Johnson's Russia List
#6555
16 November 2002
davidjohnson@erols.com
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org
[Contents:
1. RIA Novosti: PRESIDENTIAL ECONOMIC ADVISOR ANDREI ILLARIONOV: IN FOUR
YEARS
RUSSIA HAS UNDERGONE MANY CHANGES.
2. RIA Novosti: RUSSIAN MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IS
CONFIDENT
IN THE INFLUX OF AMERICAN INVESTMENTS IN RUSSIA.
3. RIA Novosti: GEORGE BUSH TO LEARN PLANS FOR STABILISATION IN CHECHNYA AT
COMING MEETING WITH VLADIMIR PUTIN.
4. The Guardian (UK) book review: Robin Blackburn, Boris the terrible.
Robert Service reaches a damning verdict at odds with his earlier support for
Boris Yeltsin in his history of the catastrophe that engulfed Russia in the
1990s.
5. RFE/RL: Gregory Feifer, Analysts Say Moscow Spins And Loses Political
Game
Over Kaliningrad.
6. Interfax-Ukraine: Ukraine president to go to NATO summit.
7. The Globe and Mail (Canada): Jeff Sallot and Mark MacKinnon, NATO pares
Prague guest list.
8. PRESS BRIEFING BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE ON
THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO NATO SUMMIT.
9. Washington Times: Nicholas Kralev, Tiny Baltic states have big hopes for
NATO.
10. AP: Chechen Chief Ashamed of Crackdown.
11. New York Times: Sabrina Tavernise, Chechens, Left Homeless, Cope as War
Drags On.
12. Yevgen Fedchenko: Postcolonial thoughts over Turkish Delight.(re
Ukraine)
13. VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS IN RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN 1994 - 2001.
14. New York Times book review: Ken Kalfus, 'Medea and Her Children':
Love in the Time of Brezhnev.(re MEDEA AND HER CHILDREN by Ludmila Ulitskaya)
15. The Times (UK) obituary: Joe Dobbs. Diplomatic who became a leading
expert
on all things Russian.]
*******
#1
PRESIDENTIAL ECONOMIC ADVISOR ANDREI ILLARIONOV: IN FOUR YEARS RUSSIA HAS
UNDERGONE MANY CHANGES
BOSTON, November 16. /RIA Novosti correspondent Dmitri Klimentov/.
"Investors are not facing the dilemma of whether to invest money in Russia
or not, any more. They are trying to figure out where exactly to invest
their money," said Friday Andrei Illarionov, economic advisor of RF
President, speaking in front of the audience during the 6th Russian
Investment Symposium in Boston, Massachusetts.
Russian economist pointed out that all six years of symposiums history
"were not easy", but the forum plays an outstanding role in putting
together experts, representatives of the leading companies, regional and
political leaders from Russia and the USA.
Illarionov underlined that it wasn't easy sometimes, and not so long ago,
the situation in Russia was very different from what it is now. "For
example, four years ago, when Russian government and Central Bank announced
the default on their obligations, investors lost up to $40 billion
dollars," he said.
In four years, Russia has undergone drastic changes, Illarionov considers.
Last year Russian Stock Market grew up 80 percent in dollar value and
became the fastest growing market in the world. This year, according to
Russian economist, it maintains the market position with the best money
index worldwide.
Nowadays, the investor's circles regard Russia from a different perspective
than four years ago, and the question is not whether to invest capital in
Russia, but where in Russia to invest it, thinks Illarionov.
In his opinion, presentations of Russian regions and Russian companies
during the symposium helped the participants to answer this question.
********
#2
RUSSIAN MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IS CONFIDENT IN THE
INFLUX OF AMERICAN INVESTMENTS IN RUSSIA
BOSTON, November 16, 2002. /RIA Novosti correspondent Dmitry Klementov/. -
Russian Minister of Labour and Social Development Alexander Pochinok is
confident in the influx of American investments in Russia.
The minister, who takes part in the Russian Investment Symposium in Boston
(Massachusetts), told RIA Novosti about it on Friday.
"American investors are coming to our country but somewhat warily, so far
at a level slightly higher than the level of Cyprus from where our
investments are returning, and slightly lower than from Germany," the
Labour Minister said.
According to Alexander Pochinok, the total amount of foreign investments in
the Russian economy in 2002 amounts to 18 billion dollars. Out of them, 22
percent are direct investments, two percent are portfolio investments, and
76 are other types of capital investments. Forty-three percent of foreign
capitals are invested in trade, 39 percent - in industry, three percent -
in high technologies, for instance in communication systems, and one
percent - in the development of transport.
"As you see, the process just begins as a matter of fact. Even in 2000,
after the 1998 crisis, the investors did not believe in the possibility of
working in Russia and only now they "have awakened", noted the Labour
Minister. According to him, "there are at least five very big investment
projects in energy; certain interest, though wary, is shown in the RAO
Unified Energy Systems of Russia; a good interest is shown in the companies
of the food sector where we notice an obviously appreciable progress; some
capitals are invested in the infrastructure of agriculture;
telecommunications have also started to attract attention." "I believe that
now investments will start to come, because the West has become convinced
that Russia gives predictable results and the reserves of the Central Bank
are sufficient enough to support the national currency even if Russian
banks start to attack the Central Bank," underscored Alexander Pochinok. He
said that the repetition of the crisis of the type of 1998 was impossible
now, and the understanding of this fact was obvious at the symposium,
because there are no portfolio investors who could flee." "Investments are
not my sphere, and it would be wrong if the government goes begging for
money and talking with investors," - in this way Alexander Pochinok
answered the question of the RIA Novosti correspondent about the state
support of investments in the Russian economy.
"I have met with all organisers of the symposium and with representatives
of the biggest companies - but with another aim: I wanted to tell them
about the situation in Russia - after all, they have a lot of partners from
the Russian side," he underscored.
The task of the Russian government, in the opinion of the Labour Minister,
is to show to potential investors that "their business will be protected:
just look for a partner and work with him." "Thus, the situation in Russia
is stable, we receive profits, and investors will come," the minister is
convinced of this.
*******
#3
GEORGE BUSH TO LEARN PLANS FOR STABILISATION IN CHECHNYA AT COMING MEETING
WITH VLADIMIR PUTIN
BOSTON, November 16, 2002. / RIA Novosti correspondent Dmitry Klimentov / -
At the coming summit in Saint Petersburg, the US President will familiarise
himself with interest with the plans of the Russian leadership on
stabilisation in Chechnya.
The RIA Novosti correspondent was told about it by Ambassador of the United
States to the Russian Federation Alexander Vershbow who takes part in the
Russian Investment Symposium in Boston.
The US Ambassador said: it will be recalled that we strongly condemned the
terrorist acts in Moscow and did it in the words that clearly showed that
there could be no justifications for seizing hostages among the civilians.
Naturally, continued the ambassador, we are also trying to render
assistance: in the course of many months the United States was addressing
our common friends in Georgia asking them to improve the control over the
border territories.
According to the US Ambassador, the American side is actively studying now
Russia's requests to include several Chechen organisations into the list of
international terrorist groups. This is a juridical question, and it is
being considered by the US Department of State without any procrastination,
underscored Alexander Vershbow. According to him, during the past year, the
United States did a lot to stop financial support of the Chechen
separatists from the third countries and terrorist organisations, such as
Al Qaeda. We believe, the US Ambassador continued, that we have achieved
success in this sphere.
Alexander Vershbow pointed out that the US administration is still of the
opinion that in the final analysis a purely military solution of the
Chechen problem does not exist, and that a political process should be
started for resolving the conflict.
In this connection, he underscored, we showed a great interest in what
President Vladimir Putin said last Sunday about the necessity of speeding
up the work over the constitution and the holding of elections in Chechnya.
I believe that President Bush will familiarise himself with interest with
the details of this initiative in the course of the meeting of the two
Presidents in Saint Petersburg next week, remarked Alexander Vershbow.
*******
#4
The Guardian (UK)
November 16, 2002
book review
Boris the terrible
Robert Service reaches a damning verdict at odds with his earlier support
for Boris Yeltsin in his history of the catastrophe that engulfed Russia in
the 1990s
By Robin Blackburn
Robin Blackburn teaches at the University of Essex. His most recent book is
Banking on Death or Investing in Life: The History and Future of Pensions
(Verso)
Russia: Experiment with a People
by Robert Service
414pp, Macmillan, £20
Robert Service has written an informative and necessary book on the
catastrophe that overtook Russia in the 1990s. It is a tribute to the
author that he reaches conclusions at odds with his own earlier support for
Boris Yeltsin, who ruled the country in these years.
