Johnson's Russia List #6010 8 Januarhy 2002 davidjohnson@erols.com A CDI Project www.cdi.org [Note from David Johnson: 1. Reuters: WTO chief says Russia ready to join within a year. 2. Reuters: Russian '01 inflation slips, more falls seen. 3. Luba Schwartzman: ORT Review. 4. Craig Hanson: RE: 6008-Booming Russia. 5. Parlamentskaya Gazeta: 2002 - THE YEAR OF ALL-RUSSIAN CENSUS. 6. The Times (UK): Michael Binyon, Moscow to bulldoze its hotel from hell. (Intourist) 7. AFP: Central Asian terror crack-down to focus on three groups. 8. Itar-Tass: Former Soviet Politburo member dies. (Zaykov) 9. BBC Monitoring: Russia Plays the Waiting Game With Tajikistan, Says Tajik Newspaper. 10. Times of Central Asia: Giorgio Fiacconi, Outlook for 2002. 11. Washington Post: Peter Slevin, New Trade Relations Sought for 8 Countries. Rights Groups Hit War-Aid Reward. 12. strana.ru: Cleaner Russia Wins New Priority in Brussels. Green concerns drive joint push to beat pollution. 13. PONARS: Celeste Wallander, The Russia-NATO Relationship: Is It Worth Another Try?] ******* #1 WTO chief says Russia ready to join within a year By Alister Doyle OSLO, Jan 8 (Reuters) - World Trade Organisation (WTO) chief Mike Moore said on Tuesday that Russia could be ready to join the global trade club within a year, following China's entry last month. In a speech to a business conference in Oslo, WTO Director-General Moore also took a swipe at farm subsidies by rich nations but said he was more optimistic than ever about creating a stable global economy built on free trade. "Russia is within our reach as a new member within a year," he said. "We have a core group of ministers who have the willpower, the horsepower and the firepower to make this happen." Russia, the largest economy that is not yet a member of the 144-nation world trade body, has said it is preparing for the next stage of talks and draft laws to bring its trade practices into line with WTO rules go before parliament early this year. Tough WTO negotiations are expected over high Russian agricultural subsidies in particular, officials have said. A few dozen protesters denounced globalisation in the snow outside the hotel where Moore was speaking, saying it "killed democracy." Moscow once denounced the WTO's predecessor as an "instrument of imperialist exploitation." Moore has said Russia, which says WTO membership is a high priority, would be able to sit at the table as a full member by the next ministerial conference, due in the middle of 2003. He hailed the new round of WTO talks which start this year and aim to cut farm subsidies, industrial tariffs and a range of other barriers to trade. "I'm more optimistic now about the prospects of creating a stable and just and fully global economy than I've ever been," said the New Zealander. China's entry to the WTO disproved suggestions that clashes of civilisations meant that trade liberalisation was a blind alley for the world economy, Moore said. "It's proof that we've rediscovered the common advantages of trading together, in a fair, open and properly negotiated system," he said. But he said rich nations should scrap farm subsidies, which in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations totalled about $1.0 billion a day. "For many developing countries the agricultural negotiations are about development. Most people have recognised that for years these policies of subsidies are unsustainable," he said. "Abolishing those subsidies would be worth eight times more than all the debt relief offered so far." ******* #2 Russian '01 inflation slips, more falls seen MOSCOW, Jan 8 (Reuters) - Russia ended 2001 with annual inflation of 18.6 percent, slightly down on the previous year, but expected to fall more strongly in 2002. Analysts said prices were fuelled by the printing of money by the central bank to buy dollars from Russian oil exporters for the country's foreign currency reserves. This will continue to be a factor in 2002, along with planned rises in gas and power prices. The December 2001 figures, issued by the State Statistics Committee, were in line with the Committee's own forecasts and revised government expectations. The Committee said the December 18.6 percent year-on-year inflation figure included a month-on-month rise of 1.6 percent. This compared with a monthly rise in prices for November of 1.4 percent. Inflation has been above government targets for most of the year, fuelled by the high level of money printing as well as some rises in state-controlled tariffs. Peter Boone, chief economist at Brunswick UBS Warburg, said prices this year would be strongly linked to the price of oil. A high price would see dollars flowing into the country, leading to the creation of more roubles to buy hard currency to boost reserves further from the current $36.5 billion. Boone put inflation at the end of 2002 at 13 percent, although this would depend on a forecast for oil prices of $18 a barrel being met. Alfa-Bank said in a recent research note that its forecast for 2002 was 16 percent inflation. "We still believe that the continuation of structural reform will fuel tariff increases over at least the next two years," it said. "In turn, this will lead to 15-20 percent inflation." Paul Forrest, London-based economist at Moscow Narodny Bank, said the high inflation was also due to Russia's economic success. The country's growth has been outstripping that of the rest of the world, coming in at 8.3 percent in 2000 and expected to be five percent for last year. ******* #3 ORT Review www.ortv.ru Compiled by Luba Schwartzman (luba7@bu.edu) Research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy at Boston University HEADLINES, Monday, January 07, 2002 - Orthodox Christians in Russia and throughout the world are celebrating Christmas today. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited a school and a holiday pageant in the city of Maloyaroslavets; he also attended Christmas Mass at the Uspensky Cathedral and sent his greetings to all Russians celebrating Christmas. - A group of Chechen fighters attacked Russian military and police troops near a bridge over the Argun River. According to reports, two soldiers were killed and four were wounded. - Mikhail Lapshin, the leader of the Agrarian Party of Russia, has been elected President of the Altai Republic. He received over 68 percent of the vote, while incumbent Semyon Zubakin received only 23 percent. - Seven-year-old Timur Zangiev was voted "man of the year" in North Ossetia. This second-grader conducted the Kabardino-Balkarian Symphony Orchestra's performance of Schubert's Eighth Symphony. - The "Hopes of Europe" festival has opened in Sochi. Over 1500 children from different countries are competing in dance and vocal performance. Winners will be able to attend Russia's most prestigious theatrical and musical universities. - The transmitter of a private company operating in Vladikavkaz has been blown up. An investigation is under way. The head of the North Ossetian Interior Ministry declared that the incident was a diversion aimed at destabilizing the political situation in anticipation of the republic's presidential elections (scheduled for