions of dollars in real estate.
- Three teenagers were killed by a landmine near Khankala.
Witnesses say that the boys often went into the guarded zone,
protected by mine fields, to collect semi-precious scrap metal.
- In the Yaroslav Oblast city of Rybinsk, twenty schoolchildren
were poisoned by an unidentified gas brought in and sprayed by
one of the students. All were hospitalized; some have been
released.
- A festival in honor of the 180th anniversary of the birth of
playwright Aleksandr Ostrovsky is underway in Kostroma.
- Emergency Ministry workers in St. Petersburg are preparing for
an operation to clear Lake Ladoga of ice.
- European Union expansion was discussed at the meeting of the
Russia-EU Cooperation Council.
- Doctors in the Far East have introduced an anti-epidemic regime
at ports, railroad stations and airports to prevent the introduction of
the severe acute respiratory syndrome into Russia.
HEADLINES,
Tuesday, April 15, 2003
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kazakh President
Nursultan Nazarbaev met in Omsk. They discussed economic
relations, cooperation in the border regions and in the medical,
transportation and energy sectors. After the meeting, the
presidents gave a joint press conference.
- Russian Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko noted that
60% of the trade turnover between Russia and Kazakhstan takes
place in the border regions.
- The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs initiated a number of
criminal cases against local administration officials in Buryatia,
Vladimir and Arkhangelsk. Most of the accused are charged with
corruption, taking bribes, and the abuse of authority. According to
a joint study by Channel 1 and Kommersant the annual volume of
bribes in Russia is $30 billion in the business sector alone.
Another $2 billion in bribes goes to teachers, doctors, traffic
officers and court officials.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov met with leaders of State
Duma’s centrist factions. He told them that documents on the
partial conversion of the Russian Armed Forces to a contractual
basis will be submitted to the government on June 1st. The
changeover will be carried out between 2004 and 2007. The
contract soldiers -- 15 percent of the personnel -- will serve in the
hot spots; the other 85 percent, draftees, will serve for only one
year instead of two.
- Russian surgeons will soon be able to use new equipment to
perform heart operations in any conditions. The equipment weighs
only 20 kilograms and can fit into a briefcase.
- The Russian Ambassador to Latvia met with students from a
Russian-language school who had sent him a letter. This was a
surprise for the children -- they did not even expect to get a letter
in response from such an important politician.
- Boris Strugatsky, of the famous science fiction writers, the
“brothers Strugatsky,” celebrates his 70th birthday.
- Renowned Polish film director Andrzej Wajda received an
honorary doctorate from the All-Russian State Institute of
Cinematography. Before the awards ceremony he held a
masterclass for the students.
- Rapidly melting snow is causing problems in six Russian regions.
Over 3,000 houses and apartment buildings have been flooded.
*******
#6
Date: Mon, 14 Apr 2003
From: "JOSEPH DRESEN"
Subject: Kennan Institute event announcement
Book launch and reception
Co-sponsored by the Division of International Studies, Middle East Project,
and Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies
Monday, April 21, 4-6 pm (4-5pm in the Auditorium, followed by 5-6 pm
reception in the Board Room)
Speaker: Aryeh Neier, President, Soros Foundation
Book title: Talking Liberties: Four Decades in the Struggle for Rights
RSVP (acceptances only) to Tonya Boyce by e-mail at boyceta@wwic.si.edu or
by faxing 202-691-4184
Joseph Dresen
Program Associate
Kennan Institute
Woodrow Wilson Center
1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20004-3027
*******
#7
Moscow Tribune
April 18, 2003
ELECTION GAMES
Who controls the Duma
By Stanislav Menshikov
In the coming elections, Vladimir Putin feels relatively safe in the
presidential race but not sure at all about chances of his party, United
Russia (UR) in the parliamentary elections. This is bothering the Kremlin
because a loss of votes by the UR might end up in the loss of control of the
Duma by the president.
So far in Putin's first term, the Lower House of Russia's parliament was all
but run from the president's administration. With rare exceptions, the Duma
would rubber stamp practically any legislative initiative coming from Putin.
Sometimes the Duma majority would change its mind on a quick wink from the
Kremlin.
Thanks to an obedient centrist majority, Putin succeeded in creating what is
known as a "managed democracy". The upper house, which had formerly been a
powerful club of province governors, was practically stripped of independent
authority. Not only did the president banish the governors from the Senate,
he also appointed his seven personal representatives to act as watchdogs
over the 79 province leaders.
There is practically no limit to what Putin could do further to bolster his
power but only if he retains control over the Duma. Loss of control would at
least put a brake on his autocratic powers.
In the last year, the Kremlin has been working hard to raise the popularity
of UR. However, its ratings have fallen below those of the Communist Party,
which despite all negative predictions has remained the main point of
attraction for the electorate's protest vote. The main reason is that the
man in the street sees UR as the party of power, i.e. the personification of
the very authorities whom he blames for his low wages and pensions and for
rising prices.
The Kremlin succeeded in bringing the formerly divided centrist groups under
one umbrella. But after integrating regional bosses UR looks even more like
a bureaucratic conglomerate. Replacing as its titular head the popular
Shoigu (minister for emergency situations) with the non-spectacular police
minister Gryzlov was another big mistake.
Recently, the Kremlin started presenting UR as somewhat of an opposition
party. With Putin's blessings, it led a mass campaign against rising
electricity tariffs and succeeded in blocking government sponsored
legislation that threatened to cut wages of low-income employees. It is also
supposedly preparing a no confidence vote in Kasyanov's government later in
the year. By these actions the president attempts to kill two rabbits with
one shot - deflect popular discontent from himself to the prime-minister and
channel part of the protest vote which normally goes to the communists into
support for United Russia.
This is not necessarily a winning combination because Putin's election war
is waged on two fronts - the communists and the oligarchs. Despite their
differences, these two opposing forced are united in one common goal -
prevent UR from gaining a majority in the Duma. Oil tycoon Mikhail
Khodorkovsky has just announced his support for both right-wing parties -
SPS and Yabloko. Because oligarchs Roman Abramovich (oil) and Oleg Deripaska
(aluminium) are behind Kasyanov (the "Family" premier) whom Putin wants to
sack, they are in one boat with Khodorkovsky.
The combined Duma seats of SPS and Yabloko (at most 15-20 percent) are not
enough to block those Putin measures that the oligarchs might oppose. But if
UR wins, say only 40 percent, the right-wing parties could become an
important force controlling presidential policies. They may even succeed in
inducing Putin to retain the present cabinet, which is mostly loyal to big
business interests.
Paradoxically, this combination depends on the left wing parties (communists
and agrarians) winning anywhere between 35 and 40 percent of votes. This,
together with the right-wing parties, could prevent Putin from controlling
the Duma. Not surprisingly, talk about secret financial help allegedly
offered to the communists by companies associated with the oligarchs is not
receding but, on the contrary, becoming stronger.
However, money is not enough to make left wing candidates win elections.
More important is changing their image by promoting younger, intelligent and
charismatic politicians that propose practical programs to solve crucial
problems of the needy majority and display managerial competence, not simply
the ability to castigate the authorities and the rich.
