Johnson's Russia List #6033 21 January 2002 davidjohnson@erols.com A CDI Project www.cdi.org [Note from David Johnson: 1. AP: Russia Hopes to Limit U.S. Shield. 2. Reuters: Court bailiffs move to shut Russian TV station. 3. strana.ru: Putin: Pro-Press Freedom, Didn’t You Know? Putin scoops “Openness to the Press” prize in Moscow. 4. Moscow Times: Curt Weldon, A New Beginning... 5. Moscow Times: Vladimir Frolov, ...Or Just Irrational Exuberance? 6. Vek: THE HYPERBOLE OF CHARLES TOWNES. Discussing the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty. (Interview with Academicain Belokon) 7. Reuters: Russian business club bemoans prosecutor's probes. 8. gazeta.ru: Communist Party Re-Registered. 9. Cape Cod Times: Bryan Lantz, Summer in Siberia. Residents believe the ‘real Russia’ resides in their enormous corner of the world. 10. RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly: RUSSIA AND NATO: THE BEGINNING OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP? 11. Reuters: Book shows Putin at his best. 12. The Globe and Mail (Canada) editorial: Chechens as targets.] ****** #1 Russia Hopes to Limit U.S. Shield January 21, 2002 By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV MOSCOW (AP) - Russia hopes to negotiate agreements that would put limits on the U.S. missile defense program, a senior general said in an interview released Monday. The statement by Col. Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky is the first official indication that Russia is trying to get restrictions on the U.S. missile shield, although Washington has shown no willingness to bend. ``In our opinion, these agreements must put certain restrictions on the missile defense system the United States intends to build,'' said Baluyevsky, the first deputy chief of staff of the Russian armed forces, who led the Russian delegation to arms talks in Washington last week. The comments were made in an interview with the Interfax-Military News Agency released Monday. There was no immediate comment from Washington. But U.S. officials have said repeatedly they would go ahead with the system despite Russian objections. Analysts said Russia is unlikely to win any concessions. The U.S. government ``wants to have free hands on missile defense and is unlikely to accept any technical restrictions,'' said Ivan Safranchuk, who heads the Moscow office of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information. He said Russia missed the chance to negotiate some restrictions on the U.S. missile defense plan by blindly opposing any changes in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The United States decided last month to withdraw from the treaty, which bans a defense system of the kind the administration wants to build against potential threats from such nations as North Korea, Iran and Iraq. ``Russia has no bargaining chips and can only plea that the United States limits its missile shield,'' the analyst said. While scrapping the ABM, President Bush has pledged to reduce U.S. nuclear arsenals by about two-thirds, to 1,700 to 2,200. Putin has said that Russia could go as low as 1,500 warheads. Baluyevsky said Russia hopes new arms control agreements can be reached by the time Bush visits in May or June despite differences that emerged during the consultations. On Monday, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov met with visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf to discuss ways to strengthen control over nonproliferation of mass-destruction weapons. Mamedov said the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty and its refusal to ratify a global nuclear test ban were undermining the international nonproliferation regime, the Foreign Ministry said in a statement. The statement said Wolf reaffirmed U.S. concern about Russia's nuclear and military cooperation with Iran, while Mamedov responded by saying such contacts were in ``strict conformity with international obligations.'' In an apparent reference to U.S. sanctions imposed several years ago against several Russian companies accused of smuggling sensitive technologies to Tehran, Mamedov said that ``unfounded'' sanctions must be lifted. ****** #2 Court bailiffs move to shut Russian TV station By Clara Ferreira-Marques MOSCOW, Jan 21 (Reuters) - Court bailiffs ordered Russia's Media Ministry on Monday to revoke the broadcast licence of the only nationwide television station outside Kremlin control and take it off the air. The TV6 station, which had only last week said it would voluntarily give up the licence so that its journalists could form a new company to keep broadcasting, said it now wanted to keep it and would appeal against the bailiffs' order. The two moves revived a battle over the station's fate, which has already raised questions at home and abroad about President Vladimir Putin's tolerance of dissent and the independence of the courts. The Kremlin says it is purely a business dispute. But the station's backers -- and the United States -- suspect politics played a role in court decisions shutting the station down. TV6's journalists and management came from NTV, another national channel which was taken over by the Kremlin-controlled natural gas monopoly last year in a boardroom coup, amid on-air strikes and street demonstrations. Media Minister Mikhail Lesin said bailiffs had ordered his ministry to "halt the broadcasting and stop the activity of TV6 as a media outlet." That, and the station's decision to fight to keep the licence, "strongly complicate the situation around TV6," he said after meeting the station's deputy director, Pavel Korchagin. He criticised the station's management for changing its mind after first offering to give up the licence freely. Lesin did not describe in detail how authorities would now act on the order to shut the station down, but said: "I still hope there will not be a blank screen." TV6 General Director Yevgeny Kiselyov said on air: "It is exclusively up to the Media Ministry to say when they will take TV6 off the air. "As for the (bailiff's) orders...we will certainly appeal against them within 10 days in the Moscow arbitration court. Our lawyers are already working on this." The bailiff's order seeks to enforce a previous court ruling made at the request of an oil company's pension fund, which owns a 15 percent stake and sued under a law that allows minority shareholders to liquidate bankrupt companies. TV6 says a new line-up of popular shows has improved its financial prospects. The Media Ministry has already announced a tender in March or April for permanent control of the station. Boris Nemtsov, leader of the free-market Union of Right-wing Forces political party said that the new legal collision course raised the odds that the station would be ruined. "This is a giant step toward breaking the company up," he said in an interview with NTV. "If in April TV6 no longer exists in its present form, we will only be able to speak about free speech in this country in quotation marks." ****** #3 strana.ru January 21, 2002 Putin: Pro-Press Freedom, Didn’t You Know? Putin scoops “Openness to the Press” prize in Moscow By Victoria Whall Vladimir Putin's relations with the press in the past year have been acclaimed by none other than the Moscow Union of Journalists, which awarded the Russian president with a prize for his "Openness to the Press" last Friday. According to "ITAR-TASS", Putin was nominated for his "sincere aspiration to inform each Russian citizen about reforms being carried out within the state." Meanwhile, beyond Moscow, the Russian president is said to abuse the freedom of the press. In fact, in May of 2001 Putin was counted among the Ten Worst Enemies of the Press by the Committee to Protect Journalists. The New York-based Committee put him on a par with