Johnson's Russia List #6129 12 March 2002 davidjohnson@erols.com A CDI Project www.cdi.org [Note from David Johnson: 1. Izvestia: Yevgeny Bai, AMERICA HAS 2,000 TARGETS IN RUSSIA. Provided the level of relations remains unchanged, it will have only 1,000 a decade from now. (interview with CDI's Bruce Blair) 2. Luba Schwartzman: ORT Review. 3. Washington Post: Dana Hedgpeth, Down-to-Wire Deal Heads Off Book Burn. Library of Congress to Glean Russian Items. 4. Reuters: Emboldened Georgia may go beyond Pankisi Gorge. 5. Wall Street Journal: Rick Jervis, U.S. Nuclear Report Threatens To Widen New Rift With Russia. 6. Moscow Times: Alexei Pankin, RAMED Off Track. (re media) 7. Obschaya Gazeta: WE CAN CONTINUE LIVING LIKE THIS. Even though most Russians still think they've lost more than they've gained in the last decade.(re polls) 8. Jamestown Foundation CHECHNYA WEEKLY: COULD PUTIN SOME DAY JOIN MILOSEVIC IN THE DOCK AT THE HAGUE? 9. Washington Post: Sharon LaFraniere, On Pro-Kremlin Site, All News Is Good News. Putin Takes Media Strategy to Internet. (re strana.ru) 10. New York Times: Sabrina Tavernise, U.S. Auditors Find Things Are Different in Russia. 11. AP: U.S. Expands Influence in Central Asia.] ******* #1 Izvestia March 12, 2002 AMERICA HAS 2,000 TARGETS IN RUSSIA Provided the level of relations remains unchanged, it will have only 1,000 a decade from now Author: Yevgeny Bai [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] AN INTERVIEW WITH BRUCE BLAIR, DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INFORMATION CENTER (WASHINGTON, DC). [DJ: Center for Defense Information/bblair@cdi.org] The United States is in for a lengthy war against terrorism, and it may find it rather uneasy to get Russia onboard any further as an ally Negotiations between the Russian and American military represented by Sergei Ivanov and Donald Rumsfeld have begun in Washington. Along with that the United States is building its future policy in other vital directions - Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. Here is an interview with Bruce Blair, Director of the Defense Information Center in Washington, on the complexity and interconnection of all these tasks. Question: What is your opinion on the report published by the Pentagon in the American media in which Russia is on the list of seven states against which America might use nuclear weapons, i.e. Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Libya. That's a nice company for the country already called a strategic ally in the United States. Bruce Blair: The United States sees the difference between and has a different approach with regard to each of these states. As for Russia, the situation is wholly different here. With rapprochement between our states deepening, the United States drastically reduces the number of targets on the Russian territory. It has 2,000 targets in Russia today, and the number will be reduced to a thousand within a decade. If I may say so, Russia has been moved to a lower category but in general this is a positive evaluation of the level of the potential threat its poses. I know at the same time that both states go on drafting scenarios of a full-fledged nuclear war even though this is absolutely impossible today. This is a legacy of the past enmity, which takes time to overcome. Question: The words about strategic partnership between America and Russia we've been hearing in the wake of September 11, are they empty words or do they really mean something? Bruce Blair: I'm very confident that Russia's assistance to the United States in Afghanistan was invaluable. The matter concerns intelligence data and information on methods of warfare on targets not indicated on American tactical maps. As I see it, our countries are on the level that may be termed as a moral alliance. When one of the state faces an external threat, the other comes to its aid. This is the first time in history that we have this sort of mutual understanding. Perhaps, the war on international terrorism will allow America and Russia to spread this cooperation into other spheres as well. We have much more room for manoeuvre in the area of offensive nuclear arms reduction than in matters concerning strategic defense missiles. Bush cherishes an ambitious anti-ballistic missile defense program, and I do not think the Russians will be permitted to have a say on its parameters. Question: Do you think the United States made a compromise by agreeing to sign with Russia a treaty on strategic offensive arms reduction? Bruce Blair: As I see it, Putin made an even more serious compromise by agreeing to the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Treaty. But certain softening of the American position is also a fact that cannot be ignored. I ascribe it to efforts of US State Secretary Colin Powell. He is convinced that it will benefit the United States to sign with Russia an accord on inspection and monitoring of the process of warhead dismantling. The same goes for the Russian-NATO relations by the way. Powell wants a Russia that will be playing an active part in the NATO 20. Question: But Powell is working against a sturdy Pentagon lobby. Who is his major opponent? Rumsfeld himself or his assistant Paul Wolfovitz? Bruce Blair: I'm not at liberty to give you an inside view. It is clear, however, that Wolfovitz is a worse hawk. He is not alone, you know. There are other hard-liners. In the National Security Council this is Robert Joseph. In the US Department of State there is John Bolton, who is the nucleus of all conservative forces therein. He is Powell's assistant on arms control. Question: But the proposed action against Saddam Hussein may create an even larger gap in the relations between our countries. Bruce Blair: The US Administration has a certain room for manoeuvring. If the American military and secret services provide proof that the military action in Iraq is needed to destroy the country's weapons of mass destruction, if an action like that fits the UN general strategy (it demands restoration of the mission of international observers in this country, you know), then operation against the Iraqi regime will probably be supported by America's allies and by Russia itself. In the long run, nobody wants Saddam. If, however, the international community sees the action only as an attempt to topple a dictator hated by the United States, then America will find it difficult to justify its actions. A few words about Afghanistan. America cannot pull out while Al Qaeda is still alive and resisting. As for the statement that "everything is just beginning" there, I think that the Pentagon strategists mean that the United States is in for a difficult and lengthy war aimed to root out terrorist organizations existing in 60 states of the world. The American troops may sustain even heavier losses now that a more dangerous phase of the operation is underway. (Translated by A. Ignatkin) ******* #2 ORT Review www.ortv.ru Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba7@bu.edu) Research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy at Boston University HEADLINES, Monday, March 11, 2002 - The old Slavonic holiday of Maslenitsa [Shrovetide] begins today. Since pagan times Maslenitsa was celebrated to welcome the spring. In Moscow, bakers are hoping to make the Guinness Book of World Records by preparing the largest blin (pancake, a traditional holiday treat) ever. - Sports trainers and referees declared that it is absolutely necessary to repair existing training facilities and provide new ones for Russia’s professional athletes. - The Kremlin press service announced that US President George W. Bush is going to come to Russia on an official visit on May 23-26. He will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow for a series of talks; then the summit will continue in St. Petersburg in a more informal environment. - A documentary about the Russian citizens [and Russian natives] who perished on September 11th will be shown today to commemorate the six-month anniversary of the tragedy. - First Lady Ludmila Putina is in Poland on a private visit. Earlier today she took a walk around Warsaw’s historic Old City with the Polish First Lady Iolanda Kwasniewski and visited a Russian Literature club. Later tonight she will meet with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski