#6129
[Second Issue of the Day]
#7
Obschaya Gazeta
No. 10
March 2002
WE CAN CONTINUE LIVING LIKE THIS
Even though most Russians still think they've lost more than they've gained in
the last decade
Author: Mikhail Gorshkov, Natalia Tikhonova, Vladimir Petukhov
[from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html]
A LOOK AT TRENDS IN POLLS ON THE STATE AND PROSPECTS OF RUSSIA. OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS THE NUMBER OF POLL RESPONDENTS WHO VIEW THE SITUATION IN RUSSIA AS CATASTROPHIC HAS FALLEN FROM 51% TO 14%. THE MAJORITY PREFERS A MILDER TERM - "CRITICAL" - AND 18% CONSIDER THE SITUATION TO BE NORMAL.
Results of opinion polls indicate....
The idea that Russia is moving toward degradation and disintegration began dominating public opinion in Russia in the mid- 1990's. Over 75% of Russians were of the same opinion in 1997 and 1998, but it was despair rather than disillusionment. Fortunately, the growth of suicidal inclinations stopped at this point and fell by autumn 2001 to the point typical of the beginning of the reforms, when everyone was still full of hope.
Over the last three years the number of poll respondents who view the situation in Russia as catastrophic has fallen from 51% to 14%. The majority prefers a milder term - "critical" - and 18% consider the situation to be normal.
Between 1995 and 2000, 65-58% of respondents admitted "shame over the state of the nation"; "a sense of unfairness about what is happening" was admitted by even more Russians, and over 50% were convinced that "life like this cannot go on any longer". By the end of 2001 the unfairness of the existing situation was sensed by up to 60% of respondents, but only 27% claimed that living like that was intolerable. Judging by self-evaluation, the share of respondents quite satisfied with the situation went up from 52% to 58% over the last year.
Almost 42% Russians believe that they have lost from the reforms. Financially, first and foremost. Only one-third of that number consider themselves winners but there is a paradox here. Almost two- thirds Russians view their current social status as satisfactory, and 41% call themselves middle class. Of course, they are poor by Western standards, but it is self-evaluation that counts in this particular case.
Most respondents, or 59%, still take a negative view of the results of the reforms. Those who consider themselves losers and those who view themselves as winners evaluate their losses and gains in an approximately similar manner, qualitatively and quantitatively. The consensus is unbelievable at first sight. The problem is that this is an evaluation of the progress of the reforms, of how they have been implemented. Moreover, since not very long ago the Russians have been associating the word "reforms" with the past, with Yeltsin's era.
This is an important detail. The public mind distinguishes between Yeltsin's era and post-Yeltsin times. Every now and then respondents demonstrate this in a surprising way. Yeltsin's decision to step down, and Vladimir Putin's ascent to power, were seen as the most positive events of the past decade. The former is even thought more important than the latter (86% against 73%) and more considerable in scale, comparable only to the default of 1998 and privatization (two unquestionable leaders in the Worst Event category). Respondents were once asked to define Putin's political course. Only 11% called the new president a promoter of Yeltsin's policies, while 37% thought that he was pursuing a course of reforms that had little if anything to do with his predecessor's policy. And 12% suspected (or hoped) that Putin would eventually stop everything Yeltsin had set into motion. In other words, the majority sees Putin as an alternative to Yeltsin. It isn't hard to see that the wave of public optimism should be attributed to replacement of national leaders rather than to any socioeconomic successes of the nation.
Studies of the nature of Putin's popularity show plainly that to a certain extent it is an alternative to the people's infatuation with Yeltsin at one time, and with Gorbachev before him. It is not unreasonable adoration, rather a reserved liking. Putin is not a hero or idol for the masses, he is rather a "foreman" acceptable for most Russians. Even if a leader like that does something disappointing, it will not harm the morale of the general public. It should be noted that the people is not nonchalant with regard to previous masters of the Kremlin either. When respondents were asked who they thought was to blame for what happened to the nation, a third of them automatically recalled Yeltsin and Gorbachev. In the eyes of the citizenry, Yeltsin and Gorbachev are more to blame than the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, external enemies, so-called democrats (they polled only 7%), and Jews (4%) all taken together. There is, however, a guilty party that matches Yeltsin and Gorbachev: 30% of respondents admit that they have nobody to blame but themselves. This is a good omen, particularly since healthy self-criticism has been slowly growing for seven years.