Carlos Castano of Columbia, Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine, and Ayatollah Khamenei of Iran - all of whom have been internationally criticized for their freedom of press abuses (and generally abhorrent democratic violations against their own people). According to CPJ Executive Director Ann Cooper, the enemies shared one goal, "to hold onto political power by controlling information and muffling criticism." Apparently, Putin stands accused of masterminding the takeover of Russia's only "independent' television channel - NTV - by the country's industrial behemoth Gazprom, legal harassment against private media outlets, violent attacks carried out against journalists across Russia, Kremlin-imposed censorship in Chechnya and much more. "Putin", Ms. Cooper says "pays lip service to press freedom in Russia, but then maneuvers to centralize control of the media, stifle criticism and destroy the independent press". Given that U.S. perceptions of Putin and Russia has taken a radical change for the better since the "Ten Worst Enemies of the Press' were named last year, one might assume that CPJ's opinion of Putin is quite different today. That doesn't, however, explain the massive disparity in perceptions. Accurately gauging Russians' nationwide opinion of Putin regarding his press relations is difficult, and the Moscow Union of Journalists does not necessarily represent social and demographic tendencies in the regions. However, Russians across the country do have access to newspapers, and they are convinced, even if others aren't, that TV-6 - the latest "independent' Russian television channel in court - is owned by Boris Berezovsky who, as Paul Saunders of The Nixon Center noted recently, supported the Kremlin only until it became clear that the Russian president was not going to play his game. In his article entitled, "More Carnage in The Washington Post", Mr. Saunders pointed out that these days, Mr. Berezovsky admits quite openly that he is in the media business to engage in political combat with the Putin government, not to ensure that Russian citizens enjoy access to independent and impartial media, or even to make money. As noted in "Nixon Center Blasts Washington Post For Biased Coverage of Russia" published in the Russian Observer on January 18, Paul Saunders offers a criticism of The Washington Post's coverage of Russia, and it seems a good place to start when looking for an explanation for Putin's blackened reputation - the Moscow Union of Journalists not withstanding. As to whether the Kremlin imposes censorship on coverage of the war in Chechnya, the answer is clearly yes. The question is, to what extent has this censorship differed from the controls put in place in every military conflict. It is, after all, very much the norm for journalists to be restricted in such cases. Perhaps it is a bit much to expect the world to join the Moscow Union of Journalists in applauding Putin for his "Openness to the Press", but equally insisting that he remain in the rank of the "Ten Worst Enemies of the Press" seems equally extreme. ****** #4 Moscow Times January 21, 2002 A New Beginning ... By Curt Weldon Curt Weldon is a U.S. congressman. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times. As the United States and Russia work more closely together, we must re-evaluate the nature of our bilateral relationship. Together, we can achieve great things for both our countries -- and for the world -- if we cast aside the last vestiges of the Cold War and build a new relationship for the 21st century. During my 28 visits to Russia, I have had the privilege of meeting and discussing U.S.-Russian relations with many of Russia's top leaders. I have studied the U.S.-Russian relationship from my vantage point as a member of the Armed Services Committee in Congress and as chairman of our interparliamentary exchange, the Duma-Congress Study Group. After consulting with leading experts on U.S.-Russian relations and speaking with my Duma colleagues and other Russian friends, I drafted a proposal for how our two countries could cooperate on a host of issues. This report, called "A New Time, A New Beginning," emphasizes 11 issues where we can work together for the long-term. These issues are not confined to defense and security issues that have divided our two countries for so long. Rather, it is a comprehensive approach that covers issues like health care, the environment, science and technology, space exploration and agriculture. Here are some examples of the more than 100 policy proposals: In space, we can cooperate on joint ventures like space solar power, propulsion technology and weather satellites. On the environment, we should expand debt-for-nature swaps to enable Russia to preserve its natural environment while it reduces its debt. We should also try to help Russia reschedule much of its Paris Club debt. In the field of science, our two countries should resume cooperation on fusion research and begin cooperation on cutting-edge nanotechnology issues. Regarding economic development, we should help Russia become a member of the WTO -- while we also work for progress on issues like property rights and intellectual property rights. In health care, we should increase cooperation between our National Institutes of Health and the relevant Russian research institutes. In the energy field, Russia has already been helpful to the United States with regard to oil production. We should work with Russia to help it utilize U.S. technology to take full advantage of its vast energy resources in an environmental and sustainable way. There are unprecedented opportunities to collaborate on defense and security issues that were previously so divisive. We are already working together to combat terrorism, and should begin to take steps to work together on missile defense programs that help protect both our countries. After half a century of Mutually Assured Destruction, the time has come to pool our technological resources for the purpose of creating Mutually Assured Protection. We find ourselves at a unique moment in history. With vigorous new leadership in Moscow and Washington, now is the time to start fresh. The positive relationship forged by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, and the increasing cooperation between the Duma and the Congress, gives hope that things are at last moving in the right direction. A long-term, sustainable relationship is in the interests of both countries. However, before any of this can take place, we must be open and honest in our dealings with each other. Let us use two new watchwords for the U.S.-Russian relationship -- consistency and candor. If we level with each other, and if we mean what we say and keep our word, then the future of our relationship is bright indeed. Imagine a world where the two great powers work together on the major issues of the day. A world where our enemies cannot divide us by playing us off against each other. A world where the U.S.-Russian relationship is a force for peace around the world. This is a world that any of us would be proud to leave to our children and our grandchildren. I believe we can achieve it, if we work together in good faith. Let us dedicate ourselves to this new relationship, and let us start today. The road ahead is long, but there is much we can do for the American and Russian people. More importantly, though, there is much we can do for peace and stability across the globe, if we have the will to act and the fortitude to stay the course. ******* #5 Moscow Times January 21, 2002 ... Or Just Irrational Exuberance? By Vladimir Frolov Vladimir Frolov, an advisor to the chairman of the State Duma foreign affairs committee, contributed this comment to The Moscow Times. The views expressed are those of the author. It cannot be seriously disputed that since the tragic events of Sept. 11 and President Vladimir Putin's statement two weeks later the tone in the United States-Russia relationship has considerably improved. Both nations seem to have finally found at least one common objective: fighting international terrorism. Moscow has all but renounced a zero-sum approach vis-a-vis the states of the former Soviet Union. Washington has decided to "feel Russia's pain" regarding Chechnya. And pundits in both capitals have been bubbling with excitement over the pending U.S.