and the First Lady and attend a supper given in her honor. - In Moscow, Russian and American experts have begun discussing the “Chicken Problem.” Russian specialists assert that US exports of chicken thighs often violate sanitation norms; the Americans disagree, but promise to thoroughly check any possible infractions. - Experts from the Russian Federal Hydrometeorology Service predict that extreme flooding will occur in a number of Russian regions, including the north of the European part and Asia. - Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov is in Israel on an official visit. - The plan for the raising of the nose section of the Kursk nuclear submarine is complete. - Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov chaired a Cabinet meeting today. The members spoke about issues currently facing the nation and about the Cabinet’s plans in the near future. - Four policemen died in Grozny’s October Region when the car they were traveling in exploded on a landmine. Four local residents have been arrested on suspicion of involvement. - The annual St. Anna National Film Festival for student and debut films has begun in Moscow; 161 films have been entered. Winners will be announced on March 19th. - Interim leader of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai is in Moscow on a working visit. - Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov is heading to the United States for an official visit. ******** #3 Washington Post March 12, 2002 Down-to-Wire Deal Heads Off Book Burn Library of Congress to Glean Russian Items By Dana Hedgpeth Victor Kamkin Inc., the Rockville bookstore that became a mecca for those in search of materials on the Soviet Union during the Cold War, got a three-week reprieve yesterday. Its eviction was delayed so that officials from the Library of Congress may pore through the bookseller's 1 million-piece collection to determine what should be saved. Minutes before the books were to be thrown into two green, 10-ton dumpsters and taken to an incinerator, the store's owner and landlord stood in the parking lot to announce a last-minute deal. Igor Kalageorgi, owner of the 50-year-old bookseller, said he would pay his landlord, Allen Kronstadt, $10,000 in rent -- raised from sales made last weekend after hundreds of customers came to his store -- to stay in the 20,000-square-foot warehouse off Boiling Brook Parkway. After exchanging accusations in front of a crowd earlier, the two stepped inside to hastily broker the deal. When they emerged 15 minutes later, they awkwardly shook hands in front of TV cameras. "It was not a complicated issue," Kalageorgi said. "We both wanted the same thing -- not to see the books destroyed. There were a few egos involved before, but we put those all aside." Kronstadt started the eviction process in December after Kalageorgi fell close to $200,000 behind in his rent. Because the collection was so large, the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office asked Kronstadt to take the books to the county's transfer station on Shady Grove Road, where they would have been stored for burning elsewhere. Over the weekend, hundreds of customers waited in line up to two hours to buy books. The store sold about $20,000 worth of books -- five times the volume of a typical weekend. Rep. Constance A. Morella (R-Md.), County Executive Douglas M. Duncan (D), the sheriff's office and the Library of Congress moved to stop the eviction. Late Sunday, James H. Billington, the librarian of Congress, toured the warehouse to find items for the library after Morella called him. Billington, who is also a Russian scholar, said he would send a few staff members to the store, possibly as soon as today, to sort through the collection. The books will be donated, not sold, to the library. "These books have to be preserved," Billington said. "We're pleased the nation's library will have a hand in getting some of the materials. This is a very rich supply. We're grateful. This has been a historic store, and we're pleased that it's reaching a philanthropic conclusion." What the Library of Congress doesn't take will be turned over to Kronstadt, who has said that he will try to find a place to donate the books. Kronstadt also agreed to forgive the estimated $200,000 in rent that he says Kalageorgi owes. (Kalageorgi says it's $115,000.) "C'est la vie," Kronstadt said as he left the store. In Russia, word of Victor Kamkin's closing spread through newspapers and over radio. Many grieved the loss -- either because they were longtime customers and said they would miss ordering items from it or because they were vendors who were owed money or periodicals. "They owe me $90,000, mostly from last year," said Vladimir Gribov, president of Inform-Systema, a Russian periodicals and book distributor in Moscow. Kalageorgi, who says he plans to open another store but hasn't decided where, denied having a debt to the firm. Gribov said: "They asked us to understand their difficult situation and to not demand big payments. They said their situation would be better, but their payment has not been so good." ******** #4 ANALYSIS-Emboldened Georgia may go beyond Pankisi Gorge By Rosalind Russell TBILISI, March 12 (Reuters) - Washington's idea in Georgia is a limited operation to flush out a handful of guerrillas from a remote mountain gorge. It aims to train and equip the ramshackle army of the former Soviet republic to restore order in the lawless, rugged Pankisi Gorge, where guerrillas linked to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network may be hiding. But having lost big chunks of its territory to separatist rebels since independence a decade ago, Georgia may seize on the mission to try to resolve a host of other problems. And some analysts believe a new, confident Georgia may find it hard to exercise restraint, raising some concern in Russia. "It makes sense in the fight against al Qaeda to mop up potential safe havens like Pankisi," said Anatol Lieven, a regional analyst at the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "If the Georgian army is boosted by a successful operation in Pankisi, it could move on," Lieven said. "I have very little confidence in the restraint of Georgians." Georgian officials are already talking about new threats in Abkhazia -- its cherished, sub-tropical Black Sea province lost to local separatists in a humiliating 1993 defeat. "They (the Georgians) could use al Qaeda as an excuse for an attack on Abkhazia, with potentially disastrous consequences," Lieven said. South Ossetia, further east, also runs itself independently, while the western province of Ajara has never paid much attention to the rule of Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze. Last week, Georgia's interior minister for Abkhazia, Mamuka Nachkebia, said he was sure Abkhazia was "in contact" with al Qaeda, accused by Washington of having carried out the September 11 suicide attacks that killed more than 3,000 people. Nachkebia said Arab nationals had surfaced in the region -- seemingly preparing public opinion for the possibility of military action under the banner of the U.S. war on terrorism. PEACE PROCESS DEADLOCKED An estimated 10,000 people died in a 1992-93 war between Abkhaz separatists and the Georgian army after the Soviet Union's collapse unleashed secessionist wars across the Transcaucasus. Some 300,000 ethnic Georgians were driven from their homes in Abkhazia, once a favourite summer resort of the Soviet elite. Since then the conflict has been frozen but unresolved, and a U.N.-brokered peace process has stalled. Abkhazia, a strip of territory sandwiched between the Caucasus Mountains and the Black Sea, now enjoys the unofficial protection of Georgia's northern neighbour Russia. A conflict would bring Georgian troops face-to-face with Russian peacekeepers patrolling the province -- a very different story from the measured, special operation Washington envisages at Pankisi Gorge. U.S. special forces instructors, expected to start arriving later this month, will train four Georgian rapid deployment battalions in anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. "There's a history of U.S.