November 1, 2000   

This Date's Issues:   4612 • 4613 • 4614

Johnson's Russia List
#4614
1 November 2000
davidjohnson@erols.com

[Note from David Johnson:
1. AFP: Putin cemetery visit aims to lay Soviet-era ghosts.
2. Izvestia: MOST RUSSIANS TRUST THEIR PRESIDENT. 
3. Interfax: TWO RUSSIAN TYCOONS TO FACE FRAUD CHARGES.
4. Wall Street Journal Europe editorial: Russia's Glass House.
5. Interfax: Russian Central Bank proposes thorough reform of banking system.
6. Patrick Armstrong: Responses to Kelley and Dolan.
7. THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION PRISM: Alexander Tsipko, THE WEAKNESSES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF PUTIN'S STATE REFORMS.
8. Celeste Wallander: Forget Russia?
9. Elizabeth Bell: Forget Russia.
10. Thomas Tirone: Forget Russia.
11. Ilvi Jõe-Cannon: Forget Russia.
12. Mark Moorstein: Forget Russia.
13. Ed Crane: Forget Russia?
14. Isaac Tarasulo: A reply to 4610/Kagarlitsky's "Two Wars, One Mess."
15. Interfax: RUSSIAN DUMA HEAD AGAINST REVISING PRIVATIZATION RESULTS.
16. Interfax: NEARLY HALF OF RUSSIAN CITY DWELLERS SUPPORT ACTIONS 
OF RUSSIAN FEDERAL FORCES IN CHECHNYA.] 

*******

#1
Putin cemetery visit aims to lay Soviet-era ghosts

SAINTE-GENEVIEVE-DES-BOIS, France, Nov 1 (AFP) - 
Standing amid the graves of the White Russian generals who bitterly opposed 
the Bolshevik revolutionaries whose mantle he inherited, President Vladimir 
Putin turned the page on the Soviet era Wednesday as he wound down his state 
visit to France. 

Leaving the most symbolic moment until last, Putin visited the cemetery at 
Sainte-Genevieve-des-Bois, south of Paris, which is the final resting place 
for 10,000 Russian emigrants and the biggest Russian cemetery in the world 
outside the homeland. 

Tsarist grand-dukes lie alongside Soviet-era dissidents, former agents of 
Moscow hobnob with dancers, musicians and impoverished exiles in these few 
acres that provide a graphic illustration of Russia's turbulent 20th-century 
history. 

"Many countries in the world have known tragedies and overcome them," Putin 
said in one of his last public statements here before returning to Moscow. "I 
think it is now time for us also to reunite." 

Accompanied by his wife Ludmila, Putin placed red carnations on a number of 
graves, notably those of Ivan Bunin, a 1933 Nobel literature prize-winner who 
emigrated from Russia in 1920, and of Viktoria Obolenskaya, a heroine of the 
Russian resistance to Nazism who died at the hands of the Gestapo.

Despite the rain and gusts of wind, Putin -- a former officer with the feared 
Soviet security police, the KGB -- lingered amid the cemetery's open spaces, 
taking time to gaze at the tombs, funerary chapels and Orthodox crosses.

Among the graves he visited were those of the dancers Rudolph Nureyev and 
Olga Preobrazhenskaya, along with those of several White Army officers who 
fought in the long civil war that followed the Bolshevik seizure of power in 
1917.

"We must all remember, we must never forget, that we are the children of the 
same mother whose name is Russia," Putin said as he left the cemetery.

The first Russian head of state to visit Sainte-Genevieve-des-Bois, Putin 
expressed thanks to the French authorities "for the protection and 
maintenance of this holy place."

The cemetery became the main burial ground for Russians in France after the 
Russian expatriate community opened an old people's home in the town in 1927 
to serve the needs of the swelling number of post-revolutionary emigrants.

Though it remains simply a municipal cemetery, it has long been a site of 
pilgrimage for Russian visitors to France.

Before getting into his car to drive to the airport, Putin briefly evaded his 
security guards to shake hands with some of the Russians who had turned out 
to see him.

The visit was "a reconciliation for the pre-1917 and the post-1917 Russia," 
commented town mayor Pierre Champion. 

*******

#2
Izvestia
November 1, 2000
[translaition from RIA Novosti for personal use only]
MOST RUSSIANS TRUST THEIR PRESIDENT

The ROMIR public opinion research organisation polled 
2,000 people in October. It turned out that the overwhelming 
majority of Russians (71.5%) approved of the activities of 
Vladimir Putin as president, although to a different degree, 
13.3% rather disapprove of them, only 6.3% fully disapprove of 
the actions of the president, and 8.9% had no answer to this 
question. 
A total of 73.9% said they trusted the president, 64.3% 
said Putin was pursuing a policy that met the long-term 
interests of Russia, but 19.8% of respondents disagreed with 
this opinion. The rest either refused or could not answer this 
question. 