The misery and loss of life endured by the long-suffering Russians in the
past decade has led 67% of them to see it as the worst decade they can
remember, according to a poll Service cites. The Brezhnev era was the only
period to be seen favourably by a majority (51%).
The devastating impact of the free market and privatisation helps to
explain this. Life expectancy for men dropped from 64 years in the
mid-1980s to 57 in the mid-1990s, and is now believed to be about 60 years.
Women live some 10 years longer but their life expectancy has also dropped
by four years. The collapse of welfare and healthcare, the failure to pay
wages and pensions for months at a time, spiralling gangsterism,
drunkenness and hopelessness have all contributed to population loss of
about 0.5% a year - even in a time of net immigration by refugees from
other former Soviet republics.
Population loss during Stalin's rule is often used to gauge its severity.
Between 1992 and 2000, Service tells us, "the Russian Federation underwent
a net loss of some 2.8 million inhabitants", and today deaths outnumber
births by "nearly one-and-a-half times". The wars in Chechnya have resulted
in "tens of thousands" of fatalities on both sides. While a small minority
grew wealthy, and a tiny number of "oligarchs" were allowed brazenly to
loot the country's prodigious natural resources, the mass of the population
was plunged into a poverty and distress not seen since the 1940s.
In the 1990s there was, of course, no Great Terror, no Great War, no mass
famine. But there was a social and economic breakdown sufficient to halt
natural population growth and send it into reverse. All this happened -
together with state-assisted robbery of national assets and the reduction
of Grozny to rubble - at the hands of a supposedly democratising regime,
enjoying the support of western governments.
Service has not the slightest nostalgia for communism or the Soviet order
but, as he tells the story, Mikhail Gorbachev - the last Soviet leader -
emerges as a genuine champion of democratisation, while Yeltsin and
Vladimir Putin have been the agents of a rapacious authoritarianism.
Before and during the attempted coup of August 1991, Yeltsin acted with
courage and earned the gratitude of Russians. But he used the initiative he
had seized to break up the Soviet Union in a way that diminished the new
democratic space, and promoted a kleptocracy drawn from the nomenklatura,
Mafiosi and capitalist "oligarchs".
Despite a worsening, though not yet catastrophic, economic situation,
Gorbachev's reforms in the late 1980s released the genie of civic
self-government throughout the union. A succession of strikes by miners had
obliged the Communist party formally to renounce its political monopoly.
Journalists and broadcasters were revelling in new-found freedoms. Millions
were following the debates of the new elected bodies on TV.
In a key chapter, "The New Russian State", Service describes how Gorbachev
proposed to Yeltsin in the aftermath of August 1991 that they should
consolidate the defeat of the coup by calling for new elections throughout
the union. Gorbachev said he would stand down and give Yeltsin a free run
at the presidency.
Instead, and behind the backs of the Russian and other former Soviet
peoples, Yeltsin made a deal with the existing leadership in Ukraine and
Byelorussia, later ratified by the rulers of the other republics, to wind
up the union at midnight on December 31 1991, together with its new
representative institutions, and to commend the fate of the various
republics to their existing power holders. Only in the Baltic republics was
this to mean a real gain for democracy.
Although Service stresses the backdoor manner in which this deal was
brokered between existing elites, he does not give much detail as to the
precise options and motivations of the military. In August 1991, key
commanders in the vicinity of Moscow sided with Yeltsin against the
plotters. But why did they later approve of winding up the union? Yeltsin
was more popular than Gorbachev, and had been elected Russian president in
June 1991. But he had no mandate to break it up the way he did. Apparently,
as far as key military figures like Pavel Grachev were concerned, democracy
had gone quite far enough and needed to be curbed. It seems likely the army
thought it would remain the arbiter throughout the former USSR, and would
face a more fragmented, and hence weaker, political authority.
Yeltsin remained as president of a newly independent Russia, with a
majority of its population soon regretting the disappearance of the union.
The constitutional order of the Russian federation was itself a hybrid
product of the Soviet era and the Gorbachev reforms, under the rules of
which both its president and parliament had been elected. Yeltsin soon came
into conflict with the majority of the Russian parliament, which he
proceeded to dissolve in 1993, ordering the army to fire on its building,
the White House, when the deputies refused to disperse.
Following the defeat of parliament, Yeltsin introduced a new constitution
greatly enlarging the powers of the president and constricting those of the
parliament. This was supposedly approved in a referendum by 55% of the 57%
who voted - only 32% of the electorate. Service points out: "[T]he counting
of the votes took place in secret and the announcement of the results was
quickly followed by the incineration of ballot papers." A presidential aide
later explained he had seen printed tallies altered by fountain pen.
Service gives a scathing description of how Yeltsin then did a deal with
the oligarchs to prevail in the 1996 presidential elections, securing large
loans, as well as media support, in return for handing over the title deeds
to valuable natural resources.
The "new order" of Yeltsin and Putin perpetuates some of the worst aspects
of the old Soviet regime in the post-Stalin era while failing to maintain,
let alone build on, its more positive side. Thus the Academy of Sciences,
and some universities and institutes, had developed a certain independence
and vitality in the late Soviet period but, in common with many areas of
cultural life, this was to be blighted by the complete collapse of public
funding. Of course the Soviet regime had to go, but the dogma of the free
market condemned the idea of any public agency that was not a commercial
corporation.
The want of legitimacy in Yeltsin's Russia reduced its economic viability,
hindering the collection of taxes. The looting of state property diminished
current revenue, while privatisation closed off future sources of income.
In turn this meant that there was no cash for education, culture and public
services once it dawned that the market revolution had gone too far.
The disastrous impact of western institutions and western advice, impelling
Russia down the path of shock therapy, privatisation and economic collapse,
has been documented by Stephen Cohen and Peter Reddaway. The strength of
Service's book is that he traces the events and forces inside Russia that
were conducive to this disaster.
Service is not happy with the conclusions to which his study leads him. He
strains to find qualifications and redeeming features in Yeltsin's record
but the qualifiers are lame and the facts spill out. "In most regions of
Russia there was no use of armed forces," he says, but elsewhere we read
that the "bloodbath in Chechnya... infected every aspect of political,
administrative, military, economic and social affairs".
Writing contemporary history is difficult - sources are thinner,
perspective difficult and there is no established narrative to use or
contest. Service has braved these difficulties and produced a work that is
thoughtful and pioneering. It illuminates almost every aspect of life in
the new Russia with unexpected detail.
*******
#5
Russia: Analysts Say Moscow Spins And Loses Political Game Over Kaliningrad
By Gregory Feifer
Moscow has praised its agreement with the European Union creating
"facilitated travel documents" for residents of its Kaliningrad exclave
traveling to and from Russia proper. But many critics say the deal was no
victory for Moscow, which had originally insisted on visa-free travel to
and from Kaliningrad. Moreover, they say that as long as Russia maintains
its own Byzantine visa regimes, it is no position to ask others to act
differently -- or to expect that EU integration will come anytime soon.
Moscow, 15 November 2002 (RFE/RL) -- Officials continue to heap praise on
Moscow's agreement this week with the European Union on travel between
Russia and its Kaliningrad exclave, which is due to be surrounded by EU
countries when Poland and Lithuania join the bloc in 2004.
State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee chief Dmitrii Rogozin is President
Vladimir Putin's special representative on Kaliningrad. Back from
negotiations with the EU in Brussels, he praised the agreement in comments
to reporters on 13 November. "This is a complete, very civilized, pragmatic
decision with serious positive prospects. We're very satisfied and happy
with it -- all of us -- including, I hope, Vilnius, Brussels and Moscow."
The Kaliningrad issue has played out over months of tense negotiations. The
EU repeatedly said it would not make exceptions in border policy for any of
its members. Moscow, in return, insisted a Kaliningrad visa regime would
violate Russia's sovereignty.
In the end, the deal will require Russians traveling to and from the
exclave to obtain one of two kinds of "facilitated travel documents."
Moscow announced the deal as a diplomatic triumph, saying it had managed to
convince the EU to change its rules by allowing Russians to transit
Lithuania without visas.
Lithuania says it will not endorse the deal without further guarantees of
sovereignty and financial assistance in implementing the agreement.
But despite official praise for the agreement, the Russian press savaged
the deal, saying the travel documents amounted to visas in everything but
name and that Moscow had been put in a humiliating position in being forced
to back down.