January 27th). - A meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was held in Beijing. Foreign ministers from Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan discussed the fight against terrorism and the political future of Afghanistan. The next meeting of the "Shanghai Six" will be held in St. Petersburg in June 2002. - Along the Transcaucasian highway, snowstorms continue: some sections of the road are covered by a meter and a half of snow; rescue workers have been delivering food to the drivers of about twenty cars that have been stranded; sixty-five avalanches were registered last night alone. - Moscow police forces are still searching for the man who stole Mikhail Zhvanetsky's Jeep. The writer explained that the car was insured, but that a briefcase with his work and address books was inside the car. ******** #4 From: "Craig Hanson (Contractor)" Subject: RE: 6008-Booming Russia Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2002 Is Michael Binyon living in the same Russia I've been following in the JRL these past couple of years; the same Russia I lived in from '97-'99 (JRL 6008, Booming Russia)? "The economy is booming, gnawing social problems are easing, crime is down, optimism is up, and the political outlook is secure." Surely some rose colored glasses are being worn here. I, too, lived in Moscow, and it was easy to believe that Russia was doing amazingly well when viewed from the perspective of that city, and to some extent Saint Petersburg. But a trip to anywhere else in the country was an abrupt reminder that the vast majority of Russians are surviving conditions that fall far short of a boom. After I left Russia, Mr Putin replaced Mr Yeltsin, and undeniably has brought a sense of youthful vigor and stability to the political climate, the nuances of how that stability is being achieved being a topic for another day. But stability should not be confused with a transformation of the Russian economy, which continues to ride on the cost of oil. Mr Binyon notes that Muskovites earn 6 times the national average. Even though the national average is paupery, six times that, relatively speaking, is ALOT! He concedes Moscow accounts for 30% of national retail spending, but adds "the boom is across the country." I'd like to believe that, but I find it too hard. "Booming Moscow" probably would have been a more accurate title for this piece. ****** #5 Parlamentskaya Gazeta No. 247 [translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only] 2002 - THE YEAR OF ALL-RUSSIAN CENSUS The State Duma adopted the law "On the All-Russian Census." It will begin at 12:00 a.m. on the night of October 9-10, 2002. It had long been necessary to hold the census. In the opinion of head of the department for census and demographic statistics of the Russian State Committee on Statistics Irina Zbarskaya, today Russia has extremely outdated information on the composition and the size of the population. The previous census was held in 1989 and the next one was scheduled for 1999. However, meagre state funds at that time did not make it possible to hold it. Moreover, the all-Russian census is quite a large- scale event, which requires 4 billion roubles and almost three years of preparations while the census itself is held within just eight days. Generally speaking, the census will make it possible to answer two questions: the size and the composition of the population. The census is necessary to obtain all social and demographic characteristics of the population. As the preamble of the law says, the census "is the basic source of the formation of federal information resources relating to the size and the structure of the population, its spread across the Russian Federation, combined with the social and economic characteristics, the national and lingual composition of the population, its educational level." Subsequently, these data will be used not only for short-term calculations and forecasts but also for the formulation of the social policy of the state. For example, today the census is the only source of information on the national composition of Russia. Moreover, today there is actually no information even about the family status of citizens. Apart from that, the questionnaire includes information about gender, age, citizenship, the command of foreign languages, education, the place of birth and residence. Apart from that, information about housing conditions, the sources of incomes and occupation will be an important aspect of the census. The poll will be carried out in the Russian language. However, the law also provides a possibility to poll citizens using the state languages of national republics and the languages of indigenous small peoples. Participation in the All-Russian census, which will now be held every ten years, is "a public duty of the individual and citizen" under the law on the census. Simultaneously, the law specially stipulates that the census will be held with the observance of the citizen's rights and freedoms relating to the inviolability of private life and housing. Information received during the census may not be used for the purposes of inflicting property and moral damage on polled citizens. Incidentally, all collected information is considered to be confidential and is not subject to public disclosure while its processing will be protected from unauthorised access. ****** #6 The Times (UK) 8 January 2002 Moscow to bulldoze its hotel from hell FROM MICHAEL BINYON IN MOSCOW A MONUMENTAL slab of Soviet history came to a much delayed and unlamented end yesterday when the Intourist Hotel, one of the most reviled buildings in Moscow that symbolised decades of sleaze, sloppiness and surly suspicion, closed its doors. Today the demolition squad moves in. The 22-storey glass, aluminium and concrete hotel, a stone’s throw from the Kremlin, was the brainchild of a President Khrushchev determined to have a skyscraper like those he saw in America. Opened in 1970, the brutalist building came to embody everything that made the Soviet Union one of the most unwelcoming destinations. Rooms were small and spartan, the food cold, bands raucous and service appalling. Moscow city authorities announced three years ago that the hotel would be demolished and a Western-style luxury one erected in its place on the prime site at the lower end of Tverskaya Street (formerly Gorky Street), two minutes’ walk from Red Square. After much bickering about the plans and haggling with international hotel chains, the Intourist was sold in 1999 for £15 million to Superior Ventures, a French offshoot of the British investment company Rathbone Brothers. The Intourist was a forlorn sight yesterday. Even the two scrawny Christmas trees outside the entrance were almost bare, strands of bedraggled tinsel falling off. Off the lobby, once near impassable for elaborately coiffured prostitutes, one heavily made-up woman in a short skirt was chatting to the barman, for old time’s sake. The leather sofas, where pimps watched their wares, were torn, the travel bureau was stripped and empty. The last 46 guests checked out yesterday morning. In the bar — still stocked with half-empty bottles of