*******

#3
TWO RUSSIAN TYCOONS TO FACE FRAUD CHARGES

MOSCOW. Nov 1 (Interfax) - The Russian Prosecutor General's Office
intends to bring charges against two well-known businessmen, Media-Most
holding CEO Vladimir Gusinsky and former State Duma member Boris
Berezovsky.
Gusinsky is to report to the office on November 13 to face charges
of fraud and be interrogated as a suspect, Deputy Prosecutor General
Vasily Kolmogorov told the press on Wednesday. If he ignores the
subpoena, an arrest warrant may be issued and Gusinsky will be placed on
the Interpol wanted list, he said.
All suspects in the so-called Aeroflot case, in particular
Berezovsky, will be summoned for interrogation starting on November 13,
Kolmogorov said. If necessary, the suspects will be placed under arrest,
he said.
Kolmogorov said that grounds for bringing charges against the two
business figures were collected in the process of investigating the
criminal cases of Aeroflot and Media Most.
The Media Most case was prompted by credit relations between Media
Most and Gazprom, he said.
Kolmogorov said it followed from the materials of the case that
back in 1999 Media Most and some of its subsidiaries not only had
liabilities largely exceeding their assets, but losses running into the
billions. Under such circumstances and in keeping with the requirements
of acting legislation, Gusinsky and other executives were bound to
decide on the liquidation of the said joint-stock companies, he said.
Notwithstanding, Gusinsky, as the owner of the joint-stock company
and its subsidiaries and other executives of the joint-stock company
took credits to the equivalent of over $300 million and loans in excess
of over 5 billion rubles with actually nonexistent assets as collateral,
Kolmogorov said.
According to him, Media Most leaders, including Gusinsky, through
fraud and abuse of trust acquired alien property - funds of Gazprom open
joint stock-company to the equivalent of about $300 million (Article 159
of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - fraud).
Kolmogorov noted that Gusinsky has been summoned twice but both
times he ignored the invitations. "If Gusinsky fails to turn up again,
it will be decided to chose a restrictive measure in the form of his
arrest and he will be declared wanted," he said.
As for the Aeroflot case, Kolmogorov said sufficient evidence has
been collected "to produce charges of large-scale misappropriation of
alien property." The grounds for the charges came from additional
materials submitted by the Swiss side to the Prosecutor General's
Office, he said.
Asked whether Berezovsky will be declared wanted if he fails to
respond to the summons, Kolmogorov said that so far the businessman "has
come to interrogations in good faith and promised to come at the first
summons any time."

*******

#4
Wall Street Journal Europe
1 November 2000
Editorial
Russia's Glass House

A familiar Soviet tactic for deflecting criticism from the West was to turn 
the tables. When censured for the absence of free speech, for example, a 
Politburo member would ask why there was no right to a job or housing in 
America.

So there was a "here we go again" quality about the proposal by a group of 
hard-line Russian parliamentary deputies last week to send observers to the 
U.S. to monitor whether the presidential elections would be indeed "free and 
fair." They suspected irregularities especially in California, Texas, "and in 
other territories forcibly annexed to the United States," the deputies 
announced.

Now there is some real concern that voter fraud on the margins will be an 
issue in next week's election, as our John Fund reported in his 
OpinionJournal.com column recently. But we doubt this is what the Duma 
deputies had in mind when they proposed setting up a foundation to preserve 
democracy in America and a "Voice of Russia" radio station to broadcast to 
Americans the real, and no doubt unattractive, state of their union.

To its credit, the full Duma voted last Wednesday to save its dignity and not 
vote on the absurd resolution. Still, it's worth juxtaposing this feigned 
concern for American democracy against the shoulder shrugs that the most 
blatant violations of democratic rights much closer to home receive in the 
Duma and the Kremlin these days.

Russia's record when it comes to real threats to democracy isn't good. 
Lawmakers said nothing when Slobodan Milosevic was stealing elections in 
Serbia and initially voted down a resolution to recognize the popularly 
elected Vojislav Kostunica. They are also conspicuously quiet on the 
anti-democratic antics of Aleksander Lukashenko, the last remaining Central 
European despot. When President Lukashenko wrapped up an election in Belarus 
this month that gave new meaning to the term fraudulent (several opposition 
leaders are missing; numerous independent candidates were left off the ballot 
and others subject to intimidation), the Kremlin looked on approvingly as 
Russia lawmakers bitterly attacked Western observers who condemned the 
election as unfree and unfair.

Nor do these elected pols speak out against the short-changing of democracy 
inside Russia itself. Press freedom in Vladimir Putin's Russia is being 
rolled back. The human rights of Chechens are routinely violated, as is laid 
out in jarring detail by a recent Human Rights Watch report into the torture 
and detention of thousands of Chechens detained by Russian forces in 
Chechnya. And few Russian lawmakers have bothered to take note of evidence of 
wide-scale voter fraud in the elections that officially gave President Putin 
his job.

In nearly weekly gubernatorial elections in Russia there is growing evidence 
that the Kremlin is determined to assert its will -- fairly or not. On 
Saturday, only a dozen or so hours before voting was to begin, Kursk governor 
Alexander Rutskoi was barred by a court from seeking re-election. We doubt 
few Russians will shed a tear for the outspoken former Afghan War veteran who 
led the rebellion against Boris Yeltsin in 1993. Mr. Rutskoi was an 
autocratic and arbitrary governor. But it would have been far better had he 
been defeated properly at the polls rather than stealthily removed from the 
running.

Mr. Rutskoi claims the barring was a direct Kremlin order. The newspaper 
Novaya Gazeta gave credence to that charge in a report that said the Kremlin 
even has a list of who is to be removed in each of the elections.

If so, it is another discouraging sign that post-Yeltsin Russia is not moving 
out of the woods but deeper into them. Perhaps Mr. Putin believes that he is 
merely restoring order to a derelict and unruly clan of leaders. But such 
methods only ensure more autocracy at the local level; and distortion and 
dishonesty would prevail in a media too afraid to report the truth.

Come to think of it, we wish the Duma had taken up the deputies' offer to 
send observers to the U.S. on election day: Warts and all, there's still a 
lot Russia can learn from a look at the inner workings of a country with a 
serious claim to being democratic.

*******

#5
Russian Central Bank proposes thorough reform of banking system 
Interfax 

Moscow, 1st November: The Russian Central Bank is putting forward the task of 
conducting a full-scale banking reform, Central Bank Deputy Chairman Tatyana 
Paramonova has told Interfax. 

In her opinion, the reform should be promoted by the mixed coordinating 
committee for advancing banking in Russia, which consists of Central Bank 
experts, officials from Russian ministries, the presidential administration 
and international financial institutions. 

Paramonova said that at the Tuesday [31st October] committee session experts 
recognized that the first stage of restructuring the banking system had been 
completed. 

"The first stage of restructuring that implied the elimination of ineffectual 
banks is over. Today, but for a few exceptions, we do not have banks that 
would have to be stripped of their licences in keeping with acting 
legislation," she said. 

She said that the banking reform, among other things, implies the revival of 
financial markets, the introduction of international accounting standards and 
the development of a banking supervision infrastructure. 

