Johnson's Russia list #6034 22 January 2002 davidjohnson@erols.com A CDI Project www.cdi.org [Note from David Johnson: 1. AFP: Russia's independent TV channel stops broadcasting. 2. Interfax: Russian politicians speak on TV6 closure. 3. Reuters: Olympics-Russians bring vodka and caviar supplies to Salt Lake. 4. Luba Schwartzman: ORT Review. 5. Moscow Times: Gregory Feifer, The Washington Post: Off Target or Spot On? (re Paul Saunders/6027) 6. Reuters: Afghan war makes U.S. active in Moscow's backyard. 7. Moscow Times: Boris Kagarlitsky, Wall Still Standing in Berlin. 8. Vremya Novostei: AN INTERVIEW WITH YEVGENY SATANOVSKY, PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN JEWISH CONGRESS. 9. International Herald Tribune: David Jay Green, Help Central Asians to Mesh and Break Out From Isolation. 10. Financial Times (UK): Robert Cottrell, Putin seeks Eurasian alliance of gas producers. 11. Novye Izvestia: Rustem Falyakhov, SILENCE OF THE COMMUNISTS. Analysis of the latest congress of the Russian Communist Party. 12. Vremya MN: Olga Kryshtanovskaya, YOUNG OLIGARCHS. A good majority of those who wield financial power in Russia today a product of early perestroika, when economic power was delegated to youths in the komsomol. 13. The Globe and Mail (Canada): Geoffrey York, Tough Canadians shut out feeble Russians. This winter, a cherished symbol of Canada is rolling through Europe with a vengeance. (beavers) 14. Worldlink: GOING WEST. Russia’s perception of the world is changing. As Charles Grant explains, president Vladimir Putin has come to realise the importance of international political and economic cooperation.] ****** #1 Russia's independent TV channel stops broadcasting January 22, 2002 AFP Russia was left without a national independent television broadcaster for the first time in the post-Soviet era after TV-6 went off the air without warning at midnight, only to be replaced by a sports channel. The station, which has frequently aired criticism of President Vladimir Putin's campaign in Chechnya and was financed by the controversial self-exiled tycoon Boris Berezovsky, served as home to many of the journalists who fled NTV, the private station that was taken over by the government amid great protest last year. The Kremlin had no immediate reaction to the development, which left a stunned audience watching a broadcast of tennis from Australia rather than the usual morning news. "We don't have a comment about this at the moment and I do not know whether we will have one later in the day," the Kremlin press service said. But a spokesman for the office of Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov told Interfax news agency that he did not think that free speech in Russia was an issue after the closure of TV-6. "What we simply have is the decision of a court being carried out, and there is no reason to talk about a change as far as freedom of speech in Russia is concerned," said Alexei Volin, the second deputy of the Russian government administration. The fate of Russian media under Putin has strained the Kremlin administration's relations with the West, but it became less of a point of contention following the start of the US-led anti-terror campaign in Afghanistan in early October. The employees of TV-6 "intend to fight until the end and fight for the right to work on a different station with the same team," TV-6 television news broadcaster Alexei Vorobyov told Moscow Echo radio. "I do not understand why we have been left standing in an information blockade." The TV-6 crew said that guards were still allowing them into the Ostankino building, a massive Soviet-era television center in northern Moscow. But the TV-6 office no longer had working phones or access to news wire services, its lights were turned off by the television center's management, and its broadcasting satellite was left without power. Russia's media ministry ordered the Moscow Independent Broadcasting Corporation (MNVK), which held the license for TV-6, to stop broadcasting as the liquidation order came into force in an unexpected ruling last week. The ruling followed a complicated law that expired at the end of last year allowing minority shareholders -- in this case the state-controlled oil giant LUKoil -- to demand that a company be declared bankrupt should it not meet a tangled formula that oversaw its assets and income. That federal court ruling overturned an earlier decision that would have allowed TV-6 to stay on air, and infuriated even those journalists who saw the private broadcaster as their main rivals. "This makes me sick. I don't know if one can force a blank screen on a television channel, but the very idea that someone would want to do that is simply foul," said Vladimir Pozner, a prominent journalist who works with the state-controlled ORT television. "I think that this is a unique incident, when a whole channel stops broadcasting. This violates the rights of their audiences, and this black hole is actually a hole in our democratic practice," complained Yasen Zasursky, dean of the journalism college in Moscow's State University. However, rights activist Alexei Simonov argued that authorities might try a different tack. "They will merely try to hang a few swords over their heads and make the team feel completely defenseless, so that they begin to do stupid things," Simonov said on Moscow Echo radio. The TV-6 team said they suspected the decision was the Kremlin's retaliation after rebel reporters fought the government over the independence of the national NTV broadcaster, and left NTV for TV-6 when they lost. The state-owned giant Gazprom had taken over NTV in April as Putin waged a war against Russia's so-called oligarchs, powerful businessmen whose fortunes were made in the unbridled free-for-all of perestroika. However, "(the Kremlin's war against) oligarchs is not important any more. It is we who are being destroyed," TV-6's show host Svetlana Sorokina said. The team would still compete for the broadcasting license, the company's director and TV-6 show host Yevgeny Kiselyov assured. Earlier, Media and Press Minister Mikhail Lesin said in a television interview that the TV-6 team's chances of winning the license were "very high." Last Tuesday, journalists at TV-6 parted ways with Berezovsky to form "OOO TV-6" in an effort to save the embattled station. ****** #2 Russian politicians speak on TV6 closure Interfax Moscow, 22 January: Many Russian politicians are not surprised about the abrupt closure of the TV6 channel, although they have different opinions about it. Gennadiy Raykov, head of the People's Deputy group in the Duma, said he expected it. In a Tuesday [22 January] interview with Interfax he said that TV6 director Yevgeniy Kiselev "simply gave up his staff like he did at NTV". He described the situation as the enforcement of the law. Vladimir Pekhtin, leader of Unity faction, thinks passions should not be fanned around the channel. In his opinion, appropriate agencies will sort out the matter. Boris Nemtsov, leader of the Union of Right Forces, criticized the closure of TV6. Speaking to journalists he stressed the need to keep the reporting team of the channel intact. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Duma deputy speaker for the Liberal Democratic party, accounted for the closure by the stiffness of the channel's reporting team. Its leadership should have drawn corresponding conclusions a long time ago because the developments were taking "a known course", he said. It should have responded and changed the channel correspondingly, he said. Zhirinovskiy said that the main reason for the closure of TV6 was the broadcasting of its analytical and political programmes for Western viewers. It should have "kept mum", waited for the difficult times to pass in order to return to its line half a year later, he said. Moscow City Duma chairman Vladimir Platonov regrets the termination of broadcasts on the sixth channel. "It is a pity that we lost such a channel," he told Interfax on Tuesday. In his opinion, TV6 ranked second in popularity after NTV. Presidential envoy in the State Duma Aleksandr Kotenkov also spoke on the issue. "I would refrain from evaluations considering that this is a dispute between shareholders," he said. Still, in his opinion, there is nothing political about the situation. If any evaluations are made, the debate "may develop into a political one", he added. Head of the Russian Journalists' Union Igor Yakovenko has criticized the shutting off of TV-6. In an interview with Ekho Moskvy radio on Tuesday he said the question of the right of citizens to watch or listen to what they want is in question. At the moment "the rights of the viewers have been violated and trampled on", he said. ******* #3 Olympics-Russians bring vodka and caviar supplies to Salt Lake MOSCOW, Jan 22 (Reuters) - Vodka and caviar, two of Russia's most famous delicacies, will be on the menu of the country's Olympic athletes and coaches in Salt Lake City. "Everyone knows Utah is a Mormon State where alcohol is tough to get," Viktor Mamatov, Russia's Olympic Chief de Mission, was quoted as saying in Tuesday's Sport-Express newspaper. "Therefore, every member of our delegation is bringing two jars of caviar and two bottles of vodka," he added. "We already have permission to bring alcohol to Salt Lake City from the local authorities." The Russians, who are sending nearly 400 athletes, coaches and officials as part of their large Olympic contingent, also taking their own chefs to Salt Lake City to cook for them. The first part, consisting of the cross-country skiers and the women's curling team, left for the Utah capital on Monday. ****** #4 ORT Review www.ortv.ru Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba7@bu.edu) Research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy at Boston University HEADLINES, Monday, January 21, 2002 - Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center. Engineers showed him plans for the Angara, Rokot and Proton-M launch vehicles and the FGB-2 module that will be docked to the International Space Station by the end of the year. - President Putin met with Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov. Cooperation in the gas sector was at the top of the agenda. President Putin suggested the establishment of a Eurasian alliance of gas producers, which would also include Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. The presidents also discussed the status of the Caspian, humanitarian supplies to Afghanistan and the restoration of the Afghan economy. - Yevgeny Kiselev, the general director of MNVK (Moscow Independent Broadcasting Corporation), has written to the Russian Media Ministry asking it to disregard last week's letter giving up the broadcasting license, since the decision was to be made by the television station's board of directors, rather than the MNVK. - Renowned choreographer Igor Moiseev celebrated his 96th birthday today. - A 10,000-ruble note [$12.5] has been introduced in Belarus. - Only two defendants -- Boris Fadeev and Mikhail Levchenko -- remain on trial in the case of the attack on the Sergievo-Posadsky police unit. The case against Igor Tikhonov has been suspended because of his health. All of the accused plead innocent. - This morning's assassination attempt against North Ossetia's Interior Minister Kazbek Dzantiev is said to be aimed at throwing off the upcoming presidential elections. A bomb was placed in a snow-bank near the gates of Dzantiev's house; no one was injured. - The Russian government discussed the schedule of restoration work in flood-damaged Krasnoyarsk Krai today. Special equipment has been sent to the area. - Two more of the 14 convicts who escaped from the Ulyanovsk oblast maximum security prison have been captured, brining the total up to 8. - Another Russian soldier -- Sergei Popov -- has been freed from captivity in Chechnya. - The International Conference on the Reconstruction of Afghanistan began its work in Tokyo today. Representatives from 22 organizations and 60 nations, including Russia, are participating. ****** #5 Moscow Times January 22, 2002 The Washington Post: Off Target or Spot On? By Gregory Feifer Russia is much praised these days. Even the director of Washington's conservative Nixon Center, Paul Saunders, recently took The Washington Post to task for its editorials condemning the policies of President Vladimir Putin. Watching out for double standards is never a bad thing. Russia is not a country that can be seen in ideal tones of black and white because, simply put, there are relative degrees of good and bad. Saunders attacks the Post for its "relative comfort with Russia's Yeltsin-era oligarchy" and refers specifically to the partnership between Gusinsky's Media-MOST and Post-owned Newsweek Magazine that created the Itogi weekly news magazine. It never occurred to me to see Itogi's existence as something to criticize, despite Gusinsky's deservedly dastardly reputation. The magazine was one of Russia's leading news publications. Saunders goes on to say that the current attempt to shut down Boris Berezovsky's TV6 television channel has nothing to do with the government, but involves a court battle between two private entities. He rightly criticizes Berezovsky for his manipulation of Yeltsin's Kremlin. Nonetheless, to say that Putin "was determined to break the relationship of mutual parasitism between his country's government and so-called oligarchs like Berezovsky" is another exercise in painting things in black and white. What is clear is that Putin has essentially sent into exile those oligarchs who were opposed to his mission of consolidating power. Those who quickly fell into line and publicly pledged support for the president's growing political machine (in the name of "strengthening the state" and "fighting corruption') are still very much prospering today. Russia's best hope (albeit far from perfect) for further democratization would have been for the existing elites -- including Gusinsky, Berezovsky and others such as powerful regional leaders -- to act as checks upon one another, to prevent the excessive concentration of power in one center and allow the country to gradually evolve toward the rule of law enforced by functioning institutions. Sure, it's easier said than done. But as the authors of Russia's mass privatization program insisted, institutions cannot exist when there is no need for them. Under Putin, there seems to be increasingly less need for them. Through various means, he and those supporting him have coopted the opposition, built up their own authority at the expense of other elites, and crippled the independence of parliament and the judiciary. Meanwhile, the atrocities in Chechnya continue with civilians being raped, tortured and murdered each week. Saunders says "no serious Russian politician argues that atrocities are a matter of government policy." But what of the policy of silence on the issue? What of the fact that Moscow's disgusting attack on the Chechen population only provides fertile ground for the terrorism that the Kremlin says it is fighting to eradicate? Putin's actions may be called reform, but it's certainly not in the direction of greater democracy. Indeed, The Washington Post should be commended rather than being taken to task for the zeal of its ongoing criticism of the Putin administration at a time when so many are applauding the temporary and superficial successes of the government's so-called reform policies -- especially after Sept. 11, when so many voices fell silent on Chechnya. To its little-deserved credit, even the ham-fisted Bush administration recently managed to raise a voice in protest at Russian soldiers' brutality in the breakaway republic. Things in Russia are not black and white. For all his faults and all the paradoxes that emerged from the discrepancy between his stated aims and his actions, Yeltsin symbolized a break with the past. As Duma Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov -- who was frequently vociferous in his criticism of Yeltsin during his presidency -- once said, "Under Yeltsin, we may have been slowly fumbling our way through a thick jungle. But at least it was in the right direction. Under Putin, we're building an autobahn, but it's headed the wrong way." Gregory Feifer lives in Moscow and is writing a book about the rise of the Putin presidency. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times. ******* #6 Afghan war makes U.S. active in Moscow's backyard By Sebastian Alison ALMATY, Jan 22 (Reuters) - Central Asia's vast steppes, largely overlooked by the modern world until now, have become the newest strategic hotspot for Russian-American rivalry. The ex-Soviet republics have seen a steady flow of visitors from the United States, anxious to secure military access to a region that borders Afghanistan but which Moscow still views as its own backyard, a decade after the Soviet Union collapsed. The latest top-level visitor is General Tommy Franks, the commander of the campaign in Afghanistan. He had talks in Uzbekistan on Tuesday, hard on the heels of Secretary of State Colin Powell, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and others. Washington has been allowed to deploy troops and has sent thousands to two of the five regional states, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. It has permission to send more to Tajikistan and has been offered logistical support by a fourth, Kazakhstan. The question now vexing Russian policy makers is this: just how long will they stay? Russia says it is happy to see U.S. troops in the region -- but only for the duration of the Afghan campaign. It sees Central Asia as a strategic bulwark against the drugs, political instability and militant Islam of Afghanistan and Iran. Yet U.S. military involvement in the region since September 11 has added a dimension to competition over oil and other economic interests in post-Communist Central Asia that has drawn comparisons with the 19th-century "Great Game" rivalry in the same part of the world between British India and Russia. DISSENT FROM RUSSIA President Vladimir Putin gave the ex-Soviet Central Asian presidents his blessing to support the U.S.-led coalition last year. But voices of dissent are now beginning to be heard. "Let them (the Americans) deal with Afghanistan," Gennady Seleznyov, Russia's Communist parliamentary speaker, said this month on a visit to Russian troops stationed in Tajikistan. "The most important thing is that they should not deal with Central Asia with the same fervour." Konstantin Totsky, who commands Russian forces on the Tajik-Afghan border, was blunter about the American presence: "It is possible only for the period of the anti-terrorist operation by coalition forces in Afghanistan. But if this is for long, we will not be friends." Yet U.S. officials seem in no hurry to remove the troops. Senate majority leader Tom Daschle, one of a stream of visitors from Capitol Hill, told reporters last week that "our presence and relationship with the people of Uzbekistan and the countries in the region is not simply in the immediate term." Uzbek President Islam Karimov, host to at least 1,500 U.S. troops at an air base, says he has set no time limit on its use. Kyrgyzstan's President Askar Akayev, who expects up to 3,000 U.S. troops and 40 aircraft at Manas airport near the capital Bishkek by the end of February, has signed a one-year agreement. But he has already said he may extend it. Yet while U.S. officials have been welcomed warmly, senior Russians have not had such luck. When Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov called on Uzbekistan's Karimov this month, the meeting started three hours late and Ivanov still left Tashkent two hours early. American visitors get more of Karimov's time. HUMAN RIGHTS The United States may be winning a battle for influence as Central Asia's presidents hope for favours -- and money -- from their guests. But as it gears up for what could be a long stay, it recognises that it is dealing with governments frequently condemned for poor records on human rights and democracy. Daschle raised human rights last week with Karimov, who, like all but one of the five leaders in the region, has been in power, first as Communist party boss and then as president, since before independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. "I think we would all agree that we have not seen as much progress as we had hoped for," he said of human rights in a country where Americans have frequently raised concerns over the disappearance of opponents of the regime. Not that Karimov seems unduly bothered. On Sunday, he holds a referendum to extend his presidential term to seven years from five. His term began in 2000 after the last mandate, won in 1995, was also extended by a referendum. An extension is expected to be granted. And the United States, mindful of needing Karimov's support as it digs in for what could be a long stay, has had little to say about it. ******* #7 Moscow Times January 22, 2002 Wall Still Standing in Berlin By Boris Kagarlitsky A recent issue of a glossy women's magazine invites its readers to visit Berlin. The readership is informed that since the fall of the Berlin Wall, which divided the city, everything has been going swimmingly. "The two Berlins are gradually growing together, the invisible scar is mending and the architectural countenance of unified Germany's capital is becoming harmonious in its integrity." In short, things could not be better. It's a great pity that the population of Berlin has a very different point of view. Local elections resulted in defeat for both of the city's main ruling parties, with the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats losing considerable ground. Moreover, the vote was not just against certain parties, it was also a vote against 10 years of East Berlin being ruled by West Berlin. East Berlin essentially revolted against its Western half. The former capital of the German Democratic Republic voted for the Party of Democratic Socialism, successor to the former Communist Party. Once, the eastern part of the city was proudly named "Berlin -- capital of the GDR." Now the slogan is: "Berlin -- capital of the PDS." Germany's capital is bankrupt. That, in any case, is what Berliners seem to think. The city has debts amounting to 900 million euros, there is no money in the municipal coffers, the streets -- uncharacteristically for Germany -- are rather dirty and municipal transport expensive. But strangely none of this detracts from the city's charm. The atmosphere of 1920s Europe is ubiquitous. Since the fall of the Wall, it has become clear that East and West Berlin, although living side-by-side, lead separate existences. Each has developed its own culture, lifestyle and politics. What's unique about the German capital is that these two distinct cities share the same territory. Mental walls separate the two no less firmly than concrete walls did before. East Berlin is poorer, tougher, more disciplined and harbors more grievances. West Berlin is a strange melange of bourgeois, radical left-wingers and immigrants. In the Kreuzberg district you rarely hear anything but Turkish spoken. In Pankow you can feel the presence of old Prussia. Also young people can be seen proudly wear t-shirts with the inscription "Born in the GDR," although they look as though they had barely entered school when the