Vladimir Pribylovskii is president of the Panorama political research
group. He said the government, particularly Rogozin, who also serves as
Russia's representative to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, tried to make the best of a losing situation. "Rogozin's future
career depends on whether his work on Kaliningrad is considered a success
or a failure. It's in Rogozin's interests to call it a success, although
there were no real successes there. It's also convenient for [Russian
President Vladimir Putin] to present it as such -- well, [the EU] met him
halfway because the meaning of the words was changed," Pribylovskii said.
Sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky said Russia might have accepted the deal with
few objections because of a sense of having lost political clout abroad
following last month's hostage crisis in Moscow.
Few Russians protested the government's hard-line response to the crisis,
which led to the deaths of nearly 128 hostages after special forces used an
incapacitating gas to storm the theater seized by Chechen hostage takers.
But Kagarlitsky said the government senses it might have lost face in the
West. "Frightening people is a good thing for Russian domestic politics,
but that doesn't mean it works internationally. Internationally, I think
the general feeling was that now Russia was kind of weakened dramatically
in terms of public image. And the only thing one could do is to compensate
with rather considerable concessions to the West," Kagarlitsky.
But analysts have long predicted that Russia would have to back down over
Kaliningrad. Moscow's stubborn stance on the issue, they say, may have been
aimed more at shoring up public support at home than at actually forcing
the EU to back down. Moscow itself called the issue "political."
Presidential envoy Rogozin brushed aside EU concerns over Kaliningrad as
primarily "technical." "The Russian president's position was different. He
thought it was a deeply political question. The Russian president announced
that the character of relations between the Russian Federation and the
European Union would depend on how the question would be solved," Rogozin
said.
In the end, the argument essentially boiled down to semantics, with the
Kremlin describing the deal one way and its critics -- and the EU -- another.
But fine distinctions between "visas" and "facilitated travel documents"
are not the only source of concern. Rogozin said Russia also fears an
influx of Eastern Europeans seeking work in Kaliningrad, a region he
described as "attractive" to illegal immigrants. Rogozin said that Russia,
like the EU, has border concerns of its own. "The Russian Federation is
also operating from an analogous concern over illegal immigration. The
Russian Federation is essentially the only Eastern European country that is
not an exporter but an importer of illegal immigrants. That's why measures
worked out during the talks with the European Union will in many ways have
long-term consequences for the Russian Federation itself, in terms of
strengthening our own border controls," Rogozin said.
The EU does not appear to share Rogozin's view of Kaliningrad as a lure for
opportunity-seeking immigrants. Kaliningrad, a once-closed military zone
that was home to the Russian Baltic Fleet, has seen its fortunes plummet as
state funding dries up. Despite attempts to promote the region as a free
economic zone, Kaliningrad, a hub for organized crime and smuggling rings,
remains in ruins.
Despite calling its standoff with the EU a "political" argument, Moscow's
acceptance of the Kaliningrad deal appears to be based on technical reasoning.
The government says the agreement will ultimately improve upon existing
visa practices. Rogozin cited as an example the expected use of an
electronic ticket system that will inform Russian citizens immediately
whether they will be granted passage through Lithuania. Without such a
system, Russians would travel all the way to the Lithuanian border before
finding out whether they had been denied transit rights, a possibility that
Rogozin called "barbaric."
Putin, meanwhile, said he supports an eventual end to all travel
regulations. While still in Brussels, the Russian president said: "I don't
think the agreement on Kaliningrad is ideal in every way. Free movement of
Russian and European citizens to and from their territories will be a
permanent solution."
Analysts say Putin is in fact interested in integrating with the West. But
Russia's own Byzantine travel regulations indicate the Kremlin's priorities
are not so simple.
The country's own visa rules, for one, are notorious for the amount of
expensive bureaucracy they generate. Russia last month transferred its visa
processing from the Foreign Ministry to the Interior Ministry, further
complicating the process and leaving the fate of many applications unclear.
Moreover, Moscow has also introduced quotas for foreigners seeking
temporary residence in Russia. Despite a dwindling population that leaves
Russia facing a potential labor shortage, Moscow has decided to grant
temporary residence to just under half a million foreigners next year.
The measures are ostensibly aimed at curbing the influx of low-paid workers
from Central Asia and other regions. With the exception of Georgia, Russia
has visa-free travel arrangements with all the CIS states. But some
observers say the regulations are also aimed at bolstering domestic public
opinion by cutting down on the number of people traveling to Russia from
the Caucasus.
Pribylovskii of the Panorama political research group agreed. "There could
be some propaganda effect from this -- but aimed inside the country,"
Pribylovskii said.
But Pribylovskii added that Russia's borders are so porous that the quotas
will actually have no effect -- another indication that any Russian hopes
of integrating with the EU are still premature.
*******
#6
Ukraine president to go to NATO summit
KYIV. Nov 16 (Interfax-Ukraine) - Ukraine decided on Saturday to send its
president, Leonid Kuchma, to a session of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council (EAPC) that is part of the program of a planned NATO summit on
November 21-22.
Foreign Minister Anatoly Zlenko will take part in a meeting of the
Ukraine-NATO Commission that will also be part of the summit.
The decision to send Kuchma and Zlenko to Prague, the summit venue, made
at a meeting of Ukraine's top security body, the National Security and
Defense Council, was "unanimous," Council Secretary Yevhen Marchuk told
reporters.
"Ukraine thereby once again provided evidence that its course of
Euro-Atlantic integration remains unchanged," Marchuk said, quoting a
resolution the National Security and Defense Council issued during its
two-hour meeting.
Earlier, the NATO Council decided to call a foreign minister-level
meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Commission as part of the Prague summit.
Ukraine has taken part in NATO's Partnership for Peace program since
1994, and is a member of EAPC, which in 1997 replaced the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council.
*******
#7
The Globe and Mail (Canada)
November 16, 2002
NATO pares Prague guest list
By JEFF SALLOT AND MARK MACKINNON
OTTAWA and MOSCOW -- Two controversial leaders from the old Soviet empire
will be barred from the big party next week when NATO celebrates its first
summit meeting in a former Communist country.
Presidents Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine and Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus
have been told in no uncertain terms they are not welcome at the gala that
Czech President Vaclav Havel is staging in Prague on Thursday and Friday.
Mr. Kuchma's alleged indiscretion was to have sold an advanced defence
radar system to Iraq. If proven true, that would be more than just a
diplomatic gaffe. The United States has already talked about taking
political action against Ukraine.
Mr. Lukashenko is being blackballed because he continues to run Belarus in
the heavy-handed, autocratic Stalinist style from the bad old Soviet days.
The two leaders are taking the diplomatic snub badly.
Mr. Kuchma said that if he is barred from the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization summit, there will be no Ukrainian delegation. Mr. Lukashenko,
meanwhile, is threatening to turn his country into a transit point for
smugglers and illegal immigrants trying to get into Central and Western
Europe.
Mr. Havel, with the full backing of the 18 other NATO countries, is not
backing down. He is refusing to issue visas for Mr. Kuchma and Mr.
Lukashenko even though Ukraine and Belarus are among the former Soviet
republics that are part of a NATO Partnership Council.
NATO leaders, including U.S. President George W. Bush and Prime Minister
Jean Chrétien, and leaders of the partnership countries are supposed to
meet on Friday.
Mr. Lukashenko, whom many call Europe's last dictator, had been hoping to
attend the summit in Prague largely to express his opposition to NATO's
plans for expansion.
"Europeans will not simply come to Belarus. They will crawl and ask for our
co-operation on drugs trafficking and illegal immigration," he said. "If
the Europeans don't pay, we will not protect Europe from these flows."
Mr. Lukashenko also said Belarus, a poor country with most of its soil
polluted by the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster, would suspend all
diplomatic ties with the Czech Republic in retaliation for the snub.
Belarus, wedged between Russia and Poland, is strongly opposed to NATO's
plans to grant membership to its neighbouring Baltic states of Latvia and
Lithuania, as well as Estonia.
As Canadian officials prepared for the summit, they admitted yesterday the
diplomatic row in Eastern Europe had already taken centre stage.
But one official said it was perhaps just a sign of what the West can
expect to face as it expands NATO into Eastern Europe.
"There are some rogue elements out there, Lukashenko being one of them,
that create enormous problems not just for NATO but the international
community," the official said.
During a briefing in Ottawa, the official said Ukrainian officials -- but
not Mr. Kuchma -- would be welcome.
He said the allegations against the Ukrainian leader "are extremely
serious" and would make it inappropriate for him to lead his country's
delegation.
