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Moscow Times
December 6, 2001
Navy Gambled and Lost
By Pavel Felgenhauer

When Vladimir Putin assumed supreme executive power some two years ago, it soon became obvious that he was an enthusiast of naval power. He visited warships and even spent a night in a nuclear submarine of the Northern Fleet.

While underwater at sea, Putin took part in a traditional Russian initiation ceremony for novice submariners: He gulped down a glass of sea water and kissed a hammer dangling from the sub's cabin ceiling.

Maybe as a boy in St. Petersburg -- a city that was always the seat of Russian naval power -- Putin dreamed of battleships and submarines, so he used his new capacity as supreme commander-in-chief as an opportunity to get on deck.

Naval commanders did their best to exploit Putin's soft spot. The navy prepared a draft of an ambitious naval doctrine that envisaged a massive shipbuilding program. Well-informed sources say that admirals were asking for a fleet with up to 15 aircraft carriers to challenge the United States on the open seas.

The naval exercises in August 2000 in the Barents Sea -- unprecedented in scope since the 1980s -- were planned to show off to Putin the capabilities of the navy. It was believed that after this show of strength, Putin's favorite --- navy chief Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov -- would be promoted to defense minister or the No. 2 in Russia's military hierarchy, the chief of General Staff.

It was also rumored in Moscow at the time that Northern Fleet commander Admiral Vyacheslav Popov would become the new naval chief, replacing Kuroyedov, while Popov's deputy, Vice Admiral Mikhail Motsak, would take over the Northern Fleet.

But during the exercises, the nuclear submarine Kursk exploded and sank, killing all 118 men on board. The public was enraged by the incompetence and untruthfulness of the naval authorities and, first of all, the Northern Fleet command. Putin's popularity took a dip.

The possible promotions of Admirals Popov, Motsak and Kuroyedov was postponed. But no one in the navy was disciplined or ousted.

Putin weathered the public outcry without seeking scapegoats or punishing the guilty, while the naval chiefs did seek and soon discovered a scapegoat -- the West. It was alleged that a U.S. or British submarine hit the Kursk and slipped away.

Within the Russian military hierarchy, the chiefs tend to be anti-Western, but the navy is a special case. Almost everybody else has potential enemies other than the West to confront in the south and east. The navy, especially the Northern Fleet (with more than half of all Russian warships and over 90 percent of the new ones), has only the United States and other NATO navies to confront in the Atlantic.

If Russia becomes a long-time ally of the West, there is no need whatsoever to keep the Northern Fleet as it is today and no need at all to begin a massive new shipbuilding program. By constantly claiming, against all odds, that a mysterious "foreign submarine," presumably American, sunk the Kursk, Russian admirals were not merely trying to shift the blame, they were fighting to keep in place the navy they loved.

After Sept. 11, Putin openly began to steer Russia's foreign policy toward the West. This apparent U-turn has caused lots of apprehension and even some opposition within the Russian military. It's hardly a coincidence that Putin responded by assaulting the most anti-Western faction of all -- the North Fleet command.

Popov, Motsak and 12 other high-ranking naval officials were ousted or demoted last week for "serious failures" in maintaning the fleet, for mismanagement of the exercise in which the Kursk sank and the organization of the subsequent rescue operation.

Putin also specifically mentioned that despite all the costly efforts, no solid evidence of a Kursk collision with a foreign sub was discovered.

The military careers of former nuclear submarine captains Popov and Motsak have been broken. Kuroyedov and other chiefs are still in place, but all are surely terrified by the scope and severity of the ouster. The Russian military is in such a state of decay that any military chief can be fired anytime for "serious failures," so no one is safe.

Meanwhile, Putin's approval ratings are growing and have reportedly passed 80 percent as the pro-Western part of the public joins the ranks of the traditional Putin fans. For the time being, Putin, if he so wishes, may proceed with his new pro-Western policies fully unopposed.

Pavel Felgenhauer is an independent defense analyst.