July 20, 2001

This Date's Issues:   5356 • 5357

Johnson's Russia List
#5356
20 July 2001
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. Interfax: Opinion poll shows Russian nostalgia for superpower status.
2. RIA: MOST RUSSIANS THINK RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN GROUP OF EIGHT IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR NATION.
3. Moscow Times: Boris Kagarlitsky, Organized Love.
4. strana.ru: NATO will not dissolve itself, neither will it accept Russia in its ranks. (Interview with Andranik Migranyan)
5. Reuters: Chechen leader demands army heads roll over abuses.
6. The Economist (UK): Putin's choice. Is Russia under President Putin heading for regeneration, stagnation or decay? Probably all three at once, says Edward Lucas.
7. Itar-Tass: Capital drain from Russia put at 11bn dollars in 2000.
8. RIA: EXISTING POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS TO BE RE-REGISTERED WITHIN TWO YEARS.
9. Vremya MN: Russian Opinion Survey Expert Levada Interviewed.
10. Moskovskiye Novosti: Gaydar Interviewed on Russian Economic Policies.
11. Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov's appeal to the G-7.]

*******

#1
Opinion poll shows Russian nostalgia for superpower status
Interfax

Moscow, 19 July: Almost a third of Russians, or 31 per cent, believe that the
main goal of Russia's foreign policy in the next 10-15 years should be a
return to the status of a superpower, similar to that the USSR used to enjoy.

Interfax obtained this information from the all-Russian centre for public
opinion surveys (VTsIOM), which conducted a representative poll of 1,600
Russian citizens in late June.

Another 23 per cent believe that Russia should be among the five most
developed countries, 12 per cent would like to see it among the 10-15
relatively economically developed countries, like Brazil, South Korea, and
Taiwan, whereas 6 per cent want Russia to be the undisputed leader among the
CIS countries, and 5 per cent would like Russia to lead a wide bloc of
countries opposing US global aspirations.

Over a quarter of Russians, or 27 per cent, believe that results of the
upcoming G8 summit in Genoa will be successful for Russia, while 31 per cent
take the opposite view. However, 42 per cent found it difficult to voice
their opinion on this matter.

*******

#2
MOST RUSSIANS THINK RUSSIA'S PARTICIPATION IN GROUP OF EIGHT
IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR NATION

MOSCOW, JULY 19, 2001. /RIA Novosti correspondent/ -- Most Russians consider
participation in the Group of Eight extremely important for Russia.

According to the Public Opinion Fund, 71 per cent of the Russians attach much
importance to Russia's participation in the Group of Eight. Most of the
respondents explain this answer by the prestigious standing of the Group of
Eight and affiliation with the group of the "strongest states," not the
possibility of deciding political or economic problems.

About 70 per cent of Russians know about the upcoming summit in Genoa.

Respondents think of the Group of Eight as a "closed" and "clan-type"
organisation. Most of those surveyed do not have a clear idea of the topics
to be discussed at the Group of Eight meeting and of issues brought up at
negotiations.

In the view of most Russians, Russia is not a full-fledged member of the
association. The reason, respondents believe, is Russia's "lack of
independence" in the international arena. This view is shared by 62 per cent
of those interviewed.

Speaking of the Russia's international prestige, 35 per cent of the polled
noted that over the past year the attitude to Russia had improved. As one of
the causes of this positive dynamics most give the coming to power of a new
president.

*******

#3
Moscow Times
July 20, 2001
Organized Love
By Boris Kagarlitsky

Confucius said: "No future has he who causes antipathy at the age of 40."
Politicians in their 40s who have found themselves in power in Russia seem
to take the words of the Chinese wiseman seriously. The only question is
how to win love. In the old days, it was believed that popular appreciation
has to be earned. But modern Russia has demonstrated how dated such an
approach is.

If you don't succeed in earning love, you can organize it.

Vladimir Putin was followed by declamations of popular love from his first
day in office. Without having done anything, without making even slightly
creative promises, the president was declared a national hero. It was
explained to each of us that everybody loves the president. The majority
believed.

A graduate student in sociology complained to me recently about a
completely confounding experience. She organized a focus group for some
research and polled 60 people. Only one of them supported Putin. But each
of the remaining 59 was convinced that he or she was the only oppositionist
in the group. The biggest success of the Kremlin's propaganda is not that
people have come to love the president, but that they have bought into the
myth of his all-encompassing popularity.

The liberal intelligentsia split into those who joyfully began to play the
Kremlin's game and those who were genuinely scared. Although there are no
grounds for joy, the intellectuals' fears are also exaggerated. The
striking inefficiency of the Kremlin's team in everything not having to do
with propaganda is good news for the country.

Putin's cult is very different from Stalin's "cult of personality." The
power of Stalin's system lay in simultaneously stirring both fear and
enthusiasm. It was not a regime under which one person was scared to death
and another full of joy. The joyful ones were mortally scared, and the
scared ones sincerely revered the object of their fear. Thank God, Putin's
regime is unable to achieve anything like that.

Putin's cult is more like the ritual paeans to Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev. By
the way, the constant evocation of a leader's name and patronymic came from
Brezhnev's era. Stalin hated to be addressed as Iosif Vissarionovich. The
vozhd, or leader, was to be addressed simply as Comrade Stalin. The
reverent form of addressing a leader as one would address a superior or an
older person was typical of Brezhnev's time. Whence comes the arsenal of
Putin's cult. People who work in the Kremlin today did not live under
Stalin. Their formative period was the Brezhnev era. It was then that they
joined the Komsomol and the Communist Party and went to serve in the KGB.
Now they are unwittingly reproducing the behavioral stereotypes of their
youth.

Brezhnev's cult covered up the deepening decay of the Soviet system.
Putin's cult, in its turn, covers up the insecurity of the new powers that
be. Employing self-glorification, the government attempts to suppress its
own fear. Aggressive vocabulary serves as camouflage for helplessness and
disorientation. Precisely according to Freud. In the depth of its soul, the
government is aware of its incompetence and tries to defend itself with
bravado.