-Russian strategic alliance. Such talk is at best premature. A U.S.-Russian alliance, although conceivable and even desirable, is not in the cards at least for now. The giddy feeling among pundits is reminiscent of what Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan once aptly described as "irrational exuberance" (he was referring to the U.S. equity markets, of course). It turned out to be bad for investors and it could be equally damaging for the long-term prospects of a stable and cooperative U.S.-Russian relationship. This irrational exuberance is dangerous for two reasons. It creates unrealistic expectations both on the part of policy makers and the public as to the closeness and depth of the relationship that can possibly be attained, as well as with regards to the specific political and economic benefits to be gained. When those heightened expectations do not materialize, the relationship will come crashing down in an orgy of mutual recriminations and disappointment. We have been down that road before at least twice. Another boom and bust cycle is the last thing the U.S.-Russian relationship needs. The irrational exuberance also has the unfortunate effect of lulling the political leadership into complacency. It quickly creates a false sense of success and allows drift to set in. More importantly, it obscures the need for building durable political support behind substantive policy changes, which are essential for transforming the relationship from one of political expediency to a long-term alliance of shared interests and values. It is precisely the political support for such a policy goal that has been somewhat ambiguous in Moscow and almost completely lacking in Washington. When it comes to votes, George W. Bush's White House and most members of Congress will find NATO enlargement to include the Baltic states a much more rewarding issue than redrawing the relationship with Russia. A year into his presidency, Bush has yet to lay out a compelling vision for U.S. policy toward Russia. He has said repeatedly that he wants to move beyond the Cold War toward some new strategic framework based on mutual trust. However, his failure or reluctance to spell out the legal arrangements for such an overarching framework suggests that he views it as little more than another one of his "faith-based initiatives." Bush has shown no inclination to articulate the desirability of a long-term U.S.-Russian alliance as something that is strongly in the national security interests of the United States. He thus has little incentive to recalibrate certain U.S. policies to make this objective easier to achieve and to build political support in Congress and among the American public for such a policy goal. In fact, he may be about to squander the political opening created by Putin's reaction to Sept. 11 by pursuing an unimaginative policy that almost looks like it was borrowed from his father's playbook: "status quo plus." In the run-up to the Crawford summit and after it, the Bush administration's policy toward Russia has been heavy on symbolism and light on substance. The most noticeable movement has occurred in areas of relatively minor importance to the White House that do not require it to wage costly political battles (e.g. Jackson-Vanik, WTO accession and Chechnya). In more sensitive areas, like strategic arms control, the administration has stuck to its guns. The unilateral strategic arms reductions announced by Bush are largely disappointing. Although they break the symbolic 2,000 level (albeit by an accounting gimmick), the remaining U.S. strategic forces structure maintains an extensive capability for a large-scale nuclear attack on Russia. This will perpetuate the inherently adversarial nuclear deterrence relationship between the two countries. (Was this not something that the Bush administration initially sought to portray as a relic of the Cold War?) And the prospects for codifying the irreversibility of these reductions appear slim. By unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM Treaty at precisely the moment Putin was signaling greater flexibility, Bush showed that for him building a constructive relationship with Russia takes second place to pandering to a zealous political constituency within the Republican Party for whom trashing the ABM Treaty was never a policy but a religion. When President Bill Clinton visited Europe in June 2000 he challenged the Europeans to open NATO and the European Union to Russian membership. A year later in Warsaw, Bush stopped well short of that. The proposed new format for the Russia-NATO relationship -- "NATO at 20" -- is not very likely (due to some vocal opposition in the United States) to dispense with the principle of NATO first reaching agreement at 19. This puts in doubt the administration's commitment to making the new arrangement work. More importantly, it does nothing to address the core security issue between Russia and NATO -- their remaining adversarial military posture, supported by such relics of the Cold War as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. For his part, Putin has not articulated a specific policy objective of forming a long-term political alliance with the United States. If he has indeed made the strategic turnaround in Russian foreign policy toward the West, the Russian public is yet to be informed of this momentous decision and its implications. While his recent actions have been unusually cooperative, the overall strategic objectives of Putin's policy toward the United States have been left deliberately ambiguous. Just like Bush, Putin has not made a compelling case to the Russian public and to the Russian political class in favor of a lasting alliance-type relationship with the United States that would transcend the narrow agenda of the war on terrorism. Accordingly, he has yet to begin building a broad-based political coalition to support such an objective. To succeed in his overtures to the West, Putin will have to offer a substantially redefined and modernized concept of Russia's national interests to make them much more congruent with Western interests in general. Such redefinition is absolutely essential if Putin is serious about pursuing meaningful cooperation with NATO on issues like nonproliferation and security in the Balkans. He will also have to further broaden Russia's foreign policy agenda to make it less self-centered and parochial and to engage the West -- or at least Europe -- on such issues as promoting democracy, human rights and humanitarian intervention. Like his friend British Prime Minister Tony Blair, he needs to turn Russian foreign policy into "a pivotal force for good." It may be, of course, that the creative ambiguity of Putin's policy toward the United States reflects a limited tactical agenda of more effectively constraining U.S. unilateralism through a policy of cooperation rather than a policy of denial. However as the case of the ABM Treaty shows, with the Bush administration that kind of strategy could very easily turn into a spectacular failure. The successful war in Afghanistan is more likely to exacerbate the unilateralist bent in U.S. foreign policy than diminish it. The war against terror is too narrow a basis for a U.S.