"We have worked out a set of measures in all these directions. From our 
viewpoint, their implementation should help raise the standard of banking in 
Russia to the standards of developed countries," she said. 

In this context, Paramonova said that six banks have launched a pilot project 
of transferring to international accounting standards within the framework of 
a working group from the mixed committee. 

"This is a fairly complicated and labour-consuming project that will last for 
16 months. We have defined the concrete directions of this effort and have 
started training our own specialists. I think we are in for a whole era of 
transition to international accounting standards," Paramonova said. 

She said the task of improving supervision and adjusting it to international 
standards is closely related to accounting. 

"If we speak of countries with a transitional economy, the supervision 
exercised by the Central Bank is of a fairly high standard. But we are 
putting forward the task of modifying the supervision system so that it would 
be effective under the conditions of a transition to international accounting 
standards," she said. 

Paramonova said that representatives of international financial institutions 
on the mixed committee believe that the Central Bank should keep its 
supervising functions in the near future. 

"It is evident to both us and international experts that, from the viewpoint 
of advancing the lending institutions themselves and protecting the interests 
of depositors and shareholders, it would be inexpedient to strip the Central 
Bank of its role in supervising the Russian banking system," Paramonova said. 

*******

#6
Date: Wed, 01 Nov 2000 
From: Patrick Armstrong <ab966@issc.debbs.ndhq.dnd.ca>
Subject: RESPONSES TO KELLEY AND DOLAN

Mr Kelley (JRL 4604) both fails to understand my point about unexamined
implicit assumptions about Russia and illustrates it. He takes a very
either/or position. Which of course, is part of the problem.

Why, for example, should my statement that one is wrong to assume ALL
official Russians are ALWAYS lying, be considered to assume that I meant
that all Russian officials, especially Gen Manilov, are truth-tellers?
Russians may believe in plot theories (and they certainly do) but how
many of these rumours have proved out? Remember all that stuff about how
Yeltsin was going to pull a "Milosevic" and stay in power forever? Or
how about all the military coups that were going to overthrow Gorbachev?
Y2K? Very few of the rumours have proved true. So why do so many people
still relay every bad rumour?
Personally, I think quite a lot has changed in Russia since de Custine
visited 160 years ago. He's hardly the last word on Russians any more
than Mrs Trollope is on Americans.
Of course Russia is the biggest actor in the FUSSR, but does that mean
that, for example, Gamsakhurdia or the Mkhedrioni were Moscow's puppets?

It's not a simple black hat or white hat issue in which one has to chose
one side and reject the other. All Lieven and I are trying to say is
that some common prejudices about Russia should be hauled out into the
light and examined.

We're not saying everything is wonderful, or even that very much is very
good. And why would anyone think that we were? What is the unexamined
assumption behind that accusation?

By the way what is a "Russified Georgian"? Is Mr Kelley attempting to
avoid saying "communist internationalist Georgian"? Does he mean that
Latsis was a Russified Latvian, Dzerzhinskiy a Russified Pole, Trotskiy
a Russified Jew, Kuusinen a Russified Finn, Gus Hall a Russified
American?

Mr Dolan's comments (JRL 4606) are more sophisticated.
Let me just say that while I would consider it to be a gross mistake
(even "Russophobic") to assume that ALL official Russians are liars, I
would agree that it is rational and founded on observation to say that
SOME of them are lying. And it is a subject for rational discussion, for
all the reasons Mr Dolan gave, to discuss whether, on average, they lie
more than officials from, say, Western countries. The same can be
applied to all the cases Mr Dolan gives.

My remarks are not directed against rational, evidential discussion,
which leads to strong criticism; they are directed against unexamined
assumptions. Therefore, there are lots of things one can say about the
brutality of Russian troops in Chechnya without suggesting that there is
something TYPICALLY RUSSIAN about razing Groznyy to the state that, say,
Falaise or Caen were in in 1944. .

*******

#7
THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION PRISM
A MONTHLY ON THE POST-SOVIET STATES
OCTOBER 2000 Volume VI, Issue 10 

THE WEAKNESSES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF PUTIN'S STATE REFORMS
By Aleksandr Tsipko
Aleksandr Tsipko is senior associate at the Russian Academy of Sciences' 
Institute for International Economic and Political Research and a columnist 
for Literaturnaya gazeta.

Society awaited Putin's decree on the creation of the State Council with 
anticipation and interest. It was clear to everyone that after his rout of 
the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament--when he turned it 
into repository for the second rank of the regional political elite--the 
country needed some sort of mechanism for bringing together the center, the 
regions and the peoples of our immense country.

The lower house of parliament, the Duma, cannot perform this harmonizing 
function, because it is formed mainly along party and class lines, and is 
the arena for the political battle between left and right; the new 
Federation Council--which, according to the amended constitution, is made 
up of representatives appointed by the governors and speakers of regional 
legislative assemblies--will not have any political authority at all. A 
minion--even the minion of a governor--is still a minion. He is not capable 
of contemplating the affairs of state and playing the politician when the 
sword of Damocles is hanging over him in the shape of a possible recall 
from Moscow.

The worst job in politics in the new Russia used to be that of prime 
minister, whom the president could and still can dismiss at any time. But 
the position of the senators--appointed and potentially recalled by the 
local authorities--will be even weaker and more exposed. The rewards are 
not worth the risk even for a self-respecting deputy governor. Basically, 
all these reforms of the Federation Council have resulted in an absurd 
situation. The fate of the country, issues of war and peace and state 
borders, are now in the hands of minions of the regional elite who will be 
twitching their strings. Under such circumstances, with a virtually 
nonexistent upper house of parliament, and a Duma whose fate is uncertain, 
a venue is required where the president can meet face to face with the 
regional leaders, at least from time to time. The idea of an Assembly of 
the Land has always hung in the Russian air. The question is how to apply 
it to today's conditions. Because we have preserved the Soviet 
semi-elective, semi-corporative state, then perhaps we should also restore 
the Soviet Central Committee? The whole problem is that Putin's State 
Council is not up to the job of replacing the old Central Committee, nor of 
partially compensating for the previous Federation Council. Alongside the 
abortive and incomprehensible new-look Federation Council there is the 
equally makeshift State Council. One stopgap structure is hastily put up 
alongside another.