GDR ceased to exist. Another city has arisen of late. It is a city of bureaucrats located in the middle between East and West -- where the Wall once ran. Federal bureaucrats moving from Bonn have been settled here. There seems to be very little interaction between these bureaucrats and the locals. Today, East and West are attempting a kind of second unification. PDS politicians have been offered positions in the city government and party founder Gregor Gysi is to become economy minister (although considering the state of the city's finances, one can only sympathize with his situation). In the coalition agreement, the PDS officially apologizes for the building of the Berlin Wall and for the forceable merging of the Social Democratic Party with the Communist Party in the 1940s. East Berliners snidely comment that their Western colleagues, in turn, should apologize for the mess that they have caused in the eastern part of the city over the past 10 years. Also, residents of the Sch?nefeld district discovered to their disgust that the PDS had forgotten about its promise to oppose the construction of a new airport there. It's not much fun living next to an airstrip. In a conversation with a PDS functionary, however, I got the impression that with the airport they would resort to bureaucratic sabotage, a tried and tested tactic from Communist times. Without actually saying no to the construction, they can start setting up commissions etc. to prevent the project from making any headway. At the symbolic level, the PDS' accession to power in Berlin marks the beginning of the long-awaited equality between the East and West of the country. In the press there is already talk of a possible national coalition between the PDS and Social Democrats. PDS politicians are happy to have achieved respectability. However, genuine integration depends not on political coalitions, but on investments into the economy and social sphere of the East. If PDS ministers do not ensure this, they will resolve only their personal problems and certainly not the problems of Germany's capital. Boris Kagarlitsky is a Moscow-based sociologist. ******* #8 Vremya Novostei January 21, 2002 AN INTERVIEW WITH YEVGENY SATANOVSKY, PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN JEWISH CONGRESS [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] Question: Is there anti-Semitism in Russia today? Yevgeny Satanovsky: I would not say it is institutionalized on the state level. The elite is what matters, and the Russian elite is not on the caveman level of consciousness anymore. There is mundane distrust of Jews in every country every day. Where there are no Jews, someone will inevitably be suspected of being one. Not only Jews are affected however. That goes for all ethnic groups. They all are distrustful of others to some degree or the other. Question: Does it occur to you that the negative historical experience could have bred certain complexes in some Jews? For instance the victim may think that he or she is entitled to a great deal by way of recompense? Yevgeny Satanovsky: For Jews with their memory of Holocaust, this is not a complex of the victim. It is rather a manner of behavior. Question: French ambassador to Great Britain calls Israel a "small shitty country" in a private conversation, thereby generating an international conflict. Russia may be castigated without anybody giving a damn. But when you criticize a Jew, you automatically become an anti-Semite... Yevgeny Satanovsky: What really matters is who criticizes and what for. I'd recommend that Russian politicians take a lesson or two from the Israelis. He who does not respect himself cannot expect to be respected by anybody else. The Jews have learned to defend themselves and their dignity. Question: On what level do you communicate with Russian authorities? Do Jewish organizations experience problems with state security structures nowadays? Yevgeny Satanovsky: I regularly meet with the authorities. What can I say? Jews do not threaten Russia's security. They do not pose a threat of separatism or terrorism. ******* #9 International Herald Tribune January 22, 2002 Help Central Asians to Mesh and Break Out From Isolation By David Jay Green The writer is a senior economist at the Asian Development Bank in Manila. He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune. MANILA The international community is learning an important fact about Central Asia: It is hard to get to and travel within the region. And Central Asians generally have little personal contact with market economies. If Afghanistan has shown that conflict, poverty and despair can provide a breeding ground for religious and political extremism, one should not ignore the other parts of Central Asia. Its location frustrates economic development, particularly in the former Soviet lands to the north of Afghanistan - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Being far from the marketplaces of the industrialized world has stalled these countries' chance to reduce appalling poverty. If they were located in Eastern Europe, they would have far different prospects. Central Asia is landlocked and connected to East Asia or Europe by long and poorly maintained roads and railroads. Uzbekistan is double-landlocked, in the sense that its goods have to travel through at least two countries to reach the sea. Travelers, especially traders, are often victims of underpaid and poorly supervised police or customs officials. The region lacks the easy access to Western Europe that has helped the people of Eastern Europe to adopt market-based economies and move toward eventual integration in the European Union. This has discouraged investment in Central Asia. The markets of East Asia, Europe and North America are well linked, mainly by sea and air. Central Asia lies apart and plays no role in global trade. Remoteness exacerbates more basic development problems. The former Soviet countries inherited a subsidized living standard that cannot be supported by unproductive factories and mines. For example, Kazakhstan's industrial towns were integrated into the Soviet military-industrial complex. With few exceptions, solutions have not been found to make such assets profitable. The international community has tackled some of the problems in the former Soviet Central Asia. Even before the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan, Central Asia received considerable aid. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank all work there. Aid comes also from the separate assistance programs of European countries, Japan and the United States. With few exceptions, however, the assistance does not recognize the region's central problem of being located far from industrialized markets. Aid is generally project-based - a school rebuilding here, a road repair project there. But the roads within each of the countries lead to borders that are often closed and inhospitable to trade and transport. Assistance that is not designed with a regional perspective will produce little. Even in education, national programs must deal with the differing language needs of ethnic groups spread across borders. Uzbekistan struggles to produce textbooks in seven languages. Officials there say they would be glad to trade with their neighbors for some of these. Making textbooks more uniformly available in local languages could help reduce ethnic tension. Some programs do recognize the need to think regionally about development and assistance. The Asian Development Bank is supporting a regional transport program, especially by improving connections to road and rail routes to East Asia. The European Union has supported transport route improvements from Central Asia to Europe. The World Bank has worked on the difficult issues surrounding the drying up of the Aral Sea