-Russian alliance to emerge and endure. We cannot even agree completely on a definition of terrorism, and Russia's practical contribution to the U.S. anti-terror campaign is likely to diminish substantially beyond the Afghan theater. Aready now Moscow is painfully learning that its cooperation on Afghanistan does not give it any special rights with Washington, nor does it make Russia the most important relationship in the world for the United States. At best, the anti-terror coalition provides a useful framework for a new pattern of serious U.S.-Russian cooperation to take hold. The practical policy objective now is not building an alliance, which will require further internal evolution in both nations, but to construct a workable legal framework for maintaining the current cooperative momentum and reducing the corrosive effects of differences that will inevitably crop up further down the road. As one former U.S. diplomat elegantly put it in a recent analytical paper: "It is not the end of history in U.S.-Russian relations. Yet." ****** #6 Vek January 18, 2002 THE HYPERBOLE OF CHARLES TOWNES Discussing the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty Author: Nikolai Poroskov [from WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html] RUSSIA CAN SWALLOW THE BAIT OF TOTAL MUTUAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO ACADEMICIAN BELOKON OF RUSSIA'S COSMONAUTICS ACADEMY, THE US'S ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM IS PRIMARILY DESIGNED TO COUNTERACT THE REMAINS OF RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES. Valentin Belokon, full member of the Forecasting Academy and academician of the Cosmonautics Academy, discusses possible consequences of the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Question: Does the the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty a threat to Russia? We have Satan missiles with ten separate guided warheads, which could penetrate any missile defense system. Moreover, Topol-M missiles can also be equipped with six warheads. Valentin Belokon: It is well-known to experts that creating a missile defense system is preferable for the side which is planning to strike first. If necessary, the US would be able to blackmail Russia: supposedly, we deliver a strike (after which 90% of nuclear carriers will be destroyed) and defend against a retaliatory strike at the same time. I think those who subsidize and promote the national missile defense project are counting primarily on this. Withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, the US would retain the basis for the phase which Reagan promoted, taking his cue from the "father of the bomb", Teller: laser beam weapons. While a "missile-versus- missile" project is now being researched, from 2008-12 research into laser weapons will be intensified. The US would shift toward laser and similar weapons: electromagnetic guns, neutron beams and UHF beams and microwave lasers. Question: America has outlined its stand: it is wary of either individual unsanctioned launches from Russia, or strikes on the part of the "rogue states." Belokon: However, specific countries are never mentioned, since it is hard to prove that, for instance, North Korea either can produce or possess a given kind of missile. Let us examine the deeds. Clinton's initiative - 100 interceptors in Alaska - was not rejected, and no other options were forwarded. If China, Libya, Iran, Iraq are taken as the most possible "rogue states", while shouldn't they locate these missiles, say, on the island of Diego-Garcia instead of Alaska? It is clear that they are primarily meant to be a defense against Russia. The Americans intend to drop intercontinental ballistic missiles in the boost or active phase of the flight - at the length of the first few hundreds of kilometers, since the carrier is more vulnerable than an ultra-strong warhead, which has a coating, decoy targets, and can maneuver. The system under construction is mainly designed to hit Russia's missiles when they are launched. This system would be of less use for all other theaters of war: no U.S. interceptor would catch missiles launched from China, Iran, Iraq or Libya, in the active phase. Question: Along with withdrawal from the ABM Treaty of 1972, the quantity of warheads would be reduced from 6,000 to 2,000 or even 1,500. Wouldn't that, in addition, be economically advantageous? Belokon: Sweeping cuts to the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union has not yet yielded a single kopeck even for the needs of education and healthcare. If reduction of strategic offensive weapons is linked with the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty of 1972, this is not a step to achieve new parity, but an act of capitulation: the Americans have been threatening us with withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and we are wasting 4,000 missiles carrying warheads. It may appear that the national economy could not support such an arsenal of missiles - then tell us about it straight away, without linking it to the ABM Treaty. Question: However, what if the Americans actually decided to "waste" 4,000 warheads? Belokon: A secret plan appeared in the US a few years ago, contrived by physicist Charles Townes, a Nobel laureate for his contribution to inventing the laser - and member of a top secret consultation commission. Townes related it in his book, which has recently been published in the US. He mentioned how Russia might be trapped: for the promise of total mutual nuclear disarmament. The US national missile defense is designed to counteract the remnants of Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces. However, Townes does not mention the possibility that the Ku Klux Klan may seize power in the United States. (Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin) ******* #7 Russian business club bemoans prosecutor's probes MOSCOW, Jan 21 (Reuters) - Russia's main business club, dubbed an oligarchs' forum of rich influential executives, hit out on Monday at recent financial probes by prosecutors and said they were blackening the country's image. President Vladimir Putin has promised a "dictatorship of the law." A new campaign of probes has already forced out a long-serving railways minister this year. But the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs said in a letter to Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov, quoted by Interfax news agency, that some probes were going too far. In particular, it took exception to what it called heavy handed action against a subsidiary of state-controlled Gazprom, two of whose top executives were charged last Friday with abuse of authority in an asset-stripping case. "Heavy-handed actions by the security services can easily undermine the trust, which is difficult to build, but which has been restored in the reliability of Russian economic agents and the economy as a whole," the business group said. Interfax reported last Friday that the two executives at the Sibur subsidiary, Yakov Goldovski and Yevgeny Koshchits, respectively president and vice president, had been held since January 8. The chairman Vyacheslav Sheremet was also detained on January 8 but was released on condition that he not leave Moscow. The Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs groups top businessmen, including some of the select group of oil and banking magnates known as oligarchs for their influence over the Kremlin and government. Rights groups have said prosecutors and the judiciary are being used to fight Putin's political enemies rather than just battle corruption. They cite the closure of television group TV6, the only national station outside Kremlin control, on the grounds of bankruptcy. The Sibur action has