But officials have been unable to intimidate anyone but themselves and a
small number of Moscow intellectuals. The rest of the country watches the
Kremlin's work with an increasing sense of bewilderment, which is turning
into irritation. If, sensing that time is running out, the Kremlin turns to
another "shock therapy" program currently on Putin's desk, the general
apathy may turn into hatred.

******

#4
strana.ru
July 19, 2001
NATO will not dissolve itself, neither will it accept Russia in its ranks
Putin rekindles tough rhetoric in respect to West
Viktor Sokolov

Interview with the Vice President of "Reform" Foundation, Andranik Migranyan

Q: Vladimir Putin has just suggested that either NATO dissolves itself or
accepts Russia in its ranks as an equitable partner. What is this - another
invitation for a discussion? Or perhaps, the time has come for the Alliance
to either open its door for Russia or cease its existence?

A: First of all, NATO cannot open its door for Russia, and neither can it
dissolve itself.

Putin's suggestion is, of course, a belated but the same continuation of the
line that was more or less pertinent back in the 1991-1992s.

The idea that it was necessary to dissolve NATO and set up a universal
structure of security for the world and Europe first surfaced after the
Warsaw Treaty Organization dissolved itself.

After that, it was considered pointless to retain NATO since the mutual
threat had disappeared, and there was no military bloc confronting NATO.

However, the West decided to do it in its own way. They decided to turn NATO
into a universal structure of security, without the participation of Russia.

Moscow's attempts, through Partnership for Peace or the Founding Act of
Russia-NATO, to become a serious factor of international security actually
resulted in nothing.

This can be seen from the Alliance's unilateral decision to bomb Yugoslavia.
This can be seen from the repeated bombings of Iraq by British and American
aircraft. It can be seen in a lot of other events.

That is why Putin's words are seen as a revival of those positions that
Russia at one time upheld, but the West ignored them. And Moscow seemed to
have become accustomed to this.

Q: Why does such a revival come precisely at this time?

A: I think that this is connected with the upcoming next stage of expanding
NATO eastward, with the inclusion of the Baltic states.

The Russian side, in the person of Putin, is coming out with a forestalling,
radical statement on this account.

Putin is not asking why the Alliance needs Eastern Europe? Why it needs the
Baltic states? He puts the question more radically: "Why, in general, do we
need NATO?"

And he replies to this question himself: if NATO is a universal structure for
European security, then it must function together with Russia's
participation.

In the political aspect, I don't think that much will come out of this. But
from the point of view of propaganda, this may have definite significance
during discussions at the G8 summit in Genoa, as well as in all other
discussions where the question of NATO's enlargement comes up.

Q: Perhaps the Russia-NATO Permanent Council will work more energetically?

A: I've already said that this council is not very effective. We had two
lines in respect to NATO. The first - to cooperate, to become closer to each
other and to try to influence NATO.

The second was to distance ourselves from NATO and to find other
possibilities for opposing NATO's expansion.

The first line led to nothing.

The recent accords with China and Putin's tough statement yesterday
concerning NATO seem to indicate that Russia is departing from its previous
line of nodding "yes" and following in the wake of Western policy.

*******

#5
Chechen leader demands army heads roll over abuses
July 19, 2001
By Daniel McLaughlin

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia's top official in Chechnya demanded Thursday that
top army brass be held responsible for alleged rights abuses in the rebel
region, Interface news agency reported.

Ahmad Kadyrov, head of Chechnya's pro-Moscow administration, said he wanted
military leaders to answer alongside six soldiers accused of crimes against
civilians during recent search operations, according to Interface.

4th case should not be limited to the arrest of six servicemen. Generals
should be held responsible too Kadyrov told journalists in Moscow. chads
should roll here, in Moscow. Only then can we restore the people's faith
(in us)."

News reports also said a Russian M-1 military helicopter had crash-landed
southeast of the regional capital Grozny, but the fate of those on board
was unclear.

Imparts news agency quoted military officials as saying there had been no
casualties. Interface, however, quoted InfoRed sources as saying six people
were killed and eight hurt. The Defense Ministry was not available for
comment.

Earlier this month, the residents of three Chechen villages -- Sernovodsk,
Assinovskaya and Kurchaloi -- accused Russian troops of harassing civilians
and detaining several people during an operation to root out separatist
guerrillas.

Russian authorities launched an investigation into the incidents and
officials initially said serious crimes had been committed. Most later
softened their criticism.

The Russian sweeps through the three villages -- which had been seen as
largely cooperative with Russian authorities -- were launched in response
to Chechen rebel attacks.

Villagers said many of them had been beaten up and their property taken
away by soldiers. At least two Chechens detained during the operations are
still missing.

Interfax quoted top prosecutor Viktor Dakhnov as saying six soldiers had
been arrested after "excessively cruel" actions.

"The investigation should become a serious warning for those who take part
in the operations in Chechnya," he said, adding that the men were also
charged with kidnapping and robbery.

OSCE BACKS PROBE

Rights groups have long complained of excesses by Russian forces in the
21-month-old military operation. Russia denies systematic wrongdoing and
has vowed to act against offenders.

The office of Moscow's chief Chechnya spokesman, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, said
82 servicemen had so far been charged with crimes committed in Chechnya,
including 30 servicemen charged with murder, Interfax reported.

Following a visit from Justice Minister Yuri Chaika, the head of the
Chechnya mission for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), Alexandru Cornea, said the arrests were a sign Russia was
taking alleged rights abuses seriously.

"For the first time, Russia's own commanders have taken a resolute attitude
of condemnation to this," Cornea told Reuters by telephone from Chechnya.
"This is of course a step forward."

He said he and Chaika had been allowed to tour a military detention camp at
Chernokozovo and had found conditions decent.

Authorities in Georgia, south of Chechnya, were searching for a Chechen
radio station, which Russian media said was beaming to the region from
territory under Tbilisi's control.

"Our special forces received an order to find out the exact location of
this radio station and take measures to seize it if we find it," a state
security ministry official told Reuters.

Interfax also reported that the bodies of two Russian soldiers were found
near Gudermes, Chechnya's second town, and there were signs they had been
tortured before being killed.