But Mr. Kuchma insisted yesterday he would not be sending any stand-ins.
"If the President doesn't go to Prague, nobody goes," he said.
Mr. Lukashenko's threat to break off diplomatic relations with Prague has
not fazed Czech Foreign Minister Cyril Svoboda. "It only confirms that the
action we have taken is correct."
The European Union suggested yesterday that it was considering a visa ban
for Mr. Lukashenko, who has ruled Belarus with an iron fist since 1994.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, who opposes NATO expansion, is expected
to skip the Prague summit.
********
#8
excerpt
US State Department
15 November 2002
Bush to Visit Russia, Lithuania, Romania Following NATO Summit
(Rice announces trip plans at White House briefing) (4541)
President Bush will travel to Russia, Lithuania and Romania, following
his participation in the November 21-22 NATO Summit in Prague,
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice announced at a White House
briefing November 15.
Bush will fly November 22 to St. Petersburg, where he will "discuss a
host of issues, including Russia's emerging relationship with NATO,"
with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Rice said.
Later that day, Bush will fly to Vilnius where he is scheduled to hold
a bilateral meeting the next morning, Saturday, November 23, with
Lithuania's President Valdas Adamkus, as well as hold a joint meeting
with the Presidents of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Later November 23 Bush will travel to Bucharest, Romania, where he
will meet with Romania's President Ion Iliescu and make remarks to the
Romanian people at a square in central Bucharest, before returning to
Washington.
Prior to the official opening of the summit, Bush will hold five
bilateral meetings in Prague on Wednesday, November 20, Rice said.
He will meet with Czech President Vaclav Havel, Czech Prime Minister
Vladimir Spidla, Turkey's President Ahmet Needet Sezer, France's
President Jacques Chirac and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson.
"At each of the meetings the President will discuss NATO issues, Iraq,
the war on terrorism, and bilateral matters," Rice said.
Also on November 20, the President will deliver remarks at the Prague
Atlantic Students Summit, "where he will discuss his vision of a
Europe whole, free and at peace," Rice said.
The upcoming NATO Summit "is an historic event" for Europe and the
Transatlantic Alliance, Rice said, noting that for the second time
since the end of the Cold War, it will welcome new members.
At the briefing, Rice was asked to comment on potential threats by al
Qaeda, the war on terrorism, the Russian-Chechnya situation, and Iraq.
Following is the White House transcript:
(begin transcript)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
November 15, 2002
PRESS BRIEFING BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE ON
THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO NATO SUMMIT
....
Q: Could you just talk about what you expect -- what course you expect
conversations with Putin to take and what role you think Chechnya will
play in those conversations, where -- what the President wants?
DR. RICE: Let me just -- going back to the point about Iraq, let me
put it in context. Iraq is typical or the most important example of
the kind of threat that NATO will face in the future. So it would be
odd if this were not an issue at the summit. But it is not the reason
for this summit.
In terms of the discussions with President Putin, I think you will --
obviously, we expect to discuss Chechnya in the following way --
recognizing that terrorism can never be a legitimate method for any
cause. And the President has said that to President Putin. He said it
to him when the Moscow events took place.
We still believe that the best way to resolve this situation is
through a political solution that can take care of legitimate
aspirations of the Chechen people, recognizing that Chechnya is a part
of Russia, but recognizing that this is a part of Russia in which
there are ethnic groups that have particular aspirations and cultural
ties. And so I think they will talk about that during their meetings.
I would be surprised if they did not.
Yes, a follow-up?
Q: A follow-up. You once suggested that the difference about the
situation in Chechnya is that because this underlying political
problem, where you don't have that underlying political problem with
al Qaeda or with other terrorist groups. First off, President Putin
does not agree with that. He says -- he reminds that -- did pose
political demands. But even in a broader sense, in Afghanistan, you
used force for a political change of regime. In Iraq you are using
blunt force for a political change in regime. So why the double
standard?
DR. RICE: There's not a double standard here. Terrorism is wrong,
wherever it is. Whether it is practiced in Chechnya or in the streets
of Moscow or in New York or in Berlin, terrorism is wrong. And the
President has been clearer about that than anyone. He's also been
clear in trying to help, for instance, the Georgians to deal with
terrorist elements in their country that could be contributing to this
problem.
That said, political circumstances need to be dealt with, and I
believe President Putin himself has said from time to time that, of
course, Moscow would like to find a political solution to the Chechen
circumstances. And so it is a particular history, it's different than
a lot of other histories, but it does need a political solution. That
does not excuse the fact that terrorism cannot be used in any cause.
********
#9
Washington Times
November 16, 2002
Tiny Baltic states have big hopes for NATO
By Nicholas Kralev
TALLINN, Estonia — The Estonians take great pride in their small
contribution to the multinational force in Afghanistan — five men and three
dogs. Such gestures have helped them convince NATO that even countries as
tiny as theirs can play a role in the global fight against terrorism.
Along with the other two Baltic states, Lithuania and Latvia, Estonia
had serious concerns last year that the September 11 attacks might take
NATO enlargement off the Bush administration's immediate agenda. The
worries grew as Washington seemed more interested in new friends such as
Pakistan than in the young democracies of Eastern Europe.
But the United States — in spite of its decision not to seek help from
others, except Britain, in the anti-Taliban military campaign — soon
realized that in the war against terrorism, there are no big or small nations.
"September 11 showed that even very small allies can be an asset, and
even modest help like ours can be of great demand," Estonian Defense
Minister Sven Mikser said in a recent interview.
Next week, 11 years after they regained their freedom from the Soviet
Union, the Baltics and four other ex-communist states from Central and
Eastern Europe are expected to receive invitations to join NATO during the
alliance's summit in Prague.
Although Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are independent nations with
many differences, the alliance sees a bigger asset in admitting all three
because of their combined capabilities and territories, NATO officials said
in interviews at the organization's Brussels headquarters.
The officials also noted that the three nations' joint effort toward
membership in the last couple of years had improved their chances of
receiving invitations.
Latvian Defense Minister Girts Valdis Kristovskis said the Baltics
"made an effort to show NATO that taking only one state won't be effective."
President Vaira Vike-Freiberga of Latvia said, "The point of alliance
is unity, and we've proved that we can do it."
But only a year and a half ago, few were betting that the three states
would make the alliance's next round of enlargement. The main obstacle was
Russian objection, as the Baltics' accession would expand NATO to Moscow's
doorstep.
Russia's opposition subsided, especially as its cooperation with the
West increased in the battles against terrorism and weapons proliferation.
So, with the way cleared, "the Baltics will be the crown jewels of
this round of NATO enlargement," said Juri Luik, former Estonian foreign
and defense minister.
Toomas Hendrik Ilves, a member of the Estonian parliament and another
ex-foreign minister, said the first indication that the Baltic states would
probably be among the winners this year appeared in President Bush's Warsaw
speech in June 2001. After September 11, the administration began talking
about "robust expansion," from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.
"The waters have been tested," Mr. Ilves said. "I'm actually surprised
how smoothly things have gone."
Estonia
With a peacetime military of only 5,000, this former Soviet republic
of 1.4 million has an impressive record of participating in international
peacekeeping operations. In addition to Afghanistan, over the past several
years it has sent more than 900 troops to Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania, Georgia
and Lebanon.
The five soldiers in Afghanistan, who are engaged in explosives
detection, have become heroes at home, and their families and friends have
turned into media stars.
"We take our international responsibilities very seriously," Mr.
Mikser said in the Estonian capital, Tallinn. "We never had any role
outside the Baltic region before. We want to make our small country known
to the world. Plus, we also may need help someday."
Prime Minister Siim Kallas, arguing that NATO membership is the best
guarantee of Estonia's security, said his country is doing its best to earn
an invitation in Prague rather than receive it as a gift. "If we want
protection, we should offer cooperation," he said.
Public support for NATO membership is well over 60 percent, and Liis
Klaar, another member of parliament, said Estonians favor joining the
alliance "on the grass-roots level."
But the United States has linked one issue — Holocaust remembrance —
to Estonia's NATO bid, for reasons that have nothing to do with military
duties.
Washington was not satisfied by the weight the Holocaust was given in
public commemorations and in history books.
The Estonians have now updated their textbooks and designated Jan. 27
as a day to remember the victims of the Holocaust and other crimes against
humanity.
"We must remember not only the victims of the Holocaust, but also
those of the Soviet crimes," said Toomas Sildam, senior editor at the daily
newspaper Postimees.