-trained troops going on to pursue their own objectives," Lieven said. "A new Abkhaz war could mean all hell breaking loose. Along with the military training there needs to be a U.S. capacity to rein in Georgia." TENSE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA Moscow, irritated by Shevardnadze's pro-Western policies, has grudgingly accepted the plan to deploy U.S. troops on its southern flank, complaining only that it was not informed first. Russia's Foreign Ministry said last week it had received U.S. assurances that it did not expect U.S.-trained Georgian troops to fight in Abkhazia or unruly South Ossetia. But several hardline members of the Russian parliament have voiced concern that Georgia might use its improved army to win back its breakaway region, and have suggested a new association for Abkhazia with Russia. Shevardnadze and senior Georgian officials refuse to talk of renewed war in Abkhazia. "The conflict is frozen," Georgi Baramidze, head of the parliamentary committee on defence and security, told Reuters. "This suggestion of Russian protection for Abkhazia is just one more indication of Russia's imperialist mind which is working to undermine Georgia." With U.S. help, Georgia is freer from Russian influence than at any time since its independence. The U.S. deployment has forestalled the threat of Russian force in the Pankisi gorge, where Moscow says Chechen fighters have rear bases. "The U.S. decision was triggered by Georgia's inability to stand on its own two feet," said Alexander Rondeli of the Georgian Foundation for International and Strategic Studies. "It has strengthened Georgia's independence by neutralising Russian threats." ******* #5 Wall Street Journal March 12, 2002 U.S. Nuclear Report Threatens To Widen New Rift With Russia By RICK JERVIS Special to THE WALL STREET JOURNAL MOSCOW -- Post-Sept. 11, Russia and the U.S. resembled a pair of dreamy-eyed lovers. These days, they look like they're about to file for divorce. A series of squabbles have cast a pall over the entente cordiale that blossomed after Russian President Vladimir Putin backed the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Having once united against international terrorism, the countries have turned on each other. The latest irritant is a secret U.S. Defense Department policy review, which U.S. media reports say outlines a contingency plan to use nuclear weapons against at least seven countries -- including Russia -- that could threaten the U.S. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said if the reports were true, they "can cause only regret and concern, not only from Russia but from the entire world community." Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said he would seek an explanation from U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld when he meets him in Washington. Russian conservatives say the reports proved talk of a new era in relations between Moscow and Washington is wishful thinking. "Russia faces friendly nuclear strike" was the headline in the daily Kommersant. Among liberals, there is disappointment that parts of the Washington establishment still see Russia as an enemy. The nuclear posture review showed the U.S. was still far from its declared aim of "moving away from mutually assured destruction to a fundamentally new, nonadversarial relationship" with Russia , says Sergei Rogov, director of the prestigious USA-Canada Institute. "Putin and Bush talk about our countries being allies against terrorism, but in fact the real strategic relationship hasn't changed." The nuclear row will do nothing to assuage nerves already frayed by a burgeoning trade war between the two countries. In an apparent riposte to the Bush administration's imposition of tariffs of up to 30% on imported steel, Moscow imposed a ban on U.S. poultry imports Sunday, saying they didn't meet Russian food safety standards. But other grievances already had been building up. Russia was annoyed by the U.S. decision to send military advisers to Georgia to help train a counterterrorism unit. It also was irritated that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has just held some of its biggest military exercises in years in Poland and Norway, close to Russia's western borders. Russia's chief of general staff, Gen. Anatoly Kvashnin, said NATO still viewed Russia as a potential adversary, showing how little had changed since the Cold War. It wasn't supposed to be like this. When Mr. Putin backed the antiterror coalition last year, there were hopes of a new, grand bargain that would break the Cold War mold. Mr. Putin would share intelligence on terrorism with the U.S. and acquiesce to the U.S. military deployment in Central Asia, once Russia's backyard. He tacitly would accept NATO expansion, even if the former Soviet Baltic states joined. In exchange, he would get a new nuclear-arms reduction treaty, U.S. support for Russia's efforts to join the World Trade Organization, and a bigger Russian voice in NATO. But so far, Mr. Putin has little to show for his wooing of Washington. Progress on the nuclear treaty has been painfully slow: Russia says the fault lies with the Americans, who it claims are insisting on stockpiling decommissioned nuclear weapons rather than destroying them. Foreign Minister Ivanov has hinted it's now unlikely that the agreement would be ready for signing by the time U.S. President George W. Bush comes to Moscow in May. As far as NATO goes, Russia is now being offered a new relationship, with the creation of a NATO-Russia Council that would discuss issues such as peacekeeping operations, arms proliferation and sea and air rescue missions. But a British initiative that would have given Russia wide decision-making powers in the alliance was vetoed by the U.S. Meanwhile, even Washington's enthusiasm for Russia's WTO bid appears to be dwindling. Last week, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick said the Russian poultry ban made it unlikely Congress would repeal the Jackson-Vanik amendment, a 1974 sanction which made the granting of most-favored-nation tariff levels contingent on the lifting of Soviet curbs on emigration. Removal of Jackson-Vanik has been seen in Russia as a small but crucial step toward WTO membership. So far, Mr. Putin has kept his counsel. He dismissed nationalist criticism of a future U.S. military presence in Georgia, long considered part of Russia's sphere of influence, saying it was "no tragedy" for Russia . On steel, chicken, and the nuclear issue, he's been silent. He's declined to answer critics who say his foreign policy is too pro-American: With popularity ratings that consistently top 70%, he knows he doesn't have to. But some fear that unless Mr. Putin can point to some tangible benefits from his pro-western policy, bureaucratic resistance will grow. There are plenty of people who would be happy to see the U.S.-Russian love affair degenerate into just another fling. ******* #6 Moscow Times March 12, 2002 RAMED Off Track By Alexei Pankin In the March issue of Sreda magazine, Manana Aslamazyan, director of Internews, reports on the progress of the ongoing Russian-American Media Enterpreneurship Dialogue, or RAMED. The dialogue was initiated by Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush at last year's summit, and Internews coordinates the dialogue on the Russian side. Everyone knows that the American involvement in the dialogue serves solely as PR cover for delivering domestic ideas on reform of the media to the highest organ of the Russian state -- the ear of the president. And, therefore, by far the most interesting part of the dialogue is on the Russian side. Aslamazyan relates how difficult it has been for the players in Russia's media industry to find a common language, and, as an example, she cites the disagreement over how to go about creating a public television network. "Representatives of the commercial networks usually promote the idea of turning the state-owned VGTRK into a public television network," Aslamazyan writes. "Let the state fully finance its own network, and let the network be responsible for implementing government policy, they say, but that network should not go anywhere near the advertising market. It's no surprise that the heads of the state television companies are against such a proposal. They're happy to receive money from the state budget, but why, they ask, should they have to give up advertising?" Aslamazyan nevertheless holds out hope that the dialogue between