*******

#6
The Economist (UK)
July 21-27, 2001
Putin's choice
Is Russia under President Putin heading for regeneration, stagnation or decay?
Probably all three at once, says Edward Lucas

FROM the outside, it looks pretty good. For more than a decade, Russia has
been, more or less, a democracy and a market economy, and on civilised
terms with its neighbours. Against the dismal standards of Russian history,
that is a big achievement. But so far the fruits have been meagre, bringing
little comfort to most Russians. All they can see around them is physical,
cultural and moral decay.

The paradox is underpinned by three contradictory trends at work in today's
Russia. The first is revival. This started under Mikhail Gorbachev, as the
Communist monopoly of power and the planned economy collapsed together.
That allowed the beginnings of independent life in many spheres. Freed from
totalitarian controls, the energy and brains of millions have brought
countless changes for the better. There are plenty of new businesses, and
such old ones as have survived are better run than they used to be. There
is room for public-spiritedness and do-gooders. The crippling fear of the
gulag is gradually being eroded by time. And Russians have started
travelling. Instead of being isolated and bombarded with propaganda,
millions every year see other countries with their own eyes. That has
already begun to change their view of the world. And for many of those who
cannot travel, at least ideas from all over the globe are only a
mouse-click away.

The second trend, though, is stagnation. The collapse of communism, it
turns out, was superficial and partial. Well-connected people and
organisations—especially the security services—started clawing back power
straight away, and many became rich as well as powerful. Changes for the
better are often stopped in their tracks by greedy bureaucrats, and by the
peculiar difficulties and perversities of life in Russia. The state, at all
levels, dislikes criticism and opposition. Many Russians, for their part,
still hanker for the certainties, real or imagined, of the past: tradition,
authority and unity, rather than experiment, competition and pluralism.

The third trend is accelerating decline. Nobody in Russia's political or
economic elite has seriously tried to halt the downward slide that underlay
the Soviet Union's defeat in the cold war. Most of what the Soviet Union
built was shoddy to start with, but modern Russia lacks the money and
willpower to sustain even that unimpressive standard. As a result, the
country is falling apart. Things built during the Soviet era are crumbling,
leaking, rusting and rotting. Spills, collapses and fires that in other
countries would cause a huge public outcry are shrugged off as everyday
events. The education system is being corroded by low salaries and
corruption. Worst of all, Russians are simply dying out: smoke-ridden,
drink-soused lifestyles, together with unchecked infectious diseases, have
created a demographic abyss. According to one gloomy prediction, the
population could fall from 145m now to 55m by 2075.

At first these three big shifts were masked by the wild optimism, savage
pessimism and sheer upheaval following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In
1993, Russia flirted with civil war when the president of the day, Boris
Yeltsin, turned heavy artillery on the parliament building. For much of the
1990s, political extremism seemed a real threat: in the 1993 parliamentary
election, the ultra-right party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky won a quarter of
the votes. Mr Yeltsin beat his Communist rival, Gennady Zyuganov, in the
1996 presidential election partly by rigging it. Oligarchs (politically
influential tycoons) strutted the stage, apparently more important than
politicians or officials. In the provinces, local chieftains ignored the
centre and declared their tinpot republics “sovereign”. Organised crime
became a feature of everyday life.

Pride before the fall

On the economic front, the early 1990s brought hyperinflation and food
panics. But there were also high hopes, fuelled by the thought of vast
quantities of underused brainpower and raw materials that were now joining
the world economy. Some talked of a coming boom that might take Russia's
income per head above Spain's by 2010. Such wishful thinking led to the
financial bubble of 1997-98, when hot money from abroad piled into flimsy
stocks and bonds, culminating in the default, devaluation and banking
collapse of August 1998. This was followed a year later by a big
money-laundering scandal. Russia turned from darling to pariah.

In the main, both the fears and the hopes have now receded. Life may not be
much better, but at least it has become a lot calmer. Indeed, by past
standards Russian politics and economics are now quite dull. Most people
who matter agree about the economic and political direction the country has
to take: it must embrace markets, private property, a stable, convertible
currency, regular elections and freedom to travel abroad. Where once the
Duma—the lower house of parliament—furiously tried to impeach the
president, and the Kremlin sacked prime ministers on a whim, the worries
now are about missed growth and inflation targets or the slow progress of
useful bits of legislation.

That is not to say that everything in Russia's garden is lovely. Poisonous
patches include the costly and debilitating war in Chechnya; officialdom's
contempt for outsiders, especially weak and poor ones; corruption; the
ill-treatment of minorities; and blindness towards the past. But however
skewed and unfair the rules are today, at least they are not changing
continually and unpredictably. Stability is a huge plus. Today's Russians,
who have endured enough change to last them several lifetimes, certainly
value the current calm. They also prize Vladimir Putin, the president whom
they see as its architect.

If the present seems just about tolerable, though, there are big question
marks about the future. Is the recent political and economic solidity just
a temporary lull, after which Russia's unsolved problems will crowd forward
again, bringing new disasters in their wake? Or will Russia muddle along
like this for years—economically stagnant, politically not as democratic as
many might wish, a pretty miserable place to live for most of its people,
but at least a menace neither to itself nor its neighbours? Or might this
new stability—just possibly—serve as the base for the profound changes
needed if Russia is to become a full member of the developed and democratic
world, as its size, its culture and its past achievements suggest it
should? These are the questions this survey will explore, starting with the
simplest and crudest gauge of success: the prospects for sustainable
economic growth.

*******

#7
Capital drain from Russia put at 11bn dollars in 2000
ITAR-TASS

Moscow, 19 July: The capital drain from Russia was over 11bn dollars last
year, a spokesman for the presidential information department told ITAR-TASS
today.

Citing information of the Interior Ministry, he said that up to 80 per cent
of capital went to the USA.

"At the same time the volume of foreign investment in the Russian economy was
7,888m dollars, which is 30 per cent less than the official amount of money
moved from the country," the spokesman said.

According to the Interior Ministry's experts, significant investments come to
Russia from offshore zones. Some 11 per cent of investment in industry and
68.8 per cent in business was from Cyprus, 48.6 per cent of money invested in
the non-ferrous industry came from the Antilles and 23.2 per cent of
investment in trade and the catering sector came from Gibraltar.