gin, whisky, Martini and brandy — a few hotel employees were getting quietly drunk. What would they do with it all? “What do you think? Drink it, of course!” the barman said, grinning. Nostalgic traces of Soviet life were still there. In the souvenir shop the assistant was as boot-faced as all her forebears, and refused to bargain for the remaining matrioshka dolls, fur hats and reproduction posters of Stalin; he was not to be knocked down in price. The old doormen who stopped as many people as possible entering the restaurants were still wandering around malevolently. A few toughs in leather jackets gave a faded imitation of the mafia kings who did their deals in the hotel. The Intourist was the starting place for thousands of cheap holidays, where Westerners were introduced to officious guides, suspicious staff and black marketeers ready to change money or buy jeans. The rooms were reputedly bugged and the bar full of informers. Cockroaches were common in bathrooms, rats in the cellars. Showers and chandeliers were often broken. One Westerner had a nasty moment when she stepped in the main lift and it fell three storeys to the ground. Demolishing the hotel will take time: too close to the historic and recently remodelled National Hotel, and other landmarks, to blow up, it may have to be taken apart floor by floor. ******* #7 Central Asian terror crack-down to focus on three groups January 8, 2002 AFP A stepped-up anti-terrorist campaign in Central Asia by the six-nation Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will be mainly aimed at three Muslim-dominated groups. "When we talk about fighting the 'three forces' we mainly focus on the terrorist groups in Chechnya and East Turkestan and the Uzbekistan Islamic Movement," Zhou Li, a Chinese foreign ministry official said. "We believe that these forces are an important part of international terrorist forces and that they should be severely cracked down upon." On Monday in Beijing, the first foreign ministers' meeting of the SCO, which includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, agreed to set up a regional counter-terrorism agency and an emergency response mechanism. The two mechanisms could be formally established in June when the fledgling SCO will hold a summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, and sign the organization's charter, he said. The group's mandate to fight the "three forces" of terrorism, religious extremism and ethnic separatism has gained momentum with the global war on terrorism following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. The grouping, which has held meetings since 1996, has long opposed Western human rights criticisms over Russia's crack-down on Chechen rebels and on China's treatment of ethnic Uighur minorities in its westernmost Xinjiang region. "Different standards from what has been used to attack other terrorist forces should not be adopted (against the SCO)," Zhou said. Zhou's statement appeared to be aimed at the United States, which has stated that the East Turkestan organization is not a terrorist grouping and that ethnic minorities in western China have legitimate economic and social issues that need to be addressed politically. The Eastern Turkestan grouping is a loose-knit organization that generally supports the establishment of an independent East Turkestan nation in China's westernmost region. "This is a rather big circle of terrorist groups that are involved in many activities including splitting the motherland and organized and individual terrorist and violent activties," Zhou said. ****** #8 Russia: Former Soviet Politburo member dies ITAR-TASS St Petersburg, 8 January: A member of the Soviet Communist Party Politburo and a Secretary of its Central Committee [in charge of heavy and defence industry] in 1985-90, Lev Zaykov, died in St Petersburg at 78 on 7 January. Zaykov worked for many years at a plant in Leningrad [now St Petersburg], where he rose from an engineer to a general director. In late 1970s he became chairman of the executive committee of the Leningrad City Soviet [head of the city administration], then first secretary of the Leningrad party committee. Zaykov was a party boss of Moscow for two years [he replaced Boris Yeltsin who was sacked after a conflict with Mikhail Gorbachev in autumn 1987]. ******* #9 BBC Monitoring Russia Plays the Waiting Game With Tajikistan, Says Tajik Newspaper Source: Biznes i Politika, Dushanbe, in Russian 4 Jan 02 DUSHANBE--Relations between Russia and Tajikistan are in a delicate state. The military operation in neighboring Afghanistan has set some testing questions for the architects of Tajikistan's foreign policy, while Russia seems content, according to Iskander Asadullayev of the Simura information and research center, to play a waiting game in the region. But will Russia's recent decisiveness in the region, he asks, be extended to the country's economic cooperation with Tajikistan? The following is the text of Asadullayev's article in Tajik newspaper Biznes i Politika on 4 January. Subheadings have been inserted editorially. Forcing the pace of events Great powers are cautious in the face of impending events, and are similarly cautious in helping other countries. Sometimes, admittedly, they "expect" situations such as the tragedy of 11 September. One saying fits this instance pretty well: "Until the thunder rumbles, the peasant won't cross himself". In the course of independent Tajikistan's brief history, that sort of thing has happened on more than one occasion. For example, at the start of 1992, when Russia and the Atlantic countries were waiting for events to unfold in Tajikistan, Rahmon Nabiyev, the former president of Tajikistan, decided to accelerate the "resolution" of the country's indeterminate international status and arranged a visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran. At more or less the same time, the central newspaper published an article outlining the possibility of the construction of an Islamic atom bomb. It would seem that the authors of the article had in mind Tajikistan's nuclear industrial potential, which could be linked up with an appropriate area of manufacturing in any leading Islamic country. As a result, [then] U.S. Secretary of State James Baker urgently flew to Dushanbe, and President Rahmon Nabiyev's visit to Iran did not take place. A distinct lack of Turkish delight To take another example. During the summer of 1995, there was a lot of talk in the press about the forthcoming visit of [former] Turkish President Suleyman Demirel. The media had strong hopes that the visit would lead to Turkish involvement in hauling Tajikistan out of its crisis. The visit took place on 10 September. But, literally on the eve of the visit, a Tajik government delegation was invited to Moscow, where a series of agreements was signed on 6-7 September. Under these agreements, the Russian Federation became Tajikistan's main partner in many areas of its national economy. And incidentally, the media didn't pay much attention to the visit to Moscow. The attention came later, after the agreement had been signed. The period which followed saw Tajikistan and