media organizations will produce a unified policy for the industry. "If these proposals win industry support, we will submit them to the Press Ministry with the goal of reaching the president and providing him with practical guidelines for further action. And we will do our best to control implementation of this program," Aslamazyan writes. This approach demonstrates one of the main flaws of reform efforts in this country in general: Transformation of the most important areas of public life has fallen not to society itself but to those responsible for creating the problems in the first place. Generals are reforming the army, collective farm chairmen are reforming agriculture, and so on. The downside of such an approach is so blatantly obvious that it doesn't take much effort to predict that the media dialogue in its current form will yield no sensible result. Take the army, for example. The "generals' reform" has given us a hybrid army made up of conscripts and quasi-professional troops. Surely, one would think, this is an improvement. The generals' feelings haven't been hurt and the public is happy. Snotty-nosed draftees see less fighting, and that part of the adult male population that has been trained to fight -- the kontraktniki, or hired soldiers -- has the opportunity to earn a legal living. Unfortunately, this sort of army seems to have been specially created for looting. The mass media are no less important to the interests of society than defense. It cannot therefore be left to interested parties -- the heads of state and private networks -- to decide among themselves the fate of public television and to hand down their own compromise as the only possible model for this crucial institution. Industry opinion must not be allowed to guide the president's hand. And it would be nothing short of mockery if the press were to control the state's implementation of a media reform program created by media companies for the selfsame media companies. Far be it from me to criticize the organizers of RAMED. They're doing the best they can. I blame the government, which has failed once more to play a constructive role in the reform process. What the government should be doing is fostering a public debate in society on the crucial question of reforming the mass media. The media lobby has an important role to play in this debate but not the leading role, let alone monopolizing the whole thing. Alexei Pankin is the editor of Sreda, a magazine for media professionals (www.internews.ru/sreda) ******* #7 Obschaya Gazeta No. 10 March 2002 WE CAN CONTINUE LIVING LIKE THIS Even though most Russians still think they've lost more than they've gained in the last decade Author: Mikhail Gorshkov, Natalia Tikhonova, Vladimir Petukhov [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] A LOOK AT TRENDS IN POLLS ON THE STATE AND PROSPECTS OF RUSSIA. OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS THE NUMBER OF POLL RESPONDENTS WHO VIEW THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA AS CATASTROPHIC HAS FALLEN FROM 51% TO 14%. THE MAJORITY PREFERS A MILDER TERM - "CRITICAL" - AND 18% CONSIDER THE SITUATION TO BE NORMAL. Results of opinion polls indicate.... The idea that Russia is moving toward degradation and disintegration began dominating public opinion in Russia in the mid- 1990's. Over 75% of Russians were of the same opinion in 1997 and 1998, but it was despair rather than disillusionment. Fortunately, the growth of suicidal inclinations stopped at this point and fell by autumn 2001 to the point typical of the beginning of the reforms, when everyone was still full of hope. Over the last three years the number of poll respondents who view the situation in Russia as catastrophic has fallen from 51% to 14%. The majority prefers a milder term - "critical" - and 18% consider the situation to be normal. Between 1995 and 2000, 65-58% of respondents admitted "shame over the state of the nation"; "a sense of unfairness about what is happening" was admitted by even more Russians, and over 50% were convinced that "life like this cannot go on any longer". By the end of 2001 the unfairness of the existing situation was sensed by up to 60% of respondents, but only 27% claimed that living like that was intolerable. Judging by self-evaluation, the share of respondents quite satisfied with the situation went up from 52% to 58% over the last year. Almost 42% Russians believe that they have lost from the reforms. Financially, first and foremost. Only one-third of that number consider themselves winners but there is a paradox here. Almost two- thirds Russians view their current social status as satisfactory, and 41% call themselves middle class. Of course, they are poor by Western standards, but it is self-evaluation that counts in this particular case. Most respondents, or 59%, still take a negative view of the results of the reforms. Those who consider themselves losers and those who view themselves as winners evaluate their losses and gains in an approximately similar manner, qualitatively and quantitatively. The consensus is unbelievable at first sight. The problem is that this is an evaluation of the progress of the reforms, of how they have been implemented. Moreover, since not very long ago the Russians have been associating the word "reforms" with the past, with Yeltsin's era. This is an important detail. The public mind distinguishes between Yeltsin's era and post-Yeltsin times. Every now and then respondents demonstrate this in a surprising way. Yeltsin's decision to step down, and Vladimir Putin's ascent to power, were seen as the most positive events of the past decade. The former is even thought more important than the latter (86% against 73%) and more considerable in scale, comparable only to the default of 1998 and privatization (two unquestionable leaders in the Worst Event category). Respondents were once asked to define Putin's political course. Only 11% called the new president a promoter of Yeltsin's policies, while 37% thought that he was pursuing a course of reforms that had little if anything to do with his predecessor's policy. And 12% suspected (or hoped) that Putin would eventually stop everything Yeltsin had set into motion. In other words, the majority sees Putin as an alternative to Yeltsin. It isn't hard to see that the wave of public optimism should be attributed to replacement of national leaders rather than to any socioeconomic successes of the nation. Studies of the nature of Putin's popularity show plainly that to a certain extent it is an alternative to the people's infatuation with Yeltsin at one time, and with Gorbachev before him. It is not unreasonable adoration, rather a reserved liking. Putin is not a hero or idol for the masses, he is rather a "foreman" acceptable for most Russians. Even if a leader like that does something disappointing, it will not harm the morale of the general public. It should be noted that the people is not nonchalant with regard to previous masters of the Kremlin either. When respondents were asked who they thought was to blame for what happened to the nation, a third of them automatically recalled Yeltsin and Gorbachev. In the eyes of the citizenry, Yeltsin and Gorbachev are more to blame than the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, external enemies, so-called democrats (they polled only 7%), and Jews (4%) all taken together. There is, however, a guilty party that matches Yeltsin and Gorbachev: 30% of respondents admit that they have nobody to blame but themselves. This is a good omen, particularly since healthy self-criticism has been slowly growing for seven years. The list of what society has lost through the years of the reforms is topped by "deteriorating living standards" followed by "falling morals" and "loss of respect in the world by Russia." The list of what it gained is more interesting. By the way, only 9% of respondents do not think society has gained anything at all (a surprisingly small figure). The list of the gains includes along with "availability of consumption goods" such immaterial gains as free speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of trips abroad (22-28% of respondents). Interesting enough, only 4-5% Russians make trips abroad (business or for pleasure). For all the rest this is an abstract value, a privilege of others. The