#6334 #6335
[Third Issue of the Day]
#14
Jamestown Foundation
Russia and Eurasia Review
Volume 1, Issue 3
July 2, 2002
PUTIN'S POLICIES: THE PEOPLE WEIGH IN
By Andrei Kolganov
Andrei Kolganov is a doctor of economics and a senior research fellow at Moscow
State University.
[Note: This article is largely based on the findings of a Russia-wide sociological survey; "New Russia: Ten Years of Reform," carried out in November 2001 by the Institute of Complex Social Studies. That study used research conducted in 1992-2000 by the Russian Independent Institute for Social and National Problems, in collaboration with the Academy of Security, Defense and Law Problems and the participation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.]
Surveys of Russian public opinion show a consistently high level of public confidence in President Vladimir Putin. Since he took office, Putin's ratings have risen steadily, with only small fluctuations.
Context and coincidence are the key to Putin's popularity. His years in government have coincided with economic growth and increased personal income. No less obvious (and much noted) is the marked contrast in personality between Putin and his predecessor Boris Yeltsin. The comparison, in all respects, favors Putin.
Will Putin's popularity last? Analysis of recent polling data suggests an answer.
The quality of life in Russia, as Russians judge it, has noticeably improved since 1997, and especially during Putin's presidency. In 1999, fewer than 12 percent of those polled said that life was good. In 2001 over 20 percent did. The proportion of those who thought it was not fell from 26.4 percent to 15.5 percent in the same period. The number of those who found it satisfactory remained almost unchanged.
The numbers below give the percentages for each of the years 1997-2001:
-- good: 11.7, 12.0, 12.0, 14.4, 20.3
-- satisfactory: 63.3, 61.6, 61.6, 62.5, 64.2
-- bad: 24.0, 26.4, 26.4, 23.1, 15.5
Views on the situation in the country show a somewhat different pattern. The percentage of Russians who called the situation in the country "normal," as opposed to "critical" or "catastrophic," was about the same in 2001 as in 1997 (before the financial crisis of August 1998). Some 30 percent of all Russians called the situation "catastrophic" in 1997, compared to about 14 percent in 2001. The numbers below show the percentage of responses in each of the years 1997, 1998, 2000 and 2001 (no data for 1999). The 1998 poll was taken in October, after the financial collapse.
-- situation normal: 16.2, 1.9, 16.3, 17.6
-- situation critical: 44.6, 45.0, 59.6, 50.5
-- situation catastrophic: 32.8, 50.7, 17.6, 13.9
-- don't know: 6.4, 2.4, 9.2, 18.0
Rising satisfaction with the economy and the quality of life underlies a rising positive assessment of Putin's performance. Between 2000 and 2001, positive assessments rose from over 51 percent to nearly 70 percent.
-- definitely positive, up 3 points (from 11.5 to 14.4)
-- generally positive, up 15 points (from 40.0 to 54.5)
-- generally negative, down 5 points (from 12.1 to 7.1)
-- definitely negative, down 2 points (from 4.2 to 2.1)
-- no definite opinion, down 11 points (from 32.2 to 21.9)
Putin's high rating, then, is attributable in large part not only to the obvious positive social and economic changes, but also to hopes that a whole range of pressing problems can indeed be solved. And Russian society is pinning those hopes on Putin.
What are the problems that most concern Russian citizens?
However unlikely it may seem, fear of civil war is near the top of the list. In 1994, not long after the pitched battle between parliament and the president in the heart of Moscow in October 1993, polling data showed that 45.4 percent cited it as a concern. In 2001 that number rose to 54.4 percent, second only to crime (57.4 percent). Russians in 2001 also feared a reduction in quality of personal life (47.1 percent, despite the growth of the economy), and the mafia (33.3 percent).
