#6323
[Second Issue of the Day]
#6
Financial Times (UK)
June 24, 2002
What does Russia have?
By Andrew Jack in Moscow
In an effort to vie with the US's capability, the former Soviet Union built up a vast WMD stockpile and accumulation of expertise, the result of a military-industrial complex which consumed a large proportion of the region's resources.
The result today is the following in WMD:
Nuclear: an estimated 5,500 deployed strategic missiles; several thousand tactical nuclear weapons; several thousand stored nuclear warheads.
The best protected from loss or theft are those armed on missiles. Upwards of 600 tonnes of weapons-grade nuclear material exists in storage; a further 600 tonnnes is contained in up to 40,000 weapons. Nuclear procurement has dropped sharply, especially with the removal of Marshal Sergeyev, the former defence minister and a convinced "Cold Warrior" in 2001. No Topol-M missiles were ordered last year with scarce military resources being channelled instead into conventional weapons.
There is widespread access, information, and considerable foreign funding for threat-reduction initiatives. This is the area most subject to international scrutiny and assistance, and where most help to reduce the risk of proliferation has been made. That includes help to allow specialists in nuclear cities to convert their military skills for civilian use, clean-up assistance, the conversion and purchase of materials, and efforts to improve physical security. Problems with decommissioning, notably of nuclear submarines, remain. Russia has so far stalled on widespread agreements limiting the liability of international contractors involved in clean-up.
Chemical: an estimated 40,000 tonnes are stockpiled in seven sites. Russia is party to the chemical weapons convention and foreign experts have access to sites. Considerable foreign funding has been provided for destruction of stockpiles, matched by Russian funds - with a notable acceleration since the civilian-run Munitions Agency took charge of decommissioning in 1999. But destruction has not yet begun, and Russia has formally requested an extension of the convention's 2007 deadline to 2012, which may still prove far too ambitious.
Biological: This is the most secretive area. There are three military research centres where foreign observers have never been granted access. The former "Biopreparat" centres, which produced biological weapons under a civilian cover, insist that they undertake biotechnology research and are no longer involved in military work. No verification procedures exist. This is in part due to the US's refusal to agree to the creation of an international bioweapons inspection body, claiming that visits by foreign scientists to US biotechnology centres could risk violating commercial secrets. The Russian government claims it has destroyed all stockpiles, but the military maintains that extensive cultures still exist.
Old threats
First use: The Russian military doctrine published in 1993, and reiterated in 2000, has provided for first nuclear strikes as a last resort, mirroring NATO strategy. It would apply, in principle, only in the event of an attack threatening the Russian homeland or Russian forces by a nuclear power or a non-nuclear power in alliance with a non-nuclear one.
While Cold Warriors are still a pervasive force in the Russian military hierarchy, and troop deployments follow the continued logic of a conflict in Europe, the political and military rhetoric is increasingly turning to the need for small, mobile troop deployments using conventional weapons along the new flashpoints of Russia's southern borders: within Chechnya, along the Georgian borders and into Central Asia. Vladimir Putin recently re-emphasised the importance of a Russian military presence in the Caspian. There are increasing political concerns about the growing role of China.
Leakage: There are periodic reports of equipment failures, including a recent fire in a missile base near Moscow. Rare large-scale events (radiation in Chelyabinsk in the 1960s; an anthrax spill in Ekaterinburg in 1979) have occurred in the past, although nothing serious has been reported in the post-Soviet period.
New threats:
Dirty bombs: There are thousands of sites where quantities of radioactive material exist, from research, industrial and medical purposes. Although small, the quantities could be sufficient to create dirty bombs. There is limited security and little foreign aid
This is the least examined area, but considered to be of increasing concern.
Proliferation concerns
Scientists: Tens of thousands of scientists and technical specialists were involved in the Soviet military effort, although the numbers who have sufficient overview to develop weapons elsewhere is far more limited. Centres are under-funded or being closed, wages are a fraction of their former levels in real terms, and the traditional perks (for example, cheap food) in the former research centres no longer exist.
There have been efforts by foreign organisations such as the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) to foster international academic cooperation and initiatives to develop commercial partnerships. Most scientists remain relatively badly paid, but claim their situation has been improving recently improved after really tough times in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Sergei Ivanov, the Russian defence minister and former senior FSB/KGB officer, has said that he has no evidence of WMD materials or equipment falling into foreign hands but added that there may have been some transfer of people and expertise.
Most of the handful of claims by Russian agencies of proliferation over the past decade are impossible to verify. They may be motivated as much by a desire to seek additional funding and justify their existence and prove their worth as much as resulting from fact.
Guards: This is an area of concern which is frequently overlooked. Officially controlled by the military, foreign influence and funding to help the situation has been limited. There are regular reports in the Russian media of theft, suicide, violence and demoralisation among the low-status guards who are poorly paid and lack good housing. The situation may deteriorate further, given current plans to sharply reduce the size of the armed forces.
Physical security: Thefts of material are regularly reported within the CIS. Surveys by US organisations have documented missing or unlocked doors and low-grade security. But what is initially labelled as "weapons grade" frequently turns out in reality to be low-grade material unsuitable for weapons.
Export: Effort has concentrated on supplies to the civilian nuclear power industry in Iran. The Bushehr reactor was originally conceived with help from German companies. Russia took the project over, and is at an advanced stage of supplies in a contract worth more than $800m. The US has deemed it a "dual risk" - in other words, that it could be adapted for military means. Russia insists that sufficient safeguards are in place to prevent such a shift.
The CIS: Many argue that the former Soviet countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) provide a greater risk of proliferation than Russia. Most are worse off economically, continue to house former military facilities and stockpiles, and have specialists who worked on weapons programmes. However, the facilities and expertise were also more thinly dispersed than in Russia. For example, all of the USSR's ten "closed cities" involved in nuclear military research and development were based in Russia, not in its neighbours.
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