RUSSIA AND ITS NEIGHBORS: THE NORTHERN EUROPEAN REGION

10. RUSSIAN-NORWEGIAN COOPERATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY

SOURCE. Geir Honneland and Arild Moe, "Joint Russian-Norwegian Nuclear Safety Initiatives: A Research Note," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 2001, Vol. 42 No. 8, pp. 615-621.

The authors, researchers at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (Lysaker, Norway), assess on the basis of interviews with participants selected joint Russian-Norwegian nuclear safety projects undertaken since 1995 under Norway's Action Plan to address environmental dangers arising from nuclear activities and chemical weapons in areas adjacent to the country's northern border (i.e. in Russia).

Norway seeks to catalyze awareness of and financial support for nuclear safety initiatives in Russia, and to create international mechanisms for this purpose such as:

* the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (Norway, Russia, and the US)

* the Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation

* the Contact Expert Group on the safety of radioactive waste management under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency

* the Nuclear Safety Account within the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

Norway has also led efforts to persuade the Russian government to create a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program as a general framework for all nuclear safety projects in Russia.

In 1995-99, Norway spent 343m kroner ($38m) on the Action Plan, although the 113 projects listed under the plan had a total budget of 536m kroner ($59m). The spending shortfall was due to the fact that many planned projects had not yet begun as of January 2000.

Priority has been given to improving the safety of the Kola Nuclear Power Station at Polyarnye Zory in Murmansk Province, assessing pollution in northern areas, and building facilities and equipment to handle radioactive material.

Bilateral cooperation has entailed dealing with a wide range of Russian governmental and commercial organizations, including the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the State Committee for Environmental Protection (abolished by Putin in May 2000), the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Authority, and the Nuklid Inter-Branch Coordination Center.

The specific projects studied in depth by the authors were the following:

[1] Upgrading and expanding an effluent treatment facility for liquid radioactive waste from nuclear-powered icebreakers and naval vessels in Murmansk

This project is regarded as a qualified success. The facility was finally reopened in June 2001 after repeated delays. Some independent Russian respondents attributed the delays to lax financial control, which created a disincentive to completing the project.

[2] Tackling the environmental threat posed by the Lepse, the icebreaker fleet's old storage vessel for radioactive waste

This project is the quintessential failure: a lot of talk, a lot of publicity, but no action. The Norwegian leaders of the project insist that practical work cannot begin until all Western parties involved secure a tax release and indemnity against liability.

[3] Providing a specialized vessel for safe transport of spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned nuclear submarines from remote locations to transfer terminals in Murmansk and the Sevmash Shipyard in Severodvinsk

The project was delayed until 2000 by disagreement between the Russians, who proposed to reconstruct an existing transport vessel, and the Norwegians, who wanted to build a new ship. Minatom finally accepted the Norwegian point of view.

[4] Producing four additional specialized rail cars for the transport of spent nuclear fuel from port terminals in Murmansk and Severodvinsk to interim storage or reprocessing at Mayak in the Urals

The rail cars were completed in March 2000 at the Tver Railroad Plant. There were arguments over which organization would own the rail cars (Mayak or a new firm called Atomspetstrans).

[5] Upgrading of storage tanks for liquid radioactive waste at the Zvezdochka Shipyard in Severodvinsk

The project was initiated in May 1998 and completed in August 1999 at below-budget cost. Officials of Moss Maritime, the Norwegian firm entrusted with the project, attributed success to the fact that Nuklid was not involved. (The Norwegians seem to have experienced considerable frustration in their dealings with Nuklid, which insisted upon controlling financial flows and making its own choice of subcontractors.)

[6] Analysis of material from joint expeditions to investigate radioactivity levels in the Barents and Kara Seas

The purpose of the expeditions was to assess the effects of reported Soviet dumping of radioactive material in these seas. Three expeditions were conducted in 1992-94 in areas approved by the Russian authorities. It was concluded that dumping had not been random or careless but had been at sites selected in consultation with radiation experts: leakage of radioactivity from dumped objects was negligible, and it was agreed that it would be best to leave them where they were.

The joint expert group envisaged a follow-up project to investigate radioactivity levels in the Kola and Motov fjords. However, permission to go to these areas was refused in 1996, 1997, and 1998, after which the project was put on hold.

The Norwegian participants in the joint projects were ambivalent about the organizational confusion they encountered on the Russian side. On the one hand, it would be simpler and more convenient to deal with the Russians if they were better coordinated among themselves. On the other hand, the confusion allows for greater flexibility. Progress might well be even slower if a united Russian front were dominated by interests disinclined to cooperate so closely with the West in the security field. [A situation now gradually emerging under Putin? -- SDS]