Latvia
Unlike Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia has not yet sent troops to
Afghanistan, although officials said during a recent visit by The
Washington Times to the capital, Riga, that they are now considering doing
so. The issue is sensitive for this nation of 2.4 million.
"Until not long ago, Latvian men were being drafted in the Soviet
military," Mrs. Vike-Freiberga, the president, said. "Many of them went to
fight in Afghanistan, and some are still crippled."
The difference now is that only professional soldiers can go on
international missions and they know in advance "it's risky, just as
firemen do" before they choose their profession, she said.
Mrs. Vike-Freiberga said the majority of Latvians support NATO
membership, but it was difficult for the government to explain why it
should spend 2 percent of the gross domestic product on defense, as the
alliance demands. "We also had to secure money for pensions and other
social programs," she said.
In their assessment of Latvia's readiness to join the alliance, U.S.
officials cite widespread corruption as the country's most serious problem.
Under pressure from Washington, the government has created a special bureau
to fight corruption, said Maris Riekstins, state secretary at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
But Mrs. Vike-Freiberga said the issue has been overblown. Corruption
is said to occur frequently in privatization deals, she said, and Western
companies also bear some responsibility because they are playing the game.
In addition, she said, when Western officials say they expect Latvia,
as well as the other applicant nations, to show concrete results in
battling corruption, "they are looking for commitment, not purity."
Another concern for NATO and the European Union is the treatment of
the Russian minority in Latvia, which makes up nearly 30 percent of the
population. Many of the problems related to citizenship, language
restrictions and political participation have been solved, Latvian
officials and foreign diplomats say.
Irina Yesina, a political reporter for Telegraph, a Russian-language
daily newspaper, said those problems will disappear as generations change.
The young Russians are very good at learning Latvian and assimilating in
society, she said, but many of the older ones just refuse to do so.
Many Russians complain about what they call a complicated
naturalization process. The state offers citizenship classes, but not
language help, Miss Yesina said.
"This is the way the government thinks: If you want a good job, you
need to speak Latvian. So go learn it, but we won't help you," she said.
Lithuania
Officials in all Baltic states recognize that Lithuania is ahead of
the curve when it comes to readiness to join NATO. It began preparing a
couple of years before the others. It also took the initiative in
organizing the so-called Vilnius group of Prague hopefuls, which includes
the seven nations expecting invitations next week, along with Albania,
Macedonia and Croatia.
Lithuania is expected to be rewarded for its pro-American stance with
a visit by President Bush immediately after next week's summit. Lithuanian
President Valdas Adamkus, who spent most of his life as a refugee in the
United States, is a passionate defender of American foreign policy.
"How can the United States be accused of selfishness when it's
spending so much money for various causes around the world?" he said during
a recent interview in the capital, Vilnius.
On Wednesday, Lithuania purchased $31 million worth of American
anti-aircraft missile systems — 60 missiles and eight launching devices.
But the image of the United States has suffered from another business
deal that turned into a disaster and became a household topic.
In late 1999, the government signed a contract with Williams
International, sharing Lithuania's oil assets with the U.S. company. The
deal, viewed by many Lithuanians as disadvantageous for the country,
coincided with a drop in support for NATO membership to its lowest level
ever, 35 percent, said Vladas Gaidys, director of the Vilmorus marketing
and opinion-research center in Vilnius.
But things did not work out for Williams, and this summer, the
company, without informing the government, sold its stake to Yukos,
Russia's second-largest oil producer.
"That led to distrust in the government and, to some extent, the
West," Mr. Gaidys said. "People say that Russians now control our energy
system."
********
#10
Chechen Chief Ashamed of Crackdown
November 15, 2002
By JIM HEINTZ
MOSCOW (AP) - The head of the Moscow-backed Chechen administration said
Friday that so many people are disappearing in the republic, possibly
seized by Russian servicemen or police, that he's ashamed to look his
people in the eye.
Akhmad Kadyrov's statement underlined the fear tearing at the fabric of the
republic in the midst of an intensified Russian crackdown and the delicacy
of his own position - answerable both to the Kremlin and to suffering
Chechens.
After last month's seizure by Chechen rebels of hundreds of hostages at a
Moscow theater, Russian forces in Chechnya have stepped up the widely hated
``mopping-up'' operations in which villages are sealed off while troops
search for suspected rebels and collaborators.
Throughout the war, now in its fourth year, Chechens and human rights
groups have denounced the operations, saying troops summarily kill some of
the people they seize, spirit away others - whose corpses are occasionally
found months later - commit rapes and loot houses.
``Nine people have been taken away from my native village of Tsentoroi this
week and it's impossible to find out where they are now. I can't look my
fellow villagers in the eye,'' Kadyrov said, according to the news agency
Interfax.
Kadyrov, although seen by many Chechens as a lapdog of the Kremlin, has
become increasingly critical of the Russian campaign to wipe out separatist
rebels. He has called the Russian troop presence a major obstacle to peace.
Still, his remarks Friday stopped short of open accusations.
He said people were taken away ``in the night, by unknown armed
individuals,'' raising the possibility that some were seized by
separatists, who often act brutally against people they believe sympathize
with Russia.
At least 220 people were detained by Russian forces over the past 24 hours,
an official in the Kremlin-backed Chechen administration said Friday.
The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, also said 12 Russian
servicemen and allied Chechen militiamen were killed in the previous day -
four in attacks on army outposts, four in a clash with rebels in the
village of Geldagen and the others in ambushes or by land mines.
After the end of large-scale offensives in 2000, the Chechen war became
locked in a pattern of small clashes, hit-and-run attacks and land mine
blasts that kill five to 10 Russian servicemen a day.
Despite the violence, Russian officials claim stability is returning to
Chechnya and make much of programs to restore war-shattered buildings and
services.
On Friday, the new Kremlin-appointed prime minister of Chechnya, Mikhail
Babich, took up his duties. His predecessor, Stanislav Ilyasov, who has
moved up to federal minister for Chechnya, said he and Babich ``have a
common cause - the restoration of normal life in the republic.''
The semblance of normalcy has been undermined by the kidnappings of several
aid workers, including the seizure Wednesday of two Russian drivers for the
Red Cross. Kadyrov said ``it is 90 percent known who did it,'' the
ITAR-Tass news agency reported.
Another report named a Chechen warlord as the probable suspect, but critics
have suggested some previous aid worker kidnappings were committed by
Russian forces or allied Chechens in order to discourage sporadic pushes
for Russia to hold peace talks with insurgents.
Kadyrov's own security services have also faced allegations of criminal
activity. On Friday, police in the neighboring region of Ingushetia said
three men carrying papers identifying them as Kadyrov's guards had burst
onto a bus Thursday and tried to seize two passengers.
The attempt ended in a grenade explosion that killed four people and
injured nine, and the three supposed guards now face charges of attempted
kidnapping for ransom.
Russian forces withdrew from Chechnya in 1996 after rebels fought them to a
standstill in a 20-month war, but swept in again in September 1999 after
Chechnya-based insurgents made incursions into neighboring Dagestan and
after some 300 people died in apartment bombings that officials blamed on
the rebels.
*******
#11
New York Times
November 16, 2002
Chechens, Left Homeless, Cope as War Drags On
By SABRINA TAVERNISE
GROZNY, Russia, Nov. 10 — When the sky above the Khankala military base lit
up with the explosion of a gunned-down helicopter on Nov. 3, Asya Dazayeva,
a slender mother of four who works in a kiosk near the base, knew there
would be trouble.
She ran to her house several blocks away on Khankalskaya Street to protect
her children, including her deaf teenage son. Soon after, soldiers banged
on her door. Gunfire roared almost constantly for more than six hours,
until after midnight.
"A soldier came and was shouting at me, `Who shot down the helicopter?' "
said Ms. Dazayeva, picking through her belongings. "I said I didn't know.
They took our men to check them all. They told me they had orders to blow
up the building."
The next morning, Russian soldiers detonated six dilapidated high-rises,
leaving at least 23 families without homes and, the other residents say,
killing one old woman who refused to leave. The men returned that morning
on foot, many in the bedroom slippers they had been wearing the night
before, said Ms. Dazayeva and three other witnesses, also residents of the
buildings.
Russian military officials defended their actions, saying that the
buildings were already close to collapse and that the area needed to be
cleared because of its proximity to the military base. Also, residents were
given warning, officials said.
"We are poor people," said Ms. Dazayeva, whose husband is an unemployed
city bus driver. "Winter is coming. What are we to do?"
It was a new tactic by Russia in this guerrilla war, which has just dragged
into its fourth year. One resident drew an analogy to Israel's strikes on
suspected militants in Palestinian territory, and echoed the anger and
helplessness often expressed by people there.