Not surprisingly, leading TV channels have been lately inviting on their
talk shows left politicians like Sergei Glaziev, a noted economist with
experience in the first Gaidar government. He, as an outsider, recently ran
a successful third in the heavily contested gubernatorial race in
Krasnoyarsk. Glaziev, now on the Communist faction of the Duma, though not a
party member, has shown the ability to carry on professional dialogue on
national TV with men like Khodorkovsky.
But is the Communist leadership eager to place people like Glaziev in the
top slots on their candidate list? No sign of that yet. Gennady Zyuganov is
counting more on the elderly and more traditional down to the earth types
that have secured his stable large minority twice in a row.
If he is wrong, Putin might still be able to keep his hold on the Duma and
proceed with undermining Russia's democracy.
*******
#8
Vremya Novostei
No. 69
April 17, 2003
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
THE LESSONS OF WAR: A VIEW OF RUSSIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS
On April 16 Russian political scientists and politicians
gathered in Moscow to discuss the lessons that Russia could
draw from the Gulf war. There were many speakers. Vremya
Novostei's Nikolai POROSKOV heard out all of them. Below the
editorial board publishes a digest of some of the speeches -
without comment.
Fedor BURLATSKY, president of the Eurasian State
Cooperation Foundation:
"The USA has started a big mop-up of the globe from
totalitarian regimes, fearing first of all, for its own
security.
The war in Iraq is being waged for security, not oil. In this
sense, friendship with Germany and France is good for Russia,
however, our main partner in the security sphere is still the
USA. We need to get rid of the psychology of a superpower,
Russia is America's junior partner in overhauling the system of
world security."
Sergei KURGINYAN, president of the international public
foundation Experimental Creative Center:
"A strong gesture of a week man is shameful. This is how
the dispatch by Russia of its ships to the Indian Ocean looks
like. Something different is advantageous to Russia. Say,
playing a big game with the USA, by creating a strategic bloc
with, say, India.
Gleb PAVLOVSKY, president of the Efficient Policies
Foundation:
"During the Caribbean missile crisis in the early 1960s,
Britain took a sharply anti-American stand, whereas de Gaulle,
on the contrary, supported the USA. Everything is changing in
the world. Today - by 180 degrees."
Anatoly ADAMISHIN, former deputy foreign minister:
"We are approaching the cardinally changed world with the
cold war yardsticks. The world is divided according to the
principle of strength. The Americans cannot be banned from
overhauling the world as they see it fit. Russia has
overestimated its possibilities in this respect. It is to be
hoped that life will judge the Americans. We should stop
playing in various coalitions - this ties out hands. Russia's
task now is to prevent the aggravation of relations with the
USA and start tackling problems relating to the internal
situation, say, elections."
Alexander KONOVALOV, president of the Institute of
Strategic Estimates:
"America needs a strong Russia, capable of opposing,
together with it, modern threats. There is no threat to
Russia's sovereignty from the USA. Today, being a Russian does
not mean being an anti-Americanist."
Viktor KUVALDIN, the Gorbachev-Foundation:
"In Iraq, a regional conflict took place - as part of the
global conflict, as a result of which a new world order is
forming. The USA does not have strategic partnership with any
country of the world. Nor will it have it with Russia, at
least, because the USA does not want it. However, we can and
should develop relations with this country, equipping, at the
same time, the Topol-M ICBMs with MIRVed warheads for the
purposes of our own security."
Irina KHAKAMADA, vice-speaker of the State Duma:
"Russia, as a strong and efficient country, is rather a
rival of Europe than the USA. However, a conflict between these
two continents is disadvantageous for Russia."
Yefim ZHIGUN, Institute of Israeli and Mideastern Studies:
"Russia needs to overhaul its armed forces, orienting
itself to the sophistication of high-precision weapons,
reinforcement of special forces, etc. Establishing a lobby in
Washington would not be out of place - the sentiments there are
quite different and there is even a Honduras lobby there, while
there is no Russian one."
Alexander SHARAVIN, director of the Institute of Military
and Political Analysis:
"Russia has not preserved the efficient armed forces and
secret services inherited from the USSR. So, in the near future
we may have a limited sovereignty. Candidates running in the
Duma elections have no military-political platforms, nor is
there a party supporting the army and the defense-industrial
complex.
President Putin has not made real steps to strengthen the
army."
Vladimir ORLOV, director of the Center of Political
Studies:
"After what happened in Iraq, Russia may become a world
moral-legal leader. Its main international mission now is to
prevent the existing security system - the UN and its Security
Council - from collapsing."
*******
#9
Gazeta
No. 64
April 2003
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
US MONOPOLY IS THE MAJOR THREAT TO THE UN
The UN is powerless against transnational monopolies -
criminal, financial and political. Alexei ARBATOV, deputy head
of the State Duma Committee on Defense told Gazeta
correspondent Anton BILZHO about his views on the future of
this organization.
Question: How would the events in Iraq influence the
future of the UN?
Answer: During the Cold War, the world experienced the
balance of two major power centers - the phenomenon called
bi-polarity. The system of international law was based on this
balance, which allowed it to introduce certain rules of the
political game. The organization was influential only when both
centers were able to reach some sort of agreement. However,
because most of the time the opposing centers disagreed and
competed with one another, the UN could not exercise its
authority to a full extent. After the end of the Cold War,
favorable conditions were created for a sharp increase of the
UN role in the world affairs. In the 1990's, the UN conducted
more peacekeeping operations and solved more international
conflicts than it had done in the 40 previous years of its
existence.
Unfortunately, a new uni-polar system emerged later, when the
USA started playing a dominant role on the international arena
and tried to establish a global political monopoly. As a
result, the UN role started to diminish. The events in Iraq are
the best evidence of this tendency, ever. When three permanent
members of the UN Security Council, which plays a special role
within the UN framework and the whole system of the
international law, opposed the U.S. military action in Iraq and
were even ready to impose a veto, the action still took place.
Question: Does this mean that the United States is
destroying the UN?
Answer: The main threat for the UN is the political
monopoly sought by the United States, and the violation of the
sovereignty of national states by the actions of
non-governmental forces like, for instance, transnational
corporations, international terrorism, global organized crime.
Interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states is
becoming a norm. It destroys one of the fundamental principles
of the current system of international relations - the
existence of sovereign states as main players on the
international arena, as objects and, at the same time, as
subjects of this system.
Question: Political scientists insist that the theory of
the right of nations to self-determination proved to be wrong
at the end of the 20th century, which inevitably caused the
beginning of the destruction of the UN from within. What is
your opinion in that respect?
Answer: The right of nations to self-determination to the
point of separation and creation of independent states is a
slogan that captured the political minds during the collapse of
the colonial system. However, in the present circumstances this
slogan must be revised to a certain extent. There's no doubt
that the nations are entitled to self-determination, to the
preservation of their cultural, historical and other traditions.
But if we raise this principle to the extreme, up to the
establishment of an independent state, we inevitably create the
ground for endless conflicts and wars. For example, there are
150 nations and ethnic groups in Russia. Does this mean that
150 independent states might eventually emerge on Russian
territory?
The same refers to the United States. In order to establish
peace and tranquility on the international arena nowadays, we
have to change our approach to the right of nations to self-
determination. Certainly, we can't deprive nations of this
right entirely, but the approach to its extreme form - the
establishment of independent states - must be revised in a
sense that such goal should be achieved only by peaceful means,
only by agreement with a titular nation or with other ethnic
groups, which exist within this state. Otherwise, this right
would become a recipe for endless wars, international
terrorism, transnational crime, which always thrives on
conflicts.