"The continuing growth of foreign investment in Russia's economy warrants
adequate laws for protecting the rights of investors, owners and the
country's economy as a whole from such encroachments of organized crime as
money laundering" the spokesman said.

******

#8
EXISTING POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS TO BE RE-REGISTERED
WITHIN TWO YEARS

MOSCOW, July 19 /RIA Novosti correspondent Marina Uryvayeva/ - Within the
next two years political organisations intending to participate in the
elections must undergo re-registration with the Justice Ministry, deputy
justice minister Yevgeny Sidorenko said on Thursday at a press-conference.

According to him, this has become a requirement after the federal law "On
Political Parties" came into force on July 14. He further said that those
organisation, which fail to re-register until July 14, 2003, will lose the
status of political organisations and will not be able to participate in the
elections.

As of today, there are up to 10 political parties that meet the requirements
of the new law. In the opinion of Sidorenko, this law will put an end to "the
fragmentation political forces." By today 59 political parties, 35 political
organisations and 104 political movements have been registered in Russia at
the federal level. At the regional level, the number of political
organisations runs into several thousand, he pointed out. The deputy justice
minister told the press-conference that in compliance with the law on
political parties, an organisation numbering at least 10,000 members and
having regional branches may be registered as a party.

******

#9
Russian Opinion Survey Expert Levada Interviewed

Vremya MN
13 July 2001
[translation from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
Interview with Yuriy Levada, director of All-Russian Center for Study
of Public Opinion, conducted by correspondent Yelena Tokareva:
"Authorities Interested Only In Themselves"

Practically all of today's sociological centers
have come out of the All-Russian Center for Study of Public Opinion
(VTsIOM). There are already several of them, but the VTsIOM remains the
mirror of social processes in Russia, and one can always find a new study
on some current topic on the Internet. The regular publication from the
series of studies entitled, "Soviet Common Man," makes a big impression.
This time, it is devoted to the present-day values held by 60 percent of
our country's population. Who contracts for such work? Could it be
the authorities? The director of the VTsIOM, Professor Yuriy Levada,
answers questions posed by our correspondent.

[Levada] Do not be deceived: The authorities are interested in
nothing but themselves. Only about 3 months before the start of some
regularly scheduled elections, the authorities order a poll to determine
the chances of their favorite. We get few state contracts. Except
perhaps from the Ministry of Labor, which is one of our regular clients.

The "Soviet Common Man" is an extensive series of studies. The work
was performed in three waves: In 1989, 1994, and 1999. It was
contracted by three institutes: The Fund For Survival of Mankind, the
Institute of Man, and the Moscow School of Political Studies. This is
an extensive principle work, but primarily we are gauging the "political
weather" in Russia. That is, we engage in current affairs.

[Correspondent] The system of life values of the common man has
been fundamentally studied. But what about a study of the elite?

[Levada] It is much more difficult to study the elite than the
common people. For example, we have great difficulty in studying the
habits of the business elite, the directors of enterprises. It is hard
to make them answer a questionnaire--they do not want to show their face
and to participate in a mass survey. They consider themselves to be
"singular commodities," and this is correct. At the beginning of the
year, at the request of the Civil Society Fund, we studied the life
orientations and propensities toward institutions of civil society
exhibited by young businessmen. The most general thought was that young
businessmen are interested in freedom of business, and are less
interested in politics. All these works bear a closed character. They
are contracted, and they have owners.

[Correspondent] What representatives of the elite are the masters
of thought? Who formulates the social climate in Russia?

[Levada] Personally, no one. At the present moment, there are no
masters of thought or prophets in Russia. And public opinion is
formulated by the mass media.

Civil society in Russia is conditional, there are embryos. But will
something grow out of them? During perestroyka, the ecology
organizations--and primarily the regional ones which protected local
rivers, trees, and forests--exhibited considerable activity. There was
public enthusiasm on this question. But it seems that these movements
have remained in the stage of inception.

During perestroyka, the liberal intellectuals, who had kept quiet
during the period of stagnation, unexpectedly manifested themselves as
masters of thought. Under Gorbachev, they came out of the shadows,
began talking, began justifying the principles of operation of
institutions of civil society. Gorbachev's attitude toward Andrey
Dmitriyevich Sakharov was especially interesting. Through the lips of
Sakharov, Gorbachev debated with the stagnant part of the communist
party. Sakharov said: "Gorbachev is letting me out in public, but he is
also limiting me." Then, the need for such people as Sakharov
disappeared.

In Yeltsin's times, in order to make a connection with the thinking
segment of society, they created a Presidential Council. But it played
no role, either in politics or in society. And now the authorities need
faithful servants, and not independent thinkers, not people who are
capable of being influential. The human rights organizations irritate
the authorities. And society is indifferent to them. This may be seen
even in the fact that it is not giving them any material support.
Berezovskiy gave money to Sakharov's fund, and Yelena Bonner justly noted
that [the fund] should take it, because no one else in the country would
offer it. The human rights organizations live primarily at the expense
of foreign grants. This speaks of their lack of broad support in
society. But worst of all is the fact that representatives of the
younger generation do not aspire in the least to the role of rulers. It
is people of the older generation who speak out on serious social topics
in the newspapers--people such as Boris Vasilyev or Daniil Granin.

[Correspondent] And can we not classify Kiriyenko, Chubays,
Nemtsov, and finally President Putin as influential figures of the new
generation?

[Levada] But these are people who aspire to power, and not to
influence in society. They most often achieve their goals by
behind-the-scenes methods. They do not need publicity, and appeal to it
only in difficult cases. Publicity is when a public leader or
politician is capable of open dialogue with society. On television.
Or in a factory or club. We do not have any such politicians today.

[Correspondent] But it seems to me that, as compared to President
Yeltsin, President Putin is much more publicly oriented. He listens
carefully to the groans of society. He may be called a "sociological
President." It seems that his court sociological service gauges the
attitude of society toward him in all difficult cases.