"Chechens are very angry," said Abu Betsiyev, a resident. "We won't forget
this."
Razing the buildings has compounded what was already a grave housing
problem for residents of a city devastated by years of war. In residential
neighborhoods like Oktyabrskaya, nearly every house is destroyed. Most
people live without running water and many, without electricity.
The destruction is a major obstacle to luring back the 275,000 people the
United Nations says have fled Chechnya since 1999. The Russian government
has earmarked money in its state budget for resettlement and promised
families safe passage.
As Russia tries to contain the war in Chechnya — reshuffling the local
government and planning elections and a new constitution — a refugee
homecoming would serve as an outward sign that the war on the ground was
abating, something Moscow wants.
Some have already returned. Husein Gakayev, a cobbler, is one. He brought
his wife and four children back here, to the Chechen capital, after finding
himself unable to make rent payments on his apartment in the neighboring
region of Ingushetia.
The family is now living in a green metal shanty, set in a field with rows
of others like it, across the street from the building where he grew up.
The field, he said, used to be filled with apricot trees. Now it contains
rows of about 80 metal sheds, and is rimmed by partly collapsed buildings
with dark, glassless windows.
Mr. Gakayev had to pay about $63 for the trip back to Chechnya. His shanty
— provided by the city authorities — is free, but difficulties abound. A
water truck has stopped deliveries, and the few families who live in the
sheds now carry water from a basement pipe in a neighboring building. A
battered stove set on the bare earth serves as a kitchen for residents.
"We don't have to pay for it," said Mr. Gakayev, 48, gesturing to his
12-by-12 shelter. "We bring the children to school, and we wonder if there
will be explosions. Something could happen at any moment."
Most Chechens, so far, are staying away. Recently, a group of Chechen
refugees in Ingushetia appealed to the president of Kazakhstan to give them
asylum there, in Central Asia, where they had been deported by Stalin
beginning in 1944. [Kazakhstan refused the request on Thursday.]
Some Chechens blame rebel fighters for their homelessness. A Chechen
religious leader from Serzhen-Yurt, who would identify himself only by his
first name, Turko, said a training camp for Islamic militants near his
village home blew out his windows, after the first period of war with
Russia had ended in 1996.
"They kept me in war even though it was supposed to be over," said Turko,
who has lost three homes in five years of war. "Fighting, explosions. I
told them, 'Take your war away.' When the planes came to drop the bombs,
they hit us first because of that camp."
At night the quiet, dark neighborhoods of Grozny hide secrets. One
neighborhood, called Stary Sunzhensky, is said to be the home of one of the
women who took part in taking hostages in a Moscow theater. Young men who
live there said in interviews that she was from an observant Wahhabi Muslim
family that had moved into a home on the edge of the neighborhood. She had
recently married, they said.
Some signs of life are emerging from the chaos and destruction here. In a
residential neighborhood that is a popular spot for Chechen police
officers, the Aquarius Cafe is doing a brisk business. Its freshly painted
white facade contrasts with the gaping holes and glassless windows open to
the sky in the building's ruined second floor.
The poignantly named Renaissance Cafe is across the street. Kheida
Debirova, a milkmaid from an agricultural suburb of this city, works as its
cook to make extra money. She herself is a returned refugee. In the 1970's,
she moved to Chechnya from Kazakhstan, where her family had been deported
three decades earlier.
"We came here to live in our homeland," said Ms. Debirova, setting down a
bowl of soup. "At 51 years old, I'm left with nothing."
******
#12
From: "Yevgen Fedchenko"
Subject: re:Ukraine-European identity
Date: Sat, 16 Nov 2002
Dear Mr. Johnson
Here is an Opinion article on the problem of European identity in Ukraine
with the reflections on the past elections in nearby Turkey. If you will
find it interesting, you can put it to your JRL. One more reason to consider
this idea can be the next: articles in your list are very interesting but
mainly devoted to Russia and Ukraine appeares there only in connection with
scandals, like the very last one when Ukraine was accused in selling radar
station to Iraq. But it's not the only problem in Ukraine's foreign and
domestic policy. And probably someone would be interested to read about
other political and ideological clashes in Ukraine.
Best regards,
Yevgen Fedchenko, an anchor for Vikna u Svit (Windows on the World) TV
Program, STB Television(Ukraine). The author can be contacted by
e-mail:yfedchenko@hotmail.com
Postcolonial thoughts over Turkish Delight
By Yevgen Fedchenko
The results of Turkish elections are surprisingly unsurprising: the
long-time game with Turkish European accession or non-accession opened the
door to islamists in less-than-half European country. Turkey being denied
the place in EU for many years made this choice as a clear signal
for the West: if you don't see us as a Europeans, accept us as an Islamists
who in the nearest future would be pictured in European press as new
barbarians who might be linked to fundamentalism (or even Al Qaeda?!). The
end of Turkish European dream ruined by Europe itself.
Probably, to compare Ukraine and Turkey is not correct from many points of
view, but the situation with the "europeanness" of Ukrainians is very much
the same. At first there was a desire to become Europeans, than a lot of
cold showers from Europe and finally the total ignoring of Ukraine. The
end of European track in Ukrainian mentality?
Turkey was demonstrating it's willingness to join EU for decades and EU
made a lot of promises on that way. Turkey itself has also made a lot to
respond to "high standards": death penalty was abolished, the human rights
record for Kurds were improved, the European faces on TV were introduced
and Bach and Mozart became the favorites of radio programming. But finally
it appeared to be a kind of colonial-style fraud by Europe, because
Ankara was included neither in the first wave of EU expansion, nor in the
second nor even in the third.
Now Valery Giscard d'Estaing says that admitting Turkey as a member would
"spell the EU's end". Giscard D'Estaing speaking on the future of the EU,
said that "we are basing everything on a Europe of 25 plus 2, and no
more,"( Agence France Press, PARIS, November 8, 2002) .
European Commission rejected Giscard d'Estaing's remarks that Turkey is
no more European or even it never was. But d'Estaing is rather
influential person to believe that this attitude can be shared by many others.
Also d'Estaing compares Turkey to Ukraine, saying that we (Europeans)
should offer Turks only the same kind of cooperation agreement as we
offered to Ukraine. So, is Ukraine of the same level of "europeanness" as
Turkey is? Here the most important thing is not even an answer, but the
question itself.
Probably, such kind of revelation of (post)imperial thinking of d'Estaing
is not that bad symptom for Ukraine as for TURKEY, because we didn't waste
time and we know the truth about our bleak perspective in EU and we will
not, unlike Turkey, spend much time persuading someone in what we don't
believe ourselves.
The second good thing (this time for others) is that in Ukraine, unlike
Turkey, there is no islamists (at least yet), who can take revanche as a
response to the neoimperial-style restructuring of the Third World and who
can take advantage amidst mixed or distorted struggle over identity
question. Although some historical revisionists can remind to Ukrainians,
that Kiev was actually founded when most European capitals still were
swamps and their forests were full of barbarians (not Third-world's ones ,
but very european).
At least now we have not the Orwellian double-speak, but the very clear and
what is very rare thing for European politics (real politik) - we have
very sincere message - enjoy special agreeement (about good and happy
neighborhood?) and expect nothing else.
From this point of time Ukraine can make three things: get upset with
d'Estaing's words , get angry or start moving. First two options are both
counterproductive. If the option is moving the natural question is where.
The first but doubtful choice for many could be Russia. But this kind of
move doesn't need any movement, because ukraine already enjoys all
preferences of cooperation with this not wealthy but rather ambitious
neighbor, who usually use the same kind of (neo)imperial logic as all other
major world players: to divide and to rule.
There is the fourth option with zero level losses. Ukraine can leave apart
the question of identity in terms of trying to attach itself to something
bigger just to avoid responsibility. In any case the economic logic would
prevail over politics, and over reflections of Ukrainians about their
European or not that much European identity.
Now it's time to try to build good bi-lateral relations with countries
like Japan, China, India, countries of Middle East( I would not mention
Iraq now just not to became the advocatto del diabolo) and with countries
of Latin America, like Brazil. The example of Brazil can illustrate this
dilemma between politics and economics. Before the elections of Lula da
Silva as Brazilian president big transnational corporations promised
heavy consequences if the socialist leader wins. But the strong position of
the candidate and economic importance of the country left no choice for
TNC and they would be forced to cooperate with Lula who is a great advocate
of relations between countries of South- South axis, to which Ukraine
evidently belongs. Only this kind of South- South cooperation can be
performed on the basis of equality of partners, of mutual respect, and of
mutual profit. All other forms of cooperation between Ukraine and
countries of the developed North (plus Russia) will make Ukraine the
secondary partner, who is of interest for others only as a source of cheap
labor and raw materials. Does that kind of European recognition we need
so much?