Question: How do you picture the UN in 10 years?
Answer: The future of the UN would depend on the existence
of the U.S. political monopoly. We can discern now that some
sort of a symmetry naturally appears to counterbalance the
monopoly.
Smaller states start to unite in order to counterbalance the
influence of this unique, large state, which refuses to follow
the rules of the game and strives to attain limitless freedom
only for itself. If Russia manages to create together with
Western Europe a counterweight to the U.S. monopoly, this
reasonable containment of the American presumptuousness would
create the basis for the normal functioning of the UN. Later,
other power centers would emerge.
*******
#10
Moscow Times
April 17, 2003
Election Coverage: Will There Be Any?
By Vladimir Pribylovsky
Vladimir Pribylovsky, president of the Panorama think tank, contributed
this comment to The Moscow Times.
Sometime in the next few weeks, the State Duma is to debate a package of
amendments to Russia's laws on the mass media and charitable organizations,
as well as to the Criminal and Administrative codes. The amendments,
sponsored by President Vladimir Putin, are intended to bring these laws and
codes into line with the new law on the basic guarantees of voters' rights.
Horse-trading continues before the Duma votes on these amendments in their
crucial second reading, but all of the big issues have already been settled
in negotiations with the Central Elections Commission.
Proposed changes to Russia's mass media law would give the government
broader powers to stop the presses. If a publication or other media outlet
commits two violations during a single election campaign, federal or
regional elections commissions can file a complaint with the Press Ministry
calling for the offender to be shut down until after the election campaign
is over.
The voters' rights law, passed last summer, prohibits electioneering during
a campaign that is not paid for by a party or candidate with official
campaign funds. "Electioneering" under the new law includes speculation as
to what would happen if a particular candidate or party were to win or
lose, reporting on a candidate outside the scope of his or her professional
activities, and any "other actions" that could influence the voters. In
other words, the new election law prohibits not just "unauthorized"
electioneering, but all independent political analysis for the duration of
an election campaign.
The new law forbids giving more space or airtime to one candidate than to
others, and requires that reports of campaign events be presented without
bias or commentary.
In theory, the law has been in force since last November. But to date these
provisions have not been enforced because the law contains no mechanism for
punishing offending journalists and media outlets.
Putin's amendments would fill this gap.
One loophole does remain, however. Anyone not on a candidate's payroll will
still be able to write about elections on Internet sites that are not
registered as Internet publications. This would still be a violation of
election law, of course, but the president hasn't come up with a punishment
for it yet.
Central Elections Commission chairman Alexander Veshnyakov has emphatically
denied that recent legislation governing elections in Russia strikes a blow
against the freedom of speech. "It strikes a blow all right," he said, "but
against the freedom to lie, against negative campaigning and dirty money."
When journalists and average voters talk about violations of voters'
rights, they usually focus on how the ruling elite misuses the power of
office (or "administrative resources") to ensure victory for the "party of
power" and its candidates. And when members of the elite talk about the
shortcomings in the electoral process, they angrily denounce so-called
"negative campaigning." By "negative campaigning" the ruling elite always
means compromising information about its candidates, whether that
information is true or false.
Abuse of the power of office, especially when it involves vote-tampering
and removing candidates from the ballot, directly violates voters' rights.
Negative campaigning, even in its most egregious forms such as libel, does
not. It more likely violates the ruling elite's monopoly on tendentious
campaign coverage.
Independent candidates by definition have no access to "administrative
resources." When things get nasty they prefer to "go negative" or buy
votes. The establishment also buys votes, but it doesn't just hand out cash
on street corners. It buys votes indirectly, misusing the power of office,
as when the administration of the Krasnodar region allocated 300 million
rubles for road repair and construction of a new stadium in Novorossiisk in
order to give their man a boost in the mayoral election.
In the Duma's first reading of Putin's proposed amendments, the four
factions that enjoy "administrative resources" -- Unity, Fatherland-All
Russia, People's Deputy and Russia's Regions -- voted to ban "negative
campaigning."
This means that during election campaigns, the mass media could no longer
independently remind voters which candidates voted to legalize the
importation of nuclear waste, or to evict people from public housing for
falling behind on their bills, or to raise phone rates, or against raising
the minimum wage. That sort of information could only be printed or aired
in campaign ads paid for by the candidates and their parties.
On the other hand, the proposed amendments effectively legalize the abuse
of power. Officials who get involved in ballot-stuffing or removing their
competitors from the ballot could be fined, it's true. But the fines -- a
few thousand rubles -- are merely symbolic. Were a candidate to get up to
the same kind of monkey business, he would face a fine and up to four years
in prison. The same applies to election commission employees -- the very
people who would be called on to do the dirty work for those higher up the
political food chain.
As Duma Deputy Boris Nadezhdin joked, governors can now pay their fines for
abusing the power of their office up front, and then "do whatever they like."
According to the letter of the law, television programs like "Besplatny
Syr," "Tushite Svet" and "Odnako," which deal with politics, would have to
be pulled off the air for the entire upcoming Duma election campaign, and
again for the presidential campaign next spring.
But since all laws in Russia are enforced sele0tively, it doesn't take a
genius to figure out that Mikhail Leontyev's program, "Odnako," will stay
on the air, while Viktor Shenderovich's "Besplatny Syr" will get the hook.
It should be obvious that the Central Elections Commission will turn a
blind eye to slanted coverage of incumbents backed by the "party of power"
on state television, and that it will crack down on independent Internet
publications for posting "compromising" material "not related to the
candidate's professional duties."
You may recall that in the election campaigns of 1999 and 2000, Veshnyakov
muzzled opposition journalist Alexander Minkin even though he lacked the
legal means to do so, while allowing "party of power" pit bulls Leontyev
and Sergei Dorenko total freedom of expression. And how Veshnyakov
cynically announced that Putin's announcement of his "personal" decision to
vote for the Unity party was not a misuse of the power of his office. In
fact, he said that by reporting the announcement, the press had violated
the president's freedom of speech.
The new legislation affords grim prospects for satire, political analysis
and independent journalism. The only real hope is that, in line with the
old Russian tradition, the severity of the new laws will be mitigated by
their non-enforcement.
*******
#11
Jamestown Foundation
www.jamestown.org
Russia and Eurasia Review
Volume 2, Issue 8
April 15, 2003
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN RUSSIA'S 2002 REGIONAL ELECTIONS
By Alexander Kynev
Alexander Kynev holds a doctorate in political sciences and is an expert
member of the International Institute for Humanitarian and Political
Studies (MIGPI).
The role of political parties in regional elections has acquired particular
significance over the past year and as Russia's December 2003 State Duma
elections approach. Two contradictory trends are apparent. On the one hand,
there has been a weakening of party structures in the regions. On the
other, however, the federal center is trying to force regional elites to
create a party structure, one that is capable of becoming the basis for
projecting the center's power into the regions.
There are any number of examples which illustrate the first trend. In
comparison with the campaigns of 1998, to cite one, candidates in 2002 were
much less likely to invoke party membership in their electoral campaigns.