same goes for abundance of goods. It is mentioned even by the Russians who lack finances to buy anything. Attitudes toward success, toward the "new Russians" in this case, is a vital indicator of public mentality. Public opinion utterly disregards propagandistic myths spread by liberal publicists. In public opinion, Russian businessman is an energetic and smart professional, a workaholic and a good organizer, indifferent toward interests of the state, someone who uses his subordinates, who is not exactly law-abiding or decent, and is always on a lookout for an easy buck. Falling in love with an image like that is difficult, but neither does it breed the desire to get an axe and start wrecking everything within sight. The country would have hardly avoided class conflicts otherwise. The term "democrat" is used in quotation marks in Russia, and has been for a long time. Elections, parliament, free speech are empty abstractions for two-thirds of Russian citizens - because "it is those who have money and wield power that decide everything anyway." Equality before the law is the major democratic value in the eyes of 83% of respondents. It is followed (with a considerable gap) by independence of courts and nationwide election of the president. Sociologists draw only one conclusion from these figures: it follows that there is utter lawlessness in Russia and a strong authoritarian ruler offers the only hope. It would be wrong to say on the basis that Russians understand what democracy is - because they place too little value on the following essential notions: multi-party system (3.8%), political opposition (17%), free expression of political views (22%), and even the right to strike (3%). These values have been losing importance in public opinion with each year. The growing disillusionment in all forms of personal involvement (be it membership in a party or in a trade union, appeal to the media or court, participation in elections or manifestations) is the worst trend. Society has withdrawn from politics. As far as most Russians are concerned nowadays, democracy is not a result of consolidated effort of all citizens. It is some sort of correct way of life organized "from above". The "above" is of course the president, not necessarily Putin. The rise in paternalist moods became clear before Putin. It was generated primarily by the financial crisis of 1998 which devastated banks, stock exchanges, and the system of values formed since the beginning of the decade. The number of nightmares that have stopped torturing Russians has diminished insignificantly. The fear of starvation ceased being a mass phobia by 1994. These days, Russians are fairly indifferent toward threats like disintegration of the country, establishment of dictatorship, the homeless and refugees, or cultural degradation. The old nightmares have given way to new ones. Nowadays, Russians are particularly worried by the crime rate (57% of respondents), the possibility of further deterioration of living standards (47%), poverty in old age, deterioration of health care services, inability to ensure proper education for their children. And 54% of respondents fear a civil war (an unusually high number, a 9% rise compared to 1994 when the public was shaken by the attacks on Ostankino and the Supreme Soviet in October 1993). Pollsters think that this fear is generated by the war in Chechnya, but many other factors must be at play here. There is another alarming nuance. Fear of another world war is making its way into the public mind again. The notion of external enemies and threats is back. They were anachronisms only recently. Chronologically, the turning point in the public mind coincided with the American attack on Yugoslavia. It is particularly clear in the attitude toward the United States. In 1995, the former Number One Enemy all of a sudden topped the list of nations Russians liked. Over 77% admitted to having warm feelings for the United States then. Everything was different in autumn 2001 when the United States topped the list of countries Russians liked least (America was followed by Iraq and Israel). The September 11 tragedy and the "pro-American drift" of the popular president did not change matters. These days, over 60% of respondents say that "these Americans have always been insolent." Needless to say, this attitude could not help having an effect on attitudes toward the West in general. Russians are more skeptical now. Disillusionment here is not as considerable, however; the West is not viewed as an Evil Empire. Pro-Western views remain an influential ideology. By the way, it is three NATO members that top the list of states Russians like most - France, Canada, and Britain. It seems that as far as Russians are concerned, the United States and the West are as distant from one another geopolitically as they are distant geographically. (Translated by A. Ignatkin) ******* #8 Jamestown Foundation 11 March 2002 - Volume III, Issue 8 CHECHNYA WEEKLY - News and analysis on the crisis in Chechnya (Chechnya Weekly is a publication of the Jamestown Foundation. It is researched and written by John B. Dunlop, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University) COULD PUTIN SOME DAY JOIN MILOSEVIC IN THE DOCK AT THE HAGUE? On March 8, the online daily Gazeta.ru reported the extraordinary news that Akhmed Zakaev, a deputy prime minister in the Chechen separatist government and a special representative of Aslan Maskhadov, had met with the chief prosecutor of the Hague International Tribunal for the affairs of former Yugoslavia, Carla del Ponte, at her offices in The Netherlands. The discussion took place during a break in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, who is charged with having committed crimes against humanity. Del Ponte, Gazeta.ru noted, "can help Aslan Maskhadov to initiate a judicial trial against Vladimir Putin in connection with war crimes committed by the federal forces in Chechnya. Today in The Hague she spoke with Akhmed Zakaev for more than an hour and gave him his first consultation on that subject." Zakaev's meeting with del Ponte had been arranged by the well-known British actress Vanessa Redgrave, who is highly active in efforts to help bring an end to the war in Chechnya. In comments made to Gazeta.ru, Zakaev noted that he was in regular contact with President Maskhadov and that the latter had approved his proposal to meet with del Ponte three weeks previously. The trial of Milosevic for war crimes, Zakaev stressed, "instills the hope that Russian generals who are responsible for genocide and war crimes in Chechnya will find themselves in the same place [on trial]." And he added: "Putin has a choice. Either he himself will bring his generals to account or he will end up in the same spot as Milosevic. After all, Milosevic also says that he did not know of the crimes committed by his military." Zakaev adamantly declined to communicate any details of his conversation with del Ponte, but did remark: "I can only say that Carla del Ponte asked that we not lose hope, and said that a just retribution will be the lot of those guilty for what is being done in Chechnya." In a written statement issued on March 7, Zakaev underlined: "It is known that the jurisdiction of the Hague Tribunal does not apply to Russia." However, he added, the meeting with del Ponte serves nevertheless to "instill horror into the Russian generals who are up to their elbows in the blood of Chechen women and children.... Today's meeting with Madame Carla del Ponte is also a beginning in this process [against Russian war criminals]. We hope for the Russian society, for the support of those who themselves suffered from the explosions of the houses in Moscow, Volgodonsk, and Buinaksk. Those who committed these crimes against Russian citizens are today located in Chechnya, killing, torturing and raping tens of thousands of innocent citizens. We will in every way possible contribute to bringing these killers to justice. I was present in the room of the Hague Court considering the case of the former President of Yugoslavia, Milosevic. This is an indication of the fact that, independently of their rank, criminals will be summoned" (Chechenpress.com, March 8). In its commentary on the Zakaev-del Ponte meeting, Gazeta.ru observed: "In reality the representative of Maskhadov has