the Russian Federation sign more than 100 agreements and treaties, which are unfortunately no longer in operation, either because of economic problems in Russia, or because the Russian Federation had not fully established its position on Tajikistan, leaving itself some time in hand before the onset of a possible crisis in the future. The vagaries of foreign policy Political scientists noted Tajikistan's notoriously contradictory foreign policy: on the one hand, military and political orientation towards Russia, on the other hand, a foreign economic orientation towards the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other international financial institutions in which Western countries play the leading role. Since Russian President Vladimir Putin's arrival in the Kremlin, it cannot be said that Russia's policy towards Tajikistan has been indeterminate. Moreover, the spilt blood of Tajiks and Russians has delivered stability in Central Asia over the last decade, and it is Russia itself which is making the main contribution to the defense of Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan. However, only during meetings between the Tajik and Russian presidents at the CIS 10th-anniversary summit in Moscow was it stated in earnest that Russian specialists are due to arrive in Tajikistan shortly to resolve our country's energy problems. The question remains: what will be the next step, and when will it be taken? Making use of some "time in hand" In the meantime, as far as the antiterrorist orientation is concerned, it needs to be said that the same principle was operating in Central Asia and in Afghanistan. Amid the rapprochement between Russia and the Atlantic countries, the countries of Central Asia and the Northern Alliance found themselves in a geopolitical dilemma. In our opinion, it seems possible that Russia, in order to avoid aggravating a [word missing from original text] of this nature, stepped up its policy in Afghanistan, and the Northern Alliance was able to launch an attack on the Taleban. Can it be said that, in this case as well, Russia used its time in hand to maximum effect, and forestalled the onset of a critical situation for itself and for others? The answer to this question lies in the future. It is possible that, on the issue of Tajikistan as well, certain Russian circles believe that there is some time in hand until the country is faced with an economic crisis. ****** #10 Times of Central Asia January 7, 2002 Outlook for 2002 By Giorgio Fiacconi BISHKEK--The introduction of reforms to take advantage of the recent Afghan war will be an even greater challenge to Central Asia than the ten years of transition. During the last ten years Central Asia has not been able to achieve stabilization or the economic balance between development and human rights. Nevertheless the region has moved forward, and today a new challenge lies ahead in the introduction of much demanded and needed reforms. The current rebound of International cooperation and support is offering a unique opportunity to all Central Asian leaders to create a new approach and a favorable investment climate. There will be plenty of cash around to be used in infrastructure and development, but the region should understand the importance of cooperation, and work toward a regional economic zone. Although many claim this to be the solution few really try and introduce such a zone. If in other parts of the world September 11th has created stagnation in the economy and a general slowdown, this should not be the case in Central Asia, where the economy can take advantage of the enormous influx of funds for humanitarian aid and civil reconstruction. Uncertainty has been one of the main problems for foreign investors in Central Asia. The step forward made by Kyrgyzstan in lifting all barriers that impede investment and create an obstacle to development is now under the scrutiny of several working groups. In few months proposals should be published along with a draft for a new investment law, as well several procedures relating to company's inspections, licenses and permits, judiciary, tax system and incentives. This time reforms should not stop with the preparations of laws but should obtain wider implementation. If terrorists have destroyed one of America's symbols, the war against them is bringing economic development and better human rights; demonstrating that globalization and world cooperation is stronger than any act of terrorism and that it is dialogue that is the key to development. 2002 should see the stabilization of Central Asia through the deployment of an international military force, that while supporting humanitarian aid and the reconstruction of Afghanistan, will also be instrumental in providing the whole Central Asia region with much required stability and act as watch dog on human rights. In our outlook for 2002 we cannot avoid considering the legacy of the 90's as described by John Naisbitt & Patricia Aburdene in their book Megatrend 2000, published in 1990 by The New York Times. The book with its optimistic views did not consider the possibility of such a cruel event as September 11th 2001, but nevertheless the overall economy although subject to a temporary slowdown will rebound again, and Central Asia may represent one of the most active regions. If in other, more prosperous, parts of the world, the job market may slowly react and remain weak for some time, in Central Asia employment should surge to new levels and bring growth that was not achieved in the previous ten years of independence. The amount of money promised, not only for Afghanistan, is staggering, and expected investments are to the tune of several billions dollars. The situation after the Afghan war should see the beginning of the Turkmenistan- Afghanistan - Pakistan gas pipe line at a cost of approximately 2 billion dollars. It is estimated that the proven reserves of oil and gas that various Central Asian States, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan jointly hold in the Caspian sea region may account for around 20-30 billion barrels of oil and around 240 trillion cubic feet of gas. At an average market rate, these reserves have been valued at $4-5 trillion. It is out of question that a peaceful Afghanistan and a stable Central Asia can play a role in connecting pipelines from Central Asia to the international markets of Europe and South Asia. Not only the American Unocal project may see a new life with their 1600 kilometer pipeline form Turkmenistan to Pakistan, but there is now a real possibility that the project may also continue to India. The Europeans will also be quick to resurrect the Traceca project, which through Central Asia will connect Europe to China. In addition there are proposals to construct railways that would connect China to Uzbekistan via Kyrgyzstan, with a branch probably connecting Tajikistan and Afghanistan to Kazakhstan in order to create an integrated Central Asian railways system. While China is building a new pipeline from Bejing to Xinjiang the natural progression would be connection to the Caspian Sea oil trough Kazakhstan. After a decade of trying to change their