Not a single governor was elected on the strength of his party affiliation,
and even communist governors campaigned as independent candidates, above
party membership. Even in regions that by tradition are politically active,
candidates loyal to specific parties now carefully conceal their party
membership. And the party organizations themselves do not generally
participate directly in elections. In the traditionally "democratic" Nizhny
Novgorod Oblast, not one candidate overly affiliated with a party was
elected to the Legislative Assembly in the elections of March 2002. And
there was likewise no one prepared to risk running as a candidate of the
Union of Right Forces (SPS), even though the SPS had been stunningly
successful there in the 1999 Duma elections.
In Saratov, the August 2002 oblast Duma elections were similarly dominated
by independent candidates--who consisted mostly of directors and
bureaucrats. Only one Communist Party (KPRF) member was elected. Most of
the independents presented themselves as members of United Russia, despite
the fact that the party has no apparatus there and actually embraces the
whole of the regional elite (albeit fragmented into warring clans).
In the traditionally "red" Krasnodar Krai, the 1998 elections were
completely dominated by the Fatherland movement of Governor Nikolai
Kondratenko, which captured more than forty of the fifty seats. For 2002
the region switched from multi-mandate to single-seat constituencies, a
change that reduced the role of the party structures. Kondratenko's
Fatherland took thirty-two seats, the KPRF thirteen, and United Russia, the
Liberal Democrats (LDPR) and Agrarian Party (APR) just one each.
St Petersburg's 1998 Legislative Assembly elections were notable for the
intense rivalry between party teams, in particular Yabloko and the Yury
Boldyrev bloc. In the 2002 elections, however, independent deputies took 31
seats, leaving Yabloko with just five, United Russia with nine, and the
Communist-Nationalist grouping with five.
The role of parties in Karelia's 2002 Legislative Assembly elections was
similarly minimal, though all the main parties had previously enjoyed
strong representation. Almost every party deputy was forced out in the 2002
elections and the newly elected nomenklatura was divided between United
Russia and the National Party.
The same trend has continued this year. Governors are energetically
opposing efforts to impose on their regions elections based on party lists.
And it is likely that the governors will be able to find public support for
their stance. Experience shows that the electorate tends to focus on local
issues in regional voting, while being prepared to vote in the abstract for
conventional paradigms (left-wing, democratic, patriotic) in national
elections.
The decay of regional party networks is the result of both a general
lessening of the authority of parties at the national level, and an
increase in the authoritarian character of the current political
regime--that is, the expansion of the authority of a non-party president
alongside the erosion of influence of the State Duma. The party networks
have no power and have not learned how to lobby effectively. There are,
meanwhile, signs of boredom with party brands and politicians. Electoral
turnout is falling, and identification with a party is now more of a
hindrance than a help for candidates running for election.
Indeed, regional structures, including even those affiliated with parties
that were trying to create effective organizations in the 1990s, are
effectively being destroyed or virtualized. This is true of the LDPR,
Yabloko and the SPS. Most of their regional organizations are now in a
"latent" state, pending cash injections for the federal campaign. It
remains the case that the most "animated" regional network is that of the
Communist Party. Nonetheless, the number of left wing deputies in the
legislatures of the "red regions" has fallen off, and many "red" governors
have been publicly distancing themselves from the KPRF.
United Russia, much like the other "parties of power" that have preceded
it, is a creature of the nomenklatura and something of a virtual brand. As
an organized structure, one capable of running an election campaign, United
Russia is almost non-existent.
Regional party apparatuses are increasingly being molded by the interests
of financial-industrial groupings or personal interest groups, which simply
use the party brand or imprimatur as an electoral device. In some regions,
local party branches have effectively been transformed into public
relations teams ready to work for anyone who can pay ready cash.
Up to now, most Russian regions have been using a single-round simple
majority system to elect their deputies. This means that the main challenge
for parties is to defeat independents rather than candidates from other
parties. The two round majority system, used in some areas, makes it even
more difficult for parties, since the non-party majority typically
steamrollers the party candidate who makes it to the second round. So the
electoral systems currently used in the regions are a direct impediment to
the survival of Russia's party system. It is apparently in response to this
development that President Putin came up with a plan to impose a mixed
electoral system on the regions.
The center's desire to forcibly strengthen the role of the federal parties
is evidenced by the new law on political parties, which bans the creation
of regional parties. In addition, there is another new law which requires
that at least half the seats in a regional legislature be allotted to
candidates from party lists. This requirement comes into effect for
elections taking place after July 14, 2003.
These measures presage revolutionary changes in the political systems of
most of Russia's regions, where the ensconced regimes generally operate
with varying degrees of authoritarianism. Since 1993, some regions have
already made use of the mixed system to elect their legislative assemblies.
These include Krasnoyarsk Krai; Sverdlovsk, Kaliningrad, Saratov and Pskov
Oblasts; the republics of Marii-El and Tyva; and the Koryak and Ust-Ordynsk
Buryat Autonomous Okrugs (AO). Aside from the Koryak AO, there is a 5
percent threshold for parties to enter the legislature in each of these
regions.
In Marii-El, Tyva, Saratov, Ust-Ordynsk Buryat AO and Koryak AO, elections
using party lists were held just once, and then the system was dropped.
Since 1996, in fact, the number of regions using the mixed system has
steadily decreased and only one new region--Pskov oblast--has introduced
these list-based elections.
Even in these cases where party-list elections have taken place, the
pattern has been for elections to assume a highly personalized character,
and for federal parties to play only a negligible role. This is clearly
illustrated by the successes enjoyed by such purely regional constructions
as "Kuznetsov, Polozov, Savitsky--together for the future" in Pskov; "For
Our Native Urals" and other blocs in Sverdlovsk Oblast; and the "Ours" bloc
and the "Anatoly Bykov Bloc" in Krasnoyarsk. In Sverdlovsk, no branch of
any of the federal parties, apart from the Communists, has ever managed a
top three finish or earned more than 10 percent of the vote. The picture is
much the same in Krasnoyarsk, where local blocs won the top three places in
the 2001 elections. Neither the SPS, Yabloko nor the LDPR were able to
secure even 5 percent of the vote in regional elections in Krasnoyarsk,
Sverdlovsk or Pskov.
Most regional branches of national parties are wholly unprepared for the
new conditions. They have been marginalized and their leaders effectively
excluded from the local elite.
This strongly suggests that the regional elections will result in a
renaissance of parties that are little known at the national level.
Alongside this renaissance of small parties, the regional branches of
existing parties will likely be colonized by people with financial and
administrative means. This will exacerbate the problem of internal party
unity and the inability of central party organs to control their own
regional structures. Quite distinct organizations will be operating in
different regions under the same party name.
There is no reason to believe that the new law will actually promote the
diffusion of federal parties. As of January 20, 2003, fifty political
parties were registered, yet it is practically impossible to find branches
for most of them in the regions. And electoral blocs in regional elections
may be formed not only by the branches of political parties, but also by
national-level voluntary organizations. According to the Central Electoral
Commission, 199 such voluntary political organizations have been registered.
One of the main arguments used by those who support the introduction of the
new mixed proportional-majority system in the regions is that the
strengthening of the "party vertical" will promote national unity. They
have decided to fight the regional parties at a federal level by banning
them. But this is highly unlikely to be effective. It is better to have
regional parties appearing and registering openly rather than having them
hide behind blocs of non-existent regional branches of federal parties.