With the exception of the quality of personal life, all these concerns reflect a feeling of helplessness before lawlessness and disorder in all its forms. The primary worries of 1994 have not gone away. Relative stabilization and even some improvement in the social and economic environment have apparently not given the citizens of Russia any greater feeling of safety or assurance.
Russians are troubled to a lesser extent by threats, even of a very serious nature, that are not directly connected with the risk of violence. Expressed in percentages, the top concerns in 2001, after crime (57.4) and civil war (54.4), follow:
--polarization of society (30.4)
--the potential break-up of Russia (23.1)
--environmental problems (17.9)
--growing foreign influence in Russia (16.7)
--long-drawn-out reforms (14.0)
--cultural deterioration (13.0)
--transition to a dictatorship (12.7)
--increasing numbers of refugees and homeless people (6.8)
--and so on.
The character of such fears also shapes the hopes the people place in Putin. Putin's top priorities, the polls say, are ending the war in Chechnya (56.9 percent) and dealing with poverty (53.6 percent). Apart from these, they also list:
--stamping out corruption in organs of power (41.9),
--imposing order on the authorities (29.5) and
--limiting the influence of the oligarchs (22.7).
These are tasks that Yeltsin would not or could not tackle. Russians are hoping that Putin will. But they cannot decide whether Putin is Yeltsin's heir or Yeltsin's antithesis. Putin's policies, they say, are:
--an independent course of reform (37.5 percent),
--don't know (20.3 percent),
--a dynamic extension of Yeltsin's reforms (15.7 percent),
--a gradual repeal of Yeltsin's reforms (12.0 percent),
--a continuation of Yeltsin's reforms (11.4 percent),
--other (3.1 percent).
In economic policy at least, Putin and the people differ sharply. Putin has not yet persuaded Russia of the wisdom of reducing state interference in the economy. More people want a strong state sector today than did in 1994. They have said so.
The numbers below show the percentage of responses in 1994 and 2001 to the question: What type of government best serves the country's economic interests?
--fully centralized management of the economy and price control: 15.5 and 18.2
--minimum interference in the economy and maximum freedom for the private sector: 12.5 and 8.0
--a state economic sector and increased private economic and political opportunities: 39.5 and 37.2
--a leader with total responsibility who conducts a decisive economic policy: 20.8 and 23.2
--don't know: 11.7 and 13.4
Nor has Putin won over the populace on specific reforms. Despite intensive cultivation of public opinion, opposition to reforms in electricity, housing and pensions is high and rising. The answers to the question on what should be managed by the state and what should be private sector made this very plain (numbers for 1998, 1999, and 2001; no data for 2000):
Electricity industry
--state sector: 82.4, 86.0, 88.6
--private sector: 3.3, 1.8, 1.3
--a combination: 14.0, 12.1, 7.4
--don't know: 0.3, 0.1, 2.7
Housing
--state sector: 42.0, 44.4, 62.9
--private sector: 10.1, 9.5, 5.7
--a combination: 47.4, 45.9, 25.5
--don't know: 0.5, 0.2, 5.9
Pension reform also lacks support. In 2001, 80 percent responded in favor of preserving state control of pension funds, 15 percent for allowing state and private pension funds to co-exist, and only 0.6 percent for privatization of pension insurance.
The recent demonstrations in Voronezh against housing reform are more evidence that Putin's program is in trouble. But I suggest that even if it becomes clear that his social and economic policies have never been focused on the interests of ordinary citizens, and that his economic successes are fleeting, his ratings will still remain relatively high for some time.
A conformist political outlook is typical in Russia, as is a high level of confidence in the highest authority, and especially in the leader who personifies it. In a thousand years there has been little else. Yet the fear of disappointment in the latest champion is just as great. We should not forget how long the public retained confidence in Yeltsin, despite the obvious failings of his policies. After all, only a quarter of Russian citizens still believe that ordinary citizens can have any influence on policy.
Will Putin remain more popular than his policies? Election day is March 21, 2004. That is another poll to watch.
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