The author is an anchor for Vikna u Svit (Windows on the World) TV Program,
STB Television(Ukraine)
*******
#13
Date: Sat, 16 Nov 2002
From: Pavel Goulkin
Subject: Data on foreign Venture Capital investments in Russia
Dear David,
Please, find attached the abstracts from the content and the main findings
of the statistical and analytical survey of Venture Capital investments in
Russia during 1994 - 2001. This is the first and only systematic account on
this type of investing made for and presented at the 3rd Russian Venture
Fair held in St. Petersburg on October, 17-18, 2002. It was also used by
the officials from the Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology of RF
for the development of the "Concept of Venture Capital Development in
Russia", which is currently negotiated with other Russian Ministries. Hope
these data may have been useful for a part of your subscribers.
Best regards,
Pavel Goulkin,
Head of "Alpary SPb" Analytical Center
Phone: +7-812-323-7068
Phone/fax: +7-812-276-3804
E-Mail: goulkin@yandex.ru
VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS IN RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN 1994 - 2001
Statistical and Analytical Study
RESUME [summary]
The data received in the course of statistical and analytical study of VC
Industry in Russian Federation in 1994 - 2001 enables us to make the
conclusions as follows:
1. Total amount of identified VC investments made during 1994 - 2001 in 176
enterprises of Russian Federation is US$580.6 mln. This amount jointly with
the discovered but not properly identified with due confidence VC
investments in 49 Russian companies let us assume the total volume of VC
investments made through established VC funds and companies amounts to
approximately US$1.5 - 1.8 bln. This figure entirely accords with the
expert estimations offered by the authoritative professionals working in VC
industry, who reveal such data basing on the total capitalization of VC
finds and companies targeting Russia;
2. The data on the industries sectors allocation of VC investments in
Russian enterprises during 1994 - 2001 shows that the major part of the
investments flew to the infrastructure and "traditional" sectors of the
economy. More than 51% of the total amount of VC investments went to the
telecom and food industries - 25.3% and 25.9% respectfully. They are
followed in a descending order by cosmetics, drugs and medicine (9%),
construction and manufacturing of construction materials (8.4%), consumer
goods and services (7.7%) and leisure, tourism and entertainment (6.3%).
The share of oil, gas and mining industries is remarkably insignificant -
only 2.7%. The list of VC-backed companies accounts a few (10 - 15 at
least) companies, which could be regarded as hi-tech firms - traditional
targets of VC funds. We assume the more accurate statistical picture on the
VC investments allocation to the stages of development of the companies
could be obtained in the course of VC-backed companies briefings;
3. Geographical distribution of VC investments in Russian Federation looks
utterly uneven. From the total amount of VC investments, US$181 mln. goes
to Moscow and US$144.7 mln - to St. Petersburg. The share of 5 largest
cities in Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, Nyzhny Novgorod and
Tver) amounts to 74% of the total volume of VC investments. This data
evidences of the serious disproportion in geographical and territorial
distribution of the objects attractive for venture capitalists in Russian
Federation;
4. Somewhat unusual at the background of countrys' general economic
development looks the trend of annual VC investments during 1997 - 2000.
With regard to the well-known circumstances of 1998 financial crisis and
the rumors of cancellation of activity of many VC funds and companies in
1998 and consequent year, the largest volume of VC investment in 1999
(almost US$150 mln. compared to US$138 mln in 1998 and US$71 mln. in 2000)
looks difficult to comment. This asynchronous with the streamline of the
country's economic cycle trend may have been explained by the "postponed"
or "delayed" reflection of venture capitalists, who, being the strategic
and not speculative investors, rely on the longer period of living with
invested companies - 10 years at least. Basing on this theoretical
assumption, we can also presume that the peak of 1998-1999 economic crisis
has turned out a favorable period for both the venture capitalists and
Russian manufacturers benefited substantially from the weakening of the
domestic currency. Identified VC investments in 1998 were done in 40
companies, compared to 28 companies in 1999. Discovered VC investments in
2000 were made only in 20 companies.
5. Starting from 2001 an annual flow of VC investments in Russian
enterprises began to recover, especially compared to low fertile year of
2000. The volume of VC investments in 2001 has reached US$124 mln. - almost
90% of the pre-crisis level of 1998. The number of VC-backed companies in
this year amounted to 28 - the same number as in a digestive 1999;
We suppose, contrary to the opinions of some analysts, who forecast the
decline of VC investments to Russian Federation, that in the nearest future
the VC industry will live through the "third wave", starting from the 2002.
Our conviction is based on the following facts and tendencies:
1. The trend of VC investments in 2001 shows the upside movement;
2. 2001 and in particular 2002 have become the years of emerging exits of
VC funds from investee companies. Alongside with this new phenomena, the
efficiency of VC investments in Russia proves to be the highest among the
countries with the developing economies (see "Comparative table of the
performance of DFI" in the section "Performance of VC Investments in
Russian Enterprises");
3. The successes demonstrated by some of VC funds operating in Russia, for
instance - Baring Vostok Capital Partners - enable them to raise new,
larger funds targeting domestic companies;
4. If at the beginning of its appearance the VC industry was represented
primarily by the funds emerged as a result of some sort of a governmental
(TUSRIF), program (Defense Enterprise Fund) or inter-govermental (EBRD
Regional RVFs) initiatives, in a meantime these, still formatting the
appearance of VC industry in Russia, funds were joined by the new entirely
private funds and companies - BVCP, CIPEF, Orion Capital, etc.;
5. Recent years demonstrate the tendency of active involvement of Russian
by origin capital in VC business. Pure Russian by the sources of capital
and management teams structures VC entities have already been created and
started to function. They are not yet able to compete efficiently at the
market of VC investments with their Western counterparts, although in the
field of direct investments in the most attractive industry sectors and
enterprises they behave rather independently and even aggressively toward
the Western VC competitors;
6. In the area of legal and judicial procurement of VC activity - and more
widely - in the field of interrelations between the Russian government and
VC industry - there is a serious and productive development. Russian
government today regards the VC industry as an almost no-alternative source
of SME financing - first of all - the local innovative companies - and
undertakes a reasonable and sounded steps narrowing the gap between the VC
aspirations and governmental support. The brightest example is the
formation of a fund-of-funds - the Venture Innovative Fund with 100%
governmental capital;
7. VC community in Russia has grown strong enough to formulate and lobby
its positions among the state officials. Once it felt the menace of
bureaucratization of the industry when an intent of issuing the law
regulating the industry was revealed, it had reacted promptly and
efficiently to block this harmful initiative.
The collected and analyzed quantitative and qualitative data has driven us
to the logical and natural conclusion of the common favorable prospects for
the development of VC industry in Russian Federation during the several
forthcoming years, once the positive development trends and achieved
results in the macro and microeconomic environment are preserved and enforced.
******
#14
New York Times
November 17, 2002
book review
'Medea and Her Children': Love in the Time of Brezhnev
By KEN KALFUS
Ken Kalfus is the author of two short-story collections, ''Thirst'' and
''Pu-239: And Other Russian Fantasies.'' His novel, ''The Commissariat of
Enlightenment,'' will be published next year.
MEDEA AND HER CHILDREN
By Ludmila Ulitskaya.
Translated by Arch Tait.
312 pp. New York: Schocken Books. $24.
The Crimea is a sunny, verdant Vermont-sized peninsula that juts into the
Black Sea east of Odessa. Now a part of Ukraine, the region has long
nourished a colorful bloom of ethnic groups. Among its Russians,
Ukrainians, Tatars, Jews and Armenians dwells a population of Greeks, whose
distant ancestors came to the Crimean coast as seamen and merchants. By the
end of the 20th century, these Greeks had largely assimilated and
dispersed, but as recently as the last generation you could hear spoken in
the region a medieval Black Sea Greek that, the Russian novelist Ludmila
Ulitskaya tells us, was as far removed from contemporary Greek as it was
from the classical.
An extended family of Crimean Greeks occupies ''Medea and Her Children,''
Ulitskaya's charming new novel, her second to be published in the United
States. (''The Funeral Party'' appeared here last year.) Written with
contagious affection for the peninsula's untamed landscape and easygoing
people, ''Medea and Her Children'' takes place mostly in the summer of
1976, when the childless widow Medea Mendez, born Sinoply, welcomes the
return of her vacationing nieces and nephews, whose families have been
scattered throughout the Soviet imperium.
