#6410
#14 - JRL 6409
Novoe Vremya
No. 34
August 2002
CHECHNYA: THE WAY OUT
Specialists discuss the Chechnya peace plan proposed by Ruslan Khasbulatov
Author: Nairi Ovsepjan, Lyubov Tsukanova
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
RUSLAN KHASBULATOV HAS PROPOSED A NEW SOLUTION TO THE WAR. IT INVOLVES SPECIAL STATUS FOR CHECHNYA, BACKED UP BY INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES, AND COMPLETE DEMILITARIZATION. A PANEL OF EXPERTS, INCLUDING KHASBULATOV HIMSELF, DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF THE PLAN AND ITS CHANCES OF BEING ACCEPTED.
Alexander Pumpyansky: Let's look at the essence of the plan first. Could you outline its main points, please?
Ruslan Khasbulatov: Special status for Chechnya, backed up by international guarantees. That's the key idea. I don't mean an international contingent in Chechnya; I'm talking about the presence of international organizations like the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, or the OSCE.
Why are international guarantees needed? Because we all know - all too well - that the people don't trust the authorities of Russia.
Complete demilitarization is the next point. No military detachments, no lawlessness like before. A decision should be made on the forces required to maintain law and order, supervised by all involved parties and international organizations.
Next point: I don't think Chechnya should be considered a region of Russia any longer, since that idea has discredited itself. On the other hand, I doubt that the people of Russia will take to the idea of proclaiming Chechnya a sovereign state - given the prevailing attitudes, and the casualties sustained by both sides. Neither will the president or the government of Russia accept this. That is why I am proposing the following formula. Chechnya would be part of Russian legislative territory: common citizenship, common currency, administrative borders within Chechnya. External borders should be patrolled by Russian and Chechen border guards together. In this way, the territorial integrity of Russia will be preserved.
In order to ensure trust, the plan proposes (and Aslan Maskhadov's side knows it) that the men who fought the federal troops, those who are anti-Russian, should not be allowed to hold office in Chechnya at the municipal level or higher.
This doesn't mean a restoration of the old order. Chechnya should be secular, and that is something the people should decide at a referendum. I'm confident that the majority will vote for a secular republic.
Why is special status so important for Chechnya? Because with this status we could unseat the radicals who aren't going to surrender to the federal troops without some substantial concessions. Otherwise, they would continue to terrorize Chechnya itself and the neighboring regions regardless of actual developments, and stopping this process would be impossible.
Alexander Pumpyansky: I have a question for Emil Payin. Do you think all this is feasible?
Emil Payin: A good plan is a plan that can be carried out. In this case, however, carrying out the plan doesn't depend on Khasbulatov or the forces he represents. It depends largely on the federal government. In my view, any significant changes in policy are highly unlikely now. Why?
I remember 1996, when most of the general public wanted the war to be over. It was difficult to put an end to the war, even then, because the generals came to see the president and told him some very simple things: so much money has been spent, and so many lives have been lost... now, just one more little push - and the problem will be solved. We have to stand fast, and that will be that. It worked, you know.
The same words spoken now have a more substantial impact on the authorities. The public is confused. The latest opinion polls indicate that less than 50% believe the war will end in a victory. On the contrary, almost 70% of respondents believe it is possible that the separatists could take power in Chechnya again. All the same, almost no one would go out on the streets in protest over it - maybe ten or fifteen people, no more.
Lyubov Tsukanova: How do you explain that? Why this indifference in society?
Emil Payin: We are dealing with political apathy here - and on top of that, there is something associated with the Chechnya situation in general. To be more precise, we are dealing with the knowledge of what happened after Khasavyurt.
There is another factor here. The lives. Let's assume negotiations take place. Let's assume that we once again sacrifice our supporters in Chechnya, as we sacrificed them the first time. A great many pro-Moscow Chechens were murdered then, and many others were imprisoned. I'm talking about what happened after Khasavyurt. Let's assume we forget the people who are now supporting Akhmad Kadyrov. And what about Aslan Maskhadov? In my view, there is a belief in society - perhaps unconscious - that Maskhadov is like Arafat, in the sense that people used to have great expectations of them once.