Still, there are grounds for cautious optimism that the reform will have
positive effects on the role of regional legislatures over the long term.
For example, the introduction of mixed elections is likely to make regional
politics more competitive. Regional parliaments will become much more
independent of their governors, and will serve as places where various
interest groups can be represented. The current majority system frequently
leaves the political opposition totally unrepresented in local assemblies.
Even in cases where the opposition has the support of 10-15 percent (and
sometimes 30-40 percent) of the population, an unpopular governor can put
forward for election local "heavyweights"--directors, doctors, and others,
all of whom are wholly dependent on the administration. These are people
who are guaranteed to win.
A second possible benefit will be on the quality of the legislatures' work.
The current system produces regional assemblies that are often dominated by
motley crews of lobbyists. The doctor, for example, wants more money for
his hospital, the director more contracts for his enterprise. Meanwhile, no
one is taking an interest in long-term, strategic development. With
proportional elections, however, party leaders should have more of a stake
in the development of the whole region, rather than one small part of it.
One practical problem connected with the introduction of party list voting
is the need to increase the size of legislatures. The law requires that 50
percent of deputies should be elected from the lists. Since incumbent
deputies will not want to merge the existing constituencies, the party list
seats will probably be added on, increasing the size of the legislature.
Thus, it is possible to conjecture that the new electoral cycle will see
some strengthening of the role and influence of the elected assemblies.
During the first electoral cycle, from 1993-1996, most assemblies faced off
against powerful, appointed governors. So the assemblies at least had the
advantage of democratic legitimacy. But in the second and third electoral
cycles, from 1996-2000 and from 2000-2004, there has been a weakening of
the assemblies, which have had to coexist with elected governors.
*******
#12
pravda.ru
April 16, 2003
The New Kind of the Russian Patriotism
Russian protesters burn American dollars, 2/3 of Russian people live below
the poverty line
The Moscow department of the party Unified Russia managed to gather 80
thousand Muscovites for a meeting that took place on Wednesday. It was
planned to gather 100 thousand people there, but 80 thousand were enough in
order to set out the protest to Americans regarding the incident with the
convoy of Russian diplomats in Iraq. Everyone remained alive, thank God.
The participants of the meeting did not talk about the reason why such a
large number of Russian diplomats had to stay in Iraq for so long during
bombardments, and why they were evacuated on a most critical moment. It
seemed like it did not matter, for the anti-war protest was far more
important at the meeting, especially after the war was basically over.
There is an impression that there is nothing else to think of. The
Vechernyaya Kazan newspaper wrote, someone even called Baghdad Stalingrad.
Well, here is a short list of some of the problems to think of. Twenty-two
schoolchildren died in the fire in the republic of Yakutia, because there
was no money in the budget for a new school building or for a group of
firemen. Yet, no one of those people, who came for the mentioned meeting in
Moscow, asked Russian corporations to share their extra profit for such
purposes.
As someone at the meeting said, each flag for protesters cost "only 12
dollars." The number of those flags could allow to change old electric
wires in several provincial schools. Eighty thousand clerks, students,
officials did not work in the middle of the week. Someone came for the
meeting by buses, others came on foot to scold the American administration.
Meanwhile, Russian deputies worked on amendments to the Law "About the
Federal Housing Policy." The reform of the Russian housing and public
utilities system, which was initiated by centrist factions, by Unified
Russia in particular, will worsen elderly people-s social position. There
was a small group of Yabloko faction activists at the Wednesday meeting,
though, to protest against the predatory reform.
It is disgusting to see young men (who are definitely not hungry at all)
burning American dollars, expressing their despise against the United
States. Two-third of those men's country-fellows live below the poverty
line. It is disgusting to realize that it is possible to make people take
flags in their hands, make them go out for meetings - there were a few
people, who volunteered to participate in the action of protest. It is
disgusting to realize that envy and hatred against another country became
the essence of the Russian modern patriotism.
Twenty-eight students of a boarding school for deaf children died as a
result of the fire in the republic of Dagestan, about a hundred children
were hospitalized. Probably, the school did not have enough money to repair
the electric wiring either.
The United States has lost 100 servicemen over three weeks of the war in
Iraq. Fifty schoolchildren have died in fires in Russia over a week.
*******
#13
San Francisco Chronicle
April 17, 2003
Russia now admits training Iraqi spies
But it says intent was to fight crime, terror
Robert Collier, Bill Wallace, Chronicle Staff Writers
Baghdad -- Russian intelligence officials have confirmed that Iraqi spies
received training in specialized counterintelligence techniques in Moscow
last fall -- training that appears to violate the United Nations resolution
barring military and security assistance to Iraq.
A spokesman for the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Boris
Labusov, acknowledged that Iraqi secret police agents had been trained by
his agency but said the training was for nonmilitary purposes, such as
fighting crime and terrorism.
Yet documents discovered in Baghdad by The Chronicle last week suggest that
the spying techniques the Iraqi agents learned in Russia may have been used
against foreign diplomats and civilians, raising doubt about the accuracy
of Labusov's characterization.
The Russian training program for Iraqi spies was revealed Sunday in an
exclusive Chronicle story that was based on documents found in an Iraqi
security complex in Baghdad after looters had ransacked the building.
The documents included personnel dossiers on officers of the Mukhabarat,
Saddam Hussein's security service. At least five of the dossiers contained
certificates of graduation from specialized surveillance courses given in
September 2002 by the Special Training Center in Moscow.
Russian officials in the United States flatly refused to discuss the
documents discovered by The Chronicle.
"We will have no comment on the matter at all," said Evgeni Horosho, press
liaison for the Russian Embassy in Washington.
But Labusov, the press officer for the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service,
confirmed that the certificates discovered by The Chronicle were genuine
and that the Iraqis had received the training the documents described.
Labusov was questioned about the documents by Andrey Soldatov, director of
Agentura, a Moscow-based journalism organization that uses the Internet to
disseminate information about Russian intelligence services.
Labusov suggested that the training the Iraqis received was not unusual.
"The SVR does not refuse cooperation with secret services of different
countries in the areas of counter-terrorism and war, fighting drug traffic
and investigating the illegal trade of weapons," he told Soldatov, who
relayed the response to The Chronicle by e-mail.
TRAINING MISAPPLIED?
However, it seems likely that the Iraqi agents who were trained at the
Moscow center were using their skills for other purposes. Found in the same
Mukhabarat office with their personnel files and graduation certificates
were a host of other documents, including orders for wiretaps and for
break-ins at such sites as the Iranian Embassy, the five-star al-Mansour
Hotel and private doctors' offices.
A spokeswoman for the U.S. State Department flatly declined to comment on
the spy training the Russians provided to Iraq and also refused to discuss
whether the training appeared to violate U.N. resolutions prohibiting
military and security assistance to the Hussein regime.
But one U.S. intelligence source who agreed to speak on background told The
Chronicle that it was disingenuous of the Russians to compare Iraqi
counterintelligence agents to law enforcement and security officers from
other countries who combat terrorism, drug trafficking and illegal arms
sales.
"The sole purpose of the Iraqi security services was to protect the Baath
regime from its enemies inside and outside Iraq," he said. "That was their
only reason for existence."