ways through a new economic approach and unbalanced development, Central Asia now has great opportunities and it is really at a cross roads. The region may start the New Year with a stabilizing military force based in Kyrgyzstan and other countries in the region and this will certainly reassure any foreign investor. The long suffering, badly paid Central Asians may see their poverty dramatically reduced. Local and foreign investors, through the new entrepreneurial leadership that may inject the necessary confidence, should provide new jobs. The lack of political will within a bureaucratic and corrupt system that has kept investment at bay for several years should be replaced by a new wave of leaders that keep the future of their countries at heart. ******* #11 Washington Post January 6, 2002 New Trade Relations Sought for 8 Countries Rights Groups Hit War-Aid Reward By Peter Slevin Washington Post Staff Writer The Bush administration, already seeking normal trade status for Russia, wants Congress to allow eight former Soviet republics -- including two Central Asian countries with poor human rights records -- to graduate this year from trade restrictions imposed during Communist times. A central motivation in the cases of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, according to officials familiar with the effort, is to reward countries helpful in the war on terrorism. Supporters in the administration believe the 1974 law tying trade status to government behavior on human rights is neither effective nor relevant to current conditions. But critics, particularly in human rights organizations, worry that the administration is surrendering a valuable weapon against repressive regimes and also is being inconsistent in deciding which countries to detach from the trade rules. They describe Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, recent allies in the assault on al Qaeda terrorists in nearby Afghanistan, as unworthy of normal trade relations. Such countries "see graduation as a sign that they have made it as full-fledged partners of the United States, and, from the American point of view, it seems to make sense because the law appears to be a relic of the Soviet era. Unfortunately, some of these countries are also relics of the Soviet era," said Tom Malinowski of Human Rights Watch. Given that trade measures sometimes fall prey to a perennial Capitol Hill debate between promoters of unfettered trade and their opponents, the administration's quest to lift restrictions could be an early test of ways the anti-terrorism war influences the equation. The Bush effort also raises a question about the fate of certain traditional foreign-policy goals and values at a time when the war against violent extremism is the guiding force of foreign policy. "We have soft-pedaled a number of our traditional concerns on human rights. That's part of coalition-building. You do it for a larger good, which is the defeat of terrorism," said Lee Hamilton, former Democratic chairman of the House International Affairs Committee. "You can't go into Pakistan and give sermons on human rights. You can't go into Riyadh." Two months ago, as Bush administration officials made plans to end trade restrictions on a number of former Soviet republics, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were excluded because of their dismal human rights performance and related worries. But since Sept. 11, their cooperation in the war on terrorism has made a difference. "The timing is not a coincidence," said a State Department official who asked to remain anonymous. Although department staffers have alerted Congress that the administration would like Russia to graduate within three months and the eight others within nine months, several U.S. foreign-policy officials said no formal strategy decisions have been made. A favored possibility is to group all countries but Russia in a package requiring a single piece of legislation. Another is to divide them into groups and launch them on different timetables. In either case, the administration intends to seek written pledges on political and economic issues from each government. Officials are consulting with Congress and interest groups on how to proceed. "We haven't precisely developed the list yet. There are still some judgments to be made," said a senior adviser who described graduation from the restrictions as a way of "putting behind us the Cold War . . . and creating new partners for trade." Bush advisers reject the idea that removing countries from rules created by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment signals a diminished U.S. concern for human rights in the region. Rather, several officials said, the effort reflects a view that other forms of diplomatic engagement may work better. "I've never accepted that Jackson-Vanik is a useful stick. It simply isn't. The notion that you're giving up leverage is simply not true," said an official involved in the debate. A high-ranking foreign-policy official added, "Jackson-Vanik was an important lever, but it was for a specific purpose for a different time." Jackson-Vanik, a 1974 Trade Act amendment named for its sponsors, prohibits countries without market economies from enjoying normal U.S. trade relations if they do not have open emigration policies. Its original target was the Soviet Union, which persecuted Jews and made it extremely difficult for Jews to emigrate. After the Soviet collapse in 1991, the Jackson-Vanik restrictions were applied to Russia and other successor states. Initially focused on emigration, the provisions became a vehicle for appraising progress toward free markets and human rights, including democracy, free speech and freedom of worship. Two former Soviet republics, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia, graduated from Jackson-Vanik in 2000. Congress declared that Georgia had complied with freedom-of-emigration requirements and had "made progress toward democratic rule and creating a free-market economic system." Russia is next on the White House list. Amid warming relations with the Kremlin, President Bush said in November that he supports Russia's ambition to graduate from Jackson-Vanik. On the issues of emigration and the protection of religious and ethnic minorities, Bush called Russia "a fundamentally different place than it was during the Soviet era." The Russians have never been denied regular trade status since the Soviet breakup and have been found in formal compliance with the emigration provisions since 1994. They view the annual congressional review of their performance to be a demeaning irritant to relations with the United States. To press the point, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Jewish leaders to assure them that Russia would respect religious rights. Harold Luks, chairman of NCSJ, formerly known as the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, said the organization supports Russia's graduation and favors similar treatment for other former Soviet republics. He noted that Jackson-Vanik contemplates a broad human rights agenda. "What we want to see is both a recognition of the progress that has occurred