been backed by investors as a way of getting assets back to Gazprom. Some shareholders say billions of dollars of assets have been siphoned off. ******* #8 gazeta.ru January 21, 2002 Communist Party Re-Registered The Russian Communist Party has ceased to exist as a socio-political movement and has acquired the status of a political party. The Communists gathered in Moscow for their 8th extraordinary conference on Saturday, January 18, to amend their charter in order to accommodate the requirements of the new law on political parties. The recently enacted law on political parties imposes stringent requirements to gain party status, without which political organisations cannot run in elections. Only political movements with more than 10 thousand members and a minimum of 100 members in each of at least 50 of Russia's 89 regions can register as a political party. The new requirements have forced several parliamentary blocs to merge in order to survive. At the end of last year the centrist Fatherland-All-Russia merged with the pro-Kremlin Unity to form a new political party named United Fatherland. Several movements, including the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), led by the flamboyant Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the liberal Union of the Rightist Forces (SPS), the People Deputy’s Group, held conferences last year, whereat they amended their charters in order to re-register as political parties. Although the sole purpose of the Communist Party’s gathering at the weekend was to reform in order to register as a political party, the Communist’s leader used the occasion to criticise the president and the government. Communist Party chairman of many years Gennady Zyuganov delivered a lengthy speech in which he warned of impending economic disaster in Russia and harshly criticised President Putin and his government. It is worth noting that Vladimir Putin greeted the conference with a telegram, in which he called the Communist Party “a large political union” and said he hoped that its activity “will be constructive and creative”. The president’s gesture did nothing to quell Zyuganov’s caustic attack on the country’s leadership. He resolutely denounced the ruling regime as “anti-national”. According to Zyuganov’s estimations, by March the government will stop paying salaries to employees of budget-funded enterprises. He also predicted a major cadre reshuffle inside the government as early as in the 1st quarter of 2002. “The situation in the country is extremely hard and it is deteriorating,” said Zyuganov. “If (the USSR President Mikhail) Gorbachev has gave up the (Communist) party and (ex-president Boris) Yeltsin for the sake of power dissolved the USSR, Putin is, in fact, giving away the geopolitical space of our thousand-year-old country. In the beginning of 2001 nobody could even have had a bad dream about the USA deploying military bases in the Central Asia.” Other party members, however, adopted a friendlier tone towards the “ruling regime”. Gennady Seleznyov, who is not only a regular Communist Party member, but also the chairman of the State Duma, said he could not agree with Zyuganov’s assessment of recent developments in Russia as genocide. Seleznyov said such charges were too ambiguous and simply not true. The governor of the Kamchatka Region Mikhail Mashkovtsev went even further in criticising his more hard-line colleagues. He suggested that the party be more cooperative, develop cooperation with the president and the government because the Communists’ popularity in the regions has dropped recently and “people no longer vote for us”. Therefore, the party should be friendlier towards the contemporary rulers and in the meantime, it should foster a new presidential candidate, “a young, energetic, good person”. Then, in 2008 Mashkovtsev said the Communists would have a real chance to win the presidential elections. “There is no use to try in 2004”, he said, since “it is absolutely sure that Putin will keep the post for two terms.” Zyuganov, however, appeared unruffled by his comrades’ reproaches. In a rare display of bonhomie he remarked, “Full unanimity is possible only in the cemetery”. But he had a reason to be cheerful: The conference had re-elected him as party chairman. ******* #9 Cape Cod Times January 20, 2002 Summer in Siberia Residents believe the ‘real Russia’ resides in their enormous corner of the world By BRYAN LANTZ STAFF WRITER TOMSK, Russia – Lev and Mikhail sit in the airport terminal, discussing where to find the real Russia. Moscow? They both say no. And for these physicists from Siberia – the heart of Russia – it isn’t hard to imagine why. Moscow is too big, Lev says. St. Petersburg? Not at all. Despite its big personality, it’s too Western. And what about Tomsk, Siberia? With scarcely a look between them, these two native sons of Tomsk agree that their hometown is, in fact, the real Russia. We’ve been at the terminal in Abakan – two-thirds of the way between Tomsk and the Mongolian border – for more than an hour. I’ve watched two cows amble carefree across the parking lot of the Abakan airport, scratching themselves on a cement bench, as small wooden buildings stretch toward the foothills of the Altai Mountains beyond. If Tomsk is the real Russia, Abakan is more like the Old West, albeit with Tu-154s crossing the skies (but rarely landing here), and Ladas, Moskviches and other small cars replacing horses as the primary transport. But I’m hoping to reach Tomsk to meet Sasha, a teacher at the city’s only private school. She has been learning English through my e-mails. I’m running seriously late. It was an overnight flight out of Moscow, and we’d already begun our descent in the growing dawn when the pilot notified us of, well, something in Russian. Lev, who’d realized on the tarmac in Moscow that I don’t speak much Russian, turned around from the row in front of mine and said, "We’re going somewhere else." Tomsk was socked in with fog, and our pilot on Sibir Airlines was taking no chances. Lev and Mikhail warn me and another new American acquaintance, yet another physicist, Ralph, from Maryland, that delays like this sometimes take days. But before long, we’re back on board and on our way. "Is not bad," says the man in the seat next to me, a Kazakh-looking equivalent of Tom Selleck. And I can’t disagree. Center for learning And so we reach Tomsk, Siberia’s academic capital and one of its oldest cities. Founded in 1604, it’s slightly older than Boston, though the overall impression is of a much younger city. It’s far from barren, as one might imagine Siberia to be – trees grow along the main streets. And apart from one area of Soviet-era, 10-story apartment buildings, it seems much smaller than its half-million inhabitants. There are five universities in the city. Chief among them is Tomsk State University, although those devoted to scientific disciplines also have earned their place among the world’s elite, which explains the high number of physicists on my flight out of Moscow. I’m installed, amid much stamping of papers, in the Hotel Sibir. For about $30 a night, I get a full suite: bedroom, parlor, modern bathroom and entryway. It’s a pleasant surprise. As is the city, which is largely unmentioned in travel books, except to mention the large nuclear complex north of town as a reason to stay away. My hotel is on the main street, the Prospekt Lenina. To the north, this street gives way to a statue of Lenin gesturing toward a ’70s-era theater, as if touting the latest show. To the north, it ends at a park devoted to those from the city who died in World War II, known throughout the former Soviet states as the Great Patriotic War. The names of those from Tomsk who made the ultimate sacrifice are well over 1,000, all listed in a series