The glow of nostalgia illuminates the novel's portrait of the detente
decade. Ulitskaya, who in the 1970's lost her accreditation as a scientist
after translating a banned American book into Russian (it was Leon Uris's
''Exodus''), doesn't miss Communism, but she warmly recalls the
impoverished simplicity of Leonid Brezhnev's era of stagnation. Medea's
nieces and nephews, their material ambitions discouraged, feel free to
pursue low-paying, fulfilling careers. Under the parasol of their aunt's
hospitality, they enjoy their friends and their shashlik barbecues. Without
a private automobile at their disposal, a picnic at the beach requires a
half-day walk down paths whose views are ''almost more than the eye could
bear.''
Interspersed with Ulitskaya's leisurely told account of a single Crimean
summer, drawn from the complicated life stories of the young holidaymakers,
lies another novel -- a novel about Medea herself (who was born in 1900)
and her late husband, a libidinous Jewish dentist with a Spanish surname.
The 20th century has spread the family from Lithuania to Tashkent,
involving a few cousins in low-level politics, though not enough to earn
them a stake in the Soviet regime. The Sinoplys have survived these Russian
centuries by avoiding too-close encounters with politics and current events.
The idea of the Crimean peninsula as an outpost of freedom was famously
promoted in ''The Island of Crimea,'' Vassily Aksyonov's prophetic 1983
political and geographic fantasy. In Ulitskaya's free Crimea, Soviet
citizens compensate for their lack of political liberty by making common
cause with the West's sexual revolution. Countering the widespread
perception of the U.S.S.R. as a romantic icebox, Ulitskaya recalls the
relaxation of social mores and the increased flexibility in the Russian
definition of proper family life. Her description of the extended family's
torrid couplings and decouplings makes the Brezhnev era sound like an Eric
Rohmer film:
''The young mothers with babies or toddlers usually arrived at the
beginning of the season; their working husbands didn't stay long, a couple
of weeks, rarely a month. Friends of some sort would come, rent a bed in
the Lower Village, and at night they would come secretly to the house,
moaning and crying out on the other side of Medea's wall. Then those
mothers separated from one husband and married another. The new husbands
brought up the old children and fathered new ones; the stepbrothers and
stepsisters visited each other, and then the ex-husbands came back with
their new wives and new children to spend the holidays together with the
older ones.''
Even in the swinging 1970's, however, sexual license breeds sexual rivalry,
followed by tragedy. Valerii Butonov, a ponytailed former gymnast, is
spending the summer with Medea's neighbors. This is the 70's: he arrives
wearing tight white jeans and a pink T-shirt. Butonov takes up first with
Nike, Medea's niece, and then with her grandniece, Masha, who are as close
as sisters. Nike and Masha were raised together after Masha's parents were
killed in an automobile accident. Now the two women struggle against each
other and against the empty-headed, cold-hearted Butonov, whose own life
story includes ill use by the corrupt Soviet sports establishment.
Medea observes the threesome with disapproval but doesn't meddle, acutely
aware that their drama echoes her long conflict with her sister Alexandra,
Nike's mother. They too had once shared a lover. Although she has not seen
Alexandra in 25 years, their history continues to inform Medea's attitudes
about human character: ''Medea was deeply convinced that frivolity led to
unhappiness. . . . From childhood, however, Alexandra behaved exactly as
her wayward heart dictated, and Medea could never understand waywardness,
whims, urgent desire, caprice or passion.''
Unfortunately, as Nike and Masha break off, reconcile and break off again
with their Soviet boy toy, the story's forward motion, never very vigorous,
falters. Masha is a sensitive intellectual and an accomplished poet with a
loving husband. Her obsession with Butonov, though certainly possible
within the realm of human folly, fails to become credible.
It is here too that Arch Tait's translation becomes fatally overwrought.
For example: ''Butonov came to Masha every night, knocking on the window,
squeezing each of his brawny shoulders through its narrow opening in turn,
completely filling the space of the small room with himself, and all of
Masha's body and soul, and departed at dawn, leaving her each time immersed
in a tingling sensation of the newness of her whole being and of renewal of
her life.'' Note that in the dismal final clause the preposition of is
employed four times in the space of 11 words.
Tait's sentences too closely match the winding, clause-laden prose that
distinguishes literary Russian. They're often overlong and overvague,
diminishing the artistry of Ulitskaya's evocative and intricate story.
*******
#15
The Times (UK)
November 12, 2002
obituary
Joe Dobbs
Diplomatic who became a leading expert on all things Russian
THE Diplomatic Service has a reputation for moving its men and women from
post to post too frequently for its own good. In the years before the
Berlin Wall fell it was especially reluctant to see its staff spend too
long in posts in the Soviet bloc. But Joe Dobbs was a shiningly successful
exception to that rule, serving as he did for 13 years in Moscow, many of
them in the worst of times. He managed, in addition, four years in Poland
and the old Yugoslavia. In the process he made himself, while remaining
unknown to the public, the Foreign Office’s leading expert on Russia and
the Russians.
Joseph Alfred Dobbs was born in southern Ireland in 1914, the son of a
Protestant Irish horse farmer. Educated at Worksop College, in 1933 he went
up to Trinity Hall, Cambridge, as a scholar, to read modern languages. By
the spring of 1936 he was President of the Cambridge Union and secretary of
the Conservative Association. Two years later he joined the Territorial
Army, and was taken into full-time service with the Royal Artillery when
war broke out.
Dobbs had a “good war”, rising to the rank of major, achieving a mention in
dispatches and being appointed MBE (military). He fought in North Africa,
interrogating Italian prisoners and learning Italian in the process. He
fought in Italy, and at the Italian armistice helped to establish the
British Military Mission to the Italian Army, suddenly transformed from
enemy to ally. In Rome he studied Russian in his spare time and, when he
joined the Foreign Office in 1946, it was only a year before he was packed
off on the first of four tours in Moscow.
In those grim, early postwar years in the Soviet Union, Dobbs put his
knowledge of Russian to practical use, starting the process of making
himself the embassy’s in-house consultant on the Russians. It was, in a
way, an exercise in making bricks without straw. Throughout the Cold War,
contact with local intellectuals was difficult and with ordinary Russians
almost impossible. Contact with Russians who had business with the embassy
was a matter of deep suspicion on both sides. But over the years Dobbs
succeeded in breaking down barriers, befriending artists such as Mstislav
Rostropovich and Nadezhda Mandelstam when they were out of favour with the
authorities, and drawing on Russian history and literature to develop his
understanding of the Russian soul. A contemporary remembered him as almost
a “monkish” scholar of things Russian, yet he had been a keen horseman
since his youth and rode every morning at the Moscow Hippodrome. Any
evening he could get away from the diplomatic round was spent at Moscow
theatres.
Three ambassadors in turn called for his return to Moscow. He served four
tours there: from 1947 to 1951; 1954 to 1957; 1965 to 1968; and finally,
from 1971 to 1974. None came in an easy period. The first saw Stalin’s
suspicions of Britain deepen into paranoia; the second, after Stalin’s
death in 1953, came as hope of better relations with the West were dashed
by the Soviet assault on Hungary in 1956. The mid-1960s seemed again to
promise change for the better, until that hope was dashed by the Soviet
extinction of the Prague Spring in 1968. Only in his last spell in Moscow,
in the early 1970s, were relations easier, though even then far removed
from an entirely normal relationship between mature nations.
Within the embassy family Dobbs involved himself in that refuge of
expatriate communities, amateur theatricals, and found himself playing in
Harlequinade beside John Vassall, later unmasked as a Soviet spy. There too
he met, and in 1949 married, his Australian wife, Marie, who worked in the
embassy.
Although Dobbs will be remembered above all as an expert on Russia, the old
Soviet Union and Soviet communism, he had other strings to his bow. Beside
his postings to Warsaw and Zagreb, he saw service in Delhi and Rome.
Retiring in 1974 with a well-earned CMG (in 1957 he had added an OBE to his
MBE), he settled in Somerset in a long and happy retirement. He involved
himself in family life and in country pursuits — gardening, walking,
swimming, horse breeding and, until the age of 75, hunting with the
Blackmore Vale.
He is survived by his wife of 53 years and by their three sons.
Joe Dobbs, CMG, OBE, diplomat, was born on December 22, 1914. He died on
September 28, 2002, aged 87.
*******
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