only one address to which he can appeal against infringements of human rights in Chechnya. This is Belgium. In 1993, a law was adopted there which permits it to try the citizens of foreign countries for crimes against humanity.... It is not excluded that a suit will be made by the Chechens in the courts of precisely this country against the Russian authorities" (Gazeta.ru, March 8). Responding angrily to this development, the chairman of the State Duma's International Affairs Committee, Dmitry Rogozin, proposed "summoning Carla del Ponte for questioning at the Russian Prosecutor General's Office" to ascertain on what grounds she had received Maskhadov's envoy. "Having contacts like this," Rogozin fulminated, "demonstrates Ms. del Ponte's moral support for international terrorism" (RIA Novosti, March 7). The meeting of Zakaev with del Ponte represented just one of several setbacks suffered by the Russian leadership over the past week with regard to Chechnya. Human Rights Watch issued a highly-detailed fifty-one-page report entitled, "Swept Under: Torture, Forced Disappearances, and Extra-judicial Killings during Sweep Operations in Chechnya" (available at: http://www.hrw.org). And the Nobel-prize winning organization Medicins sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) on March 4 issued a report entitled "No End in Sight to the War in Chechnya" in which it concluded that at present "no international power is prepared to stop the Kremlin and protect Chechens' lives or even their most fundamental human rights" (for the text, see www.reliefweb.int). Finally, in the United States, on March 4 the U.S. Department of State issued its "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: 2001," which contains extremely critical remarks concerning Russia's conduct of the war in Chechnya (see www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eur/8331.htm). The Russian Foreign Ministry responded with considerable ire to this report, remarking: "There is an impression that the authors of the report just copied old cliches as if nothing has happened in Russia or the United States, as if there were no events of September 11.... Passages about Chechnya look especially odious against this background" (Interfax, March 7). During the same week, Senator Paul Wellstone of Minnesota introduced the text of a Senate Resolution on behalf of himself and Senator Sam Brownback in which the Russian government was urged "to seek a negotiated settlement... [and] to end human rights violations by Russian soldiers." Wellstone cited the just-released Human Rights Watch report as evidence in support of his resolution (posted on Ichkeria.org, March 6). To conclude, it appears that forging on with the war is likely to come at an increasing political cost for Vladimir Putin and the rest of the Russian leadership. ****** #9 Washington Post March 12, 2002 On Pro-Kremlin Site, All News Is Good News Putin Takes Media Strategy to Internet By Sharon LaFraniere MOSCOW -- The government has had an extremely successful two years. The number of poor people has fallen. The currency is stable. Peace is taking hold in a war-torn region. Headlines such as these are a rare treat for the leaders of most countries. President Vladimir Putin, however, can find them any day on strana.ru, a pro-Kremlin Internet site. So, hopes the Kremlin, will Russian citizens. As Russia slowly embraces the West's computer-driven lifestyle, strana.ru represents the Kremlin's attempt to establish a presence on the information highway. It is part of an overall Kremlin media strategy -- a strategy critics say is transforming parts of Russia's once-feisty broadcast media into bland mouthpieces for the state. The Kremlin's information war has already claimed two national independent television stations. A state-controlled natural gas monopoly last spring seized control of the popular NTV television network, while a state-connected shareholder managed to put TV-6 out of business this year using an obscure, now-defunct statute aimed at shutting down nonprofitable companies. A daily newspaper that was part of the NTV empire also went under. Strana.ru and its ilk are the flip side of that trend. Secure in its niche as the Kremlin's unofficial voice on the Internet, the Web site has 500 employees as well as branches in almost all of Russia's 89 regions. Its owners -- a group of businesses whose identities have never been disclosed -- are considering expanding from the Internet to radio and television. Strana.ru is a private project, but some would argue only in name. As in much of Russia governance, the distinction between public and private is heavily blurred in a project that marries political power with business interests. The Web site was conceived in the Kremlin, according to former officials, and funded by business leaders who wanted to be considered the Kremlin's friends. Their goal is not to make a profit, but to put out Putin's message on the Internet, according to Marina Litvinovich, general director of strana.ru. "It is not a business project," she said. "It's a political project. The idea is to support Russian authorities and the Russian president." The Web site has been at least moderately successful with both the public and the Kremlin -- t -- although Kremlin officials have hinted they want it to be simpler and more positive. More than 25,000 people accessed the site one day in February -- less than one-third as many as visited Russia's leading Internet news site that day, rbc.ru, run by RosBusinessConsulting, a Russian technology firm that provides online news and other information services, including e-mail. But it was 22 times as many as typically log onto the government's official site, gov.ru. One recent headline on strana.ru gives its flavor: "Vladimir Putin: Raising people's well-being must be politicians' primary goal." If the number of hits on the Web site is relatively low, the potential audience is growing rapidly. An estimated 10 million people in Russia use the Internet. That's just 7 percent of the population, compared to more than 60 percent of Americans and 39 percent of Europeans. But it is six times as many Russians as logged on in 1998. And in political terms, Russia's Internet visitors are an important group -- mostly well-educated, with above-average salaries. Thanks to strana.ru's investors, the Kremlin now has a channel to these readers. Without knowing who the investors are, it is hard to speculate about what favors they might want in return. What is clear is that their project is part of a Kremlin response to Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky, two tycoons -- and enemies of Putin -- who until recently controlled the most important independent media outlets in Russia. The Kremlin argues, with some justification, that both men grossly abused their media power to advance business aims and to savage political enemies. Gleb Pavlovsky, the Kremlin's astute political consultant, cites Berezovsky's recent allegation that the Federal Security Service engineered the 1999 bombings of apartments in Moscow and elsewhere, killing more than 300 people, to bolster support for a Russian war to subdue separatist Chechnya. "We have to recall the psychological state of people who at the end of the nineties had to watch and listen how they were accused of blowing up buildings in Moscow," Pavlovsky said. "They did not have any opportunity to refute it. They didn't know how to professionally conduct an information war." Critics argue that the Kremlin was no victim. Putin simply fails to understand that it is not the mission of the media to help the government, said Alexei Venediktov, an influential radio journalist. Venediktov is the chief editor of Ekho Moskvy, arguably Russia's most influential radio station, but says he is resigning because the state has taken over ownership. "The president is just trying to justify shutting down the independent press," he said. Strana.ru, named after the Russian word for country, was part of the Kremlin's counterattack. Former Kremlin officials said Pavlovsky was the natural choice to run it. By the time Putin was elected president in March 2000, Pavlovsky had already established himself as an Internet leader, overseeing a smorgasbord of Web sites that included one of Russia's most successful web portals, lenta.ru. "The