of plinths that could have served as the model for the Vietnam War Memorial. That’s unlikely, however. Until 10 years ago, Tomsk was a closed city, because of the nearby nuclear complex and because of its status as a center of learning – scientific and otherwise. No foreigners were allowed in. Thankfully, that has changed. I spend an afternoon roaming the wooden floors of Tomsk State University, peeking into classrooms with Sasha. Despite the university’s elaborate facade, Tomsk is a city largely built from wood. No surprise, since the surrounding forests of birch, larch and cedar provide the building materials of choice in a place where stone is rare. What surprises me is the ornate trim on some wooden buildings. Some exceed the gingerbread excess of Victorian houses back home. But even on the most basic log house – and there are many here – there’s a bit of window trim to distinguish each as a place worth noticing. Tomsk’s climate may be perfect for log homes – in winter, it can reach 30 degrees below zero – but even at this time of year, there’s a welcome diversion. The city’s botanical gardens, secure in hothouses under glass, protect massive banana palms and other plants found in much warmer climates. Evidence from the past The city is also is home to the Tomsk Technical Library, one of the oldest libraries in Russia. Tucked away on the library’s top floor, a museum of sorts shows the earliest books in its collection, as well as those from famous benefactors such as Count Stroganoff, and exhibits with fascinating looks at early Soviet graphic design and the darker side of Russian history: censorship. The library holds single copies of works banned (and burned) during czarist times, displayed alongside a Soviet encyclopedia with half a page blank. Our energetic guide explains that the entry that had been there was deemed politically incorrect, so it was removed. After a few days in Tomsk, Sasha and I head for Novosibirsk, the de facto capital of Siberia. Forests stretch endlessly toward the horizon, and in a landscape of this scale, the many farms quickly lose their scale also. And then the farmland gives way to small houses, then to huge apartment blocks. Because nothing is small in Novosibirsk. For that matter, nothing is more than 100 years old in Novosibirsk. Few things predate World War II. The train station, perhaps the largest in all of Eurasia, was built beginning in 1941, as the Soviet Union sent industry eastward, before the advancing German army. And it is a wondrous sight: Asymmetrically built, it resembles a steam locomotive, with windows for wheels and a small tower as a smokestack. Our guide explains this is because it was built during the realism trend, when design mimicked purpose. The avenues are broad and long, which seems fitting in a city where the main theater is the largest in Asia. Built by Stalin during the war, the theater can accommodate a full military parade – tanks and all – because of its size. The bitter climate provided the rationale for this: Instead of standing in the Siberian cold in winter, attendees could watch the parade from the comfort of indoors. In fact, our tour guide says, Novosibirsk’s resident ballet company has problems adjusting to smaller venues, both inside the country and out. Accustomed to the huge stage, the dancers must be careful not to collide when performing elsewhere. One of Novosibirsk’s more recent attractions is its Museum of Regional Studies, formed in what appears to be an old train station. The museum, well worth a look even for those barely stopping off on the Trans-Siberian Railway, provides a look at the peoples who have inhabited Siberia. For the random American, the exhibits seem strangely like those of U.S. anthropological museums, but with heavier winter clothes and the odd samovar thrown in from the start of the 19th century. But there are also exhibits of shamanism and an intact grave site as dug up on Siberia’s eastern fringe. The early settlers don’t seem very different from Alaskan Eskimos. Maybe there’s a reason for this. We’ve dropped in on Novosibirsk on a Friday, and this is wedding day all across Russia. Marriages may still be officially dealt with in government "palaces" (offices), but the event triggers three days of festivities for families, friends and relatives. Three brides were lined up at one church, and the father of one bride, a major in the Russian army, invited us to stay to see his daughter’s ceremony. But Sasha and I have a bus to catch, so we decline. Shashlik and beer Now it’s on to Krasnoyarsk. This is my idea, because I’ve long wanted to see the Yenisei River. The Yenisei, like the Ob in Novosibirsk, is one of the world’s longest rivers, stretching 2,543 miles, 200 miles longer than the Mississippi. The Yenisei has supported settlements for more than 200 years, whether trappers or traders in an otherwise wild region. That changed about 150 years ago. Gold was found near what quickly became the city of Krasnoyarsk. We arrive on City Day in Krasnoyarsk, and Sasha and I can only spend one night before returning to Tomsk. The crowds are thick, both in front of city hall and along the Yenisei, where a party atmosphere dominates in the many riverside cafes. We indulge on shashlik (superb Russian barbecue) and excellent local beer and spend the evening dancing among locals in a casual riverside rave. Krasnoyarsk straddles the river and marks the border of the Great Siberian Plain. Mountains to the southeast form a national park, and unique rock formations carved into the mountains form a background to a handsome city built largely of brick. An excursion into these mountains is marred by rain, and we head back to the train station. Between Krasnoyarsk and Taiga Station, south of Tomsk, we’re on the Trans-Siberian main line. In the middle of the night, we reach Taiga, the closest stop to Tomsk on the Trans-Siberian. As railroad construction approached a little more than 100 years ago, the city fathers of Tomsk decided the train would bring noise, dirt and undesirables to town, so they opted not to have it pass through. Perhaps this was short-sighted – and that thought was foremost as I sat on the benches in the station and again as we rode on the wooden-seated elektrichka train back to Tomsk in the early-morning hours – but, then, maybe the city fathers were right. With its wooden houses, Tomsk retains an almost rural charm. The Soviet architectural influence seems minimal. And its reputation as a center of learning and science has positioned Tomsk well for the modern era. In fact, its telephone company is considered the best in Russia today. Sasha’s students in this city known as "the Siberian Athens" are also well-positioned for the future. During a visit, the high-school students demonstrate their knowledge of the United States with a quiz in English ("Why is Mississippi known as the Magnolia State?"). I doubt if I’d do as well if asked about Khabarovsk or Chelyabinsk. The younger students tell me in English about themselves, their families and their hobbies. Basketball is popular; homework isn’t. It strikes me they’re not so different from the students back home. I think back to Lev and Mikhail, and their discussion about the real Russia. Tomsk is not a bad place to be. ******* #10 RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly Vol. 2, No. 3, 21 January 2002 RUSSIA AND NATO: THE BEGINNING OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP? Russia's unprecedented willingness to seek closer ties with the West has left European and American officials wondering what to make of Moscow's apparent change of heart, and how to respond. President Vladimir Putin has suggested in recent months that Russia is prepared to radically reassess its relationship with Cold War arch-enemy NATO, and