#14 - JRL 6597
full text at:
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1442/
[DJ: summary below]
RAND
Assessing Russia's Decline: Trends and Implications for
the United States and the U.S. Air Force
Olga Oliker, Tanya Charlick-Paley
$20.00 (paperback, 152 pp.)
All materials below are free, downloadable PDF files.
Contents:
Preface
Figures
Summary
Acknowledgments
Chapter One: INTRODUCTION: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF RUSSIA'S DECLINE
Declining, Failing, and Dysfunctional States
Is Russia in Decline?
Chapter Two: REGIONAL AUTONOMY OR INCREASED CENTRALIZATION?
Trends Toward Political and Economic Decentralization
Government Response
Chapter Three: THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY
Demonetization, Reform, and Poverty
Capital Flight
Crime, Corruption, and the Shadow Economy Turnaround?
Chapter Four: RUSSIA'S POLITICAL FUTURE: WHITHER DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM?
Chapter Five: THE PEOPLE OF RUSSIA: ASSET OR LIABILITY?
Demographics
Ethnicity and Racism
Chapter Six: THE RUSSIAN MILITARY
Putin and the Military
Military Regionalization
Conventional Forces: Personnel and Equipment
Nuclear Strategy and Forces
Command and Control and the Danger of Inadvertent Nuclear Use
Chapter Seven: WEAK LINKS: ROAD, RAIL, AND NUCLEAR POWER
Transport and Distribution
Power Plants and Other Civilian and Military Nuclear Facilities
Chapter Eight: ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIOS
War in Asia
Nuclear Accident
Terrorist Use of Nuclear Materials
War in the Caucasus
Scenario Implications
Chapter Nine: NEXT STEPS: PLANNING FOR AND PREVENTING CONTINGENCIES
Planning for Contingencies
Preventing Contingencies
Chapter Ten: THE AIR FORCE ROLE
Selected Bibliography
Books
Papers and Articles
Monographs and Reports
Newspapers, Magazines, Press Services, News Digests (including internet based)
Web Sites (other than news digests) and Databases
Author Discussions and Interviews
Summary
What challenges does today's Russia pose for the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. military as a whole? Certainly Russia cannot present even a fraction of the threat the Soviet monolith posed and for which the United States prepared for decades. Yet, if certain negative trends continue, they may create a new set of dangers that can in some ways prove even more real, and therefore more frightening, than the faroff specter of Russian attack ever was.
As a weak state, Russia shares some attributes with "failed" or "failing" states, which the academic literature agrees increase the likelihood of internal and interstate conflict and upheaval. Tracing through the specifics of these processes in Russia reveals a great many additional dangers, both humanitarian and strategic.
Moscow's efforts to reassert central control show that much control is already lost, perhaps irretrievably. This is manifested both in center-periphery relations and in the increasing failure of law and order throughout the country, most clearly seen in the increasing institutionalization of corruption and crime.
Although Russia's weakened armed forces are unlikely, by temperament and history, to carry out a coup, real concerns exist that the forces may grow less inclined to go along with aspects of government policy, particularly if they are increasingly used as instruments of internal control as in Chechnya. Moreover, the fact that the Russian military is unlikely to attempt to take power does not mean that it will not seek to increase its influence over policymaking and policymakers. The uncertainties of military command and control threaten the possibility of accidental (or intentional) nuclear weapon use, while deterioration in the civilian nuclear sector increases the risk of a tragic accident.
Russia's demographic trajectory of ill health and male mortality bodes ill for the nation's ability to resolve its economic troubles (given an increasingly graying population) and creates concerns about its continued capacity to maintain a fighting force even at current levels of effectiveness.
Finally, the fact that economic, political, and demographic declines affect parts of Russia very differently, combined with increased regional political autonomy over the course of Russian independence and continuing concerns about interethnic and interregional tension, creates a danger that locality and/or ethnicity could become rallying cries for internal conflict.
While some might argue that Russia's weakness, or even the potential for its eventual collapse, has little to do with the United States, the truth is that a range of U.S. interests is directly affected by Russia's deterioration and the threats that it embodies. The dangers of proliferation or use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), heightened by Russian weakness, quite directly threaten the United States and its vital interests. Organized crime in Russia is linked to a large and growing multinational network of criminal groups that threaten the United States and its economy both directly and through links with (and support of) global and local terrorist organizations. Russia is also a major energy producer and a transit state for oil and gas from the Caspian at a time when the U.S. government has identified that region, and energy interests in general, as key to its national security. Washington's allies, closer to Russia physically, are not only the customers for much of this energy but are also the likely victims of any refugee flows, environmental crises, or potential flare-ups of violence that Russian decline may spur. Finally, recent history suggests a strong possibility that the United States would play a role in seeking to alleviate a humanitarian crisis on or near Russian soil, whether it was caused by epidemic, war, or a nuclear/industrial catastrophe.
For the U.S. Air Force, this should be food for thought. Whatever operations the United States undertakes on or near the Russian landmass, the U.S. Air Force is certain to be heavily relied upon for transportation. In addition, a wide range of disparate military missions in a treacherous environment is foreseeable. The very factors that would make involvement more likely--uncertain central control, danger of WMD use or spread, epidemics, crime and corruption-- will also make any military operations far more complicated and difficult.
These problems are intensified by an almost complete lack of planning on the U.S. military's part for such contingencies. U.S. military thinking about Russia has been largely limited to engagement activities, and operational efforts have been concentrated far more on the post-Soviet states on its periphery, a situation that has exacerbated U.S.-Russian tension. This situation is a result of both strategic and bureaucratic factors, and has as much to do with Russian attitudes as with the United States. However, combined with the dangerous tendencies in Russia, U.S. military lack of planning increases the likelihood that sometime in the next 15 years the United States could find itself operating almost blind, going into a theater without knowing the status of airfields, the loyalties and proclivities of those on the ground, or the difficult terrain itself.
The current recognition by both the United States and Russia of common ground in the security arena, and, indeed, of the need for cooperation in advancing shared goals in combating terrorism and WMD proliferation (despite differences in many of the specifics of how these problems are viewed), provides an important opportunity for changes in how the United States relates to the Russian Federation. To prepare for a wide range of possible future contingencies, increased cooperation and planning not only must be pursued for the direct benefits they will bring, but also must be combined with comprehensive thinking about the new challenges that a still-evolving Russia poses.
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