Of course, it could have been worse. The danger of the State Council being 
turned into a closed, elite assembly of the leaders of Russia's wealthiest 
regions has been averted. So has the danger of giving further offense to 
the regional leaders, and, above all, affronting the national sentiments of 
the leaders of the republics. First and foremost, the leaders of every 
subject of the Russian Federation, without exception, should be represented 
in the State Council. Otherwise, instead of being a mechanism for 
integration, it might undermine Russia's national unity--at a time when 
there is an ongoing war in Chechnya, when the North Caucasus is threatening 
to secede from Russia and when the national policy of the last few years 
has failed.

Even the tsar did not risk ignoring the honor and dignity of the small and 
large nationalities which made up the empire; he was concerned with the 
feelings of the Poles, and the Kalmyks and the Yakuts, not to mention the 
Tatars and Bashkirs. Even tsarist Russia stressed that it was a union of 
kingdoms and kings, and that the emperor was not just the tsar of the 
Russians, but the king of the Poles and the Finns and so on. And yet it 
seems to me that the idea of the State Council has not been fully thought 
through. All its structures look makeshift and second rate. From the start, 
the State Council was basically conceived as the driving belt for the 
presidential administration, just as the trade unions were the driving belt 
for the communist party in Soviet times. Putin's decree rules that the 
president himself will chair and convene State Council sessions. He also 
appoints its presidium of seven regional leaders. One of the Kremlin deputy 
chiefs of staff acts as secretary on a voluntary basis, but is not a member 
of the State Council. There are no Duma leaders, ex-presidents or other 
types of politicians in the State Council.

There is currently a great deal of argument and criticism surrounding the 
question of how the president decided upon the composition of the first 
State Council. One might agree that Tatarstan's Mintimir Shaimiev takes 
precedence over Chuvashia's Nikolai Fedorov. But it is not at all clear why 
the first presidium included the chairman of Dagestan's State Council 
rather than the leader of Kabardin-Balkaria, who is popular in Russia. Of 
course, the outcome of the second Chechen war depends in many ways on 
stability in multi-ethnic Dagestan. But it should not be forgotten that the 
leader of Kabardin-Balkaria is also the leader of all the Adygei people in 
the North Caucasus, and that the fragile national consensus on Russia's 
southern border depends on the loyalty shown towards Moscow by this, the 
largest ethnic group in the region. Perhaps the appointment of members of 
the presidium should not have been left to the will of the president; 
perhaps the "Central Committee"--that is, all the members of the State 
Council--should have been given the opportunity to elect their own ruling 
body. The outcome would probably have been the same, but the psychological 
effect would have been quite different.

As it stands, the State Council as described in the president's decree--an 
advisory body, with no clearly defined powers, rights and duties--just 
looks like more political window-dressing. A council of this sort might 
have been appropriate for Aleksandr I in the days of serfdom, but at the 
end of the 20th century, when there is a critical lack of national 
consensus, such informal, nonbinding chats with the president appear 
somewhat frivolous. Why repeat the experience of Yeltsin's Presidential 
Council, which was a dead duck?

Putin's freshly-baked institution has far fewer powers than the State 
Council set up by Nicholas II in 1905, which ratified the laws passed by 
the Duma, and acted as a sort of buffer between the czar and Russia's first 
parliament, surviving right up to the revolution.

But if Putin did not want to share power at all, then even in this respect 
his new project is vulnerable. There should be dialog not just with the 
regional leaders, but also with the leaders of the Duma factions and the 
heads of Russia's main religions. If you're going to confer at all, then 
you should confer with all influential forces. As it stands, this is 
neither one thing nor the other. It is neither a house of nationalities nor 
a house of senators...

The whole story of the formation of the State Council and the reform of the 
upper house of parliament casts doubt on the question of whether Putin's 
current team is able or equipped to undertake a serious reform of state 
power; it also casts doubt on the wisdom of combining an attempt to 
strengthen democracy with the problem of restoring the power hierarchy 
which the country so needs. Putin's team are in many ways acting like 
temporary occupants, reacting to the immediate situation rather than 
thinking about the secondary and tertiary consequences of their reform 
projects, which are aimed solely at strengthening their own power base. No 
serious strategy can yet be discerned in Putin's political reforms. He has 
no coherent national policy. His team cannot see the entirety of the 
problems related to the lack of civil society in Russia.

Unfortunately, "de-communization" was identified with the destruction of 
the state. But it was possible to build a strong state without putting up 
so many unnecessary makeshift structures; the regional barons could have 
been put in their place, for example, without destroying the Federation 
Council and turning it into a repository for the second rank of the 
regional elite. The motives for divesting the heads of the local 
legislative assemblies of their senatorial powers are unclear. They were 
not economic planners: That is, they did not combine executive and 
legislative power, but only represented the sovereign interests of the 
peoples and regions of Russia. If Putin's team had given proper thought to 
this, and taken into consideration the problem of reinforcing local 
government and strengthening its authority, then it would certainly not 
have thrown the leaders of the local legislative assemblies out of federal 
politics. But one probably cannot demand the impossible from Putin's 
present team. The changing of the political guard in Russia happened faster 
than was necessary for carrying out sensible reforms. Putin's team is made 
up of the same "1970s generation" from which Gaidar selected his team. This 
is the decisive factor both for an understanding of the shortcomings of 
Gaidar's economic reforms, and for an understanding of the reasons for the 
flimsy nature of Putin's state reforms. In both cases there was no grasp of 
the fact that destroying the old will not automatically create anything new 
and reliable. Those of the 1970s generation, who came to power after the 
break up of the Soviet Union, have many good qualities. They are educated, 
disciplined and efficient; they also have a fine command of foreign 
languages. But they have one serious flaw. They are extremely technical 
rather than humanitarian in their way of thinking; they do not sense the 
social or moral implications of the reforms they are carrying out. They do 
not have the gift of a sense of time and historical continuity. All they 
have done until now lies outside the national and historical context. It is 
important to say that "Russia has to be picked up off its knees." But it is 
also necessary to know what is meant by this promising slogan.