[Levada] There is a feeling that the public's attitude toward Putin
is overly important for him. For example, our polls have showed that,
of all of Putin's reforms, the population is interested only in pension
and housing reform. The people are afraid of reform of the ZhKH
[housing-municipal services], because it directly affects the pocketbook
of each citizen. It seemed that reform was inevitable. And then
suddenly, the authorities decide to reject it. In recent days, German
Gref made an announcement that 100-percent payment for housing was being
postponed for 10-15 years. Evidently, "in court," they estimated that,
if 50 million people do not pay for their apartments, this would not be
good. It would be scandalous. To a certain degree, the state of
public opinion was taken into consideration. But the war in Chechnya is
another matter. Studies show that the population has become
disenchanted with the war.

Let us recall: In August of 1999, Putin first carefully undertook the
second Chechen campaign, and the public approved of it. Although in May
of that same year, the communists in the State Duma had initiated the
dismissal of Yeltsin, and, among his actions, listed the war in Chechnya
as being the most criminal. In May, 74 percent of the population
condemned this war. But in August, the new Prime Minister Putin renewed
active operations in the Caucasus, and the people were thrilled.
Everyone hoped that the new war would be more successful than the old
one.

[Correspondent] What is the reason for such inconsistency of public
opinion?

[Levada] By 1999, the people had tired of Yeltsin, and no longer
approved of any of his actions. But as soon as an energetic leader
arrived on the scene and bloody events began to take place--the incursion
into Dagestan, the explosions in Moscow--over 60 percent supported active
military operations. But today polls show that the war is once again
unpopular.

[Correspondent] Should we conclude that society has now tired of
Putin, who was the heart and soul of the second military campaign?

[Levada] That is not quite so. Fifty percent of those surveyed
are no longer hoping that Putin will be able to achieve his proclaimed
goals. However, he has become the symbol of hope, the favorite of
society. Seventy-two percent approve of the President's activity
regardless of anything, 30 percent sympathize, and 2 percent are
delighted with him. Today, the President's support exists outside of
any specific achievements or failures by the country in the war and in
the economy. For each failure, a specific guilty party will be found,
but it will not be the President. There is a Russian saying: "He is not
good because he is pretty; He is pretty because he is good." This can
specifically be said about him. This was also true of Yeltsin at the
beginning. He would fall in the river, he would give an address at
Harvard University in an inebriated state, but the people considered all
this to be the intrigues of the opponent communists. But then one day,
suddenly all the love ended.

But Putin greatly values his position as favorite, and unlike
Yeltsin, who did not care if the people loved him or not, Putin has
become a hostage of his rating. An example is the campaign to raise the
Kursk. This is not a very prudent action, but Putin promised to raise
the submarine, and so they are raising it. It seems to me that Putin
has not yet gotten accustomed to his new role as ruler of Russia. He
exaggerates the importance of public sentiment. In fact, the strength
of the President's position does not depend directly on the people.
Rather, it depends on the sentiments of the power elite.

[Correspondent] Nevertheless, we must admit that the "Putin
project" has proven to be extremely successful. We unexpectedly got a
politician instead of a little tin soldier. Putin listens to the
people.

[Levada] But this Putin whom we see was not calculated
sociologically. He simply did not exist. When Putin emerged as Prime
Minister, his rating was 2 percent. Almost nothing. Evidently, the
team decided that it was possible to build something out of nothing. So
that Putin's success is partly the result of leading political
technologies. The people were told, for example, that the new
authorities would be able to bring about order. And such a prospect
appealed to the people. But now it is clear that this team will not be
able to bring about anything in particular. Well, so they "ate the
canary," in the sense of Gusinskiy. And this is their main achievement?

[Correspondent] Well, we still do not know which way Putin will
turn. Suddenly, political technologists will see that Russia does not
need a kind President who listens to the people, but that it needs a
dictator. And will we live to see a dictatorship?

[Levada] That is doubtful. Only one-third of society favors a
dictatorship. But the main thing is that it has no serious mainstay.
Furthermore, even this one-third which hungers for dictatorship does not
understand the essence of such a system. First of all, it is ironclad
order. But our people want order in words. They do not want to suffer
or to sit in camps for the sake of bringing it about. Secondly, a
dictatorship requires an iron party. Thirdly, secret police. And
fear. And enthusiasm of a certain part of the population. All of this
is absent in our country.

*******

#10
Gaydar Interviewed on Russian Economic Policies

Moskovskiye Novosti
17 July 2001
[translation for personal use only]
Interview with Yegor Gaydar, by Lyudmila Telen;
place and date not given:
"I Served Out My Time"

Ten years ago Yegor Gaydar headed the first reform
government. Today there is increasingly frequent talk about the fact
that he is again determining Russian economic policy

[Telen] Do you agree with the claim that the Union of Right Forces -- the
SPS -- is forming the economic policy of the Kremlin and the "White
House"?

[Gaydar] Yes, today it can be said that there is a genetic relationship
between the program which the government is actively putting into effect
and the proposals worked out by the SPS.

[Telen] In your opinion, just what, out of the things the government has
done, fully coincides with the SPS line?

[Gaydar] Above all, everything connected with the tax laws. This is the
transition to a 13-percent income tax -- our idea -- we have consistently
come out in favor of it and, it must be said, we foresaw that it would be
extremely difficult to put it into effect. But we did. Next -- the
idea of a regressive social tax. The elimination of turnover taxes. A
flat and uniform profit tax, with a low rate and simultaneous elimination
of all exemptions. Replacing the diverse resource payments with a
simple and also flat tax, which is calculated according to quite
transparent rules.

[Telen] Which the Russian bureaucracy does not like all that much.

[Gaydar] It will have to reconcile itself to it.

[Telen] And what is there in addition to taxes?

[Gaydar] The going into force of the 17th chapter of the Civil Code,
which regulates land relations. It is an extremely important step. In
my opinion, it is more important than the approval of the Land Code.
Also, the liberalization of the customs system and the reduction of the
overall level of customs duties. At first the government took a very
cautious step in this direction, but later on it saw the positive result
and is now ready to move farther. All of these are our program ideas.

[Telen] Is there really a liberal breakthrough?

[Gaydar] It is, of course, not a revolution, but the steps are in the
right direction.

[Telen] The report on the work that has been done looks somehow too
optimistic.

[Gaydar] But we are talking about what they have succeeded in putting
into effect from the SPS program.

[Telen] That is, not everything has succeeded?