appears to accept the possibility the organization may soon expand into the Baltics. Putin has also offered the European Union opportunities for closer security and political cooperation. And contrary to expectations, Moscow barely reacted when the United States announced its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty -- long a source of contention between the two countries. Russia's changing relationship with the West was the subject of a two-day seminar held last week in Brussels. Participants at the seminar, organized by the Center for European Policy Studies, seemed to agree that the shift in Russian attitudes has finally made the Cold War a thing of the past. There was some debate, however, over whether the shift is sustainable. Dmitri Trenin, deputy director of the Carnegie Center in Moscow, calls Russia's sudden willingness to establish closer ties with the West the result of strategic calculations aimed at modernizing Russia. This strategy, he says, has led Putin to "let go" of the Cold War and seek integration. Putin, Trenin adds, wants to be seen as one of the great modernizers in Russian history. According to Trenin: "What Putin did was to start bringing his foreign and security policy in harmony with [a] 'Russia project' at home. I would submit [that] nothing is more important to Mr. Putin than to relaunch the Russian economy. He may not be known in the future as a great democratizer of Russia. In the order of his priorities, that is certainly not the highest [priority]. But he wants to be known, I think, as the guy who relaunched the Russian economy -- restructured it." To achieve this, says Trenin, Putin has made a rational decision to -- as he put it -- "move the United States out of the way" and plead "no contest" in the Cold War in order to close that chapter of history and enable Russia to freely embrace the new global economy. Trenin says this does not mean Putin should be seen as "pro- American," despite his apparent tolerance of NATO expansion and the scrapping of the ABM Treaty. According to Trenin, the focal point in integrating Russia into the broad Euro-Atlantic political and economic structures is the European Union. Integration into Europe will be a long-term project but one which will not lead to Russia's membership in the European Union, at least not in the foreseeable future. But it should result in a close economic, security, and political partnership. Again, says Trenin, this ambition should be viewed as a domestic initiative, a result of Putin's drive to radically modernize Russia: "When one talks about Russia's integration with Europe, I think one has to make it very clear -- above all in Russia -- that what we're talking about is not a foreign policy proposition. Russia's entry into Europe will not be the result of a deal made in Moscow and Brussels. It will be 95, 97, 98 percent made at home. It's the extent of Russia's 'Europeanization,' the depth and breadth of Russia's economic transformation, social restructuring, political [and] legal evolution that will turn Russia eventually -- and I believe it will -- into a European country." Trenin says Putin's modernization drive is supported by the fact that both the elites and the wider public in Russia are beginning to give up the illusion that there is a uniquely "Russian way" to develop. In Trenin's view, Putin's line is domestically sustainable and "sufficiently protected against adverse international political conditions," and the West should reward it by granting Russia closer institutional links. Trenin's belief in the sustainability of Putin's reforms is shared by Angela Stent, director of the Center for Eurasian and Russian Studies at Georgetown University in the United States. But Stent notes that misgivings still exist in certain Russian military and policy circles. She says a lot will depend on how the West compensates Russia for concessions made by Putin: "There are a number of ways in which the U.S. hopes to encourage Russia's greater integration -- if you like, globally, but also into Euro-Atlantic structures -- and some of these are on the economic side. The United States is now pushing for accelerated WTO [World Trade Organization] membership for Russia -- something that the EU has also endorsed. We're finally getting rid of Cold War legislation, the Jackson-Vanik amendment that tied most- favored-nation status for Russia to emigration policies. The United States is encouraging its business community to become more involved, to invest more in Russia, but obviously that's a longer-term process." Stent says core security relations between the United States and Russia, especially arms control, remain a "more complicated issue." The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was followed by an "in principle" agreement with Russia on cutbacks of nuclear warheads, but now disagreement has erupted over numbers. Stent indicates it is in the global interests of the United States that both NATO and the EU forge closer links with Russia. She says avoiding regional divisions is a major U.S. concern. Stent says: "The one area where there is concern as one looks to the future, and this includes the EU and NATO, is the possible effect of the dual enlargements on the wider Europe: Russia, but some of the other countries in the post- Soviet space -- this is a term I know some people don't like, but for want of a better word -- and also in Southeastern Europe. I think the concern in general is that these dual enlargements not create new divisions within Europe [between] the prosperous 'have' countries -- the ones who are in, full members of these institutions -- and the ones who are not, who have associate membership, who have different forms of association with both institutions." Stent says the United States would "probably welcome" Russia's involvement in the EU's nascent defense project, although there is considerable skepticism in Washington over whether the EU is willing to commit the necessary resources to make a success of the undertaking. Dmitri Trenin echoed Stent's comments, saying both the EU and NATO should set up concrete institutional structures to allow for practical cooperation with Russia. He says the twice-yearly EU-Russia summits should become a permanent EU-Russia Council, overseeing the implementation of joint decisions with special emphasis on "soft security." He says special emphasis should be given to cooperation in the EU's "eastern neighborhood." The EU and Russia could also embark on joint peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. However, says Trenin, Chechnya would remain off-limits for foreign military involvement, although the EU could still perform a useful role promoting economic and social rehabilitation there. With regard to NATO, Trenin suggests the alliance should become the main forum of European-Russian security relations. He says that far from withering away, the recent British proposal to involve Russia in NATO could give the alliance a special role in enlarging the "zone of stable peace in Europe." The only European representative at the Brussels seminar, Stephan de Spiegeleire, a researcher with RAND Europe, is the most skeptical about forging permanent institutional links with Russia. He says many governments in Europe are not convinced the new Russian policy is sustainable and fear a backlash if the Russian public finds Western concessions disappointing. This, de Spiegeleire says, could lead to a reversal in Russian security thinking, bringing with it recriminations that would "probably be even more virulent than in previous episodes like German reunification or the first round of NATO enlargement." De Spiegeleire says existing mechanisms of cooperation have not been used to their full potential, and the EU should stick to its