The 1970s generation is able to act effectively only on a level, defined 
plane. Thus in many ways the political moves of Putin's team are just as 
situation-based as those of the radical democrats.

A few examples from history. With the help of the newly elected president 
of the RSFSR in 1991, they wanted to defend themselves against a possible 
comeback by the party nomenklatura. This was how the first makeshift 
structure in democratic Russia appeared. Then they abolished the post of 
vice president, in order to free Yeltsin of another potential Rutskoi. They 
eliminated the system of soviets which had put down its roots in Russia, in 
order to undermine the political base of the left-wing patriotic 
opposition. In so doing they did not take account of the fact that without 
the leading role of the CPSU the soviets were merely ordinary organs of 
government. In rapid time, they distributed the country's main assets to 
random people in order to secure themselves against a revenge attack from 
the administrative system.

Many of the political initiatives of Putin's team are just as situational. 
They created the feeble and incoherent Unity movement in order to strip the 
KPRF of control of the Duma. They routed and discredited the upper house of 
parliament in order to take the autocratic regional leaders in hand. And 
now they have created the ornamental State Council, which has no rights, in 
order to win over the offended governors--though they have forgotten about 
the equally embittered speakers of the regional parliaments. Yet it is 
clear today that a situational solution does not so much solve a problem as 
sweep it under the carpet. In themselves, Putin's situational victories, 
for all their significance, do not bring a new quality or make a 
breakthrough into a new political dimension. This is all merely the 
arithmetic of domestic politics. For a qualitative breakthrough, you do not 
need arithmetic, you need algebra. Even reestablishing control over the 
breakaway Chechen republic will not solve the problem of the integrity of 
the country until new principles and values are found for a new union of 
Chechens, Russians and all the peoples of the North Caucasus within the New 
Russia. Restoring the power hierarchy per se will not resolve the problem 
of integrating the westernized capital cities with the patriarchal depths 
of the Russian provinces.

Putin himself must decide when it is time to think about his historical 
legacy, when to exchange political arithmetic for political algebra. Putin 
himself must decide which of his many makeshift structures he will abolish 
and which he will underpin with a secure foundation. But undoubtedly, the 
era of Putin's makeshift structures has played itself out.

*******

#8
From: cwallander@cfr.org (Celeste Wallander)
Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2000 
Subject: Forget Russia?

Reading some of the responses you have received on this question, I thought
I'd point out that it might be helpful to distinguish between two aspects
of forgetting Russia. The first is to forget trying to nudge, constrain,
encourage, or bludgeon Russia to develop a particular economic, political,
and social form. Most of the frustration your readers (and more generally,
specialists and generalists in foreign policy and academic circles alike)
express in leaning toward forgetting Russia has to do with that aspect. I
should come clean and say I largely lean toward this one as well.
Economic, political, and social reform should be a product of the people
and resources within countries. If it's not there, it won't work.
However, I would not 100% forget Russia on this count, because when those
sources are there within Russia, the US can play a constructive role in
working with Russia and Russians to achieve mutual interests. I'm thinking
of nuclear safety in particular, but also resources and expertise for party
building, elections monitoring and the
like. We've done bad in and by Russia (and by ourselves), but we've also
done identifiable good.

The second aspect is to forget Russia on the international scene, and we
just absolutely cannot possibly be so narrow-minded and self-defeating as
to do this one. The potential for a new arms race, for proliferation of a
whole range of weapons technology (nuclear, chemical, biological, missile,
and advanced conventional) depends in very large measure on Russia and its
future economic and security priorities. Whether or not Central Asia
becomes the next nightmare region of instability -- including international
drug trade as well as the more
familiar terrorism -- depends on Russia's relations with the countries in
that region, and with regional powers like China, Turkey, and Iran.
Probably America's biggest security concern in this century will be China,
and China's future is at least in some measure going to be affected by the
form of its relations with Russia. In the simplest self-interest terms,
the future global energy economy is going to be affected by Russia's role
in terms of both its own gas and oil resources, but also its geopolitical
location as it affects transit. That may not affect the US simply and
directly, but it will affect us if for no other reason that much of the
world's existing and future advanced economies -- Europe, Japan, and China
among them -- will be much more directly affected by Russia's presence in
global energy markets.

In short, there are so many issues on the international level that are
affected by what Russia will be and what it will want, and there are so
many problems we face that can be managed well only by cooperation with
countries including Russia, that we not only had better not "forget
Russia," we'd better start
thinking long-term and multi-dimensionally about it.

*******

#9
From: Elizabeth.Bell@britishcouncil.ru
Subject: Forget Russia
Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2000 

Here are a few of my thoughts on the "forget Russia" issue that you have
raised which I hope will be helpful. I should stress that these are my own
personal views and do not necessarily reflect the views of my employer.

I think that it is vital that we do not "forget Russia". I don't think that
isolationism or abandonment are viable options. Love them or hate them (and
I think that both Russophiles and Russophobes have few illusions as to some
of the problems or issues), I think that the geographical and cultural
centrality of Russia in the world will inevitably make them a key player,
even if it takes centuries. For example, admittedly looking well ahead,
Russia is perhaps the only country in the world that could simultaneously be
European, an Asian tiger, and a good neighbour to the Islamic world. This
doesn't mean that we should blind ourselves to some of the current problems,
and it is very important to apply a good deal of commonsense to all dealings
with them. As a general approach, I think that trying to "throw" large
chunks of money at Russia can sometimes be counterproductive, and can even
perpetuate corruption through providing too much temptation. In terms of
aid, small and grassroots can be beautiful, and I am a great believer in
focusing help on training and skills development, especially for young
people. This is a good investment in providing people with skills that they
can continue to exercise for the rest of their careers and which I believe
will ultimately build a viable Russian economy. No outsider, even with the
most grandiose plans and schemes, will ever be able to do this. I also
suspect that countries that are prepared to stick with Russia will
ultimately benefit from being regarded as good and trusted partners. 