[Gaydar] There are directions along which the government has not moved or
has not moved far. For example, we are still faced with carrying out a
block of extremely complicated structural reforms.

[Telen] How many market reforms are in progress -- we are talking so much
about structural reforms.

[Gaydar] We must realize that the ability of any government to carry out
these reforms is always limited. When you try to do everything at once,
failure is guaranteed. We have to choose our priorities here.

[Telen] Choosing priorities is as a rule compromise. Were there many
compromises involved in putting the SPS program into effect?

[Gaydar] Let us take the Labor Code, passed at the first reading -- it
is, of course, a compromise, but in my opinion, a necessary one.
Although I hope that we will still have some success in beating it off at
the second reading.

[Telen] The overall idea may be the most progressive, but later on,
individual deviations will reduce it to nothing.

[Gaydar] This danger does exist. It is therefore important to see the
future. Let us say, we engage in the reform of budget relations. We
have not succeeded in doing all that much so far. But we know what we
still have to do.

[Telen] What is that?

[Gaydar] We must make sure that the income tax as a whole remains in the
regions -- we hope to carry out this amendment through the Duma. But
the VAT, on the contrary, should be directed to the federal budget: the
territorial disproportions here have no connection with anything
reasonable. We have something to work on.

[Telen] In the sense that the cabinet of ministers has not yet completely
grasped the ideas of the SPS?

[Gaydar] The government adopted a strong liberal program. But life
itself has not changed. Various groups, with their own interests,
continue to operate in the government, and the departments lobby for
their own acts and try to drum up additional staffs and powers for
themselves. Hence -- the inexhaustible stream of various types of
directives, which actually weaken the most correct laws. There are two
lines in the government today. The true strategic one. And the
current one -- which does not correspond too well with this strategy.

[Telen] All the same, in your opinion, is Kasyanov's government, his
team, capable of fulfilling the SPS program?

[Gaydar] The government is hardly ever a unified team.

[Telen] But yours, the "91 model"?

[Gaydar] A unique case. All the succeeding governments, just as the
present one, constitute a set of people who to a certain extent coincide
in their views. But at the same time, with internal differences, with
conflicts between the departments.

[Telen] Are you calm about this? Don't you think that a more monolithic
government should come to replace Kasyanov's cabinet?

[Gaydar] No, we support the present cabinet.

[Telen] Only recently the main opponents of the SPS were the
left-wingers. Today the argument about the reform of the RAO YeES is in
progress between Anatoliy Chubays, the recognized ideologist of the
right-wingers, and Andrey Illarionov, the president's adviser, who is
liberal in his views.

[Gaydar] This was precisely what Chubays and I talked about the other
day. I asked him, "If I had told you 10 years ago that your main
problem would be Andrey Illarionov, how would you have reacted?"

[Telen] What did Chubays answer?

[Gaydar] "I would have been glad, but I would not have believed it."
When the main problem lies in disagreements between Gref, Kudrin and
Illarionov -- that pleases me.

[Telen] Because the question is not about ideological disagreements?

[Gaydar] It is about ideological disagreements. But within the
framework of a broad liberal niche. This is natural, after all, when
there are polemics.

[Telen] What position do you take in these arguments?

[Gaydar] It varies. Each side has its weak and strong aspects. At the
same time, let us not forget that the minister and the president's
adviser are in different positions. The member of the government has to
answer every day for what is going on in the country, to carry out laws
through the Duma, to settle with foreign debts and to seek money for
this. The adviser can evaluate things in a more detached way, can
criticize more sharply. Sometimes Illarionov and I are in absolute
agreement, and sometimes -- absolutely not. On the whole, however, he
criticizes the government for insufficient energy in carrying out liberal
reforms. In my opinion, this is useful. There are many people in our
country who curse the cabinet because of the fact that it is allegedly
somehow superliberal. It is a good thing that there is now criticism
from the other side.

[Telen] On the eve of the August crisis it was Illarionov who came out in
favor of the devaluation of the ruble, which, in his opinion, would save
the country from default. Today the threat of unnecessary strengthening
of the ruble has again become reality, and some economists are again
beginning to talk about devaluation. What are your comments?

[Gaydar] If anyone suggested to me a way to devaluate the ruble under our
conditions....

[Telen] Explain so as to make it clear to the man-in-the-street:
precisely what does devaluation guarantee him?

[Gaydar] Favorable market conditions on the world energy-carrier market.
The serious threat of devaluation will arise if the price for oil is
less than $15 per barrel. Then we can and must change the exchange-rate
policy.

[Telen] The government is moving in the right direction, but why is the
growth of production still slowing down?

[Gaydar] It is an absolutely normal trend. The dramatic increase last
year was an anomaly -- it was caused by the transition from maximally low
prices for oil to high ones. For Russia, with its nongrowing
population, with its nongrowing work force -- what is there to compare us
with China, with a weak banking system, with other problems -- 5 percent
is a good indicator. If over the course of 10 years, at average yearly
prices for oil, we will have average growth rates of 4-5 percent, this
means that we will rapidly begin to catch up with the more highly
developed countries which have already gone far ahead.

[Telen] The right-wingers are often criticized for the fact that they
serve exclusively the interests of major capital.

[Gaydar] One of the reasons for liberal reforms being implemented quite
successfully today lies in the fact that this course corresponds to the
interests of major capital.

[Telen] Was nothing like this observed before?

[Gaydar] Before, the oligarchs were more concerned about how to drum up
some sort of individual quotas, to build individual relations with the
government and to gain the status of a bank authorized to work with the
budget. Now, however, they have begun to get interested in the rules of
the game. Changes have taken place in management, and the new managers
want their depository receipts to be quoted on the New York stock
exchange, they want to attract serious capital, and moreover, legal
capital. But all this depends on the investment climate in Russia.
More specifically -- on what the legal system, what the legislation in
the land will be like, and what the tax system will be. They are
prepared to engage in all this, not from philanthropy -- these are
investments in the future of their own companies.

[Telen] Does this mean that there is absolute community of interests
between the oligarchs and the liberals?

[Gaydar] No, the interests of big business are quite limited. Let us
say, the laws on deregulation that are very important for the economy
don't worry it.