choice was either to create a new division inside the administration or use the ready-made, serious team outside the government," said Igor Zadorin, a former aide in the office of presidential administration. "It was the state's decision to open the site. Pavlovsky was just the one to execute the concept." By September 2000, six months after Putin's election, strana.ru was ready to go online. Pavlovsky said he recruited the investors, who still provide most of the financing. Few doubt the financiers' government connections. "It's not government funds," said Anton Nosik, editor in chief of lenta.ru. "But you know how it works in Russia. You can just tell some oil company, put your money here, or there, and you will get this return." Pavlovsky said he wants to give up the management of strana.ru, and that its ownership may also turn over. He said he is tired of the investors and government ministers or their underlings complaining to him about news items, and wants to return full time to his real love, political consulting, for the Kremlin and other clients. Some political consultants say Pavlovsky is under pressure not just from cabinet ministers, but from the higher echelons of the Kremlin, where some officials want only the government's viewpoint to be presented. Editors of other media Web sites say pro-government sites such as strana.ru will never present serious competition. Said Nosik: "There are not too many people on the Internet who love being brainwashed, and who create a demand for propaganda." Nor could the Russian government do much to control Internet news, Internet experts say. Even if it shut down a Web site -- a fairly easy matter -- the owner could simply reopen it using an international or Western domain such as .com. The Russian government's power to regulate Russian owners of Web sites in such domains is open to debate. Still, given what happened to the major independent television stations, editors of some Internet media sites say they are on guard. "Today, we do not really feel interference," said Nosik. "That's because they haven't started yet. Ever since Mr. Putin has been in the picture, there has been an urge to control the mass media. They are just not ready to come for us yet." Dmitri Orlov, deputy director of the Center for Political Technologies, which conducts political analysis, said he doesn't censor the material he puts on the center's Web site of political news. Still, he said, "All mass media sources should be very careful when they talk about the Kremlin." TV-6's demise shows the state has the tools to crush any media outlet, he said. "We should all keep that in mind," he said. ******* #10 New York Times March 12, 2002 U.S. Auditors Find Things Are Different in Russia By SABRINA TAVERNISE MOSCOW, March 11 — The big American accounting firms were among the first foreign companies to arrive in Russia after the fall of Communism. They opened offices here and in other former Soviet republics, and rapidly landed many of the largest companies as clients. But in their competitive rush for a foothold, the Big Six (now Big Five) auditors lent their reputations to practices that in the West would be regarded as unethical if not illegal, current and former employees of the firms said in recent interviews. The employees of the auditing firms — Arthur Andersen; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu; Ernst & Young; KPMG International; and PricewaterhouseCoopers — are bound by agreements guaranteeing confidentiality to their clients, and they spoke on condition that they, and in some cases the firms they were associated with, not be identified. As auditing firms have come under increased scrutiny since the collapse of the Enron Corporation (news/quote), most attention in Russia has focused not on Andersen, Enron's auditor, but on PricewaterhouseCoopers, which has been accused by minority shareholders and regulators of failing to look critically at a pattern of vanishing assets at Gazprom, the giant gas monopoly. In the chaotic early years of new Russian capitalism, accounting standards here were poorly suited to market economics. They were built around reporting to tax authorities, not gauging a company's financial health for investors. Oversight was all but nonexistent and the legal system was undeveloped, leaving room for manipulation and theft. In many cases, Russian managers actively tried to conceal the true financial condition of their companies, as Enron managers have been accused of doing. But instead of disguising losses, the Russian managers wanted to disguise profits, both from tax inspectors and from shareholders. In this environment, Western auditing firms could have and should have held their Russian clients to higher standards of behavior, investors in Russian companies are now saying. But instead, according to the current and former auditing employees, as well as analysts and government officials interviewed, the auditors often chose to play by Russian rules, and in doing so sacrificed the transparency that investors were counting on them to ensure. In Russia, auditors "check that the paperwork was done correctly, but look right past the deeply corrupt heart of the matter," said Pyotr Karpov, the former head of the government's financial accounts commission, which investigated companies with large tax arrears. "They interpret their mission very narrowly," Mr. Karpov said. "In a society with morals and functioning societal controls, that approach can work. But not in Russia." Consider AvtoVAZ, Russia's biggest car company. Auditors and tax consultants from Price Waterhouse, now part of PricewaterhouseCoopers, began examining the company's books in 1993. The audits did not give AvtoVAZ a completely clean bill of health. For example, in its 1997 Russian audit, Price Waterhouse warned that AvtoVAZ was accounting for domestic and foreign sales differently, and that it could not say how much the inconsistency affected reported sales revenue. But this red flag hardly conveyed what was actually going on at the company. "They shipped the cars to all these wonderful dealers, and the dealers disappeared after six months with huge debts that were written off," said a former Price Waterhouse employee who worked on the audit. " `What's going on?' " the former employee recalled thinking. " `You aren't getting paid — no guarantees, no nothing. Are you stupid?' It was clear to me that it was part of an organized robbery." Mr. Karpov, who went through the auto company's books in late 1995, said he saw a similar problem, with nearly $1 billion in uncollected bills for shipped cars. By 2000, the warnings by PricewaterhouseCoopers about AvtoVAZ had become much sharper, expressing doubts that the company could pay its debts over the next year. AvtoVAZ did not respond to requests for comment. In a written statement, PricewaterhouseCoopers said that it stood by its audits of AvtoVAZ, that there were no material errors in its 1997 financial statements and that the accounting firm could not respond to general and unsubstantiated claims by the former employee. Even so, principals of the Moscow office of PricewaterhouseCoopers are clearly concerned about mounting criticism of the firm as misdeeds at clients like Gazprom come to light. The principals took out full-page advertisements in two of Russia's business dailies in late February to argue that an audit "does not represent a review of each transaction, or a qualitative assessment of a company's performance." Hold on, say investors — if not the auditor, who will give the public an accurate picture of a company's finances? William Browder, manager of the $600 million Hermitage Fund in Moscow, said: "If the auditors were doing their job properly, they would say, `Why did you do business with that particular oil trading firm?' or `Why did you sell assets to that person? Is that a relative? If so, we'll have to disclose it in the audit.' Then we'd have a clearer picture." Sales at far-below-market prices to companies owned by managers or their families are another common abuse here. A team from a Big Five auditor found evidence that something like that may have been going on at a factory in the Urals. A member of the team said in an interview that a colleague was able to get sales data from a low-level employee in the factory's computer center that showed