and a very clear commitment by Congress that graduation from Jackson-Vanik does not diminish the commitment of Congress and the administration to continue to address this issue," Luks said. The eight former Soviet republics the administration wants Congress to exempt are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Moldova, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The only country left off the list is autocratic Belarus, which has a miserable human rights record and has offered no assistance to the anti-terrorism coalition, administration officials said. There is a significant inconsistency in the decision to exclude Belarus while favoring the autocratic states of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan -- the countries omitted from the original administration list -- said Human Rights Watch's Malinowski. He said the inclusion of Turkmenistan is a "clear sign that this process is being driven by coalition policy." "Turkmenistan is the North Korea of Central Asia," Malinowski said. "This is a country that has banned everything from the teaching of foreign languages to the performance of opera. There are no free elections, no political parties, no nongovernmental organizations, no independent media. Only two religions are permitted." Michael K. Young, chairman of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, said, "To graduate Turkmenistan would be a travesty. This is a terrible, terrible government. It's also one where it's not at all clear it's valuable in the war against terrorism. One of the advantages of Jackson-Vanik is it allows you to engage in a dialogue and monitor progress on issues that are really critical." Administration officials, who report measured progress from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan since Sept. 11, said the United States will make clear that improvement on human rights will be considered central to good relations. An adviser said, "All of these countries are going to learn one way or another ****** #12 strana.ru January 8, 2002 Cleaner Russia Wins New Priority in Brussels Green concerns drive joint push to beat pollution By Michael Stedman Environmental experts from the Russian government and the European Commission are drawing up the agenda for common action to tackle energy waste, water and air pollution, and damage to nature. They meet in coming weeks at the start of a process to develop "a closer and more coordinated bilateral dialogue" which recognizes the key importance Russia has in the drive for sustainable development and the preservation of global natural resources. The program is being assembled within the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the European Union (EU) and Russia, and reflects commitments to environmental initiatives undertaken at summits between Russian and EU leaders. It will drive forward environmental and nuclear safety assistance, which has directed 350 million Euros ($312 million) to Russia since 1991. Pushing the idea further is also the consequence of European Union enlargement eastward and the gathering pace of economic transformation of Russia and Central and Eastern Europe. Pollution of the Baltic, Barents, Caspian and Black seas will be an important focus, the planners foresee. A Brussels information paper said the move noted "Russia's tremendous importance to Europe's environment and the sustainable development of the planet," stressing "the key importance of the interdependence of environmental, economic and social objectives." Russia was custodian of more than 20 per cent of global water resources and forests, the document said, with vast areas of pristine nature virtually undisturbed by man. But it also had "severe environmental and related health problems in urban and industrial centers," the note continued. "Diseases and poisoning from heavy metals and other toxic materials are a significant factor in the decline of life expectancy, which for males is now only 58 years. A close partnership between the EU and Russia is a vital interest for both sides and for global environmental security," the authors said. The program targets more efficient use of energy, and action to combat climate change. More efficient generation, distribution and use of energy resources are seen as central to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and promised major economic benefits. The potential for energy savings in Russia each year is almost as great as its annual production of natural gas, Brussels officials calculate. Measures to improve public health will receive priority by addressing the condition of the water supply system, critical in many parts of Russia, experts say, and requiring urgent repairs to one third of all water pipes, according to Russian government estimates. Steps to improve resource efficiency will take in the management of spent fuel from nuclear power stations and nuclear-powered submarines, and radioactive waste, the planners say. ****** #13 PONARS Center for Strategic and International Studies http://www.csis.org/ruseura/ponars/index.htm The Russia-NATO Relationship: Is It Worth Another Try? Celeste A. Wallander Center for Strategic and International Studies December 2001 PONARS Policy Memo No. 219 Prepared for the PONARS Policy Conference Washington, DC January 25, 2002 Russia and NATO are discussing how to implement the decision taken at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) ministerial meeting on December 6, 2001 to develop new mechanisms in order to "give new impetus and substance to our partnership, with the goal of creating, with Russia, a new NATO-Russia Council, to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20." The mechanisms are to be "for consultation, cooperation, joint decision, and coordinated/joint action," and are to be in place for the next NAC meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002. (Quotes from the Final Communique of the Ministerial of December 6, 2001, second paragraph.) Yet despite the decision to move forward with the initiative, reservations in Moscow and Washington may make the initiative another failure in the short and sad history of Russian-Western security cooperation after the Cold War. Claiming that this is the last chance for a NATO-Russia reconciliation would be overly dramatic, but saying that failure this time is likely to be more costly and far more long-lasting is not an exaggeration. Failure would waste the opportunity created by the recognition of the common threat to security posed by global terrorism. It would squander the opportunity to anchor Russia's political and security institutions and individuals in Western networks and processes in a way that supports long-lasting change. It would also miss the opportunity to make cooperation and engagement with the West in political, security, and economic spheres Russia's foreign policy priority for the coming decade. What Has Not Worked and Why Keeping in mind that we approach this question with considerable context and history is important. Russian concerns about NATO are rooted in German unification. Long after then-President Mikhail Gorbachev had given up arguing that East Germany