Vadim Dubnov: What are we discussing then?
Emil Payin: What do I like about Khasbulatov's plan? First and foremost, this is the first time someone has made a proposal which has also been heard by Maskhadov - and that's important. In my view, this is an initiative which the public in Russia ought to know about, and perhaps even the international community as well.
What is new about it? A new force is moving into the focus of attention, a force that is not terrorist. These are the people who have not participated in this war. This is an entirely new force, with which negotiation is possible. It represents a distinct political group among the Chechen people, one which objects to a military solution to the conflict. This group has consolidated against a prominent leader. This is a new phenomenon, and one we should not dismiss.
Lyudmila Tsukanova: Has there been any response to your proposals?
Ruslan Khasbulatov: One of the warring sides - the Chechens - has responded. It considers that a discussion is possible. The federal government has not responded; I don't think it knows how to react.
But something has to be done, in any case.
I don't think the federal authorities should be stalling for time, especially since my proposed solution would enable all warring sides to save face. Yes, we have to admit that the major guerrilla detachments have been destroyed and that the Russian army has not been defeated. But there are different ways of presenting it to the public.
In my view, Putin could make the following statement: we take into account the heavy casualties and the numerous problems of Chechnya, yet we are convinced that Chechnya should remain within Russian legislative territory. However, we are prepared to offer a special status to Chechnya - since its people insist on more independence. You want international guarantees? They will be provided. We don't object to the presence of the OSCE, the PACE, and so on. You want your public servants to be appointed by the local authorities? No problem.
It would be a courageous move, a move appropriate for a victor.
Sergei Golyakov: Demilitarization: who would do it, and how? Do you think Aslan Maskhadov and Shamil Basayev will lay down their arms and forget their aspirations? Or will they disappear altogether?
Ruslan Khasbulatov: I have divided this question into two parts: are you competing for power again, or do you want independence for Chechnya? If it is the former, that is one matter. The people of Chechnya will say: "No more." But if it's independence you want, then let's talk things over. You phrase the key question correctly: of course, it is not a matter of the separatist guerrillas being allowed to restore their concept of order in Chechnya once again. That is why we've introduced the third party: some of those who have not taken part in the conflict, who can oversee the warring sides, in order to prevent separatist agreements. In addition, there will be international monitoring. We need a solution that would make another round of hostilities impossible.
Emil Payin: The central question is really the following: who is going to deal with the irreconcilables? They will never surrender, that much is clear. In my view, something resembling the Northern Alliance may be formed at certain stages: i.e. the Chechen side organizes some forces to neutralize the criminals. It should not be the Russian regular army, which can only organize cleanup operations. It could be the Chechen police, for example, with the help of international or Russian forces. By the way, this solution would fit in with the global context, since the war on international terrorism is still underway.
It is wrong to assume that there are no terrorists in Chechnya. There are terrorists there. Those who attack civilians, and use the methods deployed by the "martyrs" of Al Qaeda. Certain people will do anything they can to prevent long-term peace, or even more or less stable peace.
Vadim Dubnov: I'm afraid I have to object here. We have already tried relying on coflicts among Chechen leaders. There is some semblance of the Northern Alliance - it is associated with Kadyrov. And what use is it?
There is another question. I don't understand what is meant by "some special status". I'm afraid that international autonomy is not the answer. We see it in Kosovo, after all, where the whole world is involved - and there is nothing to show for the effort.
And a third question, probably the most important. Let's assume the troops have been withdrawn. In my view, all current troubles stem from the fact that Chechnya failed to become a state after 1996. I fear that it would fail to become one now as well, even if troops were withdrawn; because a critical point has been passed. Chechnya is no longer a structured society. I fear that only a treaty with the people who control Chechnya is possible now.
Emil Payin: It is not enough. The problem is that we always speak of only two sides: Moscow reaches an agreement with one of them, and that is that. This is not enough. It could result in civil war. It could initiate some destructive processes.
If we are talking of consenus, it should be internal consenus, like in Dagestan (I'm sorry) where everything depends on the agreement between the largest ethnic groups. This situation may be discussed in negative or positive tones.