[Telen] Why?

[Gaydar] Well, they no longer have any problems with officials. They
solved them a long time ago.

Deregulation is the real interest of medium-sized and small business, but
this stratum is much more poorly organized politically and their
positions therefore remain weak. We are trying to move in this
direction, but the movement is going forward with tremendous difficulty.

[Telen] Nevertheless, it seems to me that the interests of big capital,
which are poorly written into the liberal reforms, are safeguarded, on
the whole.

[Gaydar] For example?

[Telen] For example, the oligarchs do not particularly need a transparent
economy. Take the recent facts. Auditors never really could obtain
all the necessary information at Gazprom. The questions of the real
owners of Sibneft or Russkiy Alyuminiy are simply hanging in air....

[Gaydar] The problem that you are talking about is a long-term one. But
even here the situation is changing. You have now enumerated a number
of questions. Would they have occurred to you eight years ago? Then
we would have discussed it....

[Telen] All the same, about the transparence.

[Gaydar] The basic part of the tax laws, which should result in the
transparence of the economy, will go into operation beginning next year.
But the 13-percent income tax is already in operation. Look at the way
the real level of wages has gone up. What has made that happen? Well,
the people are getting away from the "gray" schemes -- it is more
advantageous for them to switch over to white bookkeeping.

[Telen] And the situation in the companies themselves?

[Gaydar] It is not ideal. It is obvious, however, that many of these
people are interested today in showing the real state of affairs, and in
conducting an international audit, not only "for the public," but also
for themselves. Not long ago I was talking with investors about a
Russian oil company which only recently had a terrible reputation. It
was held up as an example in business schools -- it demonstrated the way
an oil company can be stolen. So today the investors were struck by the
changes that had taken place in it -- a new style of management, openness
and a readiness to answer all the awkward questions.

[Telen] You think that, as the movement toward a normal market
progresses, everything will sooner or later fall into place. Then it
will be clear why the SPS did not fight very hard for the law against
laundering dirty money.

[Gaydar] Frankly speaking, I have quite a skeptical attitude toward this
direction of legislation.

[Telen] Why?

[Gaydar] Experience shows that if you want to combat money earned by
drugs or the illegal sale of weapons, it is more important to combat the
criminal business itself. So far, no one in the world has succeeded in
proving that combating the laundering of dirty money, that is, with
investigation, is more efficient.

[Telen] The Duma has removed capital formed by tax evasion from the
category of "dirty" money.

[Gaydar] Yes, here we should talk, not about laundering, but rather about
the flight of capital. And this, I am convinced, is a question of the
investment climate. Pass laws here which prevent leakage, or don't pass
them -- it is all meaningless unless you have forged ahead in the
movement along the basic directions. We are now advancing along the
basic directions.

[Telen] Is there perhaps any sense in a tax amnesty?

[Gaydar] The fact that we are easing the tax system is essentially a
civilized form of amnesty. These steps are sufficient to return the
capital that has been removed.

[Telen] Is no one interested in the story of this money?

[Gaydar] Well, in the first place, no one is really particularly
interested in it. And in the second place, the people who knew how to
get money out of the country can easily find a way to bring it back and
legalize it if they so desire. I was never enthusiastic about the idea
of a tax amnesty. This is a bad signal for market participants.

[Telen] When you headed the government ten years ago, you obviously
somehow predicted the course of events in the country. Did your
economic predictions come true?

[Gaydar] I didn't make any economic predictions, because there was no
basis for them. Predictions are a kind of model, built not only on
principles, but also on facts. If we had had three experiences of
Russia's departure from 70-year-long socialism, then we could have
roughly imagined the way this would happen. At that time only the
short-term problems were clear, and we were trying to cope with them.
If you are talking about my general ideas, then I would say this. What
happened corresponded roughly to what I expected. But everything
happened much more slowly than I expected. I falsely extended to Russia
what was obviously happening by that time in Poland. I did not take
into consideration the fact that the history of socialism in Russia was
much longer and the disproportions were greater, and it therefore would
take twice as long to get out of it as it did for the Poles.

[Telen] It was not a matter of our own mistakes and miscalculations?

[Gaydar] It was a matter of the specific situation which formed by the
autumn of 1991.

[Telen] Why did you leave public politics?

[Gaydar] I think that I served out my liability for military service in
public politics. I do not consider myself to be a born public
politician. One must engage in an activity in which one has obvious
comparable advantages with respect to colleagues. Which I am trying to
do. I like what I am doing today.

********

#11
From: "Michael Bogomolov" <dobro_prcc@mail.cnt.ru>
Subject: Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov's appeal to the G-7
Date: Fri, 20 Jul 2001
Organization: PR-centre "Citizen" (PRCC)

President Aslan Maskhadov sent today the following letter to the Presidents
and Prime Ministers of the G-7.
(Contact: Mr. R. Khalilov Tel/fax: + 32 2 742 21 90)
# 10-715 19 July 2001


AN OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENTS AND PRIME MINISTERS
OF THE G-7 NATIONS

Dear Excellencies,

I Aslan Maskhadov, the democratically elected President of the Chechen
Republic of Ichkeria, write this desperate appeal in the name of my people,
the victims of a genocidal war whose daily murder has yet to awaken the
conscience of the world you lead. We are as wretched, bloody and enslaved
as you are rich, mighty and free. You will soon gather in Genoa amidst the
splendor and ceremony that befits your place in the front rank of nations.
Guards of honour will salute you, you will meet in palaces and the world
will listen to your every word. But I write you from a killing ground
putrid with slaughter and like my brethren I remain a hunted man in my own
country. I too won the privilege and responsibility of leading my nation
from the ballot box, but Moscow calls me a bandit, a terrorist and a
criminal. Beyond the confines of my tiny country, my words seem to count
for little, just as the anguished cry of my people still astonishingly
leaves you mute and deaf. So I will continue to write until the silence is
pierced.