should remain a separate country, he negotiated for restrictions on Germany's military capabilities and for limits on NATO's extension into eastern Germany. In the summer of 1990, agreement was reached on both issues, with the relevant parties (East and West Germany, Britain, France, the United States, and Soviet Union) agreeing, among other points, that NATO forces would not extend east of the intra-German border. Russian officials would later claim that the provision on keeping eastern Germany NATO-free precluded NATO enlargement because the diplomatic discussions had referred to NATO "not extending beyond its current line" (Gorbachev reports in his memoirs that this was the specific wording by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker ) or "not moving east" (as German officials confirmed to me in interviews in the early 1990s). However, the treaty on German unification did not prohibit NATO from enlarging to include new members, and the provisions covering limitations on NATO's forces were linked to formerly eastern German territory, so there was in fact no legally binding commitment against NATO enlargement. If Soviet leaders believed that they had received such a political commitment, they made a serious mistake in not getting it in writing. The important lesson here is that ambiguity (intended or not) may facilitate an agreement, but is likely to cause problems in the future if the issue is a serious concern to the parties security interests. This appears to have been a lesson that was not properly learned. When enlargement appeared inevitable, the Russian leadership under then-President Boris Yeltsin again sought assurances that NATO military forces would not move east along with the expanding borders of NATO. The alliance would not agree to a binding commitment on this point, but made unilateral statements that NATO did not plan to deploy nuclear forces nor permanently station conventional forces on the territory of new members. This time, however, the Russian leadership also wanted assurances that Russia would have some say over NATO's growing military reach as well. In addition to enlargement, NATO members faced the question of the organization's military mission after the Cold War. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement in support of UN Security Council resolutions, as practiced in Bosnia, appeared to be the answer. Although Russia clearly would not have a veto over internal alliance issues, NATO's emphasis on new, out-of-area missions was a focus of concern in Moscow. Therefore, although the Russian leadership did not receive a veto in the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in May 1997, they did secure a provision binding both parties to "refraining from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence." To Russia, this meant that NATO could not act in non-Article 5 missions without UN Security Council (and thereby Russian) approval. Even if, as proved the case, the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) established by the Founding Act proved meaningless from Russia's point-of-view, this provision gave Russia the right to limit NATO's reach. In terms of NATO's traditional structure and missions, the Founding Act had not given Russia a veto. NATO alone could decide on membership, integrated command, political decisionmaking, exercises, and so on. In addition, the United States had ensured that the PJC would involve Russia in consultation only after all the NATO members had agreed on policy. However, in order to achieve agreement on the Founding Act, an important area of ambiguity had been left. If NATO adopted nontraditional missions, or "non-Article 5 missions" as they are known, Russia had a veto, not by way of the PJC, but by way of Russia's seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Once again, ambiguity that had made agreement possible was the basis for Russian accusations of betrayal and threat arising from NATO's growing size and role. When NATO allies determined in March 1999 that using military force against Serbia was necessary to prevent widespread murder in Kosovo, they had to do so without a Security Council resolution because of Russian opposition. In the end, NATO launched the mission without a UN resolution, which, in Russia's view, violated NATO's commitment under the Founding Act. The experience had substantial effects in Russia, undermining the arguments for security cooperation, freezing most military-to-military programs, and sparking a revision of military doctrine and security policy to identify NATO as a threat and emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in deterring it in Kaliningrad and the Caucasus. President Vladimir Putin negotiates the new opportunity for a NATO-Russia relationship in this context. My message is not that the Russian perspective is objectively correct, but that Western officials need to understand the importance of these issues for Russia in its relationship with NATO. In addition, the record shows that it is better to be precise on what is, and is not, being pledged in the new relationship over the next five months. Three strikes, and we may be out, or at least far behind. Why It Is Worth Another Try The reason to try once again to forge a constructive NATO-Russia relationship that might provide the basis for a deeper Russian political integration and transformation is not that we owe it to Russia. The reason is our own national security interest. The September 11 attacks against the United States made clear the extent of the threat global terrorism poses to U.S. political, economic, and security interests as well as the U.S. social system and the values it supports. Because the United States has made countering this threat the focus of its foreign and security policy, we face a different international environment from that of the 1990s. From the perspective of U.S. national interests, several fundamental factors have changed with respect to Russia's position in this new environment. First, global terrorism as a core threat brings into focus U.S. common interests with Russia, which are counterterrorism, stability in Eurasia, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. During the 1990s, Russia's often chaotic security policy process had nonetheless sustained two consistent themes: that the primary threats to Russian national interests were the failure of domestic economic reform, and instability and terrorism in Eurasia. Therefore, with the change in focus, the scope for common national interests expanded and became more central to both countries. Common interests do not ensure cooperation, but they do create the opportunity, and the incentive. Another important factor changed more quietly and gradually and is an underappreciated yet solid basis for U.S.