by seeking the cooperation of the mountain states Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and lower-lying Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Even regionally focused programs face serious challenges. International aid will be effective only if there is a coordinated effort, within a regional setting. Some collaborative efforts are visible. The EU funds reconstruction of border posts in support of an Asian Development Bank cross-border road project. But a lot more international cooperation is required if there is to be real impact on the lives of the people. One suggestion is for the various aid agencies to undertake joint programming missions, to plan together on how to meet regional needs. This is difficult, but the current situation in Central Asia underscores the importance of trying. More concerted efforts are needed to link Central Asia to the global economy and restore development potential. ******** #10 Financial Times (UK) 22 January 2002 Putin seeks Eurasian alliance of gas producers By Robert Cottrell in Moscow President Vladimir Putin called on Monday for a "Eurasian alliance of gas producers" uniting Russia and the three big gas-producing countries of central Asia. Such an alliance would help guarantee Russia close, long-term economic ties with key countries in central Asia, at a time when many Russians are worried by growing US influence in the region. Mr Putin made the call in a meeting with Saparmurat Niyazov, the autocratic president of Turkmenistan, a gas-producing former Soviet republic which borders Afghanistan. The gas alliance envisioned by Mr Putin would bring together Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. It would "bring an element of stability into the transportation of gas on a long-term basis", Mr Putin said. For the past decade the central Asian countries have been wondering how best to diversify their export routes and export markets away from the old Soviet pipeline system running into and across Russia. They are looking to China, Turkey, Iran and through Afghanistan to Pakistan. But in practice, most alternative routes have posed big financial or political obstacles. Mr Putin evidently hopes he can put relations on a new footing by persuading central Asian leaders that staying close to Russia makes the best commercial sense. They would continue to rely on Russia's big and still growing network of pipelines to move their gas into European markets. But for the plan to go any further, Russia will have to persuade the central Asian countries they will be treated fairly by Gazprom, the Russian gas monopoly that controls the pipelines and also covets export markets for itself. Russia is the biggest gas producer in the region, accounting for 585bn cubic metres a year. Uzbekistan produces 50bn, Turkmenistan 45bn and Kazakhstan 10bn. But the central Asian countries have plans to increase production and exports, in some cases dramatically, raising the prospect of future price wars in foreign markets from which all would suffer. Any attempt by Mr Putin to strengthen ties with central Asia will please Russian conservatives worried by the growing US presence. Gennady Seleznyov, the speaker of the Russian parliament, and Konstantin Totsky, the head of the Russian border guards, have both said recently that western forces would not be needed in central Asia once the fighting in Afghanistan was over. Of all the central Asian counties, Turkmenistan has been the most cautious in co-operating with the US-led Afghan war effort. It has allowed humanitarian cargoes to use its roads and air space. But it has refused to lend or accommodate military bases, insisting on its "neutrality". Mr Niyazov may be hoping this policy will bring him rewards from Russia. But there were no signs on Monday that he had gained ground on another priority for Russia and Turkmenistan - the need for agreement on dividing the Caspian Sea and its mineral resources among the five countries surrounding it. Mr Niyazov wants a Caspian summit at which the leaders of the five countries would themselves try to hammer out a solution. Russia does not want a summit until a solution has already been agreed by diplomats, and can be rubber-stamped. ****** #11 Novye Izvestia January 22, 2002 SILENCE OF THE COMMUNISTS Analysis of the latest congress of the Russian Communist Party Author: Rustem Falyakhov [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] AN EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS HAS BEEN HELD BEHIND CLOSED DOORS. THE COMMUNISTS DID NOT SAY ANYTHING NEW AT ALL, AND GENNADI ZYUGANOV WAS RE-ELECTED AS LEADER. THE KREMLIN'S POLITICAL CONSULTANTS ARE DOING ALL THEY CAN TO SPLIT THE LEFT MOVEMENT NOWADAYS. An extraordinary congress of the Russian Communists has been held behind closed doors. This privacy was the only intriguing aspect of it. After delivering his report to the congress, Communist leader Gennadi Zyuganov revealed its major themes right after the congress. The Communists have two main complaints against the government. Firstly, President Putin "is giving up all geopolitical territory of a state which is a thousand years old". Secondly, he is pursuing a "policy of genocide". In other words, the Communists did not say anything new at all. Delegates to the congress appraised the communist ranks as well. According to the party statisticians, 34 regional leaders support Communist ideas. According to unofficial reports, only five "red governors" turned up at the congress - from Tula, Kursk, Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Kamchatka. Even these five regional leaders did not always agree with the Communist Party in absolutely everything. Mikhail Mashkovtsev from Kamchatka urged his comrades to cooperate with the federal government, only moving into opposition to the regime on key issues. Duma Speaker Gennadi Seleznev frowned when he heard the term "policy of genocide" from Zyuganov. Seleznev said that the term sounded fine but was not exactly correct. In fact, Seleznev was actually late for the beginning. He turned up after Zyuganov's program speech. Petty discord did not prevent the communist leader's re-election. Only five delegates voted against Zyuganov. The Kremlin's political consultants are doing all they can to split the left movement nowadays. Young party functionaries want their chance to be in the driver's seat too. The inaugural congress of the Russian Labour Party took place the other day. Oleg Shein, its leader and a Duma deputy, is convinced that the new party will be able to win some votes from the Communists. The Communists do not plan to change the party name. The statement about its acronym not being subject to change is probably an echo of a recent incident. There are rumors that TV journalist Sergei Dorenko suggested the acronym for the conservative party. LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky took up the joke and said CPRF would be a fine acronym for the merged Unity and Fatherland party. It seems that even President Putin recognizes the closeness of the Communists and the pro-government party. He sent his congratulations to the congress advocating consolidation of all creative forces. ******* #12 Vremya MN January 18, 2002 YOUNG OLIGARCHS A good majority of those who wield financial power in Russia today a product of early perestroika, when economic power was delegated to youths in the komsomol Author: Olga Kryshtanovskaya, department of elite studies, Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] RESULTS OF SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEYS. The revolutionary changes that took place in Russian society in the 1980's and 1990's began when the conflict between generations of old (70-80 years) and young (45-60) politicians reached a matured stage. The former did not want to