Dr Elizabeth Bell
Assistant Director Science, Engineering and Technology
Direct line: +7 (095) 234 0235
Fax: +7 (095) 234 0205/07
BC Moscow
c/o Mailing Section
10 Spring Gardens
London SW1A 2BN

*******

#10
From: "Thomas G Tirone" <ttirone@tirone.com>
Subject: Forget Russia

Our observation over the course of the past six or seven years is that the
US attitude has always been tinged with arrogance over having "won" the cold
war, such that Russia policy has taken a seat at the very back of the bus.
The European Community has been far more engaging towards Russia. We measure
our reactions from the business community, not the political sphere, yet we
note that politics are ultimately heavily influenced by business interests,
regardless of rhetoric.

Certainly, there is cause for the administration to "forget Russia" -- it is
a potential liability to Gore in a close election. Let's see what November
7th brings...

Sincerely
Tom Tirone
President
Tirone Corporation

******

#11
From: "Ilvi Jõe-Cannon" <ilvij@online.ee>
Subject: Forget Russia
Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2000 

DJ: A recent Reuters story quoted a former US policymaker on Russia:
"The 'forget Russia' school is in the ascendancy in Washington."
I'm interested in comments and reactions.

COULD VERY WELL BE. IT'S EASY TO BECOME FRUSTRATED WITH RUSSIA AND TO SAY
"A POX ON YOU!". HOWEVER, REALISTICALLY ONE CANNOT "FORGET RUSSIA". 

Is this true? WASHINGTON'S POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA IS CHIEFLY DRIVEN BY
BUSINESS INTERESTS AND THEIR PLANS HAVE NOT BEEN REALIZED IN RUSSIA. 
HENCE, THE "FORGET RUSSIA" ATTITUDE.

Is it bad, or good? IT'S PROBABLY GOOD AND AN APPARENT RE-ANALYSIS OF
U.S. POLICY AFTER AUGUST 1998 SEEMED TO SUGGEST THAT SUCH A LEVEL OF
INVOLVEMENT IN RUSSIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS BY THE U.S. IS NOT POLITICALLY
FRUITFUL. 

Consequences? ON THE PR LEVEL, IT PROBABLY DOES NOT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE. 
AS FOR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, A LOT OF IT DEPENDS ON THE QUALITY OF U.S.
DIPLOMATS.

A request: I strongly recommend that recipients' comments for 
circulation on JRL strive to avoid personal criticism and sarcasm.
TAKE THAT AS A SIGN OF THE TIMES, DAVE. TENSIONS RUN HIGH AND YOU GOT TO
HAVE SOMEONE TO KICK. SAY TO YOURSELF, "THERE BUT FOR THE GRACE OF GOD GO
I". DESPITE ALL THE CONFLICTS AND FRUSTRATIONS, IT IS STILL AN AMAZING
PERIOD OF HISTORY IN WHICH WE LIVE.
Civil discourse is the watchword. I PONDER THE "CIVIL" DAILY IN ESTONIA. 
IT IS AN ESSENTIAL FEATURE TO ANY SOCIETY AND YET, I NOTICE HOW LITTLE
ATTENTION IS PAID TO IT. ONE OF THE REASONS BEHIND THE FAILURE OF U.S.
POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA IS THE NEGLIGIBLE ROLE ASSIGNED TO BUILDING CIVIC AND
JURIDICAL INSTITUTIONS. IF SUCH INSTITUTIONS ARE SHUNNED, WHENCE IS THE
CIVIL DISCOURSE GOING TO FLOW?

DESPITE WHAT SOME POLICYMAKERS IN D.C. MIGHT SAY, I THINK THE REMARK PAUL
GOBLE MADE AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION , i.e., THE BUILDING OF
A CIVIL SOCIETY IN ITS PLACE CAN BE DONE "BRICK BY BRICK", IS STILL TRUE. 
THAT'S WHY I CAME HERE - TO LAY BRICKS!

*******

#12
From: Fotog5@aol.com (Mark Moorstein)
Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2000 
Subject: Forget Russia

Your question raises a number of very important issues relating 
to whether the US should exhibit benign neglect to Russia.
First, no one can "forget Russia" any more than one can forget the 
moon. As the Russians say, "A fact is stubborn thing," and Russia's 
existence is stubborn. But the real implication of the question and 
Washington's attitude toward Russia is whether the United States should pay 
"proactive" or "reactive" attention. 
It seems to me as a private international lawyer and author ("Red 
Reflections") that Washington cannot afford to interfere too heavily in the 
financial affairs of Russia. It can certainly trade with Russia and buy 
Russian products, but Russia is woefully behind in producing much that the 
world can use. Its raw materials, of course, induce tremendous interest and 
on this alone Americans and all others must pay attention. The fact that 
Russia has oil will always cause others to turn a blind eye toward the ethics 
and morality of Russia. 
However, Washington cannot afford to ignore Russia. It must 
anticipate the problems Russia faces and attempt to pre-empt the problems by 
assisting in a way that will promote American interests. American interests 
--- in both the short and long term --- are for a stable democratic Russia. 
And this implies stable instiitutions, the rule of law, the enforcement of 
contracts, the reduction of red tape so that corruption no longer needs to 
compete with a economic system to accomplish things. These are all in the 
American interest.
But how far should the US go to see these things implimented? I 
think only far enough to nurture them. The US should not throw massive 
amounts of money at Russia --- because Russia is still like a teenage kid 
that tells his father he will get a job soon if only the father will buy him 
a car, a stereo and give him an allowance. Sometimes giving a teenager 
guidance is all that is necessary. Or to quote the old aphorism: "Give a 
man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish and you feed him 
forever."
Personally I am concerned that Russia is viewed as a nation of 
sociopaths --- that Russians view their only crime as getting caught. 
Official Russia has been caught in so many lies (the Kursk, Chechyna, the IMF 
and ruble scandals) that it has very little credibility. When caught, Russia 
often blames the victim: "They were stupid to trust me --- or to be no 
naive!" Russia, as all countries, must demand of itself a moral and ethical 
code that not only instill trust in itself, but permits others to trust it as 
well. Businessmen and women (as opposed to governments) will not venture 
forth (except for the high-risk/high reward types) until they feel that a 
promise means more than just a short term game of 3-card monte. Russia, 
like all countries (and people) pay a price for lack of credibility.
This image of deceit scares Americans --- and it leaves most of 
them completely cold when Congress or the President seeks support for any 
"proactive" efforts. The general feeling is that any money sent to Russia is 
money that will ultimately go to Oligarchs or corrupt Russian officials. 
There is little accountability, little hope of finding any. Americans are 
well aware of "Black Accounting" where businesses maintain two sets of books 
--- one for themselves and one to defraud others.
So, while Washington might like to "forget Russia" at times, it 
won't. It will continue to react to Russia and it will even probe now and 
again for safe opportunities. But with a billion other economic and 
development opportunities in the world, Russia itself must offer something 
positive to the world. Until it does so, Washington may not "forget Russia" 
but it won't rank very high on the list when buying Hallmark cards. 