There will not be any ideal solution. I think that the options used by Nagorno-Karabakh, the Trans-Dniester region, and even Abkhazia would be better than what we have now. A consensus among all prominent groups is needed, the groups that will guarantee this will not turn into another Khasavyurt.
Vadim Dubnov: And who do you call the prominent groups?
Emil Payin: There is the silent majority which did not fight then and is not fighting now. Unless this majority is unified and consolidated, we will never have a substantial foundation for establishing a state in the post-war period.
I value this plan for its flexibility. It doesn't offer any fixed solution, which is very important. It is impossible to finalize the entire political structure right now. There probably should be a period of being like some semi-recognized republics, such as Nagorno- Karabakh, Trans-Dniester, or Abkhazia - when it is not yet clear what they are: a member of the international community or not. However, they are still being left alone.
There is another point I like about this plan: it offers the possibility of consolidating the constructive forces in Chechnya.
Ruslan Khasbulatov: Indeed, there have been some attempts to form a coalition. Unfortunately, all these attempts were half-hearted. That's the problem. Each time, the federal government relies on what I can only call puppets. These people cannot be a coalition against the warring side; they are never recognized or accepted by the people in Chechnya. Someone is picked up from jail; someone else who is notorious for something or other is appointed to a position of power... Such people cannot be serious allies.
Forming a counter-terrorism coalition is not a problem. There are many young men who are ready to take up arms, but who consider the cause of the coalition to be important.
Emil Payin: I once heard Putin make a significant point: we don't care what status Chechnya has - what really matters is that it should not pose a threat. This is indeed a crucial position. If you only want to counter any threat coming from Chechnya, then we can discuss this.
Ruslan Khasbulatov: I would also like to say that the people of Chechnya - those who are living there now, and have survived two wars - are highly organized internally. These forces will move into the foreground as soon as the federal authorities start acting positively and looking for a compromise. As things stand now, there are no preconditions for organized action by civilians.
Even if we reach a compromise with Maskhadov alone, who is nominally the president of Chechnya and who is viewed by the West as such, it would be a solution to a great many problems.
Sanobar Shermatova: I have the impression that your plan exists quite separately from the Kremlin and its intentions. And special status for Chechnya - that is indeed a good idea. However, I think the federal government will choose the path of least resistance, as always.
The government of Chechnya says the situation is bad: guerrillas are shooting in the streets of Grozny every night. I know for a fact that members of the government pay guerrillas to make sure they don't blow anything up.
Ruslan Khasbulatov: Kadyrov himself pays them.
Sanobar Shermatova: I don't know about Kadyrov, but I know about some members of the government. If I understand it correctly, this is what the Kremlin intends to do: leave the guerrillas alone for the time being, until next spring; gauge their true strength next year, and then start negotiations.
Zaindi Choltayev: I'd like to focuse on some elements of the plan. There are many plans and ideas for solving the Chechnya crisis. A large proportion of them are organizational: correct this point here, or promote certain people to certain positions, and so on. Few if any of them take into account the processes taking place in Chechen society. The people of Russia have one attitude to the war; the people of Chechnya have another.
In Chechnya, the war affects everyone. Moreover, this war affects ethnic Chechens in Chechnya itself, in Russia, and sometimes even abroad. That is why I'm so skeptical about organizational solutions. They will not suffice. As for Khasbulatov's plan, there are some positive aspects and factors that may promote it. But as far as the Chechens are concerned, every plan and every idea are always associated with someone in particular. Influential people are always invited to participate when some important issue have to be resolved or decisions have to be made.
There are certain authorities in every Chechen family, or any small group of Chechens, who personify certain values. That is why resistance continues. I once described what has been happening as a "family front". When a Chechen man allows himself to be insulted, he cannot look others in the eye - because he has not behaved with dignity. If you ask me, Khasbulatov's plan takes into account these aspects of the Chechen mentality. There should not be any defeated side in this conflict.