You will join in your summit to consider debt relief for the impoverished
developing world. This is a laudable aim, and it is the hope no doubt of
countless millions that humanitarian concern motivates the strong to seek
an end to indentured misery for the weak. But if you acknowledge the quiet
violence of poverty upon the destitute and the hungry why do you turn away
from us? We who die in the flames of the Kremlin's dirty war, are we less
worthy of compassion? What has made us invisible to you? I fear I know the
answer. I fear the cold exigencies of realpolitik ensure your inaction and
seal our fate. Lest you damage an uncertain relationship with a fragile and
volatile new Russia, you are willing to overlook the annihilation of my
people. In your eyes, for the sake of larger interests we are an expendable
nation. So you grant a seat at the table to an honoured guest, Russian
President Vladimir Putin, and shake his hand as the leader of a great
democracy, applauding him as a reformer who shares your values.

If you could stand to see the true face of Chechnya under the agony of
Russian occupation, could you sincerely continue to offer such praise? Out
of a population that once numbered a million, one in seven Chechens is now
dead. 250,000 of our civilians are refugees. Bereft of the most basic
necessities, many are ravaged by disease and malnutrition, especially the
elderly and the young. More than 20,000 civilians and resistance members
endure imprisonment in the new Gulags, the so-called filtration camps. Held
in dehumanizingly foul and primitive conditions with little or no medical
care that far exceed the worst standards of the Russian penal system, life
in the improvised camps sees the sadistic and systematic use of torture.
Burning with cigarettes, crippling beatings, suffocation, drowning in human
excrement, mutilation with knives, high voltage electric shock and sexual
abuses are only some of the common practices. Many prisoners are ultimately
killed. Surely for some this must be a welcome deliverance from hell.

Our women are often rounded up at random and gang raped. In a common
scorched earth policy villages are looted then razed and the able bodied
males including boys 15 and under are swept up and disappeared. Any Chechen
can be arrested without charge or receive capital punishment without trial.
Summary executions are an everyday occurrence for men, women and children
of all ages. The bodies of the dead are often deliberately mutilated and
left on display, their burial forbidden. Our dead also serve as a new form
of currency, with Russian soldiers forcing relatives to pay large ransoms
before they can obtain the remains of their loved ones. Countless mass
graves lie hidden in a landscape dotted by flattened villages and burning
ruins. Our infrastructure no longer exists. Only in the last two weeks a
dozen villages in south eastern and western Chechnya were again terrorised,
over 300 civilians murdered in a systematic sweep and thousands more
imprisoned, tortured and raped. We informed the Council of Europe but to no
avail. This is the darker truth of realpolitik. Terror, butchery and
madness is the price we pay to ensure the pragmatism of international
diplomacy.

In 1945 you defeated the evils of militarism, fascism and Nazism. Those
nations among you that had given birth to the monstrous juggernaut and
holocaust of world war, vowed never to repeat the same fatal errors and
forged yourselves in a new spirit to stand proudly among the elder
democracies. Over half a century of progress together you built new
institutions for the community of nations, the UN, NATO, the EU, and the
OSCE, among other regional and global bodies, aimed towards a more
equitable and safer future. You prevented the doomsday of a nuclear
conflict and your example brought down the Berlin Wall, lifting the yoke of
communism and ending a long cold war. You dismantled your colonial empires
and allowed former subject peoples to be themselves. You fought racism at
home and abroad and your voices helped to vanquish the stain of apartheid.
Time and again you fostered the virtues of democracy to triumph over
dictatorship. Perhaps above all, at Nuremberg you responded to your most
noble instincts establishing the rule of law and human rights as
inviolable, universal principles that would forever hold barbarism
accountable to a civilised code of conduct.

So how is it that you celebrate Slobodan Milosevic at last facing judgement
at the Hague but embrace Putin as a credible partner? How is it possible
that you mobilised to confront naked aggression during the Gulf War,
intervened when you witnessed ethnic cleansing and savagery in Bosnia,
Kosovo, Timor and Sierra Leone and now seldom even utter the word Chechnya?
You condemn and isolate the SLORC regime in Myanmar and the Taliban in
Afghanistan. You pressure China over its abuses in Tibet and its
persecution of dissident intellectuals and religious followers, but you say
nothing about the mass murder of Chechen civilians. You practice tireless
diplomacy trying to secure peace in the Middle East, Northern Ireland,
Macedonia, Kashmir, the Congo, even the Sudan, where is your Chechen peace
initiative?

In the name of a dying nation I beg you not to forsake us any longer. I ask
that you collectively take steps to foster the resumption of peace
negotiations and the enactment of an immediate cease-fire guaranteed and
monitored by neutral parties. I beseech you further to demand in accordance
with international law the deployment of desperately needed humanitarian
aid, health and medical personnel. I further implore you to seek the return
without hindrance of NGO human rights investigators, observers from
international institutions and all members of the global press currently
being barred from entering Chechnya. I appeal to you as leaders of the free
world to muster the moral courage in keeping with the democratic traditions
you represent and have sworn to uphold to pressure Russia to cease its
extermination of my country, to hold it accountable for genocide, and to
impose sanctions if Moscow will not desist.

The savagery we must bear is not new. We remember Stalin's salt mines, his
guard towers, barbed wire and unmarked graves. The pain of exodus and
genocide we have known before. So we recognise the others with whom we
share a terrible kinship of horror. The skeletal Jews and Romany in the
ovens of Dachau and Auschwitz. The bayonet fodder of Nanjing. The ancient,
wide-eyed children of Biafra. The pleading mother and baby facing the
rifles at My Lai. The marsh Arabs of Iraq choked by the clouds of mustard
gas. The Tutsi of Rwanda butchered on the Kigali road by the knives of the
Interhamwe. They are all our martyred brothers and sisters in the legacy of
senseless murder. Only our slaughter, our death is not yesterday's, it
belongs in the living nightmare of the present. How many Chechens will have
died in the time you take to read this letter? How many more must we bury
by the time your summit is over? Do not fail to speak, for the sake of
humanity and justice act now upon your conscience or in time history will
also mark you with a page of shame. If you continue to stand idly by while
my people vanish in a bloodbath, if you fail to act with conviction and
resolve as you did in Rwanda, Chechen ghosts will stain your honour as
surely as they do Russia's.

May God grant you the wisdom and vision to serve the cause of peace and
justice.

Respectfully,
Aslan Maskhadov
President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria

*******

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