much of its output being sold extremely cheaply to obscure offshore companies. The accountant who got the data informed the auditing firm's Moscow partners, his colleague said, but the partners refused to mention the suspicious sales in the audit. The accountant who got the data later resigned. Fierce competition for clients may account for some laxness by auditors. The biggest, most lucrative clients were also the most complex, and at times auditing employees said they felt pressure to sign off on questionable practices by such clients to avoid alienating them. "A big client is god," said one former employee of Ernst & Young in Moscow. "You do what they want and tell you to do. You can play straightlaced and try to be upright and protect your reputation with minor clients, but you can't do it with the big guys. If you lose that account, no matter how justified you are, that's the end of a career." Gazprom is held up by critics of the auditors as a case in point. Of the 800 employees PricewaterhouseCoopers has in Moscow, 50 work on Gazprom alone, according to a former employee assigned to the account. A spokesman for the auditing firm declined to say how much of its business Gazprom represents. In a statement last month, the firm dismissed as "absurd" the accusation that it compromises its standards to retain big clients. Some investors are unpersuaded. "The only related-party transactions PricewaterhouseCoopers eventually disclosed were those that found their way into the public domain," said Charles E. Ryan, the chairman of the United Financial Group (news/quote), an investment bank that has Gazprom shareholders as customers. "If you believe their assessment, you would conclude we found 100 percent of the related-party deals. I doubt that is true." Russian business — and auditing — has changed markedly since the mid-1990's. Managers of some Russian companies now try hard to please minority shareholders. AvtoVAZ, which began a joint venture with General Motors (news/quote) last year, now posts two years of financial data on its Web site. And changes in several laws since 1998 have modernized some Russian accounting practices and, more recently, made auditors more responsible for the integrity of the figures they sign. "There has been quite an evolution of financial statements over the years," said Stanley Root, a partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers in Moscow. "The accountancy profession started from scratch. Companies have come a long way since then. We are here to help our clients improve their level of disclosure." The firm emerges in a positive light from a 1998 audit of Purneftegaz, an oil company partly owned by the state-owned Rosneft and partly by minority shareholders. According to Dmitry Vasiliev, former head of the Russian Federal Securities Commission, the company's managers have been selling oil to Rosneft at deep discounts, to the detriment of its other shareholders. PricewaterhouseCoopers mentioned the practice in its audit report. The following year, Purneftegaz dropped the firm and hired Arthur Andersen as its auditor. Analysts say the discounted sales continued, but they are not mentioned in Andersen's audits. Hans Horn, Andersen's managing partner in Moscow, said Russian law does not require such disclosure. ******* #11 U.S. Expands Influence in Central Asia March 12, 2002 By SALLY BUZBEE WASHINGTON (AP) - The United States probably will keep its new military ties in central Asia, or expand them, even after the war in Afghanistan ends. That would create a new sphere of influence in a region where American military might was unthinkable a decade ago. As the leader of the region's most important country, Uzbekistan, visits President Bush on Tuesday at the White House, it is less clear whether American troops will remain based long-term in the former Soviet republics. The alternative, training exercises and military cooperation, is as likely. ``I think the (Bush) administration is really struggling with that question right now,'' said Andrew Hess, an expert on the region at Tufts University's Fletcher School. ``The United States' long-term interests in central Asia simply remain unclear.'' In the short term, most analysts expect the U.S. military to expand its presence, despite Russia's worry over the growing American influence, and U.S. worries about human rights violations in many of the countries. The United States sought the military cooperation first to help it fight the war in Afghanistan, and then to ensure that al-Qaida fighters or other Islamic militants couldn't gain a foothold in neighboring countries. For their part, the countries view the U.S. ties both as a counterbalance against Russian influence, and also as an opportunity to increase their security against the Islamic militants who threaten them, and improve their struggling economies. ``All of these countries are in worse shape now than before the fall of the Soviet Union,'' Hess said. ``They see cooperation with the U.S. as a possible solution.'' Uzbek President Islam Karimov is expected to talk about human rights and seek closer economic ties in his talks with Secretary of State Colin Powell and with Bush on Tuesday at the White House. Bush also meets Tuesday with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, who plans to see Powell and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld as well. The United States reached out to Uzbekistan immediately after Sept. 11, because of the need to have bases near Afghanistan, at a time when Pakistan's support for the war against terrorism was still unclear. The U.S. military says about 1,000 American soldiers have been at a base in southern Uzbekistan since October. But those who've been to the base say the number appears much larger, and the base appears key to all covert and acknowledged operations inside Afghanistan. In addition, the United States has troops at an airport in Kyrgyzstan, and recently held nine days of simulated anti-terrorism exercises with that country. Other allied forces are expected to move to bases in Tajikistan. War commander Gen. Tommy Franks, head of U.S. Central Command, says he has 60,000 troops overall in the region. Just slightly farther away, but also a concern to Russia, the United States is ready to send 100 to 200 U.S. troops to train forces in Georgia fighting against possible al-Qaida-linked insurgents there. Despite the new ties, the United States has continued to complain about the countries' human rights abuses. The State Department says Uzbek security forces torture, beat and harass people, and arbitrarily arrest Muslims suspected of extremist sympathies. Yet U.S. officials also recently announced a tripling of foreign aid to Uzbekistan, to $160 million. A week ago, the Uzbek government allowed the first-ever official registration of an independent human rights organization. Russian officials, for their part, have grown increasingly nervous about the U.S. military presence in formerly Soviet central Asia, which Russia considers it sphere of influence. President Vladimir Putin and most other high-ranking Russian officials have said American troops are necessary to fight Islamic extremism and terrorism in the region, which also threatens Russia. But Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov made clear in early February that Russia assumes ``these bases are there on a temporary basis, and only until the end of the anti-terrorist operation.'' ``Russia is extremely frightened of us remaining there,'' said Charles Fairbanks, a central Asia specialist at Johns Hopkins University. U.S. military officials say they have no intention of keeping American troops permanently in central Asia. The United States doesn't want its own bases in the region, but does want access to local bases, Franks says. ``The question, of course, is how guaranteed is our access if there are no (American) bases,'' Fairbanks said. For now, the continued instability in Afghanistan makes it likely that U.S. troops will be in the region for some time to come, on the lookout for al-Qaida fighters inside Afghanistan and out. ``Look at the way they're building up troops in the region, building up facilities,'' said John Pike, a defense analyst at Globalsecurity.org in Washington. ``There's no indication they're getting ready to pack up and go home.'' *******