The list of what society has lost through the years of the reforms is topped by "deteriorating living standards" followed by "falling morals" and "loss of respect in the world by Russia."
The list of what it gained is more interesting. By the way, only 9% of respondents do not think society has gained anything at all (a surprisingly small figure). The list of the gains includes along with "availability of consumption goods" such immaterial gains as free speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of trips abroad (22-28% of respondents). Interesting enough, only 4-5% Russians make trips abroad (business or for pleasure). For all the rest this is an abstract value, a privilege of others. The same goes for abundance of goods. It is mentioned even by the Russians who lack finances to buy anything.
Attitudes toward success, toward the "new Russians" in this case, is a vital indicator of public mentality. Public opinion utterly disregards propagandistic myths spread by liberal publicists. In public opinion, Russian businessman is an energetic and smart professional, a workaholic and a good organizer, indifferent toward interests of the state, someone who uses his subordinates, who is not exactly law-abiding or decent, and is always on a lookout for an easy buck. Falling in love with an image like that is difficult, but neither does it breed the desire to get an axe and start wrecking everything within sight. The country would have hardly avoided class conflicts otherwise.
The term "democrat" is used in quotation marks in Russia, and has been for a long time. Elections, parliament, free speech are empty abstractions for two-thirds of Russian citizens - because "it is those who have money and wield power that decide everything anyway." Equality before the law is the major democratic value in the eyes of 83% of respondents. It is followed (with a considerable gap) by independence of courts and nationwide election of the president.
Sociologists draw only one conclusion from these figures: it follows that there is utter lawlessness in Russia and a strong authoritarian ruler offers the only hope. It would be wrong to say on the basis that Russians understand what democracy is - because they place too little value on the following essential notions: multi-party system (3.8%), political opposition (17%), free expression of political views (22%), and even the right to strike (3%). These values have been losing importance in public opinion with each year.
The growing disillusionment in all forms of personal involvement (be it membership in a party or in a trade union, appeal to the media or court, participation in elections or manifestations) is the worst trend. Society has withdrawn from politics. As far as most Russians are concerned nowadays, democracy is not a result of consolidated effort of all citizens. It is some sort of correct way of life organized "from above". The "above" is of course the president, not necessarily Putin. The rise in paternalist moods became clear before Putin. It was generated primarily by the financial crisis of 1998 which devastated banks, stock exchanges, and the system of values formed since the beginning of the decade.
The number of nightmares that have stopped torturing Russians has diminished insignificantly. The fear of starvation ceased being a mass phobia by 1994. These days, Russians are fairly indifferent toward threats like disintegration of the country, establishment of dictatorship, the homeless and refugees, or cultural degradation.
The old nightmares have given way to new ones. Nowadays, Russians are particularly worried by the crime rate (57% of respondents), the possibility of further deterioration of living standards (47%), poverty in old age, deterioration of health care services, inability to ensure proper education for their children. And 54% of respondents fear a civil war (an unusually high number, a 9% rise compared to 1994 when the public was shaken by the attacks on Ostankino and the Supreme Soviet in October 1993). Pollsters think that this fear is generated by the war in Chechnya, but many other factors must be at play here.
There is another alarming nuance. Fear of another world war is making its way into the public mind again. The notion of external enemies and threats is back. They were anachronisms only recently.
Chronologically, the turning point in the public mind coincided with the American attack on Yugoslavia. It is particularly clear in the attitude toward the United States. In 1995, the former Number One Enemy all of a sudden topped the list of nations Russians liked. Over 77% admitted to having warm feelings for the United States then. Everything was different in autumn 2001 when the United States topped the list of countries Russians liked least (America was followed by Iraq and Israel). The September 11 tragedy and the "pro-American drift" of the popular president did not change matters. These days, over 60% of respondents say that "these Americans have always been insolent."
Needless to say, this attitude could not help having an effect on attitudes toward the West in general. Russians are more skeptical now. Disillusionment here is not as considerable, however; the West is not viewed as an Evil Empire. Pro-Western views remain an influential ideology. By the way, it is three NATO members that top the list of states Russians like most - France, Canada, and Britain. It seems that as far as Russians are concerned, the United States and the West are as distant from one another geopolitically as they are distant geographically.
(Translated by A. Ignatkin)
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