vacate the watering holes that were their positions, while the latter sensed that power was gradually slipping off their hands as they themselves grew older. When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, the young nomenclature got its chance to change the situation. The average age of the team that initiated the perestroika was 68.5 years. Gorbachev put into motion a true "staff meat-grinder", mercilessly getting rid of the men of Brezhnev's era. The Politburo became seven years younger, the Central Committee five years. The nomenclature got its chance to make careers at a much faster rate. This means the new generation of the nomenclature that came into the corridors of power with Gorbachev would not have the time to exploit their victory. It would be buried - along with Gorbachev - under the ruins of the Soviet Union. All the same, Gorbachev succeeded in making changes in the political system, changes that would have global consequences for the powers-that-be. Introduction of the so-called Komsomol economy was one of the fundamental reforms. It permitted young apparatchiks to try their hands in business. Youth centers of scientific-technical crafts were established under the aegis of the All-Union Lenin Communist Union of the Youth (Komsomol) in the capital city in 1987 and 1988. Enjoying unique privileges, these centers became the first business structures in the Soviet Union. Their success put forth a new process - the nomenclature began exchanging power for property. In the long run, it resulted in the appearance of a second branch of the government, the financial oligarchs. The functions of the Centers were restricted to mere cashing of funds stashed away in the bank accounts of most Soviet enterprises. Permitted to execute this simple operation, the Centers got their commission as mediators between state enterprises and individuals - from 18% to 33% of the sum of the deal. 5% of the commission went to the "overseers", the party structures. Legal commerce in Gorbachev's era was something reserved for the privileged only. Only the nomenclature and its puppets were permitted to deal in something that promised - and provided - super dividends. Having got tired of sitting in their dusty offices, Komsomol functionaries got into show-biz, international tourism, establishment of banks, construction and real estate companies. They handled export- import operations as well. All of them were young men under 30. The clearer it became that the barter trade of power for property was profitable and commercial risks minimal, the more party and Komsomol functionaries rushed to the new structures of the emerging "alternative" economy. Between 1987 and 1992, the ratio of ex- functionaries in business elite grew from 38% to 61%. The average age of the new Russians was not that green at all: 41.1 years in 1992, and 44.6 in 1994. It means that young Komsomol functionaries were not alone - even before the mass privatization, there were also men of medium and even old age who were smart enough to think ahead into the future and move to positions of power in the economy. The nomenclature sector of the quasi-market economy was formed by several means. It was formed by way of auctions (privatization, essentially) of ministries and departments (Gazprom was established in this manner in the first place). It was formed by way of establishment of commercial structures on the initiative and with the direct participation of state structures that promoted their own men to manage the new business ventures. A lot of companies were established by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade and Soviet Committee for Foreign Economic Contacts. State officials established commercial structures to suit their own needs and eventually got themselves assigned there to pull all sorts of strings. The barter trade of power for property was the most actively used method. In the Soviet Union, there was the practice of using "diplomatic exile". A new way of leaving the gradually emerging power structure to transit into business. These structures were quickly staffed with high-ranking retirees and personal pensioners. This barter trade eventually took another form - some state structures delegated commercial powers to their appointees. The appointees were usually young men who immediately became heads of powerful financial structures. This golden youth appeared as self-made men only to the naive. The fact is that powerful state structures were always behind them. Studies of how representatives of different generations came to business is important for the proper understanding of the emergence of market economy in Russia. This is because the "new bourgeoisie" had a direct effect on politics. The first attempts of this sort were very naive. They were restricted to attempts by new Russians like Artem Tarasov, Herman Sterligov, Konstantin Borovoi and others to claim financial prosperity through parliamentary electoral campaigns. Aggressive attempts by the newly emerged business to "buy power" became much less frequent only several years later. Businesses' political clout went on growing but businessmen became much more cautious. All branches of the government started experiencing lobbyism. Large businessmen delegated its representatives to all levels of power structures. Representatives of large businesses controlled 17.3% of the Duma in 2001, 4.2% of the Cabinet, 8.1% of gubernatorial offices, and 15% of the presidential inner circle. Back in the 1990's, the ratio of youths who were eager for seats on parliaments of different levels was rapidly falling. There is more to the tendency than meet the eye. The chances of getting elected were falling as well. The following is an approximation of the chances of varying age groups to get elected into the Duma in 1999: young men under 30 had the worst chances of only 9.6% (the smallest). The rest of the age groups had much better chances: 26.1% for those within 30- 39 years old, 24.1% for 40-49 years old, 25% for 50-59%, and 23.2% for 60 years and over. How come this discrimination? The reasons are rooted in the organizational weakness of youth movements, the absence of a network of youth organizations with regional subdivisions, and their lack of clout among voters. The Komsomol passed away, and nothing was formed in its stead by way of national youth organizations, representing the interests of the youth in power structures. The financial factor is playing an important part here too - the youth has much less by way of support in business structures. Do Russian political parties bet on the youth? The answer to this question may be given using only two parties as an example, that is LDPR and Union of Right Forces. The reasons are different again: LDPR relies on its charismatic leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky (and it is typical for charismatic leaders to appeal to the youth for support above the head of the regime). The Union of Right Forces relies on the youth because the new generation is more prone to value democratic ideals and Western values. Whether this is true or not remains to be seen. Young men under 30 account for less than 3% of all parliaments on all levels. On the federal level, however, they are represented twice as better than on the regional. Ethnic republics and autonomies of the Russian Federation are the oldest in this respect - they have the lowest number of young deputies. Men in their forties are the most populous group in all parliaments. There are legislative age margins for candidates for positions in executive power structures in some regions. The formation of the political elite in the executive power structures in the 1990's took place in two forms. The first may be termed as a big leap, as in when a young man without experience in management