policy of slow, organic integration. Arguing against "conjunctural" impulses to change this long-term strategy, he says the EU's low- level engagement reaches "into the fiber of the Russian society and polity in a way that no other external actor could currently come close to." (Ahto Lobjakas) ****** #11 Book shows Putin at his best By Andrei Shukshin MOSCOW, Jan 21 (Reuters) - He is fearless, altruistic, steel-willed, hospitable, unbelievably hardy, unpretentious and warm -- and he has lost none of these qualities since becoming Russia's president. A scrupulously unbiased snapshot of Vladimir Putin? It is, if you believe the author of the first volume of a Kremlin-backed trilogy on Putin's life, written in the unmistakable style the Soviets once reserved for Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin. "I do not think it is a eulogy. I simply conveyed what people (who met Putin) said," Oleg Blotsky told a news conference on Monday as he posed for photos with his "Vladimir Putin: Life Story." The book, complete with a genealogical tree back to the beginning of the 18th century and a chapter dedicated to Putin's ancestors, spans from his birth in post-war Leningrad -- now St Petersburg -- to the start of his career as a KGB spy. Putin contributed to the work with extensive interviews to Blotsky, who acknowledged having his way to the Russian leader's country retreat smoothed by Kremlin information guru Sergei Yastrzhembsky. The result is a selection of memories by Putin's friends and acquaintances who hold nothing but the warmest recollections of the man who overwhelmingly dominates the political scene one and a half years into his first term. LIKE A SNOW LEOPARD Praise bestowed on the Kremlin leader ranges from young judoist Putin fighting "like a snow leopard" to many years later his being visibly moved and humbled when decorated war veterans in the Kremlin stood up in salute as he entered the hall. It opens with the Kremlin munificently answering an old woman's plea -- addressed in a letter to "V. V. Putin, the Kremlin, Moscow" -- to help erect a decent tombstone on the grave of Putin's first teacher. One account portrays Putin as a man who would stop at nothing to win a fight. "He would scratch, bite, snatch tufts of hair, do anything to avoid being humiliated in any way," an old friend said. But young Putin is also an ordinary boy, frightened by a looming visit to the dentist. The only person in the book who does not heap praise on the president is Putin himself, who is characteristically humble. The book is written in simple easy-to-read Russian and often resembles anecdotal stories about the good deeds of Lenin, amply served to schoolchildren in the Soviet days. It follows the publication more than a year ago of a tentative textbook for primary schools in which little Vlad Putin, who never smoked and always did his homework, featured as an example for every boy and girl. The Kremlin then distanced itself from the publisher and Putin said he was not enthusiastic about the textbook project. Blotsky said neither Putin nor any other Kremlin official ever sought to censor his work or steer it in a specific direction. Putin only read the book when it hit shop shelves last week, he said. "The issue of me having to present the text for approval was never raised at all," he said. The book's first run of 15,000 copies was selling well in Moscow shops and China, Bulgaria and Slovenia have shown an interest in issuing a translation, the publisher said. Blotsky, who said he was a converted Putinist after his audiences with the president, said he was already working on the second volume of his series "Vladimir Putin: Rise to Power." ******* #12 The Globe and Mail (Canada) 21 January 2002 Editorial Chechens as targets The U.S.-led war on terrorism is providing useful camouflage for the suppression of core civil liberties in many of the world's trouble zones, the much-respected group Human Rights Watch contends. But no one should be surprised that the abuses occurring in the breakaway Russian republic of Chechnya have stirred particular concern. Chechnya's name may not always have been familiar to President George W. Bush. But he did seem to agree, until a few months ago, that Russian authorities battling Chechnya's stubborn insurgency were not earning points for their observance of human rights. Several times during his presidential campaign, he rebuked Moscow for its ruthless conduct in Chechnya, and as recently as last June the United States supported a United Nations resolution echoing the condemnation. Sept. 11 changed all that. Mr. Bush's criticism of Russian heavy-handedness evaporated into silence with the realization that many Chechen rebels are Islamist extremists, possibly with ties to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network. And to be fair, Mr. Bush was not alone. Both German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi said that after Sept. 11, Russian brutality in Chechnya needed reappraising. So perhaps Russian President Vladimir Putin, Mr. Bush's new friend, now believes it is open season on Chechnya's civilian population. That's certainly the impression to emerge from the annual survey of New York-based Human Rights Watch, released last week. Among the 66 countries scrutinized, nations as diverse as Israel, Saudi Arabia, China and Zimbabwe all earned black marks for their abuse of human rights in 2001. But the worst offenders, it seems, were three key U.S. allies: Egypt, Uzbekistan and Russia. In Chechnya, Russian sweep operations have resulted in "widespread looting, arbitrary detention, torture and an alarming number of disappearances," the group states in its hefty, 670-page report. Two other rights groups, both Russian, said much the same last week. The organization Memorial accused the Russian military of killing and beating civilians, wrecking buildings and defiling a local mosque. The Association for Russian-Chechen friendship also reported widespread abuse. None of this is new. When Russian troops first moved into Chechnya in 1994, they quickly destroyed most of Grozny, the capital, with indiscriminate shooting and shelling. Forced to withdraw in 1996, they launched a fresh offensive in 1999 after a series of deadly terrorist bombings that Moscow blamed on Chechen rebels. Ever since, Russia has been accused regularly of atrocities, including several large-scale massacres of detained civilians. In all, a minimum of 3,500 Russian soldiers and 11,000 Chechens have perished in the past two years. Rights groups say the real, unconcealed total is far higher. A tide of refugees has been fleeing the upheaval, with an estimated 180,000 homeless people now spending their third winter in the adjoining Russian republic of Ingushetia. "The plight of the displaced population has lost the attention of the international community," the charity group Doctors Without Borders said last week. The same seems true for Chechnya's grievous human-rights record. Through repeatedly comparing the events of Sept. 11 with the war in Chechnya, Mr. Putin is pushing all the right buttons in the White House, the immediate reward being something that looks a lot like a nod and a wink. No question, some Chechen separatists are terrorists; proof is found in a long string of atrocities. But in Mr. Putin's view they all are, certainly all the leaders. Not true, said UN High Commissioner for Refugees Ruud Lubbers on Friday, after meeting with Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov and describing him as "a key person" in any peace settlement. But along with a few other world leaders, it suits Mr. Putin for the term "terrorist" to have a wide application. That creates scope to pursue a military strategy in Chechnya that can only be described as overkill. *******