Iraq is listed among the states that sponsor terrorism in the "Patterns of
Global Terrorism" report issued by the State Department in May.
EXPLANATIONS WANTED
Rep. Ellen Tauscher, D-Walnut Creek, said that Russia, a member of the U.N.
Security Council, must explain why it was helping to shore up Iraq's secret
police at the same time it was criticizing the Iraqi government for giving
assistance to terrorist organizations.
"Back in September of last year, it was very clear that Iraq was on the
other side of the fence from the rest of the world in terms of the fight
against global terrorism," said Tauscher, a member of the House Armed
Services Committee. "It doesn't make sense for the Russians to have been
providing them with additional intelligence capabilities at that time."
Victor Mizin, a former global security expert for the Russian Ministry of
International Affairs who now is a senior diplomatic fellow specializing in
Russian arms and security operations for the Monterey Institute for
International Studies, said that the Special Training Center where the
diplomas were issued appears to be one of several training facilities that
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service officials use to train intelligence
officers from other countries.
"There are a belt of such camps in Moscow," Mizin said. "They were
established in the 1920s and 1930s to train agents for the old COMINTERN
(Communist International)."
Russian security services have long provided technical training for Iraqi
military and security specialists, Mizin said, adding that about 70,000
Russian military and security advisers had been sent to Iraq over the last
30 years.
Mizin said Russian training for Iraqi intelligence officers may fall into a
gray area under U.N. resolutions dating back to the 1991 Gulf War that
prohibit giving military assistance to Iraq.
After the U.N. resolutions went into effect, "all the old contracts to
provide material and services stopped, but the (personal) contacts went
on," Mizin said.
Telephone and e-mail messages to U.N. spokesman Fred Eckhard, seeking
clarification on whether Russia had violated U.N. sanctions by training
Iraqi spies, went unanswered Wednesday.
HISTORY OF COOPERATION
Last week, Mikhail Falkov, a Russian expert on the Middle East and author
of the book "Afghani Pandora's Box," wrote an article for the Agentura Web
site (www .agentura.ru) that details the long history of cooperation
between spy agencies for Iraq and Russia.
"Soviet instructors have played a primary role in the reorganization of
Iraqi intelligence and security agencies," Falkov wrote. "Many officers of
these special services have passed through training in the USSR."
Although the Iran-Iraq war and a Baath Party crackdown on Iraqi communists
in the 1970s and 1980s weakened the relationship between the two nations'
spy agencies, Iraqi agents continued to have close ties to their Russian
counterparts, receiving aid and assistance from the Russians in return for
Iraqi intelligence information on Arab countries that had no diplomatic
relationships with Russian.
For example, Falkov said Iraq had provided information about some Islamic
extremist organizations operating in Chechnya.
And as recently as October 1999, the Iraqi minister of foreign affairs met
with Russian military and security officials, announcing afterward that the
meetings had been to negotiate "an exchange of experience (and) realization
of joint trainings of different sorts of experts in our area."
Robert Collier reported from Baghdad and Bill Wallace reported from San
Francisco. Independent journalist Andrey Soldatov of Agentura assisted in
Moscow. / E-mail the writers at rcollier@sfchronicle.com and
bwallace@sfchronicle.com. Soldatov can be e-mailed at webmaster@agentura.com.
*******
#14
WPS Monitoring Agency
www.wps.ru
April 16, 2003
POLITICAL FORECASTS [press summary]
THE SUDDEN END OF THE WAR IN IRAQ, AND NEW RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS:
NOBODY LOVES A WINNER
The topic of Iraq continues to dominate the headlines in Russia,
though there has been a noticeable change in genre: the papers have
moved from straight reporting to commentary and analysis.
The virtually bloodless taking of Baghdad came as a real shock to
the Russian media. "America has won again!" says Andrei Kolesnikov in
[Izvestia] - and his words could serve as an epigraph for most
articles about Iraq.
Alexander Minkin's article in [Moskovskii Komsomolets] is titled
"The Bitter Taste of Somebody Else's Victory".
Minkin considers that the primary reason why the US victory has
aroused "such great annoyance" in Russia is because it is being
compared to Russia's own campaign in Chechnya.
The comparison is not in Russia's favor.
"Twenty-one days of war, compared to seven-and-a-half years of
war. US and British casualties: 132 dead. Our casualties in Chechnya:
over 10,000 dead. Around 4,000 Iraqi civilians have been killed. In
Chechnya, over 100,000 civilians have been killed. Iraq is a long way
from America, across the ocean. Chechnya is right next to - or within
- Russia."
Further comparisons may be made, but they still don't answer the
main question: why have things turned out this way? "For them, why has
it been easy, fast, with few casualties on alien territory? For us,
why has it involved high casualties on our own territory, and why has
it lasted so long?"
Pavel Felgengauer aims to forumulate his own answer to this
question in [Novaya Gazeta]: "In strategic terms, the Americans have
won in the best style - they demolished the enemy, without destroying
them or shedding excess blood." And this is precisely why "the
political prospects have brightened for establishing a allied regime
in Iraq which will be friendly towards the US in the long term."
"Perhaps it's simply that we envy the Americans," says Andrei
Kolesnikov in [Izvestia]. "With a steady hand, they are able to draw
their axis of evil on the map." But Russia can only dream of doing
that: we are forced to warmly embrace the tyrants "who live in our
geopolitical underbelly", says Kolesnikov, "because we are dependent
on their natural resources". He notes a recent visit to Moscow by
President Saparmurat Niyazov of Turkmenistan (known as the
Turkmenbashi).
Sadly enough, says Kolesnikov, all we can do is admit that in the
wake of the American victory in Iraq, "we have been left alone with
our anti-Americanism - greatly deluded about being part of a Paris-
Berlin-Moscow axis, with chimerical visions of Central Asian
geopolitics, and that unanswered question: Why isn't Russia the United
States?"
The conclusion is clear: that which may be described as "a social
consensus of anti-Americanism" in Russian society (VTsIOM polls show
that 55% of respondents dislike the United States, Public Opinion
Foundation polls indicate 54%) is probably provoked by an awareness of
our own inability "to catch up with the US in anything at all".
[Profil] magazine offers its readers some ideas about the nature
of Russia's anti-Americanism.
Vladimir Zharikhin, deputy director of the CIS Institute, says in
[Profil] that President Bush's doctrine "happens to touch upon the
basic interests of ordinary Russian citizens" - and this couldn't fail
to have an impact on the attitudes of those citizens to Americans in
general.
According to Zharikhin, the problem is that Russians and
Americans have ended up with their phases out of synch: "After eight
years of a calm existence under Clinton, thanks to Bush and bin Laden
America went in for cowboy feats. Whereas Russia, after twelve years
of revolutionary upheavals, suddenly decided to step on the brakes."
Putin managed to achieve at least relative stability at home and
improved relations with the West. "Dangers started decreasing, one by
one. Everything appeared to be going well." The rules for getting by
in these new circumstances turned out to be simple: keep your savings
in dollars rather than rubles, go on vacation to Turkey rather than
Sochi, and take lessons from the Americans in "what may be their sole
positive quality: being law-abiding."
These, the barely-formed lifestyle rules of Russia's nascent
middle class, have started to crumble as a result of the actions of
President George W. Bush.