*******

#13
Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2000
From: Ed Crane <civilsociety1@yahoo.com>
Subject: Forget Russia?

Let's deconstruct this idea of "forget Russia": (1) if we are concerned
about "who lost Russia" can we also recommend any form of "forget Russia"?;
(2) when we look into any recommendation of the "forget Russia" variety, we
probably find a split, "remember Russia" (nuclear/biological/chemical
weapons, Central Asia oil, hammer Chechnya, protect Russian Jews, promote
new religious denominations, adopt Russian orphans) and "forget Russia"
(partnership, international relations, elites, state, NGOs, reform); (3) on
the merits, such a split does not make sense--from both a principled and an
interested perspective, Russia must be "remembered" in all these areas; (4)
the unrealistic psychological function of any form of "forget Russia" is a
final act of "forget (eliminate)Communism/Soviet Union". Russophobia?
maybe... 

******

#14
From: Birs1987@aol.com (Isaac Tarasulo)
Date: Wed, 1 Nov 2000 
Subject: A reply to #11, No. 4610, Kagarlitsky's "Two Wars, One Mess"

Four countries, three comparisons, two wars, one mess, or "v ogorodi
buzina, a v Kiyivi
dyad'ko."

Boris Kagarlitsky's article (#11, No.4610, October 31, 2000), comparing
Chechnya with the Palestinian Authority and Israel with Russia literally
woke me up to certain popular views in Russia. I hadn't expected something
of this kind from a person so perceptive and analytical as Mr. Kagarlitsky,
whose work I enormously respected until now. I have to answer, and not
only to Kagarlitsky, but to a mass of other pseudo-experts who write on any
subject, at any given moment, without any preparation. In particular,
whenever Israel is concerned, there are legions who express their
categorical views. In the past, I would often ask these rhetoricians:
"Have you ever been to Israel, have you ever been to the West Bank, have
you ever been to
Ramallah, have you ever served in an army, Russian, Israeli, American."
Invariably, the answers were always in negative. 

Yes, comparisons do help us to understand complex circumstances, but they
do not negate the specific aspects, history, geography, etc. In my
experience, the comparisons are mostly tools of political scientists.
Historians are much more careful in using them. Frankly, Russia and
Israel, Chechnya and Palestine Authority--are not compatible subjects for
comparison. Israel is a flourishing successful democracy while Russia is a
failing remnant of a powerful empire. Chechnya is a separatist movement
that doesn't have an international recognition, while the Arafat "kingdom"
is a part of the Arab world and has a wide international recognition and
support. It would have been easier to compare Russia and Serbia, and
Chechnya and Kosovo. It seems, that
Boris Kagarlitsky is particularly critical of the Russian Jews, Israeli
conservatives and the Russian leaders. 

The basis for Kagarlitsky's tenuous comparative analysis are "sinister
conspiracies," "bad agreements," corruption and incompetence. Nobody will
argue that in regard to corruption and incompetence the Russians are the
greatest experts of all times. There is nothing in these two areas that
anyone can teach them. Going through the second "Time of Troubles" might
be a logical explanation. Nobody knows when these "Times" will end.

The Oslo and Khassav-Yurt "bad" agreements are also cannot be objectively
compared. First of all, both agreements weren't bad, they weren't realistic
by presuming that both sides will execute them judiciously. Whereas the
Oslo Agreements, with all their well-known shortcomings, were a result of
the multi-year unofficial effort by many Israelis and Palestinians on all
levels, and between Israeli and Jordanian leaders. Besides that, these
Agreements were also based on the Madrid Declaration. Kagarlitsky is wrong
when he claims that the Palestinians sought autonomy in Oslo; they have
rejected the very notion of autonomy promised already by the first Camp
David agreement, sponsored by Jimmy Carter. This was a grave mistake on
their part to reject this offer when there were relatively few settlements
on the West Bank. 

The Khassav-Yurt Agreement was basically prepared within a couple of months
in 1996, as a result of the Russian defeat in August of the same year. In
terms of the Chechnya's status it seems that it is clear: Chechnya is a
part of Russia. Chechnya is demanding independence based on the successful
rebellion. Otherwise, Chechnya isn't different from Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan, or Kalmykia. Also, it is hardly noticeable that either
Chechnya or Palestinian authority fear reoccupation: Chechnya broke
Khassav-Yurt Agreement by twice invading Dagestan, by carrying out numerous
kidnappings and terrorist acts on the territory of Russia proper. The
Palestinians have a strong police force, basically an army consisting of
50,000 well-armed men, but they use mostly children to annoy the Israelis
and create a crisis. What they need is a market massacre of a type that
helped Bosnian Muslims. The Chechens are indomitable warriors who defeated
countless armies of the Russian empire, Soviet Union and newly democratic
Russia.