was appointed to a vital position. Boris Yeltsin's advisors were ex-scientists of the Academy of Sciences. Among them were historian S. Stankevich, sociologist G. Starovoitova, mathematician G. Satarov, S. Shakhrai and G. Burbulis. Yeltsin elevated to the governmental level young and inexperienced Gaidar, Glaziev, Khakamada, Generalov, etc. These meteoritic promotions were a characteristic feature of the president but were also typical of the time, since democratic system in Russia followed its own laws. There was, however, an alternative way to the top. The way of gradual ascension. Most young men got to the corridors of power by gradual infiltration and careful staircase-climbing. (Translated by A. Ignatkin) ******** #13 The Globe and Mail (Canada) January 22, 2002 Tough Canadians shut out feeble Russians This winter, a cherished symbol of Canada is rolling through Europe with a vengeance By GEOFFREY YORK MOSCOW -- They munched their way through Finland and Sweden. They flooded the remote forests of Tierra del Fuego. Now the Canadian beavers are invading Russia -- and the Russians are nervous. Like a science experiment gone awry, the march of transplanted Canadian beavers across the northern tip of Europe is advancing inexorably southward, ousting Russia's native beaver population and creating fears of damage to forests and farms. Russian scientists say their country has become the world's only battleground between Canadian and European beavers. So far, Canada's national symbol is winning. "Day by day, the European beavers are pushed to the southeast, and Canadian beavers are pushing them out," complained Maxim Sinitsyn, an ecologist at the Institute for Evolution and Ecology, which belongs to the Russian Academy of Sciences. "It could create a very acute problem. It is an invasion by a species not typical of Europe, and their pressure is forcing out the European species and changing the ecosystem. The European environment is not ready for the activity of Canadian beavers." The Canadian beavers, he says, were introduced in the 1950s and 60s into Finland and Sweden, where no native beaver population existed. With no natural predators, they swiftly expanded their area. Beginning about 25 years ago, they spread from Finland into the northern Russian region of Karelia, where they continued to expand. Up to 20,000 Canadian beavers are believed to be thriving in northwestern Russia today, and scientists predict they will soon march further south, rudely shoving out European beavers as they go. Canadian beavers are historically a younger species than their European cousins, Mr. Sinitsyn said. "The Canadian beavers have more stamina and flexibility, they are more active and they can survive better." One of the main differences between the two is that Canadian beavers build dams -- sometimes huge structures up to hundreds of metres in length -- while European beavers generally don't. As a result, the Canadian beavers are changing the Russian ecology in unpredictable ways. "They cause a flood in the surrounding territory, and the flatter the landscape, the wider is the zone of influence," fretted Alexander Rusanov, director of a Russian environmental foundation. Scientists are worried the beavers could damage Russian canals and farms, changing the composition of rivers, threatening commercial forests and even perhaps stealing vegetables from farmland. They acknowledge, however, that the beavers could have positive effects. In areas that have become dried out by logging, beavers can help restore wetlands, creating havens for animals and resting spots for migrating birds. Beavers became extinct in most parts of Europe centuries ago. Now Russia has become the first zone of direct contact between large numbers of European and Canadian beavers, Mr. Sinitsyn said. "Karelia is the only transition zone in all of Europe." This isn't the first time the furry Canadian rodent has provoked foreign anxieties. In 1946, Argentina imported 25 pairs from Canada to help the fur industry in Tierra del Fuego. By the 1990s, the original 25 pairs had multiplied to 50,000 on the Argentinian side. Their dams were flooding forests and roads, eroding farmland and creating alarm among scientists who feared the beavers would swim to the South American mainland and take over the Andean forests. In Finland, Canadian beavers have caused heavy damage to commercial forestry in some regions, with dams flooding forests and killing valuable trees. Other countries have been quick to guard against the Canadian beast. When an English wildlife trust decided last year to reintroduce beavers in wetlands (almost 1,000 years after beavers became extinct there), it deliberately chose the European beaver. One British newspaper sniffed that the Canadian beavers were "uncivilized brutes." ****** #14 Worldlink The magazine of the World Economic Forum January-February 2002 GOING WEST Russia’s perception of the world is changing. As Charles Grant explains, president Vladimir Putin has come to realise the importance of international political and economic cooperation Grant is director of the London-based Centre for European Reform. This article is based on an essay in "Europe After September 11", published by CER in December 2001 During the final months of 2001, Russia’s dalliance with Nato caused much interest in western Europe and the US, and some concern in the eastern European states that escaped Moscow’s domination only a decade ago. In December, Nato foreign ministers agreed to pursue the idea of a Russia-Nato Council that would discuss matters of joint concern, and in which Russia might have the right to veto certain decisions. Much less attention has focused on Russia’s increasingly close relationship with the EU, though this may have more significance in the long term. Since September 11, president Vladimir Putin has moved deftly to position Russia as a key ally of the west in the struggle against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Putin has moved ahead of his own defence establishment and important strands of public opinion by supporting the bombing of Afghanistan and by calmly accepting the presence of US forces on former Soviet territory. His softening of Russia’s previous hostility to Nato enlargement has upset plenty of senior figures in Moscow. But Putin has also made it clear that he wants Russia to deepen its ties with the structures of global and European economic governance. Until recently, the Russian elite had little interest in, or knowledge of, the EU. They assumed that the bloc was a body for trade negotiations and that important power lay in the member states. In the two years since Putin became president, however, many Russians have begun to take a keen interest in the EU. They have begun to understand that it counts as an entity in itself. Russia’s liberals are keen to promote closer relations with the EU as a way of modernising their country. Before September 11, Putin’s entourage argued that his strategy of strengthening the Russian economy depended on integration with Europe. The Kremlin was looking to the EU for a closer, high-level partnership, but felt frustrated that it did not respond. Those responsible for EU foreign policy acknowledged that its links with Russia left something to be desired. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which covers trade issues, the Tacis programme of technical assistance and the twice-yearly EU-Russia summits tended to follow a bureaucrats’ agenda and to underplay the political dimension for which the Russians were looking. The Russian side, however, often put too much emphasis on the creation of grand political structures and not enough on the nitty-gritty of the domestic reforms that would facilitate closer economic ties. The EU told the Russians that if they entered the World Trade Organisation (WTO), it would be happy to negotiate a free-trade area with them. WTO membership would require Russia to make some painful economic and legal changes, which is one reason why the talks on Russia’s joining moved slowly. Russian negotiators sometimes appeared to think that, because theirs was a large and important country, it should not have to jump through as many hoops as some others that seek WTO membership. The Russians will not like Brussels or Geneva telling them what to do. But if they want to attract investment and strengthen their economy, they must move closer to the WTO and the EU However, the prospects of a genuine EU-Russia partnership have looked much stronger since September 11. Putin seems to have decided that Russia needs closer ties with the EU and that it must therefore implement the necessary political and economic reforms. Speaking before the Bundestag on September 25, Putin declared: "Nobody doubts the great value of Europe’s relations with the US. However, I simply think that, certainly in the long term, Europe will better consolidate its reputation as a powerful and really independent centre of international politics if it combines its own possibilities with Russia’s human, territorial and natural resources, and with Russia’s economic, cultural and defence potential." In October, when Putin went to Brussels for a regular Russia-EU summit, he spoke of Russia’s joining the WTO and the EU. Putin and EU leaders agreed on a more substantive set of measures than are usually covered in their meetings. The Russian ambassador to the EU will have monthly meetings with the Political and Security Committee, the EU body responsible for coordinating foreign and defence policy. There will also be monthly consultations to share intelligence on criminals and terrorists, on financial transactions that could aid terrorists and on monitoring movements of materials that could be used in nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The EU promised to help Russia with the reforms that will be needed to facilitate its joining the WTO. For his part, Putin declared that Russia was prepared to cut farm subsidies and tariff barriers, that it would comply with WTO rules on intellectual-property rights and that it would adjust its foreign-trade laws to meet WTO requirements. The Russian government and the EU also reaffirmed their commitment to the existing consultation on energy cooperation. The point of this dialogue is to encourage investment in Russia’s gas and oil industries, so that Russia boosts its exports and the EU gains more secure supplies. The EU, of course, is only too keen to diversify its supplies of energy away from the Gulf; with enough foreign investment, Russia could probably produce as much oil as Saudi Arabia. The EU also wants to use this dialogue to ensure, among other things, better safeguards for foreign investors, the right to inspect pipelines of mutual interest and the restructuring of gas giant Gazprom. There is still much Russian resistance to foreign investment in natural resources. An earlier EU-Russia energy charter remains unratified by the Duma. Some influential Russians still claim that western capitalists want Russia in the WTO only to exploit the country’s mineral wealth and enrich themselves at Russia’s expense. (The mundane truth is that Russia could use WTO mechanisms to defeat protectionism by the EU or the US.) Some Russian industries might well suffer from WTO membership. But if Russia were seen as willing and able to enforce WTO rules, it would improve its miserable record of attracting foreign direct investment ($2.7 billion in 2000, compared with Poland’s $10 billion and China’s $41 billion). If Russia made an effort it could perhaps join the WTO in 2004. Then, not only a free-trade area but even the "common European economic space", proposed in May 2001 by European Commission president Romano Prodi, would become feasible. The idea would be to extend the EU’s single market to Russia, removing non-tariff barriers to trade and investment. Russia would have to adjust much of its legislation to comply with EU norms. Both sides would have to accept the principle of mutual recognition and have confidence in each other’s inspection systems. Closer ties between the EU and Russia must include a frank dialogue on human rights. Russia’s progress over the past decade has been impressive, but the war in Chechnya remains an ugly scar on its reputation. Encouragingly, Russia seems to have recently become more interested in talking to Chechen rebels. Its keenness to show that it is a western country – plus the evident failure of its existing policies – may be having a positive effect. On November 18, negotiators representing Putin and Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov had their first acknowledged meeting, at Moscow’s main international airport. Russia’s participation in the anti-terrorist alliance has led EU countries – much like the US – to soften their criticism of Russian actions in Chechnya. But they have not ceased to raise human-rights issues with the Russians; nor have they forgotten their concerns about press freedom. The joint statement issued after the October EU-Russia summit declared that "media pluralism is a basic ingredient in a modern democratic society." The best way for the EU to anchor Russia in a westward-leaning direction would be to offer the prospect of a joint EU-Russia political structure. Instead of the existing summits, a special council of EU and Russian ministers could meet regularly to discuss issues of common concern such as the Balkans, organised crime, the environment or Prodi’s proposal of a common economic space. Decisions of the council would require the consent of both partners and then be binding. That kind of partnership will not become viable until Russia’s view of the world has evolved. Britain and France have had 40 years to adjust to the loss of empire and to understand that mid-sized countries can achieve more through integrating with neighbours than by standing alone. The Russians lost their empire only 10 years ago and some still view their country as a superpower. But as Russia gets closer to the EU and other international clubs, it will learn that integration sometimes requires giving up specific national interests in return for broader benefits. The Russians will not like the bureaucrats of Brussels or Geneva telling them what to do. But if they want to attract investment and strengthen their economy, they have no choice but to move closer to the WTO and the EU. Putin seems to understand this. In his Bundestag speech he said: "Yes, the implementation of democratic principles in international relations, the ability to find the right resolutions and the readiness for compromise, these are difficult things. Yes, it was the Europeans themselves who first understood the importance of seeking joint resolutions and rising above national egotism. We agree, these are good ideas." The Russians will therefore need to think hard about how their state can evolve. In the terminology of Robert Cooper, the British diplomat who wrote the essay The Post-Modern State and the New Order, states are either pre-modern (Afghanistan), modern (the classic nation state) or post-modern. Those in the EU are the most post-modern because they have learned the benefits of devolving some powers to a regional level while pushing others up to supranational institutions. Russia is a modern state with a few pre-modern zones within, notably in the Caucasus. The EU should help make Russia a post-modern state, one that, in Cooper’s words, "accepts either the necessity and desirability of interdependence, or its corollaries of openness, mutual surveillance and mutual interference". Since September 11, that task is easier. *******