First, the dollar wavered. Then Antalia became a city close to
the front line. But the main point, according to Zharikhin, is that
Bush started behaving like a "new Russian" - he did the equivalent of
driving his powerful car in the wrong lane and simply disposing of
anyone who got in his way.
Thus, it appears that Russians have taken offense at the
violation of certain principles of Western civilization to which they
have barely had time to become accustomed. And indeed, such things are
hard to forgive.
But why have the defeated Iraqis suddenly shown such a passion
for the Americans, whom they were cursing only recently? Television
images around the world have shown crowds of people jumping for joy on
the streets of Iraqi cities as they watched coalition troops pass by.
Once again, observers turned to applied social psychology. The
[Kommersant] newspaper says: "The problem is that a clan-based society
such as Iraq, knowing nothing of democracy or liberal values,
automatically submits to the strongest. As long as Saddam Hussein had
power, they submitted to him without protest and called him their
father. But now George W. Bush has proved to be stronger - so he has
become the father of all the Iraqis." At the same time, [Kommersant]
warns readers not to delude themselves. "If, by some miracle, Saddam
and his legions rose from the ashes tomorrow and started thrashing the
coalition, Saddam would once again become the leader of the nation and
the focus of universal adoration. And the Americans would once again
become the despised occupiers."
And yet, according to [Kommersant], the unexpected gift given to
the Americans by Saddam Hussein, who dissolved without a trace in the
ruins of Baghdad, along with his army - "as if they were phantoms
rather than people" - could have grave consequences in the form of "a
drastic devaluation of the principles which say that restructuring the
world by force is wrong".
[Kommersant] goes on: "If blood can be washed away and tears can
dry so quickly, why not use surgical military solutions again in
future, in the name of love for humanity, since they have apparently
proved so effective in Iraq?"
The [Vedomosti] newspaper quotes US Ambassador to Moscow
Alexander Vershbow: "We consider that the Iraqi people are ready for
democracy." [Vedomosti] comments: "The statement is arrogant enough in
itself, but it's entirely in the spirit of contemporary American
diplomacy."
[Vedomosti] has it own view of events: "Over the 23 years of
Saddam Hussein's rule, many Iraqis have become slaves. They have lost
the habit of considering Iraq as their own home: one is convinced of
that when one sees apparently ordinary, peaceful citizens looting
stores, offices, and the homes of state officials. Along with their
monuments, the Iraqis have lost their society as such. The people who
have now gained liberty are people who have grown unaccustomed to
responsibility - so what's happening is not surprising."
Of course, says [Vedomosti], the Iraqis will remember how rapidly
Saddam Hussein's regime collapsed - though it had seemed so cunning,
cruel, and powerful: "But they will also have many reminders that they
did not bring down the dictator on their own."
In [Yezhenedelnyi Zhurnal], Alexander Goltz writes: "The war in
Iraq has demonstrated for all to see that Washington now possesses
absolute military, informational, and economic superiority around the
globe." He adds: "But there is no certainty whatsoever that the
present US administration is capable of using that power wisely."
According to Goltz, the UN Security Council dispute about whether
or not to use force against Saddam Hussein was essentially a dispute
over what a superpower should permit itself to do. "In starting a war
despite the protests of many other nations, Washington has shown that
it considers 'I can' and 'I have the right' to be synonymous."
Goltz says this principle is extremely dangerous. "The attempt to
restructure entire regions by force could lead to outrage across the
Arab world - and a wave of terrorism which would make current Al Qaeda
operations look like innocent pranks."
Nevertheless, according to Goltz, the Bush doctrine does not pose
any direct threat to Russia's security. Goltz believes that
declarations such as "Iraq today, Russia tomorrow" are nothing but
demagoguery.
Bush's hit list includes "fanatical ayatollahs, tyrants, and
dictators - not democratically elected presidents". Therefore, those
Russian politicians who persist in denouncing "the American
aggressors" and stirring up anti-American hysteria are doing Russia a
poor service.
No less foolish, in Goltz's opinion, are those Russian
politicians who dream of creating some kind of "anti-American Entente"
in Europe. "This idea simply cannot be described as sensible; after
all, Paris and Berlin have already started cautiously toning down
their statements about the United States. It doesn't seem at all
likely that they would be prepared to side with Russia against
America."
Undoubtedly, in the event that the US continues its actions - in
the Arab world or in North Korea, as the papers have been saying
lately - the situation along Russia's borders could become more
difficult: extremist organizations would inevitably grow more active,
in Russia itself as well as the rest of the CIS. According to Goltz,
these are precisely the problems we ought to be discussing with the
Americans: "After all, they have a vital interest in Russia remaining
stable."
Of course, such a course of action would have plenty of opponents
in Russia. We may well expect Russian politicians to declare that
"lying down beneath Washington" is humiliating.
However, Goltz emphasizes, we ought to bear in mind that there is
only one alternative: "Entering into an anti-American coalition along
with the ayatollahs, Kim Jong-Il, and the Syrian military."
In that case, Goltz predicts that Russia could become the largest
"rogue state" - and the West would once again have a common enemy.
The [Moskovskie Novosti] weekly says: "Now that the military part
of the American operation in Iraq is over, this question arises: Who's
next? Which dictatorship will the United States pick as its next
target?"
There are a number of options. As everyone knows, President Bush
recently accused Syria of concealing chemical weapons. Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld state that most of the foreign mercenaries
fighting the coalition in Iraq had arrived there via Syria. Moreover,
[Moskovskie Novosti] reports that Syrian passports for Iraq's leaders
have been found in Baghdad - and Saddam Hussein's step-brother was
arrested while attempting to flee to Damascus.
According to [Moscovskie Novosti], the United States is seriously
considering whether it should deal with Syria after Iraq. "On the one
hand, starting a war right now against yet another Arab nation would
mean conclusively turning the Arabs against the US. But on the other
hand, if a war is to be fought, it's best to do it now, when a
powerful group of forces is concentrated in this hostile and unstable
region. If this is left until later, everything would have to be
started from scratch, which would be very costly." It's a substantive
argument.
But there are also other regimes causing concern for the United
States - and first among them is North Korea, of course, especially
since Pyongyang appears to have learned the wrong lessons from the
fate of Iraq. North Korea has decided to boost defense spending by
15%. It continues working on nuclear weapons. It has passed a new law
on military service, which obliges all party and government officials
to undertake three years of military training (ordinary North Korean
conscripts serve for eleven years). Moreover, North Korea has refused
to negotiate with the joint forces of the United Nations in the
demilitarized zone.
All these reports have produced panic in South Korea: in Seoul's
view, Kim Jong-Il is obviously taking Bush's promise to "eliminate the
axis of evil" seriously. Understandably, Kim Jong-Il's southern
neighbors are none too happy about the prospect of becoming a casualty
of a military conflict between the US and North Korea.
[Argumenty i Fakty] quotes a recent statement by Kim Jong-Il: "If
North Korea ceases to exist, the entire world will cease to exist."
This threat cannot be disregarded, says [Argumenty i Fakty]: if
North Korea really does have nuclear weapons, as it leader has long
implied, there could be a nuclear war on Russia's border.
[Argumenty i Fakty] shares some information received from sources
at the Russian Embassy in Seoul: "Kim Jong-Il's defense cooperation
agreement with China is still in effect - and God only knows where
that might lead, if the Chinese should fulfill their obligations and
send troops to aid North Korea."
