#19 - RW 10-8-04 - RW Home
RFE/RL Newsline
October 7, 2004
RUSSIAN RUMINATIONS ON THE PROSPECT OF A NUCLEAR IRAN
By Mark N. Katz
Copyright (c) 2004. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036. www.rferl.org

Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University. This piece is based on conversations he had in Moscow in September with several Russian scholars.

While some Russian observers maintain stoutly that there is no evidence that Iran is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, others privately indicate that Moscow recognizes this is exactly what Tehran is trying to do. Furthermore, the administration of Russian President Vladimir Putin is increasingly concerned about the implications of a nuclear-armed Iran for Russia. Moscow, though, does not see itself as able to stop this from happening. But others may be able to.

During a recent conversation in Moscow, one Russian scholar with close ties to the Kremlin stated that Putin sees himself as being in a dilemma regarding Iran. On the one hand, he does not want to see Tehran acquire nuclear weapons both because of the threat from Iran this might pose to Russia, and because this could encourage proliferation of nuclear weapons to other Middle Eastern countries that have -- or may eventually have -- governments more hostile to Moscow.

On the other hand, the source said, while Putin realizes that the nuclear reactor Russia is building for Iran in Bushehr will help Tehran acquire nuclear weapons, he does not want Russia to stop work on it. To do so would be seen as Moscow backing down to U.S. pressure. Further, those in the Russian nuclear industry and others who want to continue building the reactors are arguing that if Russia stops work at Bushehr, U.S. or other Western firms might step in to finish the reactor and build others if, say, their is an Iranian-U.S. rapprochement similar to the recent Libyan-American one. The source also said that statements by prominent U.S.-based organizations such as the independent Council on Foreign Relations calling for an Iranian-American rapprochement are viewed by the Kremlin as evidence that such a rapprochement might soon occur. According to him, Putin does not understand that such statements have little influence over U.S. foreign policy, and that even if the U.S. president wanted to change course on Iran, getting Congress to lift U.S. sanctions against Tehran would be extremely difficult -- and without such a move, an Iranian-American rapprochement is unlikely.

Another Russian observer, a specialist on nuclear issues, said that Moscow should never have signed the deal with Iran to complete the Bushehr nuclear reactor, but since it did so, the Putin administration feels that it must finish the job. But Moscow, he too argued, is increasingly nervous about the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran. The best solution to this problem, according to him, would be for what has already been built at Bushehr to be destroyed either by the United States or Israel.

The Putin administration, the observer predicted, would publicly denounce such a move in the strongest terms, but would actually be relieved. For this would both end the Iranian nuclear weapons program and forestall any unwelcome -- from the Russian perspective -- U.S.-Iranian rapprochement. Russia would offer to rebuild Bushehr -- if Iran would pay for it again. Even if Tehran did, this project would take years and years to complete.

When asked about reports that Tehran has hidden, hardened facilities that would enable the Iranian nuclear program to survive even the destruction of Bushehr, the nuclear specialist responded that while he believes Iran does have other facilities where it is working on nuclear weapons, the spent fuel from the Bushehr reactor would still be needed to fabricate them. Thus, without Bushehr, there can be no Iranian nuclear weapons. Iranian statements that is has hardened facilities elsewhere are apparently intended to convince the United States that an attack on Bushehr would not end the Iranian nuclear program even though it actually would.

But it would be better for Moscow, he said, if Bushehr were to be destroyed by Israel and not the United States. A U.S. attack on Iran would whip up anti-American hysteria in Europe and elsewhere that would be difficult for Moscow not to go along with without appearing acquiescent or even complicit in the destruction of Bushehr. An attack on Iran by Israel, by contrast, would allow Moscow to condemn Tel Aviv while maintaining reasonably cooperative relations with Washington.

Such sentiments by observers, of course, do not necessarily reflect a desire on the part of the Putin administration to encourage the destruction of Bushehr. Indeed, when a Russian Foreign Ministry official was asked whether it would better for Moscow if this were undertaken by the U.S. or by Israel, he pointedly responded, "By neither!" What these statements do reflect, though, is a growing Russian unease about the prospects of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons as well as the sense (whether accurate or not) that Moscow cannot do much to prevent this.