Emil Payin: Let's forget the plan itself for now, and give some thought to predictions about what may happen. What would happen in Russia and Chechnya if this plan is turned down - which is a distinct possibility, after all. For the authorities, the illusion of victory is more important than victory itself, and the illusion of stability more important than stability. On the other hand, there are problems: resources are not infinite. Recruiting contract soldiers for service in Chechnya is getting more and more difficult, and sending poorly- trained conscripts is an even worse option. It follows that the game of make-believe will continue: more and more unsuitable men will be recruited into the Russian army, more and more formal functions transferred to figureheads in the government of Chechnya. The illusion of activity will thus be created. And since such a government is not truly a part of its society - in fact, it is helpless - the military campaign will continue, with its cleanup operations and so on. Meanwhile, the growth of radicalism in Chechnya and throughout the Caucasus is a serious danger.
We hear that Russia is not Palestine; there is not the same level of bitterness here as over there. No, there is not, for the time being. On the other hand, Palestine did not get to where it is today instantly. It took 40 years for suicide bombers to appear. We are seeing some movement in this direction in Chechnya as well. All my Chechen acquaintances say that young people are becoming more radical than ever before. And mind you, they don't mean young people in Chechnya alone - they mean the youth of Moscow and other Russian cities. The process will continue.
On the other hand, events may take a different turn altogether. That would happen if the regime chooses a different paradigm. So far, everything has been done within a single framework: we have to keep Chechnya within Russia at all costs, or it will bring us eternal disgrace and disrupt the entire system of governance in Russia. This can only be changed by gradually preparing the Russian public and the Kremlin for accepting the idea that new tactics are needed; that keeping Chechnya within Russia should give way to the idea of how we can alleviate the consequences of the crisis.
Vadim Dubnov: The problem is that the regime doesn't view Chechnya as a catastrophe. Chechnya is a constant. It's like a rotten tooth, unpleasant but something you can live with. The Russian public has grown used to it, and so has the Kremlin. The war in Chechnya isn't even preventing elections any more. And what might be the outcome of all this? It may end in something like the crisis of 1996, when the separatists took Grozny.
Ruslan Khasbulatov: I am much more concerned. In my view, Russia could lose all of the Caucasus. The aging leaders of the Caucasus will soon be replaced by younger and more radical politicians (that's an objective reality we cannot escape). Unlike their predecessors, they view Moscow and the Kremlin as absolute strangers. When Gelayev marches across the mountains in the direction of Karachaevo- Cherkessia, young men there are waiting for him, longing to join his detachment. Such attitudes prevail among the youth of the Caucasus. It is in Russia's own interests to end the Chechen campaign, the sooner the better.
Alexander Pumpyansky: You mentioned an important issue: the "Chechnya syndrome" in Russia. We occasionally hear reports of soldiers who have served in Chechnya going on shooting sprees after they return home. Even when they come back to Russia, our soldiers and officers remain at war. What should we do about it? What can we do?
Emil Payin: What you are talking about is a direct political corollary of the fact that almost 1.5 million soldiers have passed through the Chechnya vortex over the past decade. We should remember that Russia is not the Soviet Union after the war in Afghanistan - Russia is a much smaller country. That's an important factor.
The second question, about radicalization of civilian life. The media aspects of this campaign are of paramount importance. State- controlled TV channels, in shaping the image of the enemy, are doing all they can to rally the public against that enemy. This propaganda may fail to convince part of society. For young people, however, it is a signal. Attacks on foreign students or anyone who doesn't look like a pure Slav are not only committed by young men who have served in Chechnya. Our society has all the necessary preconditions for the development of neo-fascist trends and extremism.
Moreover, continuing the war will inevitably strengthen Islam. Islam is a vital factor for the Caucasus, a unifying factor for this ethnically divided territory. Actually, the Caucasus will remain a part of the Russian Federation only as long as it is divided. Withdrawal of the ethnically divided territories would mean a lengthy internal war. But Islam - especially Wahhabi ideas, radical ideas - takes no account of ethnic barriers. It becomes a factor of internal integration in the Caucasus, a factor of resistance to any non-Islamic world.
Specialists know for a fact that non-traditional Islam is already spreading into the traditionally Islamic territories and beyond, into the Astrakhan region or Stavropol territory, for example. It is inseparable from international organizations. Their oppositionist nature is the main attraction. That is why the war in Chechnya will provoke and encourage development of these non-traditional, radical, and highly politicized forms of Islam.
(Translated by A. Ignatkin)
Back to the Top Next Issue
- Back to the Top -