#6063
#8
eurasianet.org
February 5, 2002
RUSSIA FOCUSES ATTENTION ON CASPIAN BASIN ISSUES
By Igor Torbakov
Russia and the United States are busy forging new strategic alliances and reshaping old security arrangements in Central Eurasia. In response to the growing US presence in Central Asia, Russia is targeting the Caspian Basin, seeking to enhance cooperation with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. The Kremlin is keen to resolve two inter-related strategic issues - retaining control over the region's vast energy resources, and resolving the question of the Caspian Sea's territorial division.
So far in 2002, several high-profile US delegations have toured Central Asian states. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives]. Those US diplomatic initiatives have been matched by two late January summits held in Moscow. Those meetings involved Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkmen and Azerbaijani counterparts - Saparmurat Niyazov and Heidar Aliyev. The two summits, Moscow observers say, produced somewhat different results, reflecting the varying degree of Ashgabat's and Baku's dependence on Moscow.
In the center of Putin-Niyazov talks was the issue of Russian purchases of Turkmen gas. The significance of the topic, Russian commentators point out, has increased "after the landing of the US troops in Turkmenistan's neighboring countries of Central Asia and in Afghanistan."
"So far, Turkmenistan doesn't have any export routes other than across Russia," notes the influential Moscow business daily Vedomosti. "However, in a couple of years this situation might change."
To forestall Russia's losing its monopoly on the transit of energy resources, Putin unveiled a proposal to Niyazov to form a Eurasian gas alliance. The group would comprise the four gas-extracting CIS countries - Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. If this alliance takes shape, Moscow experts contend, it could end up exerting considerable influence over the world gas market.
"Russia is the largest producer of the 'blue fuel,' and Central Asian countries aspire to play, in the near future, an important role in the world gas trade, first of all as Russia's competitors," writes regional analyst Arkady Dubnov in the Vremya Novostei newspaper.
Western geopolitical strategies in the 1990s, Dubnov argues, were based on the backing of alternative sources of energy and transport routes that would bypass Russia. Now, Dubnov adds: "if Moscow manages to gather all the 'new' gas countries under its aegis, it would be able to 'regulate' their competitiveness in its own favor."
Putin's initiative also received an endorsement from the Moscow News weekly. "If these plans [to forge the Eurasian gas alliance] are realized," writes the paper's Central Asia expert Sanobar Shermatova, "Moscow will, in fact, snatch up the initiative, currently held by America, in managing the post-war energy projects in Central Asia and Afghanistan."
According to some well-informed Moscow sources, Putin's initiative appears to reflect not so much the feasibility of the ambitious project, but rather the fact that Moscow has failed to reach a bilateral agreement with Ashgabat on the amount of purchased Turkmen gas.
Indeed, the Moscow summit talks between Putin and Niyazov were generally unproductive. The two leaders could not achieve a breakthrough on Russian-Turkmen differences over the division of the Caspian Sea. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archives]. Of five Caspian littoral states, Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan suggest that the seabed be divided into national sectors while the water be kept in common use - a scheme that would leave Iran with the smallest sector. Iran wants to divide the seabed equally, and Turkmenistan appears to constantly waver between the two proposals.
Since Niyazov has been reluctant to join the Caspian "troika," many Moscow observers have accused the Turkmen leader of trying to torpedo the Caspian deal. Lacking the economic levers to resolve the problem of the disputed oil and gas fields - first of all, the money needed to explore them - Niyazov, analysts say, has chosen instead to sabotage the Caspian settlement.
"Turkmenbashi is going out of his way to drive the Caspian issue into a blind alley," wrote the Novye Izvestiya newspaper right after the end of Moscow summit. Only the active efforts of the other shoreline states "may prevent [Turkmenistan's president] from playing up the Caspian card in his favor," says the newspaper.
Immediately following Niyazov's visit, Putin and Aliyev met for talks that also focused on the Caspian question. The Azerbaijani and Russian leaders discussed the framework for a bilateral agreement on Caspian-related issues. Russia and Azerbaijan both have signed bilateral accords with Kazakhstan that clearly establish their respective Caspian sectors. Once Russia and Azerbaijan reach such an agreement, "use of the Caspian mineral resources will be fully solved between our three nations," Aliyev said at a news conference in Moscow.
Later, in an interview with the leading Moscow daily Izvestiya, Aliyev pointed out that Baku has forged a "strategic partnership" with Russia. He stressed that the two countries had "reached complete understanding on the principles of [Caspian] division."
Both Russian and Azerbaijani experts agree that a Caspian deal became possible only after Moscow and Baku settled the issue of Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan. Moscow had sought a long-term lease of the early warning radar station. Azerbaijani officials had been reluctant to give Russia control of the facility for an extended period. Ultimately, the two sides compromised on a 10-year lease. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives].
Not all the stumbling blocks in Azerbaijani-Russian relations have been removed, however. Azerbaijani politicians would like to see a "more active" (read pro-Azerbaijani) Russian stance in the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. In a recent interview with the Obshchaya Gazeta weekly, Eldar Namazov, the Azerbaijani political scientist and former advisor to president Aliyev, expressed the hope that "the general evolution of [Russian strategic] thinking will eventually result in the revision of the idea of Russia's 'military bridgehead' in Armenia."
According to Namazov, the security architecture in the Southern Caucasus can be reshaped in two ways. According to one scenario, Russia can step up its efforts in settling the regional conflicts "on the basis of territorial integrity and inviolability of borders." However, if Russia remains inactive, Azerbaijan and Georgia could invite NATO countries, including Turkey, to set up military bases on their territory. "The symptoms of such turn of events can already be perceived," Namazov said. [See related EurasiaNet story].
In the new international situation shaped by September 11 and its aftermath, Baku is intent on keeping its options open. This may portend more tough bargaining over the Caspian Sea's division and other issues. "We must continue work to reach agreement among all the Caspian states," Aliyev said. "I think that we will be able to achieve that, but it's difficult to say how long it would take.
Editor's Note: Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist and researcher who specializes in CIS political affairs. He holds an MA in History from Moscow State University and a PhD from the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. He was Research Scholar at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1988-1997; a Visiting Scholar at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, 1995, and a Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University, New York, 2000. He is now based in Istanbul, Turkey.
Back to the Top Next Article
- Back to the Top -