Kagarlitsky is right in describing Chechnya and Palestinian territories as
incapable of ruling themselves. However, it isn't surprising if guerrilla
republics do not have political and economic skills, necessary to create a
state. After all, Russia itself is going through undescribable political
and economic mess. Certainly, such Yugoslav republics as Croatia and
Slovenia, former Soviet Baltic republics are in a better condition to run
their own affairs than a partisan republic of Chechnya. 

All of sudden, in the middle of his article, Kagarlitsky unleashes a crude
hateful philippic against the former Soviet Jews, resettled in Israel. He
characterizes them as a homogenous group who eat pork on Saturdays,
couldn't care less about the Jewish holy places, vote liberal because of
promises of peace and jobs. However, when violence flares up they
"immediately turn into rapid hawks and call for bombing." According to
Kagarlitsky, the Soviet Jews were manipulated by "provocateur" Sharon and
Israeli conservatives. These conservatives, in Kagarlitsky's words, would
stop at nothing to destabilize the whole Middle East, even if thousands
will perish. Why did Sharon wait so long to visit Mount Temple, probably
only Kagarlitsky knows. Kagarlitsky had forgotten already that even
totalitarian Soviet regimes failed to manipulate the Soviet Jews who
obtained the right to emigrate through vicious struggle. Hardly anyone can
claim that it is easy to manipulate Natan Sharansky, who fearlessly
challenged Soviet authorities and was jailed for 7 years.

Such portrayal of the events is beyond any rational analysis. Even
Egyptian and Iraqi newspapers would envy such phantasy in regard to the
Russian Jews, displayed by Boris Kagarlitsky and published in the Moscow
Times.

Kagarlitsky compares events in the Middle East to the war in Chechnya that
he views as an "amazingly successful" presidential campaign. Both
leaderships, Israeli and Russian are equally manipulative and cynical, in
his opinion; their "great-power patriotism" undermine the moderate forces
in Chechnya and Palestinian territories and strengthens radicals. 

In Kagarlitsky's opinion, the fault lies entirely with Israel and Russia
who, he thinks, will ultimately end up as losers. He's oblivious to the
reality of the victimization of Chechen and Palestinian populations, as a
result of the recklessness of their own leaders. Obviously, Kagarlitsky
doesn't regret the expulsion of a million and half Russian Jews from the
Soviet Union and Russia. It is comparable to the expulsion of the Jews
from Spain that brought Spain to its political and economic decline.

*******

#15
RUSSIAN DUMA HEAD AGAINST REVISING PRIVATIZATION RESULTS

MOSCOW. Nov 1 (Interfax) - The chairman of Russia's lower house of
parliament said on Wednesday that he is against revising the results of
the privatization program of the early 1990s.
"The results of privatization should be revised if it was carried
out with flagrant violations of the law, where those violations were
glaring and where no one is sticking to that privatization," State Duma
speaker Gennady Seleznyov has said.
As for the Norilsk Nickel issue, he hesitated when asked at a
meeting with the staff of the magazine Rossiiskaya Federatsiya Segodnya
(Russian Federation Today) whether the privatization of that enterprise
should be revised.
Delegations from the city of Norilsk have asked the Duma not meddle
with their business, he said.
Russian President Vladimir Putin should act "more harshly" in
dealing with the "oligarchs," Seleznyov said.
"From the point of view of treading on the oligarchs' tails, he is
expected to take harsher action," the Duma chief said. So far Putin "has
merely shaken his finger at them."
Seleznyov also advocated tighter state control of the natural
monopolies.
Duma committees have been asked to arrange parliamentary hearings
on the Railways Ministry, national electricity company Unified Energy
Systems and natural gas monopoly Gazprom, he said.
Duma deputies want Putin and his government to clamp down on the
natural monopolies, Seleznyov said.
"There is confidence in Putin" in Russian society and "many
deputies, even some from opposition factions, support him," he said.

*******

#16
NEARLY HALF OF RUSSIAN CITY DWELLERS SUPPORT ACTIONS OF RUSSIAN FEDERAL FORCES IN CHECHNYA

MOSCOW. Nov 1 (Interfax) - Nearly half of Russian city dwellers
support the Russian federal forces' actions in Chechnya, the independent
center Russian Public Opinion and Market Research (ROMIR-Gallup
International) announced on Wednesday.
The data is based on the results of a poll of 2,000 Russian city
dwellers over 18 years of age that was taken in mid-October.
A total of 46.4% of respondents said they support the federal
forces in Chechnya to a certain extent, 44.5% do not approve of their
actions and 9.1% were undecided.
At the same time, 49.6% of those polled believe the combined
federal force in Chechnya is defending Russia's interests, 24.6% believe
no one is defending Russia's interests in Chechnya and only 5.3% believe
the Chechen civil administration, State Duma deputy from Chechnya Aslan
Aslakhanov or the followers of Bislan Gantamirov are defending Russia's
interests. The remainder were undecided.
As for international organizations' activity in Chechnya, only
28.7% of respondents believe they are acting in the interests of
international society, while 14.4% of citizens think these organizations
are acting in the interests of illegal armed formations, 11.7% - in the
interests of the republic's population and 5.8% - in the interests of
the Russian federal authorities. A total of 3.2% gave other answers to
this question and over a third of those polled - 36.2% - were undecided.
A total of 48.4% of those polled believe the head of Chechnya
should be elected by the Chechen people rather than appointed by the
central authorities, as was Akhmad Kadyrov, while 23.7% said an
administrator appointed by the Russian president should head the
republic. Another 9.8% would like the commander of the combined federal
force in Chechnya to be the republic's head, 3.7% offered alternative
candidates and 14.3% were undecided.
Regarding Russia's further policy in Chechnya, 52.9% believe Russia
should continue the combat actions, 20% said the troops should be
withdrawn outside the administrative limits of Chechnya, 17.7% believe
the troops should be withdrawn and Chechnya's independence recognized
and 9.3% were undecided.

*******

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