-Russian security cooperation: Putin's Russia and its foreign policy have undergone their own evolution in the past two years. The fundamental goals of Putin's pragmatic foreign policy are economic growth and Eurasian stability. Putin priority has been to rebuild the Russian economy. He needs to do much at home to achieve economic growth, but he needs help from abroad as well. Russia needs foreign markets for oil, natural gas, and metals, which are 80 percent of Russian exports. Exports in these sectors are a major reason for the strong warming of Russian-European relations under Putin. However, Russia also needs opportunities to develop other export markets for new sectors, such as consumer goods. Most importantly, Russia needs foreign investment as one source in the $2.5 trillion the economy is estimated to require during the next 20 years. Most of that investment will have to come from within Russia, but much will also need to come from foreign sources. Along with foreign capital, Russia also needs Western business practices and management expertise. For these reasons, Russian foreign policy had been drawn to the West in the months before September. Many in the United States missed the trend because Putin's efforts were focused primarily on Europe. However the trend was clear in the improvement in U.S.-Russian relations over the summer as well. Successful meetings this summer between President George W. Bush and Putin built on a trend well rooted in Russian national interests and the foreign policy priorities of the Putin leadership. As a result of the change in U.S. security priorities and Russia's recent evolution, when Putin faced his choice after September 11, the heightened demand for and supply of real cooperation against terrorism created the opportunity for progress in many areas of the relationship, not least NATO. What Is NATO, and What Will Russia Be? The question of the NATO-Russia relationship is every bit as much about NATO's dilemmas as Russia's problems. Is NATO a meaningful military institution, with the purpose and capabilities to defend the security interests of its members? In the 1990s, the easy part of the answer was that Article 5 missions (common defense) remained the core mission of the alliance. The debate was about the extent to which non-Article 5 and political security missions (integration, transparency, and assurance) could form the primary task of the alliance. After September 11, however, NATO's relevance to its core mission is in question. NATO faces irrelevance. We face a new security world, with a new security mission. NATO invoked Article 5 after the September attack, but NATO is not the instrument on which the United States has chosen to rely to defeat the threat it faces. The United States has not relied on NATO for the campaign in Afghanistan because NATO does not have the assets needed to succeed. NATO members (particularly Great Britain and Turkey) have contributed to the military campaign, but not as NATO members per se. More important to the success of the U.S. campaign of fighting terrorism based in Eurasia have been bases in Central Asia as well as South Asia, and Russian intelligence on Afghanistan. In the next stages of the campaign against terrorism, the active cooperation of NATO and non-NATO members will be required to disable criminal, financial, and the associated terrorist networks throughout Eurasia and Europe. Most importantly, the threat posed by global terrorist networks grows enormously if the networks have weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their component materials. Russia holds the sad distinction of being the largest source of potential chemical, biological, or nuclear materials that could be used by terrorists to attack the United States or its allies with far greater destructive force than that achieved in September. In short, if NATO is to remain a viable and valuable military asset for U.S. national security, it needs to adapt to its new security environment, or risk becoming irrelevant to the security needs of its core member. Imagining how NATO can do so without cooperating with Russia in counterterrorism, WMD control and nonproliferation, conflict prevention and stabilization, and related emergency management missions is difficult. Government officials are currently exploring many creative and promising ideas for areas of cooperation in the NATO-Russia Council. They are discussing ways to ensure that the Council at 20 will not compromise the rights of NATO members to have autonomy to make alliance decisions at 19, including admitting new members, sustaining alliance integrated command, and maintaining the strong coherence of its common values and practices. These details are important, but keeping in mind the broader view is also important: What is NATO's purpose without relevance to the security threats that face us now at the beginning of the twenty-first century? Given the sources and substance of that threat, can NATO be effective without somehow solving the problem of a strong and cooperative relationship with Russia? The question is posed not only to NATO, however, but also to Russia. NATO is not merely a pragmatic, nineteenth-century style alliance of sovereign states. It is based on the transnational values, practices, and institutions of its members that enable them both to work together and to sustain a level of assurance about one another's intentions that makes meaningful security cooperation possible. NATO must take Russia seriously, but if the Russian leadership continues to approach NATO as it did during the 1990s that will not be enough. What does this mean? First, Russia has to reform its military to make it not only effective, but also modern. Precisely how Russia reforms its military is an internal matter, but Western standards of civilian control, officer professionalism, and the rights of enlisted personnel are clear. Reform entails organizational, financial, and also training questions with which several NATO members (not least Germany) have some positive experience that might be of use. Second, the Russian leadership has to shed its ambivalence and suspicions about NATO's intentions. That NATO has the capability to harm Russia is little doubted. However threat consists of capability and intention. Without acceptance that NATO does not have the intention to harm Russia-an acceptance that was never achieved in the 1990s-one more try has little point. Finally, not only Putin but also Russian society must come to grips with the perennial "Russian question": Where does Russia belong? East, West, or drifting in the middle? The solution to such a question has a good precedent, and one rooted in NATO. Time and again, Western security came up against the German question: Could Germany exist as a prosperous, powerful country that did not threaten the security of its neighbors? NATO played a vital role in solving the German question in the twentieth century, not by telling Germany to go away, and come back once it had fixed itself to NATO's satisfaction. It was solved by engaging and integrating Germany. On the German side, the determination of a new generation of leaders beginning with Konrad Adenauer who anchored Germany in relations with its former enemies made it possible. History cannot provide simple formulae, but the opportunity presented by the September attacks is a strong argument for evolving the precedent as a solution to the Russia question. NATO needs to engage Russia, and Russia needs to engage itself. *******