In an article about Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov's visit to
South Korea and Japan, [Izvestia] quotes him as saying: "As the Iraq
situation developed, and proceeding from its own reasoning, North
Korea considered that only possession of certain means of defense
could guarantee its integrity and its capacity to exist and develop as
the leadership of that country sees fit." Ivanov emphasized that he
was setting out "Pyongyang's reasoning, not Russia's."
According to [Izvestia], this is precisely what President Putin's
team considers to be the most dangerous consequence of the war in
Iraq: any regime that feels vulnerable will now hasten to acquire
nuclear weapons for the purpose of "deterrence".
A Defense Ministry source told [Izvestia]: "Of course, this
doesn't mean that nuclear war will soon break out on the Korean
Peninsula - but in terms of tension, the situation resembles Russian
roulette."
The [Vremya Novostei] newspaper looks at the possible reasons
behind the cancellation of Sergei Ivanov's visit to the United States
(the defense minister was meant to have spent April 13-15 in
Washington). It concludes that this decision may have been linked to
the North Korean nuclear problem.
Once it became clear that bilateral negotiations between the US
and North Korea were ineffective, the US insisted on Japan, China,
South Korea, and Russia being involved in the process - viewing Russia
"as a peacemaker whose opinion is still heeded by the obstinate leader
of North Korea". However, Sergei Ivanov didn't manage to produce any
results; so he had nothing to take to Washington.
But there is also another side of the coin. When journalists
asked whether Pyongyang really does possess nuclear warheads, Ivanov
replied mysteriously: "Even if it did, I'd never tell you."
Of course, as [Vremya Novostei] points out, Sergei Ivanov
couldn't have avoided such questions in Washington; and nobody over
there would have been satisfied with such an answer. According to
[Vremya Novostei], this may have been one reason why the defense
minister's visit was cancelled.
However, another theory is more popular with the papers: the real
reason for the cancellation of the visit was an article in The Sunday
Telegraph, alleging that Russian intelligence agencies cooperated
closely with their Iraqi counterparts right up until the start of the
war.
Allegedly, Russian intelligence gave an Iraqi spy information
about a confidential conversation between Tony Blair and Silvio
Berlusconi about the prospects of British troops taking part in the
conflict in Iraq. [Vremya Novostei] describes this as illogical.
"Talks between such senior figures as Blair and Berlusconi take place
in private, in premises which have been carefully checked for bugs. So
even if there was a leak, one of the interlocutors should be blamed
for it."
Moreover, a source in Russia's military intelligence agency told
[Vremya Novostei] that American troops didn't let either looters or
journalists anywhere near the Iraqi intelligence offices. Not a single
signficiant document could have disappeared from there. Even if the
Americans did find documents of that kind, they would be unlikely to
publish them. According to the source, "it would be an excellent
pretext for blackmailing counter-spies".
In fact, [Nezavisimaya Gazeta] considers that the article in The
Sunday Telegraph is only a beginning: " Within the next few days, we
can expect the leading American and European media to pick up the
issue of secret cooperation between Russian and Iraqi intelligence
agencies." [Nezavisimaya Gazeta] doesn't rule out that this media
campaign is being instigated by the CIA and MI-6, which may have
decided to leak the secret documents they found in Baghdad to the
media, "in order to punish the Kremlin for its stance on Iraq".
Nikolai Zlobin, American political scientist and director of
Russian and Asian programs at the Defense Information Center in the
US, says in an article for [Izvestia]: "Russia could have been a
fully-fledged member of the anti-Iraq coaltion. What risk would there
have been to Russia? The US and Britain weren't asking for troops, or
airfields, or financial assistance. They wanted political support."
But that support was denied.
In Zlobin's view, the main reason why the Russian administration
took this position was a fear of losing voter support in an election
year; most voters are opposed to the US military operation.
Zlobin writes: "Putin has shot himself in the foot, as they say
in America, by making long-term national interests vulnerable for the
sake of his own popularity."
According to Zlobin, this stance of the Russian president came as
"an unpleasant and unlooked-for surprise" for the United States:
Russia "demonstrated its unreliability as a strategic partner - and,
as it turns out, also showed that the ambitions of a former superpower
still haven't died." The Russian-American dialogue established
following September 11 was broken off - "friend George" took offense
at "friend Vladimir".
"Has Moscow gained anything from this?" asks Zlobin
(rhetorically). "We shouldn't exaggerate the extent of the trouble it
has caused for Washington. That pales in comparison to the damage
Moscow has done to itself." Zlobin describes Putin's position in the
Iraq conflict as "Putin's sole mistake in foreign policy".
As for Washington, at present "it is not making any special
effort to reach out a hand to extract Moscow from the situation in
which it has placed itself." According to Zlobin, President Bush "has
no policy on Russia" right now.
Bush is unlikely to acquire one any time soon. The United States
has other priorities, especially given that "it's not 1991 any more";
we can't expect the US administration "to drop everything and start
developing a concept for US-Russian relations in order to offer it to
the waiting Kremlin".
In [Nezavisimaya Gazeta], Leonid Radzikhovsky says that after
September 11 Russia had an opportunity, and President Putin made use
of that opportunity: starting to "spin the thin thread of strategic
partnership", although it was hard work.
The situation that arose required great patience, great effort,
and humility from Russia in order to strengthen the ties which had
been established. Radzikhovsky says: "The Americans are very
egotistical, and their egotism often takes the form of outright
rudeness (which is why they're so greatly loved all around the
world)."
Nevertheless, Russia had no other option: "Because we are the
poor relations, and the rich uncle is Uncle Sam. It's repellent, it's
bitter, it's hurtful - but it's true."
No capitalist country has come up in the world independently
since 1945, notes Radzikhovsky, not even the now-prosperous Germany
and France. "Russia will be no exception. Either we have a strategic
alliance with the United States, in which case we will have a chance -
only a chance - to become a technological 21st Century state; or we
shall remain a supplier of raw materials to Europe and the US, without
any chance at all."
Of course, to achieve the former, Russia would have to give up
its imperial pride - and there's no sign of that so far. As a rule,
says Radzikhovsky, Russia's envy triumphs over its common sense. "That
was only more apparent than usual during the war in Iraq."
Radzikhovsky considers that a crude political mistake has been
made by the Russian political elite, which has set itself against the
United States.
In Radzikhovsky's view, some simple conclusions are likely to be
presented to the Russian public about the outcome of the war in Iraq:
"Firstly, we were absolutely right to condemn this war. Secondly, it
wasn't our war, and Saddam Hussein wasn't our son of a bitch. Thirdly,
all is well and life goes on."
It's understood that "diplomacy is a game without end", says
Radzikhovsky, and relations with America will gradually be restored -
to almost their previous level. However, if Russia should require more
than formal smiles and handshakes - if it should require real help,
i.e. that very same strategic alliance with the United States - then
the alliance "may have to be purchased at a much higher price tomorrow
than the price we refused to pay during the Iraq crisis."
Actually, it's too early to speak of that. Russian politicians
and the public had spent a long time preparing to protest against the
start of the war - and now everyone still seems to be stunned by its
sudden end.
Mavra Kosichkina
(Translated by Arina Yevtikhova and Alexander Mazzucchelli)
*******
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